EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Social and Political Sciences

Public support for European integration in Eight Member States: a Battle for the Hearts as well as the Minds of Europe's Citizens

by

Rory Domm

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the European University Institute

Florence, October 2002

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Prof. Anthony Heath (Oxford University)
Prof. Michael Keating (European University Institute)
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Abstract

In this thesis the author aims to make a contribution to our understanding of mass attitudes towards European integration.

The initial theoretical backdrop is the field of regional integration, where mass attitudes are generally specified to play a minimal role in integrative developments. I criticise this viewpoint, and in particular the Permissive Consensus approach of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), from an empirical and theoretical stance, arguing instead that public support for European integration is capable of fulfilling an important legitimising function.

Amongst other researchers that view public opinion as worthy of study, the consensus is that mass support for integration is largely a function of utilitarian calculations. My starting points are the large, unexplained differences in support by country that remain in many utilitarian studies. I hypothesise that explanations of mass support for integration are complemented by the inclusion of variables that account for so-called 'affective' attitudes. Specifically, I construct variables measuring national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism for European Union respondents surveyed in the International Social Survey Programme 1995 National Identity dataset. Here, as elsewhere in the thesis, I use commonly applied social sciences methodologies to test my hypotheses both at aggregate and country level. Essentially, I show that higher levels of pride and European identity are positively related to support, while nationalism and racism are negatively related.

A second empirical section to the thesis addresses how the four affective concepts interrelate with one another in the data. Although I do not formulate specific hypotheses in this case, I am, however, informed by the socio-psychological literature concerning social identity. In a final empirical section, I use Eurobarometer data to attempt an explanation of non-attitudes towards European integration, shown to be ubiquitous in both surveys. Here, the explanatory focus is on education, knowledge and interest in politics rather than affective variables.

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I wish to acknowledge the support of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research for use of Eurobarometer datasets and codebooks, and the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne for use of the International Social Survey Program National Identity survey.

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INTRODUCTION

> "The European idea is empty, it has neither the transcendence of Messianic ideologies nor the immanence of concrete patriotism. It was created by intellectuals, and that fact accounts at once for its genuine appeal to the mind and its feeble echo in the heart." Raymond Aron (1954, p. 316).

The post-war fantasy of a United States of Europe, and the subsequent reality of the European Communities was an undeniably elite-minded project. A *vade mecum* of early participants might give prominence to visionary statesmen such as Winston Churchill, Aristide Briand or Count Coundenhove-Kalergi, or the contribution of political entrepreneurs such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. One would doubtless also be minded to stress the role of a wider class of policy-makers, administrators and economic interests in the United States of America and the governments of the 'Original Six', West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. However, from a long list of biographies, memoirs and histories one notable actor is absent: the general public, whether in the form of a pan-European consciousness, as a significant national or pan-national political party or movement calling for closer European integration, or even in a more radical, revolutionary guise[1].

This initial pattern of events is adopted in many of the International Relations-based theories of European integration (see **chapter one**), where the main determinants of the direction and pace of integration are policy-makers and institutional actors, so that only a limited role is assigned to the mass public. Writing in the neo-functionalist tradition, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) notably characterise the public as providing a 'permissive consensus' on European integration, allowing policy-makers to proceed unchecked. I strongly challenge the notion of a 'permissive consensus' on both theoretical and empirical grounds; there is a strong case to be made that European publics have critically evaluated the Communities for at least three decades. Significantly, there has also been a shift among many theorists of European integration to allocate the public a more prominent role. Public displays of contrition from Ernst Haas (1975), a prominent neofunctionalist scholar who in early variants of this theory strongly criticised the use of public opinion surveys, and an increasing domestic politics element to many realist theories of integration have been joined by later approaches such as multi-level governance, which take a more heterogeneous stance towards actors in the European Community decision-making process.

This recognition of a role for the public in (theories of) European integration is the starting point for this thesis, and raises some basic questions that I set about trying to answer in the remainder of the work. Principally, I focus on *what role* the public plays in integration, *how* this role performed and above all *which factors* allow us to understand public opinion towards European integration.

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[1] As ever in such matters, there are exceptions. However, ex-President of the Commission Hallstein may well be the exception that proves the rule when he writes "the decisions that have been taken [in the 1960s] lag far behind public opinion in Europe." (1972, p. 30; see also section 1.3.2.)

In answer to the first of these questions, I emphasis the legitimising role of the public. It is clear that the European Union, despite its technocratic beginnings, has arrogated enough state sovereignty to require public approbation of its activities. Documenting how the public impacts upon integration, or the transmission mechanisms of public attitudes, reveals how this legitimising role is performed. Although theories of integration are not particularly enlightening in this regard, one might regard referenda, elections, participation in mass movements and organisations such as pressure groups, unions and parties and, of course, public opinion polls as channels of mass attitudes. I choose to measure mass attitudes using survey data, not least because the ability to draw broad conclusions from statistical findings is rather appropriate to a subject such as mass attitudes, while I take support for European integration as the chosen dependent variable. Anticipating somewhat the discussion below, support possesses the advantage of being an open, neutral question that allows one to capture both utilitarian and affective dimensions to respondents' attitudes, so that one can test and weight a variety of explanatory approaches. Secondly, support is a mild measure of attachment to the EU perhaps consistent with the current legitimising function played by the public: many writers argue that the EU is not yet far enough advanced along the line of state development to require a sense of belonging or identity from its citizens. Indeed, writers such as Weiler (2000) warn that any attempt to impose a relation between nationality and citizenship in, say, the style of Carl Schmitt is to abandon the idea of Europe as a multi-national melting pot. Support, then, may be the most appropriate measure of the civic republican type of attachment that the European Union currently requires. Having covered these arguments, I present a detailed summary of support for integration by question and over time as measured in the Eurobarometer survey series (see **chapter two**).

These preliminary questions answered, the main corpus of the thesis concentrates on understanding why people think the way that they do towards European integration; if they are in favour or opposed, why is that? Following the most prominent analyses, individual evaluations of objects in a political system tend to elicit responses based on either narrowly rational 'utilitarian' or more emotional, 'affective' considerations. I provide an overview of utilitarian and affective measures of support since the early 1970s using Eurobarometer data (see **chapter three**). This affective/utilitarian typology is then exported to a comprehensive literature review of attempts to explain support for integration, helping demonstrate that while utilitarian approaches predominate and indeed perform better than some of their 'affective' counterparts such as Inglehart's (1977) theory of a Silent Revolution, authors such as Gabel (1998) fail to account for sizeable and persistent national differences in support for integration.

The hunch of this author is that utilitarian approaches to understanding the public's role in conferring legitimacy assume a bygone, even mythical era in Community development. I contend that current EU institutional arrangements, even if difficult to characterise, have clearly assumed proportions that require affective as well as utilitarian mass attachment. So, support for European integration can be at least partially explained with reference to the presence or absence of affective loyalties towards the EU. More precisely, I set out to test the effect of national and European identity, national pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia on support for integration. I extend the study to include xenophobia and racism out of deference to the idea, most notably present in the work of Adorno *et al.* (1950), that attitudes of outgroup inferiority are the other side of the coin to the ingroup superiority of nationalism. So, the aim of this thesis is not so much to replace utilitarian approaches to explaining support for integration at the micro, individual level, but rather to complement them with the twin, overarching concepts of identity and tolerance.

For the predicted impact of selected independent variables on support for integration I turn to the discipline of social psychology, so that the hypotheses I test are informed largely by the social identity and self-categorisation branches of this literature (see **chapter four**). Essentially, nationalism and racism are predicted to impact negatively on support for integration on the basis that the European Union forms in some way the 'out-group' in question for respondents holding these attitudes. By the same logic, any divergence between respondents who feel a sense of European identity and support for integration would be an indictment of the present European Union architecture. For national pride, I draw from the socio-psychological literature the idea that persons hold multiple identities, so that a sense of mild attachment to one's country does not necessarily preclude a positive or negative opinion on the European Union.

Lest some of these hypotheses seem obvious enough, it is the strength of the relationship between pride, European identity, nationalism and racism with support, as well as the existence of any such relationship, that will be useful in determining the extent to which affective factors explain support for integration. Moreover, the fact is that very little work exists investigating the relationship between affective attitudes and support for integration - see just Hewstone (1986), Müller-Peters (1998), Routh and Bourgoyne (1998), Charillon and Ivaldi (1996). Only one of these four works relies upon internationally recognised, publicly available datasets. To investigate the determinants of attitudes towards integration I make use of International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity survey data. Although the more diffuse Eurobarometer survey series contains data on all fifteen EU member states, and over several decades up to the present, the ISSP dataset includes a superior range and quality of variables for eight EU member state countries: Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The results from the aggregate and country level logit regression model used suggests that all the hypotheses can be confirmed except for the expected neutral impact of national pride, where in the ISSP data there is a positive link between higher levels of national pride and support for integration (see **chapter six**). I speculate that this positive link reflects the degree of incorporation of European identities in national identities, and thus subscribe to a constructivist view of identity formation.

A particular advantage of the approach taken here is that I manage to combine the measurement of several concepts at the same time, and over eight European Union member states. This allows for an analysis of the interrelationships between European identity, pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia (see **chapter five**). This is interesting not just from a wider sociological perspective, but also because of the theoretical proximity of the concepts in question. Amongst other findings, I demonstrate a cultural and political dimension to national pride.

In the final empirical section (see **chapter seven**) I tackle a topic that originally I had no intention of addressing but the treatment of which became more and more pressing as the thesis progressed: non-attitudes towards European integration. It is clear that many respondents, rather than being hostile or favourable towards the European Union, simply do not have an opinion one way or the other. This can be distinguished from non-committed attitudes, generally people in the 'don't know' response category that on the balance of evidence are unable to reach a conclusion on the subject in question. From chapter two, in some Eurobarometer questions respondents holding non-attitudes constitute the second highest response category. With these numbers not falling over time with the increased

salience of the Union, non-attitudes have become an important (non) response that, in addition, have largely fallen by the theoretical wayside as the debate concerning attitude-holding has progressed. I attempt to redress this balance with a statistical analysis of non-attitudes based on the Eurobarometer survey series. Although continuity with the ISSP survey would obviously be preferable, Eurobarometer 42 (1994) is the most recent survey of the EU containing an appropriate measure of non-attitudes and explanatory variables, where I draw on hypotheses concerning non-attitudes from the theoretical debate concerning public opinion towards United States foreign policy. The evidence confirms that the socio-demographic factors interest, knowledge and education are key explanatory variables. There is also a role for national pride and European identity, where it seems that prouder, more European respondents that we have seen are more likely to support further integration draw this extra support partially from non-attitudes as well as from 'converting' negative attitude holders.

The last chapter of the thesis reviews the seven preceding chapters with the dual purpose of providing a quick overview of all the results and interpretation contained in the thesis and speculating on some of the larger questions answered and raised by the thesis (see **chapter eight**). So, for a more complete overview of the thesis findings, the reader is invited to turn straight to the conclusion.

1. THE PUBLIC IN THEORIES OF INTEGRATION

1.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical context within which later results concerning public opinion towards European integration can be more fully appreciated. It is intended to specify, according to theorists, if, when, and how public opinion might be expected to play a role in the process of European integration. Through this review of the role of the public in its wider context, one can also begin to provide an answer as to why one might wish to study public opinion at all. After all, were there convincing arguments to the effect that public opinion holds little sway over the European integrative process, one's time might be more gainfully employed than in writing a thesis investigating the determinants of public support for integration. So, I define in section 1.1. what is meant by public opinion in this context and in section 1.2. I will undertake a literature review in order to assess the role of the public in the most diffuse theoretical models of European integration.

In summary, the importance of public opinion for integration is mentioned or can be deduced implicitly from many of the main theories of integration. Functionalist, revisionist neofunctionalist and some multi-level governance theories go furthest in acknowledging a role for the public, while authors writing in the realist tradition have less to say regarding the public. In particular, theories of integration that posit some role for the public tend to fall into two categories; in functionalist and neofunctionalist theories mass support for integration is harnessed through 'payoff' or utilitarian reasons, while scholars such as Checkel and Inglehart write of social integration and value shifts, so that support derives from more affective, non-instrumental reasons. This payoff/non-payoff dichotomy reappears in chapter three when I categorise and assess the theories explaining public support for integration.

On the other hand, the role of the public is downplayed in probably the best-known piece of theory devoted specifically to the role of the public in integration: the 'permissive consensus', an offshoot of revised neofunctionalist theories of integration. While not arguing that the public is insignificant, under the permissive consensus a reservoir of goodwill exists that means the public can effectively be ignored. This argument is criticised on theoretical grounds below and on a more empirical basis in section 2.4.

On the whole, and even for those theories that look relatively favourably on the role of the public, detailed arguments as to when and how the public acts to influence political decision-making do not form part of the mainstream of regional integration theory. Coming from the point of view that public legitimacy is increasingly required for the successful continuation of European integration, I argue that one of key criticisms of the mainstream theoretical treatments of European integration is that many fall short of current reality in evaluating the role of the public. Even for those less well-known theories of integration such as Deutsch's transactionalism, Liberal Constructivism and Inglehart's Silent Revolution approach that do posit a strong role for the public, for the most part they fail to put this into an empirically testable theory.

1.2. Public Opinion

Public opinion is a set of opinions that people hold about some issue that is politically relevant. Public opinion has:

- a direction: a majority of the public may be in favour of a certain issue or against it.
- a certain intensity: people do not feel equally strong about all issues.
- a certain degree of stability. Some opinions are very stable, and people do not change them often. Other opinions change frequently.
- Public opinion polls, whether by mail, phone, fax, Internet or face-to-face are all accepted ways to measure public opinion.

In any given situation, the public can be seen in opposition to private bodies and refers to those 'non-assigned' persons who in various situations cannot be defined as private

individuals or as members of private groups (Barry, 1989, p.250). Thus for European policy-making the public consists of those persons affected by the actions of the members of several private groups, including amongst others the relevant ministers, bureaucrats and lobbyists. The composition of the public will vary from issue to issue and individuals will often find that they have an interest both as a member of the public and as a member of an interest group. Of course, in large-scale public opinion surveys it is rather hard to distinguish between the mass public and special interest groups, so that in practise we assume that all survey respondents constitute the public.

While a minimal definition of public opinion would seem a necessary precursor to investigating its role in theories of integration, there are many questions that are left unanswered here. For instance, are opinions plucked out of the air and hence likely to very randomly or are they more stable, relating to an individual's deep-seated values? These and other issues are embraced in section 2.2.2. and 7.2. with the aim of understanding the value and limitations of opinion poll data.

1.3. Literature Survey

I proceed by discussing the main theories of European and regional integration, and they will be treated according to paradigm, and then on a chronological basis. So, as well as encapsulating current thoughts about the role of public opinion in integration, we will also be in a position to judge how public opinion was perceived to affect integration over time.

As a caveat, it should be mentioned that there is a huge array of approaches to European integration that cannot all be treated with justice here. The aim of the literature review is not to exhaustively cover all theories of integration, but rather to bring out the role of the public in either those theories that do treat the issue explicitly or to highlight its absence in theories otherwise perceived as significant within the academic community. Furthermore, a reading of the political integration literature confirms that in many areas of the field a persistent debate remains between various intellectual schools of thought; for instance, as to whether the process of European integration is better explained using tools primarily from the

discipline of International Relations or Comparative Politics. It will not be my aim in this chapter to attempt a resolution of such disputes.

Finally, the serious criticisms sustained by the main theories of integration have led at least one commentator to suggest that integration theory will be consigned to "a rather long but not very prominent footnote in the intellectual history of twentieth century social science" (Puchala quoted in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 11). Certainly it is true that over many decades of research no empirically testable theory of integration has been rigorously established[1]. Pentland's remark that "events in Europe continue to outpace academic theory" rings just as true today as when it was made (1973, p. 146). Several theorists have suggested ways out of this supposed impasse; Moravcsik, for instance, considers a broader definition of European integration so that it encompasses four dimensions, each of which could be treated as a separate theory if necessary (1993, p. 479)[2]. Nevertheless, the intrinsic value of integration theory lies not just in its success (or rather failure) to accurately predict the direction of integration according to the rigorous standards of empirical social science, but in its value as a model or tool to help break down developments that in reality may be far more complex. By way of analogy, economists continue to study models of perfect competition not because they accurately depict the actual competitive state of a particular sector of an economy, but because such models aid comprehension both by reducing economic activity to a few key variables and by providing a benchmark against which actual markets can be compared. This may not be enough or ideal for theorists seeking to predict or prescribe but for the purposes of contextualising the role of the public it is still of some value.

1.3.1. Functionalism

The term 'functionalism' can be applied to the research of a number of integration theorists, where Mitrany's *The Progress of International Government* (1933) and *A Working Peace*

[1] In a now well-known analysis, Puchala makes an analogy between scholars attempting to explain the process of international integration and the story of the blind men and the elephant; each blind man touches a different part of the animal, leading to different inferences as to its actual physical shape (1972).

[2] The four dimensions mentioned by Moravcsik are (1) the geographical scope of the regime; (2) the range of issues on which policy is co-ordinated; (3) the institutions of joint decision-making and (4) the direction and magnitude of substantive domestic policy adjustment (1993, p. 479). By suggesting that it is unrealistic to expect one overarching theory to fully cover all aspects of European integration, Moravcsik is diluting the power of integration theory. This approach is confirmed

System (1943) are usually taken as the key works. At its heart, functionalism dichotomises social, economic and technical change with political change and illustrates a dynamic correctional mechanism to ensure that tensions between the two forces are peacefully resolved. Many functionalists see historical development as driven forward primarily by technology, as well as a tendency for political development to lag behind these advances. The result, at least in the extreme, can be war. Mitrany specifically attributes the 'German aggression' of the First World War to the malaise of the general world system (1943, p.38). This theory of war, based as it is on the objective conditions of society such as social injustice and economic insecurity rather than on, say, emotive factors such as nationalism has struck some commentators as Marxist in inspiration[3]. By tackling head on the issue of world peace, functionalism established itself as an ambitious theory, rather more so than its neofunctionalist successor. It was nevertheless a theory that fitted well with the internationalism of the time, encapsulated in the League of Nations and writings of such intellectuals as H.G. Wells and Bertrand Russell[4].

Mitrany's brand of functionalism was a subtle theory that foresaw peace not as a state but as a process; in Frederick Schuman's words "peace by pieces" (quoted in Claude, 1971, p. 381)[5]. This aim was to be achieved through the rational organisation of administrative functions. Mitrany echoes Burke's warning to the sheriffs of Bristol that "government is a practical thing" (1943, p. 20). The nature of the technological and social challenges facing society means that the nation-state cannot always provide effective solutions, which should be tackled by a specially created bureaucratic body at the appropriate regional and jurisdictional level[6]. Mitrany believed that this method of 'technical self-determination' would prove to be adaptive, flexible and able to side-step traditional political jealousies and controversies.

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in Moravcsik's later work, where he self-consciously focuses on the process of testing multiple hypothesis rather than a particular 'grand theory' towards integration (1998, p. 17).

[3] See, for example, Haas (1964, p. 20) and Claude (1971, p. 381).

[4] Both Wells and Russell professed that only a world government could save the world from endemic war: Wells in his *Anticipations* (1901) and Russell in the Problems of Democracy lecture series in New York (see Coren (1993) and Ryan (1988) for more information on Wells and Russell respectively). Russell specifically called for a world university to train an administrative elite that would plan world society along utilitarian lines.

[5] The view of peace as a process rather than simply an absence of hostilities has parallels in Kant's essay *Perpetual Peace* (1795) where he argues that peace without the removal of present and future causes of hostility is simply a truce (Reiss ed., 1991). Such pragmatic views can be seen in contrast to the more fantastic internationalism of H.G. Wells and Bertrand Russell, and Mitrany criticises their support for the creation of a world state as an invitation to Empire-builders (1933, p. 135). In a similarly idealistic vein Woolf, writing in *International Government* (1916), simply proposes an end to conflict through the once-off creation of a supranational disputes arbitration mechanism with binding authority over its members.

[6] Holland points out that this way of thinking has a parallel in the concept of subsidiarity introduced during the Maastricht negotiations (1993, p. 15). Article 5 of the post-Amsterdam consolidated Treaty states that political or administrative decisions are taken at the Community level "only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be

Mitrany, then, saw the future of international society rather as his contemporary Le Corbusier saw the future of architecture in *Towards a New Architecture* (1952): form was to follow function[7]. The vital interests that concern states are altered through the functional development of international organisations, as opposed to, say, trying to influence states' behaviour directly. The desired result was that it would no longer be in states' interests to risk war over a territorial dispute given, say, the economic disruption this might involve. This intermeshing of states is not an entirely redundant notion today: for instance, support for China's entry into the World Trade Organisation amongst a significant segment of US foreign policy-makers is arguably informed by the notion that prosperous countries will have less reason to argue with one another[8].

Functionalists took their cue from the host of international organisations and unions that sprung up from the middle of the nineteenth century. Reinsch draws our attention to the 1850 Austro-German Telegraphic Union, an administrative organisation regulating international telegraphic communication, as one of the first examples of its kind (1911, p.15). Latter day examples of institutions founded on supposedly functionalist lines might include the various specialist agencies of the United Nations or the European Coal and Steel Community[9].

The logical end-point of the functionalist endeavour was a topic that Mitrany approached in a pragmatic manner. In *A Working Peace System*, Mitrany argues that various functional agencies may require co-ordination, especially with international planning authorities (1943, p. 37). Mitrany denies that this implies any overarching political authority, yet seemingly as a way of recognising the powerful argument for such a body, concedes that some form of representative body could meet periodically, if only to ventilate opinion rather than formulate policy. Elsewhere, Mitrany refers to the creation of a world government through the gradual

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sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community" (1997).

[7] Arguably the term 'function' acquires a host of meanings in Mitrany's writings including 'need', 'purpose' and 'task'. See Haas (1964, p.7) for a fuller discussion of this point.

[8] The 'commercial liberal' tradition of international relations embodies some of this reasoning. Cobden states rather idealistically that "if we can keep the world from actual war, and I trust that trade will do that, a great impulse will from this time be given to social reforms" (quoted in Nye, 1988, p. 246). More recently, Rosecrance has points to the beneficial effects of economic process in reshaping international relations (1986).

[9] Many scholars of regional integration have written monographs exploring the functionalist dimension of organisations such as the International Labour Organisation (Haas, 1964) and some of the United Nations programs such as the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (Sewell, 1962).

shift of functions and loyalties or "federalism by instalments" (quoted in Haas, 1964, p. 13). Yet it is also clear that to Mitrany, to create a supranational political body for its own sake was to miss the point of functionalism and simply to reproduce the tensions of nationalism on a large scale[10]. Indeed, in places Mitrany shows himself to be sensitive to cultural differences and the role of the state, and goes as far to suggest that cultural devolution could go hand in hand with functional integration of material activities (1933, p.137).

A contrast between Mitrany's functionalism and early neofunctionalism in particular involves our main point of concern here; the role of the public in the process of integration. To reach the end point of, say, an international federation, a crucial psychological prerequisite for Mitrany is the transfer of mass allegiance to functional bodies. This process takes place in two stages as, firstly, those touched directly by co-operation change their attitudes (for example, international travellers and collaborating scientists) and, secondly, as this experience is diffused throughout society by education and the media, while at the same time the scope of functional agencies increases so as to make it likely that every individual will experience some contact with one. By way of contrast, in section 1.3.2. we see that early neofunctionalism generally marks out public opinion as superfluous. Nevertheless, Mitrany's view of the public is contradictory. Underlying the argument of a function-by-function transfer of loyalties to a new socio-psychological community is the assumption that such loyalties can be transferred incrementally, and that there is no political loyalty that transcends the sum of functional loyalties (Pentland, 1973, p. 85). At once, man according to Mitrany is supposed to be rigorously utilitarian, in the spirit of Mill, transferring allegiance on the basis of perceived benefits. Yet in other contexts Mitrany deplores the supremacy of nationalist modes of thinking[11]. The argument is made in this thesis that instrumental reasons alone are not enough to explain national variations in support for integration and that we must defer to

[10] Federalism is a particular target for this criticism of reformulating old lines of nationalist division. Federalists call for the creation of a single supranational state among a group of previous sovereign powers as a solution to conflict. For federalists, integration is generally a directly political phenomenon negotiated for swift implementation by political elites such as Schuman and de Gasperi imbued with 'political will', where economic integration tails political developments. Similarly, in the short term the public's role in this process is solely reactive and by and large limited to the loose assumption that the people are 'ready and eager to make the federalist plunge' (Claude, 1971, p. 376). Ironically, writers in the federalist tradition tend to promote a strong role for democratic values and popular support once the federal state is established. Indeed, Pentland argues that some federalist movements have been so deeply populist in nature that gradualist moves to federal integration have been condemned as 'collaborationalist' with national governments (1973, p. 171).

[11] One way to square this circle might be to argue that people are shaped by the institutions that govern them; under the rule of a nation-state people might be expected to be more relatively nationalist whereas with the rise of international functionalist institutions people may display more internationalist sentiments. At no point, however, does Mitrany make this institutionalist argument.

theories of nationalism to more fully account for public opinion towards integration (see chapters three and four).

Other key aspects of the functionalist model have been subject to criticism, and these have been well documented[12]. Functionalist theories of international co-operation demand, for instance, that tasks can be separated into political and non-political categories, where non-political tasks do not present occasion for conflict. Yet this approach seems rather unrealistic: it stands to reason that technical decisions can lead to disagreement, and there may well be a political dimension to an otherwise technical issue. Pentland gives the example that the return of the Ruhr to Germany was a more important factor in gaining their support for the ECSC Treaty than the economic arguments (1973, p.94). There would also seem little incentive for governments to co-operate in functionalist designs, despite the wishes of their citizens, if in the long term this means a loss of status. Indeed, it is not immediately apparent why functional needs could not be accommodated within an intergovernmental or even domestic framework; since 1900 the share of state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounted for by public spending has grown in industrial countries from single-digit figures to around 40%. In summary, we are presented with a theory of global integration according to broadly exogenous factors that, while it incorporates a role for the public, is open to criticism on a number of fundamental issues regarding the mechanism of integration.

1.3.2. Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism, which was first posited by scholars such as Haas and Lindberg in the late 1950s and early 1960s, applied a modified version of the dynamics of functionalism to a vision of an end-of-ideology, pluralist international political society. Written in a post Second World War environment, the focus of functionalist dynamics was no longer world peace through consensus building but rather determining the conditions under which a rudimentary regional grouping of states gradually acquires the capacity to make and execute

[12] See, for example, Pentland (1973, p. 64-100).

common decisions[13]. The typical modern political community, according to Haas, is a "multi-group competitive national society" where there is "agreement on the means of resolving internal conflicts by peaceful methods" (quoted in Pentland, 1973, p. 103)[14]. The focus then, is on the non-political, competitive process of integration rather than an end-point[15].

Instead of arguing that international co-operation is achieved by objective functional need circumventing politics, neofunctionalists consider economic and political integration as intertwined. Integration proceeds, then, through the 'expansive logic' or self-sustaining processes of spillover, of which there are three basic varieties identified by Tranholm-Mikkelson (1991, p. 4-7). Functional spillover is a mechanism arising from the economic interdependence of Western Europe. Addressing policy issues in one area is assumed to be impossible without creating externalities in other sectors. Political spillover arises as political elites perceive that their interests are better served by seeking supranational solutions and so refocus their activities and eventually their loyalties to a new centre. Lindberg stressed the role of government elites in this connection. For example, bureaucratic interpenetration through the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) developed in the European Communities as governments found it increasingly difficult to function as gatekeepers. Cultivated spillover is a voluntaristic element in an otherwise deterministic and hence predictive theory. Here, central institutions such as the European Commission can themselves encourage integration by upgrading the lowest common denominator of interests through mediation[16]. Integration, then, is a 'demand-driven' flow of societal pressures (Schneider and Cederman, 1994, p.641).

The result is

[13] The focus originally was on the early integrative efforts of the European Community (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). Later this scope was widened to consider, in particular, Central and South America (see, for example, Schmitter and Haas, 1964).

[14] Assuming a background of liberal, ideological consensus allows interest groups to competitively pursue their own interests. This process implies a group of winners and losers (and hence opponents of integration), although this is an issue not deeply explored by neofunctionalist writers. Corbey, however, suggests that stagnation may be a booster to integration in the medium term (1995). This competitive approach is in contrast to functionalism, where there is the assumption of a *de facto* common good, which more and more people come to recognise over time.

[15] Pentland points out that the similarity between the neofunctionalist emphasis on process and Easton's system's theory, where the focus is on the set of interactions in a society rather than the institutions themselves (1965). As noted in the main text below, Lindberg and Scheingold later adopt this model formally in *Europe's Would-be Polity* (1970).

[16] Scholarly literature has produced several different varieties of spillover, most of them in the attempt to come to terms with criticism of neofunctionalism. Lindberg and Scheingold, for instance, look to 'spillback', 'output failure' (failure of spillover), 'equilibrium' and 'systems transformation' (a new bargaining process transcends the old) to explain the ebbs and flows of European integration (1970, p.134-9). Spillover, then, is downgraded to one mechanism amongst others.

> "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p.16).

Although Haas settles on the term supranationalism, many commentators have been quick to detect a federalist tinge to neofunctionalist writings in this area[17]. However, confusion over the end product or 'dependent variable' has not aided neofunctionalist writers in their attempt to draw up an empirically testable theory[18].

The political actors mentioned in the above quote are governmental and industrial elites, where the public is supposed to simply shift loyalties in a derivative manner, so that in 1958 Haas argued that

> "it is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys" (1958, p.17).

So, neofunctionalism resolves a *prima facie* contradiction thrown up by functionalism, squaring a theory that emphasises above all the role of the technocrat in the mechanics of integration with a role for the general populace in creating a socio-psychological community, by effectively removing the influence of the populace[19].

Initially, neofunctionalism appeared plausible. Early integration projects were very much elite-driven, and often self-consciously with the aim of setting the ball rolling, so that the issue area was less important than the degree of co-operation[20]. As for public opinion, former

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[17] See, for instance, Taylor (1983) and Pentland (1973). Pentland argues that federalism creeps into the writing of both Haas and Lindberg through the joint decision-making political processes necessary for integration just as much as in any notion of an end product (1973, p. 104).

[18] See, for instance, Haas (1970). One of the reasons that neofunctionalism was to come in for so much criticism was that it purported to be methodologically consistent and verifiable: to describe, explain and predict. This is in contrast to functionalism, which laid no claim as to over what time-period technical self-determination might work itself out. This lack of concern with verification or falsification lead Claude to argue that functionalism is an approach rather than a theory (quoted by Taylor in Mitrany, 1975, p. xix).

[19] Thus a community consisting of common loyalties, values and kinship, or *Gemeinschaft*, was not viewed as the essential basis for sovereignty, although it was of course hoped that a community of competing interests would follow from the transfer of sovereignty.

[20] "The common market for coal and steel by itself contributes decisively to the producers and consumers of coal and steel. But at the same time it offers the opportunity for stating and effectively solving the problems of creating an integrated European economy suitable to the modern world" (Haas, 1958, p.283). Despite the greater success of the Common Market, Monnet and other elite figures were keenest at first to promote Euratom, as this was seen as having a greater political future (Duchêne, 1994, p. 292-9).

President of the Commission Hallstein claimed simply of the 1960s "the decisions that have been taken lag far behind public opinion in Europe" (1972, p.30)[21]. Neofunctionalism has since been attacked repeatedly, so that the theory has undergone many reformulations and even recantation from one of its founding figures, Haas[22].

In particular, interdependence theorists objected to the teleology and regional focus of neofunctionalism. On this view, interdependence between states is a global not regional phenomenon and the optimal area for co-operation between governments may extend outside any given regional structure. Interdependence also does not necessarily presuppose integration and could be consistent with a number of institutional outcomes. Most theorists in this tradition acknowledge a debt to Haas by arguing that the European Union exhibits a supranational style of decision-making in the sense that it is based on compromise and common interests[23]. However, while the notion of spillover is retained, its automaticity is removed and instead made contingent on successful intergovernmental bargaining. If the importance of public opinion to this approach is not immediately apparent, Nye at least argues that the public influences the behaviour of elected political leaders by creating broad or narrow limits for integrative programs (Nye, 1971, p. 63). Moreover, Nye also points out that the concept of integration must be disaggregated into its economic, social and political components, where the political component includes mass attitudes, so that integration without mass loyalty shift will only be 'token' (1971, p.73).

Other criticisms directed at neofunctionalism take issue with the theory's disavowal of the importance of mass attitudes. Hoffmann's article *Obstinate or Obsolete? The fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe* (1966) makes the case, amongst other

[21] Insofar as it demonstrates a similar disregard for public opinion, this view coincides with that of Pascal Lamy, Delors' one-time *chef de cabinet* and current Commissioner for Trade, who argued that in the 1980s and 1990s the Commission had to lead the public:

> "the people weren't ready to agree to integration, so you had to get on without telling them too much about what was happening" (Ross, 1994, p.194).

[22] It seems that neofunctionalism has been attacked by generations of critics. See, for instance, George (1996, p.45-8); Hoffman (1966); Moravcsik (1987), Pentland (1973, p. 100-146). Functional spillover seems to emerge with the most credibility. However, the prospect of this leading into political spillover seems probabilistic, as Haas himself accepts (1975). In retrospect a seminal moment for both supranationalists such as Monnet and neofunctionalist theorists was De Gaulle's reminder of state authority through the 1965 empty chair crisis. Indeed, many criticisms stem from the notion that the role of government is understated; it was not willing simply to be J.S. Mill's 'cash-register of interests' (1861). Scholars who have argued for a reappraisal of neofunctionalism seem to have been far less bold than their predecessors by applying the theory to explain rather than predict (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, p.18).

[23] Keohane and Hoffmann argue that this style of supranational decision-making has been visible since at least the negotiations over the Single European Act (Wallace, 1990, p. 277-81).

arguments, that the strength of national interest in situations of 'high' politics in particular will be enough for states to wish to stall integration. Yet Hoffmann also refers to the popular basis of elite action and to 'national consciousness' (Sinnott in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 17). Hoffmann's emphasis on political parties, statesmen, national patriotism and pro-integration heads of executive integrating units all imply directly or indirectly a role for the public. Integration, then, is contingent at least to a certain degree on political culture or public opinion[24]. Gellner too emphasises the role of political culture, arguing that successive waves of modernisation and industrialisation can just as likely result in pressures for secession as integration, depending on whether political cultures between territorial units are homogenous or heterogeneous (1964). For example, where two regions are impacted differentially by a wave of modernisation, so that one becomes more materially well-off than the other, Gellner argues that the potential for discord is present where the poorer region possesses a strong regional identity by virtue of say, different religious customs or skin pigmentation.

In response to these and other criticisms, many leading neofunctionalists did begin to posit a role, albeit limited, for public opinion in integration. Haas looked to widen the focus from elite to mass perceptions in the context of loyalty shifting, and pointed to social learning effects, education and inter-group loyalties to justify this (Sinnott in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p.19). Schmitter, too, modestly widens his participants in the integration process not so explicitly in terms of definition, but rather in operationalising population groups such as 'national participant political groups', 'participants or observers in regional processes' and 'relevant elites'. Some of these variables are operationalised with reference to survey and panel data measuring regional identity (Schmitter writing in Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971, p.252).

Lindberg and Scheingold's mid-term report on neofunctionalism, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (1970) addresses some criticisms of early approaches, and includes a detailed picture of the role of public opinion. Without sharing all of his conclusions, Lindberg and Scheingold take one of their revisionist cues from Deutsch's conception of a social community, which

[24] This interpretation is put forward by Sinnott in Niedermayer and Sinnott (1995, p.18) Sinnott attempts to extract the key variables affecting the survival or otherwise of the nation state and then looks at the impact of public opinion and culture upon each of them.

evaluates integration by stressing a sense of community between citizens developed though mutual, mainly cultural transactions rather than an institutional framework[25]. Lindberg and Scheingold then defer to the political theory of David Easton to make an explicit distinction between utilitarian and affective components of mass political attitudes and between identitive and systemic aspects of interaction[26]. The identitive level of interaction refers to the links among the people of the Union, while systemic interaction refers to links between the public and the Union apparatus itself. Responses to questions of an either identitive or systemic nature are affective if they represent some diffuse or emotional response and utilitarian if the response is based on some perceived economic or political interest such as higher living standards. On the basis of survey data, support for the Community is seen to invite a systemic response, where Lindberg and Scheingold claimed that the strongest basis of support for the Community was utilitarian. Evidence of affective support was weaker, in the 1960s most West Europeans referred to the US as their 'most trusted ally' (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 54). Lindberg and Scheingold interpreted their data as evidence of a 'permissive consensus'; policy-makers could most probably move in an integrative direction without encountering significant opposition, which in any case positive utilitarian attitudes would most likely smother. On the other hand, if persistent social cleavages were to arise, the opportunities to block integration would be greater but without necessarily determining the outcome (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 41). Public opinion is thus a passive tool of elites or counter-elites, and little impetus will come from it. Supranational bodies are still the main motors of integration, with the public in the background providing a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration. Indeed, public support was only one of three other integrative mechanisms, where other options include logrolling, functional spillover and actor socialisation. At the extreme, one could argue that this was not a theory to bring the public 'back in', but rather an intellectual examination of why they should be kept out.

The permissive consensus of Lindberg and Scheingold has been an influential theory. Much scholarly output claims that until the 1990s the permissive consensus held as a research axiom for European public opinion studies (Eichenberg and Dalton (1993); Franklin and Wlezien (1997); Gabel and Palmer (1995)). The implication is that studies on public opinion were not carried out because they were not thought necessary. Moreover, the emphasis in the

[25] See section 1.3.3. for a more detailed examination of Deutsch's work on regional integration.
[26] Section 2.2.2. explores the link between the work of Lindberg, Scheingold and Easton in more detail.

permissive consensus on the utilitarian systemic foundations of support for the Communities offers one explanation as to why those writers looking to explain support for integration have concentrated predominantly on economic or utilitarian motives (see section 3.2.1).

Nevertheless, I argue that theoretical assumptions of the permissive consensus are no longer appropriate, so that there is a greater need to understand public opinion towards integration. To begin with, the status accorded to the permissive consensus is somewhat surprising as throughout their book Lindberg and Scheingold were highly reluctant to ascribe certainty to their findings. By looking at indicators of, say, affective attitudes their results were to a certain degree an exercise in inductive logic based around survey findings, which themselves mainly dated from the period 1954-63 for affective data and 1957-63 for utilitarian data. These findings may have been unrepresentative or opinions could have altered since the data they used was gathered. Moreover, even if the characterisation of the European Union as primarily utilitarian in character was ever true, today the Union's broad ambitions make this a harder argument to sustain. The authors themselves suggest that the consensus might not withstand a major increase in the scope or capacity of the community, although they did predict based on research detailing contemporary social trends that it would hold (1970, p.277). No mention at all is made of the possible expansion of the Communities to include member states generally more hostile to certain forms of integration. Moreover, Lindberg and Scheingold rather simplify the original permissive consensus argument put forward by Key, who states that one must also look at the quality as well as the quantity of public attachment to a particular issue. A 90% approval for a particular issue may mask hard-core pockets of discontent or loose and undisciplined attachment (Key, 1967, p. 32). Aside from these theoretical criticisms, the empirical evidence suggests that both the more instrumental and affective dimensions of public opinion towards the European Union have fluctuated widely in recent years. Policy-makers are no longer necessarily able to rely on a strong reservoir of support for integration. The empirical evidence for the permissive consensus is discussed in more detail in section 2.4., in the light of the presentation in chapter two of the aggregate levels of support for integration amongst European Union member states.

1.3.3. Transactionalism and Postmaterialism

We have already seen that Deutsch's transactionalism has influenced the work of the neofunctionalist writers Lindberg and Scheingold. However, considering Deutsch's work in its own right, this early statement of integration theory affords a relatively prominent role to political culture and public opinion.

Deutsch's basic definition of integration involves the creation of a 'security-community'; rather than favouring any type of predetermined legal or institutional outcome the emphasis is on achieving a political state of peace and security between countries. In turn, this involves the successful creation of

> "a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of peaceful change" (Deutsch quoted in Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 12).

So, integration may be consistent with an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community, where the former option implies full political union and the latter does not imply any loss of state sovereignty[27].

At heart, the sense of community mentioned by Deutsch refers to the generation of social and political communications and transactions. This transactionalism is self-reinforcing as one level of transactions fuels trust and confidence that in turn leads to new levels of communication. The operationalisation of this concept involves detecting for the presence of a number of essential conditions: for instance, mobility of persons, compatibility of values, mutual sympathies and loyalties, trust and a multiplicity of communications and transactions links. It is clear, then, that cultural variables are crucial to Deutsch's partially socio-psychological conception of integration. *In France, Germany and the Western Alliance,*

[27] Deutsch was, however, aware that a pluralistic community might require fewer 'essential conditions' to be satisfied and hence might be politically less costly to achieve (1957). An example might be the post-Marshall plan Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that promoted further cooperation such as proposals for a free trade area and payments union within Europe without compromising state sovereignty. In common with realism then, international integration is not contradictory with but rather complementary to the development of the nation-state. However, Deutsch seeks to move

Deutsch makes use of public opinion polls to argue that there was little support for a kind of European unity against the concrete reality of the nation-state (1967, p. 299).

Despite the focus on mass attitudes, there is good reason to believe that their influence is incorrectly specified. Haas makes the point that some of the variables used to indicate a state of integration also define the process, making it difficult to isolate cause and effect (1964, p. 27). One might challenge the path of causality between variables and ask whether the public simply takes its cue from their leaders, rather than vice versa. On the other hand, the focus of transactionalists on the behaviour of states in the international environment risks ignoring solely domestic political or social discourses which could have an important role to play in integration. In this context mass attitudes gain a new relevance.

In more general terms, Deutsch's model also suffers from a lack of consensus as to which common variables are most important in determining peace and security[28]. After all, one could make the case that the states of Europe that fought each other in two world wars in the twentieth century appeared remarkably uniform on a number of economic, cultural, social and even political scales[29]. Inglehart, using in part data from *France, Germany and the Western Alliance*, has been able to argue a different conclusion to Deutsch; rather than implying a plateau of integrative support, the general increase in social communications within Europe has served to instil stable attitudes in European youth which will be expressed as positive support for European integration in years to come (Pentland, 1973, p. 62). On the subject of generational change, then, I turn to consider Inglehart's theories of European integration.

Inglehart is one of the theorists who goes furthest in advocating role for the public. His 1970 article goes straight to the point, asking

beyond resting sole responsibility for peace with the diplomats so disparaged by Mitrany, calling for a qualitative and quantitative shift in interactions and communications between states (Pentland, 1973, p. 51).

[28] In the same way, further agreement could be seen as necessary on what constitutes integration: in the 'light' peace and security definition proposed by Deutsch, most of Europe could already be seen as integrated in that the prospects for conflict seem very slight.

[29] One could argue that the role of social scientists in determining supposedly 'objective' conditions for peace is misplaced when it is the subjective opinions of policy-makers and others that can propel or limit the process of integration, whatever the supposed level of underlying congruence in social or other variables between countries.

> "To what extent do public preferences constitute an effective influence on a given set of national decision-makers, encouraging them to make decisions which increase (or diminish) regional integration?" (1970, p.764).

As Inglehart continues, this is really the question "Does the public have any influence on foreign policy decisions?" Inglehart then provides the reader with three factors that affect the relevance of public opinion to decision-making: the structure of the national decision-making process (pluralistic or monolithic), the distribution of political skills within a community and the degree of intensity of opinions. With reference to this final point, a particular issue will only provoke a response if it relates to deep-seated values. Shephard interprets this to mean that 'low politics' issues of agricultural food prices will not evoke the same sentiments as debate over national sovereignty (1975, p.58). Inglehart's feedback model that is introduced in the same article suggests interdependence between public and elite attitudes, so that the direction of causality can reverse to allow elites the power to alter mass perceptions.

Inglehart's later theorising builds heavily on the idea of the distribution of political skills amongst the citizenry. The theory of the Silent Revolution postulates that political changes in advanced industrial societies will be indirectly caused by individual political value-orientations and the level of political skills (1977). Persons with a postmaterialist value-orientation give less priority to materialist ends, and will be more directed towards personal realisation. Levels of cognitive skills determine how able a person is to cope with and interpret the abstract content of political messages. Inglehart stipulates that the nation-state is too materialistic for postmaterialists, who are also concerned with a sense of belonging to a wider, more cosmopolitan community. Those with higher cognitive skills are more able to comprehend the abstract content of European integration. Postmaterialists and those with high cognitive skills will be more vociferous and supportive of European integration. Moreover, the role for the public will increase over time as skills increase and postmaterialist values are shared by more and more people. For example, Inglehart supposes that better educational systems and higher participation rates in education mean that post-war generations possess on average a higher level of cognitive skills and are more likely to be postmaterialists given the socio-economic changes in the post-war period.

Inglehart pursues a bottom-up 'push' approach to integration, as opposed to the elite 'pull' approach characterising many neofunctionalist and realist attitudes towards the public. This

'push' approach provides us with a set of value-based, more affective criteria to judge when the public are most likely to respond to an issue, in contrast to the generally instrumental approaches of functionalism and neofunctionalism. Inglehart, however, prefers to make his case for the public at some degree of generality; in the long-term, Inglehart writes, 'mass support will be a *sine non qua* for political unification' (1977b, p. 152)[30]. This point is then backed up by taking the examples of the 1970s referenda in Norway, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom over whether to enter the European Communities. Ultimately, Inglehart is more concerned with the sociology of attitude formation than with political institutions. However, a more powerful critique of Inglehart is that, as we shall see in section 3.4., postmaterialism simply does not stand up very well on an empirical footing.

1.3.4. Realist Perspectives

Realism is an International Relations centred theory of politics that when applied to the study of European integration serves to restore the autonomy of the state in the integrative process. Realists tend to posit that states are goal-oriented, rational and the principal, sovereign actors on an international stage delineable from domestic politics. Secondly, the lack of an international authority to make and enforce international law not only permits wars, but also renders co-operation problematic. This state of anarchy may leave all concerned worse off than they could otherwise be were they to co-operate. Arguably, writings in the realist tradition go back as far as Thucydides, who presented a structural account as to the origins of the Peloponnesian war (Nye, 1988, p. 235). In the discussion that follows, I recognise the plurality of realist designs and so consider several variants of the theory, where the common thread is that international co-operation is best explained from the standpoint of international state interactions rather than domestic politics and public opinion.

The realist perspective was first used in anger amongst scholars of European integration by Hoffmann in his critique of neofunctionalism. Hoffmann attacks the failure of functionalist or economic types of spillover to substantially alter the sovereign character of nation-states.

[30] This rather general assumption that, in the long-term, public support is essential for successful political integration is in keeping with the long-term impact of the *Silent Revolution* argument and is also evidenced by the fact that Inglehart is quite prepared to accept that in the early stages of integration, most decisions were taken by elites in isolation from the public (1977b, p. 152).

This criticism was especially pertinent in the light of the 1966 Luxembourg compromise as well as the evolution of the European Council and Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). As mentioned in section 1.3.3., however, Hoffmann's argument frequently refers to the popular basis of elite action and to 'national consciousness' (1966).

On the whole, realist theories are better at explaining interactions than interests. Writers such as Waltz, in the neorealist tradition, which is taken to refer to the restructuring of realist thought around a more positivist framework, are most interested in explaining the behaviour of heterogeneous states through regime structures that may or may not serve to promote co-operation. The result has been a parsimonious set of theories that rely heavily on game-theoretic literature. Waltz only treats the domestic arena to analyse how its structure might influence the behaviour of political elites (1979, p. 81)[31]. Other writers do attempt to come to terms with the issue of legitimacy, yet generally only with reference to elite attitudes[32]. Sinnott elaborates on the writings of Krasner and Puchala to argue that both writers employ the concept of diffuse values to classify those conditions that determine the creation and persistence of international regimes (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 26). It is, however, left to the reader to make the connection that the principles and norms adopted by elites are somehow related to mass attitudes.

Some reformulations and more recent statements in the realist tradition are prepared to acknowledge a role for the public in international affairs. Rosenau argues that, while mass publics may not be informed on the technical details of a particular regime or issue, they can create indirect demands for regimes by demanding solutions to problems (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 28). Two-level game theory is a recent theoretical development in a more realist mould that explicitly incorporates public opinion in the domestic politics arena. The main protagonists in this field are Zysman and Sandholtz (1989) and Putnam (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993). The foreign and domestic arenas, despite the linkages between them, are neatly differentiated into two spheres, where only governments sit in on both 'games'. This implies, in keeping with Moravcsik's theory that intergovernmental bargains

[31] In fairness to Waltz and others, the role of public opinion in certain aspects of international relations is hardly immediately obvious. Sinnott points out that the mass public is unlikely to be familiar with The Law of the Sea or the International Food Regime (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 25).

[32] Waltz too moves from the systemic to the unit level of analysis, but only to discuss learning and socialisation amongst political elites (1979, p. 74).

strengthen the state (1994), that states act as gatekeepers to international decision-making arenas, so that neofunctionalist assumptions of transnationalism must find new avenues of influence, for example through supranational institutions. There is a hierarchy of bargains, so that elite bargains are formed in response to changes in international conditions and in the domestic political context. However, Zysman and Sandholtz's approach to domestic bargaining is hardly much of a progression on Moravcsik, the authors heavily emphasising the role of changing domestic coalitions in their analysis of the Maastricht treaty. Putnam notes that the notion of the strong state has dominated domestic-international theorising and argues that a more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy must 'stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups...legislators, and even public opinion and elections' (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993, p.435). Putnam identifies Level 1 and Level 2 bargaining, where Level 2 'ratification' decisions may involve a number of 'domestic' influences that Putnam leaves open-ended. Putnam, then, does not commit himself to any exact model; rather, he specifies a broad framework that he hopes will be useful in stimulating further research (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993, p.437).

Spurred by a core interest in liberty and limited government, writers in the liberal tradition of international relations recognise that to say states act in their self-interest is tautological unless an account is rendered of how such interests are formed. Such authors go on to argue that the role of elites is constrained from within rather than without the state. Similarly, neofunctionalists emphasise the political process of learning and redefining national interests, as encouraged by institutional frameworks and regimes. Keohane and Hoffmann attempt a synthesis of intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist positions. With reference to the Single European Act, Keohane and Hoffmann argue that while pressures for spillover may have existed, its actualisation was at the discretion of governments. Public opinion is seen as a factor constraining governmental decision-making, with the authors warning of 'domestic backlashes' against the hardships that the Single Market could impose on particular sectors of the economy. In addition, the authors see that in the longer run the transfer of mass allegiances could well prove decisive, drawing our attention to the democratic deficit and the

> "paradox of an elaborate process of multinational bargaining coexisting with an obstinately 'national' process of political life and elections, the paradox of the emergence of a European identity on the world scene coexisting with continuing national loyalties" (Wallace, 1990, p. 295).

Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism is the approach in the realist tradition that has been most successfully applied to the analysis of European integration, where only an oblique role for the public is envisaged. In *The Choice for Europe*, Moravcsik begins from a methodological criticism of integration theories as being incapable of explaining all the intricacies of the process, and then employs a rationalist 'framework' to designate the set of assumptions he uses to break down integration into discrete chunks. Accordingly, the reader is presented with three stages to the integrative process: preferences are first aggregated at the national level, where appropriate states then bargain with one another to reach agreements, the institutional form of which is decided only in the final stage. In determining national preferences, Moravcsik seems to display a liberal approach; national preferences are determined by domestic political competition, where states serve to aggregate these interests in their role as gatekeeper[33]. This places Moravcsik in an *a priori* neutral position as to the societal determinants of domestic policy-making, and accordingly he accepts that amongst many other factors, public opinion may come to alter geopolitical reasons for co-operation (1998, p. 35). In practise, however, Moravcsik comes to accept that since the Treaty of Rome the most compelling determinants of national preferences have been political economic rather than geopolitical interests, with pressure correspondingly coming from special interest groups such as producer alliances[34].

Moravcsik's third stage, which analyses why governments choose institutional forms that pool, delegate or retain sovereignty, acknowledges some potential role for the public. The preferred explanation is the need to create credible commitments: a European Court of Justice guarantees serves to guarantee states' commitment to certain treaty obligations. Nevertheless, Moravcsik accepts that the quasi-constitutional character of many European Union institutions cannot be fully explained without reference to Federalist ideals. To the extent that this is true, the liberal constructivist approach discussed above can then be used to,

[33] This allows Moravcsik to argue that there is a unitary state position at the intergovernmental bargaining stage. In more complicated cases such as Germany, where the Bundesbank and the Chancellor have expressed contrary monetary policy positions, Moravcsik argues that the net national position may be stable and hence unitary (1998, p. 23). Ironically, Moravcsik may have managed to construct a weak state by postulating that governments simply calculate the relative pressures and act accordingly.

[34] Moravcsik owes perhaps too much to Milward's *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (1992) in his analysis of the economic underpinnings of integration. Moravcsik suggests that Thatcher's opposition to the United Kingdom's membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) was primarily motivated by knowledge of the economic asymmetry built into the system rather than the loss of sovereignty that this move might involve (1998, p. 427). Yet against the advice of Chancellor of the Exchequer Lawson, Thatcher turned down the opportunity to join the ERM in 1985 at a far more reasonable exchange rate.

say, look at recent decisions in the Maastricht or Amsterdam treaties to increase the legislative powers of the European Parliament. However, for Moravcsik, the third stage of the integration process cannot be understood without reference to the second bargaining stage. In other words, where other European institutions and through them the public may exercise influence, this authority is knowingly delegated by member states[35]. Moracvsik gives several reasons why this might be the case, for example the Commission is able to promote the efficiency of interstate bargaining under Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) by setting the policy agenda in the bargaining stage (1993).

We can see, then, that in varying degrees theories in the neorealist tradition have begun to 'unpack' the state. Many such theories employ rational choice frameworks, so that norms and principles promoted by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or nationally based interest groups enter the international policy-making process only by acting as constraints on elite behaviour. Liberal constructivists argue that the environment in which actors participate is social rather than methodologically individual; norms not only constrain actors but also reach much deeper as shared understandings or social constructions that constitute actor identities and interests. In this way, liberal constructivism marks an important shift in focus from interactions to interests.

If liberal constructivism is analogous to functionalism in its emphasis on inputs to the policy-making process, the process itself could only be compared to multi-level governance in its nebulous and multi-faceted nature (see section 1.3.5.). In practise there might be a myriad of 'diffusion' mechanisms that allow norms to permeate the international policy-making process, where Checkel identifies two stereotypical pathways (1997; 1998). In a relatively liberal society, transmission of norms may be bottom-up and societal. Here, non-state actors and policy networks are united in support of certain values; they then mobilise and coerce policy-makers into changing state policy. The example is given of the Clinton administration's shift in support for a ban on child labour practises following pressure from organisations such as UNICEF and domestic consumer groups (Checkel, 1997, p. 479). If the

[35] The idea that member states delegate authority from a position of full legal and political sovereignty is criticised as unrealistic in section 4.5., where MacCormick is cited as arguing forcefully using legal theory that there are very few sovereign states left in the world, and certainly none in Europe (1993). Arguably, Moravcsik fosters the illusion of full state sovereignty by focusing in his accounts on the dynamics of EU summits and 'grand bargains' to the detriment of decision-making at, say, different levels or by European Union institutions.

example here features special interest groups, it is nevertheless clear that public opinion could play a similar role. One might think, for example, of Tony Blair's reticence to force the issue of EURO membership against hostile public opinion[36]. Another pathway is top-down elite socialisation and learning, particularly appropriate to relatively state-centric political systems and institutions. Here, constructivists draw on social psychology literature to hypothesise how policy-makers may come to internalise new norms and values through constant exposure. A relevant example would be the *engrenage* or informal co-option of national officials who come to work at the European Commission (Michelmann, 1978). Although liberal constructivism does not necessarily preclude neorealist forms of integration, the focus on the social fostering of values tackles head on issues of legitimacy, the democratic deficit and European identity; all pertinent issues which appear to require some degree of mass attitudinal input to be successfully resolved.

1.3.5. Multi-actor Approaches

Many recent approaches by predominantly European scholars have depicted the EU as a complex and pluralistic structure, under relatively weak member-state control. The concern of such scholars has often been less with advancing an overarching theory of integration but rather with describing specific policy-areas that fall within the ambit of the EU. Moreover, for most theorists it follows that there is nothing inherently fixed in the current system, meaning that the EU has a far from a stable institutional structure.

Theories of multi-level governance (MLG) emphasise power sharing between different levels of government, where on one account there is

> "no centre of accumulated authority. Instead, variable combinations of governments on multiple layers of authority - European, national, and subnational - form policy networks for collaboration. The relations are characterized by mutual interdependence on each others' resources, not by competition for scarce resources" (Hooghe, 1996, p. 18)

[36] Checkel gives the example of wide public pressure, culminating with a mass campaign attracting over 1 million signatures, surrounding changes in the German citizenship law to allow people to hold dual citizenship (1997, p. 485).

Multi-level governance, then, sets out not so much to challenge the rational choice foundations of neorealism but rather the liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions of a state-centric integrative process where lowest common denominator bargains ensure that no government has to integrate more than it wishes. Fields of integration are not neatly 'nested' so that states and state leaders can monopolise the interaction between the domestic and international arenas. The justification for this viewpoint is, in short, twofold. On the one hand, actors at different levels share decision-making competencies with states; in particular, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court and even subnational regions all have independent influence that belies their intergovernmentalist role as merely bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments[37]. Secondly, collective decision-making in the form of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers weakens the power of any single government. This pushes the question back as to why states would let this situation arise. Here multi-level governance theorists argue in rational choice terms: there may be intrinsic benefits having to do with shifting responsibility for unpopular decisions or insulating decision-makers from domestic pressures[38]. There may also be further political benefits to decisional reallocation outweighing the loss of control: intrinsic benefits, such as insulation from domestic pressures on, say, a Central Bank or advantages associated with decreased transactions costs in formulating collective decisions with the costs in loss of sovereignty, for example, lagged until a later parliamentary session. Furthermore, loss of control may be involuntary[39]. As many of these points parallel arguments made by historical institutionalists, I now turn to this branch of theory.

[37] To take the example of the role of law in European integration, Dehousse and Weiler argue that its unintentional impact may be twofold (Wallace, 1990, p. 246-8). Firstly, the conservativism inherent in legal systems may make further evolution difficult. For example, Article 30 (6) as it was known when the SEA was signed is a success in the sense that it establishes cooperation in the field of economic aspects to security. On the other hand, further cooperation could be opposed on the grounds that it is not envisaged in this provision. Secondly, whether or not authority was willingly delegated to a supranational institution, where it is given the power to act reasonably autonomously, as is the case with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in certain instances, member states cannot necessarily predict or influence outcomes. The examples are given of the creative role played by the ECJ with regard to the principle of mutual recognition (the 1979 *Cassis de Dijon* ruling), the concepts of a customs union and of a common commercial policy.

[38] This follows Moravcsik's argument that in certain instances state actors are able to use the EU to strengthen their executive power by "internationalising domestic politics" - loosening the constraints placed on them by domestic actors through the redistribution of decision-making to European Council or Council of Ministers level, where such decisions take place in secrecy and can be claimed to be binding (1994). This assumes, of course, that lowest-common-denominator bargaining prevails at the international level. Either way, the implications for the impact of public opinion are negative.

[39] A final category of criticism of liberal intergovernmentalism concerns the disaggregation of some of its most basic concepts. It is seen as nonsensical to view the state as a monolithic whole, rather it is divided into institutions and actors, where the question is not 'Why do states give up sovereignty in the process of European integration?' but 'Why do particular actors change institutional rules?' (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 348). In a similar vein, the concept of power is seen not just as the ability of A to get B to do something he or she would not otherwise do but also the ability to achieve desired outcomes. So, a successful 'weak' national government in a federal state might well have more control than a less successful 'strong' national government in a confederal state (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, p. 351).

The central insight of historical institutionalism is that the consequences of what originally may have been intergovernmental decisions are often unforeseen, unintended or undesired. To varying degrees, historical institutionalists argue that in certain circumstances and especially over the longer-term state control over the integrative process is limited. In the first instance, the partial autonomy of EU institutions may hamper state control. Information asymmetries may exist, especially given the highly specialised and pan-European nature of the work of the ECJ and the Commission. Institutions, then, are not simply the information-providers or facilitators of rational choice scholars but may have a deeper effect on actor strategies. In common with MLG theorists, the argument is made that the restricted time horizons of policy-makers and growing issue density leads to problems of overload and pressure to delegate (Pierson, 1996). Furthermore, sunk costs and the rising price of exit act as a strong deterrent to states leaving the EU[40]. Integration, then, may follow a 'path dependent' route producing a fragmented, multi-actor European polity.

So, the breakdown of state control over the integrative process in both MLG and historical institutionalism suggests more leeway for the impact of the public than liberal intergovernmentalism. Despite this, the first multi-level governance theorists were usually more interested in stressing the increased role of supranational actors than the public *per se* (see Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996). Moreover, the decision-making logic of multi-level governance theorists draws heavily on the rational choice structure of neorealism rather than the more norm-based, societal approach of liberal constructivism. Nevertheless, insofar as the European Parliament is seen to play an increased role in policy-making in the multi-level mode, and is seen as representing the European public despite the arguments for the democratic deficit[41], then there is a role for the public. In addition, the teleological ambiguity of multi-level governance does not shut the door on a possible strong role for the public. However, in the final analysis both approaches arguably place more of an emphasis on supranational institutions than on mass attitudes[42].

[40] Scharpf argues that the cost of exit means that the pressure to reach agreement will be great. Yet these agreements will have a tendency to be sub-optimal given the frequent requirement for unanimous decision-making amongst fifteen states and the wish to avoid substantial loss of sovereignty (the 'joint-decision trap') (O'Neill, 1996, p. 274).

[41] The typical response to this position is that, given the low and decreasing average voter turnout for European Parliament elections, increasing the powers of the Parliament increases the democratic deficit rather than resolves the situation.

[42] See, for instance, Pierson's analysis of European Social Policy where the author stresses the role of the ECJ and the Commission (1996, p. 148-156).

An additional area of interest for MLG theorists has been the growing regionalisation of the EU. This perspective feeds into the literature on the Europeanisation of domestic structures and comparativist approaches to European integration. Benz and Eberlein argue that subnational regional units are becoming more involved in the EU policy-making process because of the increasing role of the EU in regional development policies, principally through such vehicles as the European Regional Development Fund, the European Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds (1998, p. 2). One consequence of such approaches has been that students of domestic politics have begun to find that, without addressing the role of the EU, they cannot fully explain domestic processes and outcomes. The reverse side of this is that without a fuller understanding of domestic processes, it may well be that European-level outcomes remain incompletely understood. Hence, to comparativists the study of domestic politics is seen as vital to understand why states choose to defend their interests at the international level, and because it is the basic political unit in the EU. Within each state, idiosyncratic policy-making styles based on different institutional structures and attitudes prevail[43]. The result is a renewed focus on domestic structures and attitudes: Hix looks, for instance, at pluralist, rational-choice, sociological and institutional domestic approaches. On Lipset and Rokkan's sociological model of nation building, political systems are explained by a series of cleavages created by 'critical junctures' in the historical development of each system. Hix proposes that the EU is reflected in party-political conflict not so much in the traditional left-right politics cleavage but rather a 'pro-supranational integration versus national independence' cleavage that has arisen with the 'politicisation' of the EU (1994, p. 21). Public opinion data can then be used to confirm the existence of such a cleavage in voting patterns, and indeed an attempt by Ray to do this is reviewed in section 3.2.3[44].

Writing from a multi-level governance standpoint and arguing on the basis of the existing theoretical literature that the public does play a role in integration, Sinnott tentatively formalises when the public might be expected to play a legitimising role in internationalised

[43] Ironically, in order to demonstrate the importance of the domestic politics approach, Bulmer argues that states are the basic political units at the European level too, using such realist examples as de Gaulle's boycott of the community in 1965 (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 149).

[44] Even if it is not made explicit in the literature, the domestic politics approach clearly implies an increased role for the public. For instance, one might imagine a situation where a government is constrained only by the need to build coalitions to remain in office. The maximum possible leverage that public opinion could exert is indirect: one can imagine a country approaching an election with several parties competing fiercely by making binding commitments.

governance (1994). Sinnott argues that the role of the public is a function of the relationship between public perceptions and expectations of an issue on the one hand and the nature of the problems being confronted and the claims of supranational institutions on the other. This relationship may vary by policy sector, country and over time. In a MLG system, the problem of allocating policy competences (especially in the light of the principle of subsidiarity) is also an issue. Sinnott operationalises his model by considering seven scenarios, two of which imply a strong role for the public. In the first of these cases, the nature of the problem is international; however, the principle of subsidiarity forges a link between the public and supranational organisations. Sinnott takes the cases of environmental policy, scientific research and development aid. The second example is where the public demands action at the international level, but where the issue itself is probably best tackled at the national level. Sinnott appears to use his own data collected for the European Science Foundation Project 'Beliefs in Government' to claim that in 1989 a majority of respondents felt that poverty should be tackled at the European level, despite the lack of institutional structures to deal with this issue (1994, p. 17). On the other hand, for some issues the public might not dispute the claim that it is mostly a matter for international cooperation and hence accept a correspondingly small role, the example being that of European Political Cooperation (EPC) which began in 1970. This approach, then, tries to explain the current situation on a policy-by-policy, country-by-country basis with little claim to generality in the sense that, where one might hypothesis that the public will play a part in issues where there is an element of subsidiarity, the subjective interpretation of the issue that the public is free to place on it means that it might not recognise this particular issue as falling into the 'subsidiarity' category. Clearly this is an approach that requires a lot of empirical data with which to work, something that Sinnott willingly admits to not being able to provide in the same article. By way of summary, then, multi-actor approaches do disaggregate the integration process, yet only Sinnott specifically includes the public as an active actor.

1.4. Conclusion

In the words of Stanley Hoffmann, "[t]he critical issue for every student of the world order is the fate of the nation-state" (Tranholm-Mikkelson, 1991, p. 1). Integration theory places this issue at its centre. On early theories of integration, there was a fairly simplistic split between

those theories such as functionalism, transactionalism and revisions of neofunctionalism that posited an instrumental role for the public in this matter, and more state-centred theories that denied the public a role.

However, as theories of integration converge over time, mass attitudes are being elevated in importance. After the disavowal of neofunctionalism by its leading theorist, Haas, the integrationalist debate has increasingly taken the form of theories that attempt to disaggregate the state as an actor, such as multi-level governance, domestic politics approaches and liberal constructivism. Even theories that draw more directly on the realist tradition stressing state sovereignty over the integrative process, such as two-level game theory and liberal intergovernmentalism, posit more substantial roles for domestic politics inputs, often in the form of bargains with ruling elites.

The significance of the inclusion of the mass public as an actor in several of these theories is enhanced by the feeling that, in the long run at least, mass attitudes will provide the legitimacy that the European Union needs to survive. The current debate over the democratic deficit within the EU and the numerous referenda on treaty and membership accessions would seem to bear witness to this impression. Exactly what legitimising function the public performs in the integrative process is addressed further in section 2.2.1., while the theoretical evidence of public involvement is backed up by empirical evidence in section 2.4., after a presentation of aggregate levels of support for integration amongst European Union member states. This certainly marks a change from the original design of the institutions of the Communities, which consciously avoided democratic legitimacy and was instead marked by technocracy and elitism. As Spinelli remarked on the man whose name is most closely linked to the European project:

> "Monnet has the great merit of having built Europe and the great responsibility of having built it badly" (Featherstone, 1994, p. 150).

Few authors, then, would argue that the EU is in institutional 'equilibrium'.

With more and more theorists acknowledging some role for the public, the question then arises when and how the public can be expected to have an effect on policy outcomes. Putnam characterises public opinion research as either subscribing to a 'bubble up', leading

indicator theory of the public role in integration, or a 'trickle-down', lagging indicator role, where the public essentially functions as a constraint (Putnam in Tsoukalis, 1983, p. 87). With perhaps the exception of Hallstein's reflections of integration in the 1960s, the reality is, however, that most authors stress the role of elites, possibly with mass attitudes playing the negative, constraining role first specified by Lindberg and Scheingold. As the salience of integration increases, the public might be expected to voice their opinions more and more, but in an essentially reactive way. However, with the exception of liberal constructivism and Sinnott's tentative work there is little in the way of in-depth focus on the possible transmission mechanisms of public attitudes to policy-making, so that we are left to disentangle the relative significance of public opinion amongst a morass of other factors. Moreover, few of the theories mentioning public opinion address public impact at a supranational level, for instance through the European Parliament. There are two reasons suggested for this lack of interest in the public; the influence of the permissive consensus thesis and the feeling until the later 1970s that public opinion was an unstable and irrational force.

In conclusion, the aim of this chapter has principally been to demonstrate the role of the public in the various major theories of integration as a justification or otherwise to study mass attitudes in more detail. The results suggest that, although the public is allotted some, often limited role in many theories, most theorists poorly define its exact nature. Moreover, there are grounds to believe that this limited role is understated. However, at this stage we will have to be satisfied with the premise that the public does have some relevance to the integration process, and move on to look more closely in the chapter that follows at the make-up of mass attitudes in the European Union.

2. PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

2.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

In this chapter I principally aim to specify public attitudes in the various EU member states towards European integration over a set period of time. As a result, this chapter acts as a complement to those immediately preceding and following it.

A historical description and analysis of trends in public opinion towards integration would appear a useful preface to the examination of various theories of mass support for integration in chapter three. Indeed, as we shall see in that chapter, several explanatory theories take as their starting point public opinion trends. However, as a necessary prelude to their description I elaborate on exactly what mass attitudes one should measure, a task that involves filling in some of the blanks left by theories of regional integration in chapter one on the exact role of the public in integration. I also address the relationship between respondents' attitudes and survey questions. In this way I am better placed to understand the significance, meaning, and limitations in meaning of public opinions and attitudes, so going beyond the minimal definition of public opinion adopted in section 1.2. Finally, I take the opportunity to review the permissive consensus thesis introduced in chapter one using empirical data on support.

So, in section 2.2.1. I make the case that the public provides a necessary degree of legitimacy to the European Union, as well as noting that the public might play this role in a variety of ways, including through opinion polls. In section 2.2.2. I set out to understand mass attitudes and opinions, the key insight being that attitudes towards European integration can be divided into 'affective' and 'utilitarian' components. In section 2.3. I set out to give a descriptive account of public opinion trends. This goal raises a further set of methodological questions: the source(s) of our information concerning mass attitudes, what questions from

these sources to take, how closely these questions approximate the utilitarian and affective facets of mass attitude support for integration identified in section 2.2.2., and also such issues as over what time period survey data is taken and which countries to include. At least here, I principally adopt Eurobarometer data collected under the supervision of Information, Communication, Culture and Audiovisual Media Directorate General of the European Commission, the only cross-national survey of mass opinion towards integration over a sustained time period. The support questions selected will try to cover opinion on both specific and more affective aspects of further European integrative developments, generally over the greatest time period and including as many EU member states as possible. In certain instances, support will also be analysed by issue area.

The results show that questions addressing affective issues tend to garner higher levels of support than more specific questions. Another finding regards the high level of non-attitudes towards integration, although I wait until chapter seven to treat this subject in depth. Moreover, at the aggregate level there are a number of clear trends in public opinion since at least the 1970s. So, in section 2.4. I argue that insofar as the permissive consensus of Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) can be said to exist, it only does so only temporarily in certain specific countries or sets of circumstances.

2.2. Methodology

In this section I mainly address the methodological issues behind the survey results presented in section 2.3. I work from the general to the specific: I argue that the significance of public opinion on European integration lies in its legitimising power, while a conceptualisation of respondents' modes of orientation towards the European Union allows one to address in what ways public opinion survey questions tap attitudes. In the light of this I then consider the most appropriate data sources and questions to measure support for integration in its different facets. Finally the number of countries to be included and the time period covered will also be addressed.

2.2.1. Public opinion and system legitimacy

In chapter one we saw how the public has come to play an increasing, if possibly underrated role in theories of European integration and, by extension, in the actual process of integration itself. The precise transmission mechanisms of public influence into European Union policy-making were also briefly discussed, even if here too theory is rather imprecise. Although this may suffice to show that the public has a role to play in integration, we are left none the wiser as to what measure best captures this role. I argue that public 'support' for the EU, rather than, say, measures of European identity, most appropriately captures the public's role on the basis that support is enough to fulfil an essential legitimising role in the integrative process.

At first sight, the question of what role the public plays in integration is answered with reference to the transmission mechanisms of public attitudes: in several European countries the public periodically passes or rejects referenda on negotiated EU treaties, while in all member states citizens may vote in national or supranational elections, patronise or organise popular manifestations or political organisations such as pressure groups, unions or parties or express their opinions in surveys, which might then be published in-house for political parties or in academic or journalistic media (see Gabel, 1998, p. 5). In addition, public opinion might be legitimising in its own right, or be associated with political behaviour such as voting (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995; Zaller, 1992). Of course, understanding the effectiveness of these various transmission routes is a more involved question (for a thorough survey of research in this area, see Manza and Cook, 2001). Perhaps this is enough to warrant a study of public opinion; however, this description does not help us understand in a wider sense what purpose the public serves in voicing its opinion through these channels.

I argue that public opinion is system legitimatory and to see why this might be so, I make the untesting assumptions that European Union member states are all governed by democratic institutions and that, given this, over a certain timeframe, probably measured in years or decades rather than months, these institutions must secure the acquiescence of a broad majority of its citizens to continue in existence without reform of their governing arrangements. If we then consider Polsby's four methods of securing citizen acquiescence; coercion, indoctrination, loyalty and custom (in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, p. 264) we can

assume that in a democracy, loyalty is at least the principal method of acquiring acquiescence or, rather, legitimacy. Analogously, the EU can be said to have evolved from a series of international treaties to such a degree that it too clearly requires a substantial degree of citizen loyalty. Börzel and Risse classify the EU as an 'Emerging Federal System': there is a directly elected parliament, a Court of Justice, supremacy of Community law over national law, and a series of European treaties allocating jurisdiction and resources to European and national governments (in Jorges, Mény and Weiler, 2000, p. 53). Hence, I make the claim that the system has surely arrogated enough state sovereignty for us not to question the need for attendant citizen legitimacy.

The exact form and classification of the EU is contested, with resultant implications for the precise degree or type of legitimacy needed; however, I contend that because the EU is not yet a 'superstate' it does not need loyalty based on collective identity but rather support. The basis of this argument is that, while the EU may well be an 'Emerging Federal System', it cannot be characterised as a domestic polity *à la* Hix (1994) but rather has member state power clearly entrenched at its base. Collective identity thus rendered unnecessary, Armingeon maintains that this will not change unless the EU begins to levy taxes and redistribute major resources (in Kriesi *et al.*, 1999, p. 236)[1]. The problem with identity as a source of system legitimacy in the EU context is further compounded by the fact that there is none: from figure 5.1. in section 5.2.2. we see that EU identity alone is surely too low to sustain a political regime. The transfer of allegiances as people become aware of the tangible benefits of integration, predicted by functionalists and neofunctionalists, has not happened. One might counter that low levels of identity are behind the numerous crises that have beset the EU in recent years; the rejection of several referenda, the fall of the Santer Commission, low turnout in supranational elections and the general impression of a democratic deficit. However, the EU is manifestly still with us and the scope of its ambitions shows no sign of slowing. I suggest that a milder form of attachment, exemplified by support, and coupled with behaviour such as voting in election and referenda, can instead account for the legitimacy (or otherwise) of the EU over the past decades. The key point is that while respondents with a strong sense of European identity may very likely also support the EU, supporters of integration may not share a sense of European identity and indeed they do not

[1] Interestingly, the proposal to levy an 'EU tax' was put forward at the June 2001 Götenburg summit by German finance minister Hans Eichel (The Economist, 2001, p. 40).

have to legitimise the EU. I thus challenge the exclusive focus of some scholarly research, such as the network on Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses (IDNET) on European identity.

The argument that a strong sense of European identity amongst European publics is unnecessary to the development of the European Union is pursued on a normative basis by Weiler, who argues that a relation between nationality and citizenship in the style of Carl Schmitt is to abandon the idea of Europe as a multi-national melting-pot (Weiler in Gowan and Anderson, 1997, p. 286). Weiler reserves his harshest criticism for the members of the German Constitutional Court, who in the so-called 1993 'Maastricht decision' ruled that the European Court of Justice did not have the sole power to review and annul Community measures on the grounds that no pre-existing European demos defined in organic national-cultural terms existed as a precondition for constitutional unification (Gowan and Anderson, 1997, p. 276). The concerns of Weiler appear valid to the extent that a European identity, especially one based on a Schmittian kind of *völkischen* homogeneity, might substitute national identities[2]. However, from section 4.3. I note that a European identity might sit side by side with national identities, so to the extent that Europe means different things to different peoples, a kind of unity in national diversity, this might check the emergence of a homogenous, overarching form of European identity.

Accordingly I choose to measure and analyse mass attitudes towards the EU through survey questions tapping respondents' support for European integration. In general support is a relatively neutral, non value-laden way to encompass a wide variety of explanatory factors. So, there is no *a priori* assumption being made about which set of factors are more valuable in explaining support[3]. Anticipating the discussion in section 2.2.2., evidence of this neutral status can be seen in the fact that questions concerning support for integration are typically

[2] Weiler calls for acquiescence to the EU in terms of attachment to a civic, non-cultural polity (see also Schmitter, 2000, p. 28). This is rather similar to the notion of constitutional patriotism propounded by Habermas and reviewed in section 4.3. The problem with taking civic republicanism here instead of support is one of measurement. Armingeon proposes using trust in the core institutions of democracy, along with pride in the system in question. However, this measure is fairly similar to the measure of utilitarian pride, or system legitimacy adopted in section 5.2.3. The second issue is that focusing on civic republicanism risks ignoring mild affective measures of pride (cultural pride) that may also be associated with EU support (see chapter five).

[3] To see this point, consider the evaluation of EU legitimacy solely by measuring mass levels of European identity. This would imply that identity rather than, say, economic performance is the touchstone of EU legitimacy, and also suggests a particular view of the EU, as a nation-state that requires its own identity. I do not wish to make such assumptions at this stage.

capable of capturing both utilitarian and affective types of responses. The importance of this becomes clear in subsequent chapters, where I go on to observe the relative explanatory power of utilitarian variables, and particularly rival affective variables, on mass attitudes towards European integration. This focus on support also draws our attention to understanding non-attitudes, or those respondents who hold neither a positive or negative attitude towards the EU. Can non-attitude holding be seen as a sign of withdrawal and hence disillusionment with the political system, or is it simply representative of indifference and lack of knowledge concerning politics in general? I treat non-attitudes in chapter seven.

Of course, underlying the measurement of support is the application of quantitative methods to survey data. I do not intend to justify the use of quantitative methods and survey data as opposed to, say, discourse analysis to arrive at conclusions regarding mass attitudes, although I do briefly dwell on some of the problems associated with survey data in section 2.2.2. In this following section I also focus on understanding mass attitudes; in section 2.2.3. I select the most appropriate survey data, and in section 2.2.4. I make a choice of dependent variable from the support questions available.

2.2.2. Understanding Mass Attitudes and Opinions

In this section I ask how one can conceptualise public modes of orientation towards the European Union. The aim is to understand what sort of responses survey questions addressing support for the European Union typically elicit from individuals. Here I follow Niedermayer and Westle, who make a key division between diffuse and specific evaluations of an object. I then highlight some caveats to using survey data to tap respondents' attitudes. This section, then, is the big brother to section 1.2. which offers only a minimal definition of public opinion.

I adopt Niedermayer and Westle's classification of orientations towards internationalised governance in order to better understand individual attitudes and opinions towards Europe. I make this choice because this relatively recent work draws heavily upon, and could even be seen as the culmination of, the efforts of earlier theorists Almond and Verba (1963; 1989), Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) and Easton (1965). The basic components of the

Niedermayer and Westle model consist of 'modes of orientation' and 'objects' (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 40). The former category encompasses anything a person might have in mind with respect to a particular object. In this thesis, the object in question is most likely a specific form of internationalised governance such as the EU, or one of its component policies. On Almond and Verba's analysis, it is this distribution of patterns of orientations towards political objects amongst members of a political community that constitutes political culture (1963, p. 14). The two-dimensional nature of orientation modes and objects lends itself to further study by means of a simple grid (see table 2.1. below).

Table 2.1. Model of Respondents' Modes of Orientations towards the EU

		MODE			
		Psychological Involvement	Evaluations		Behavioural Intentions
			Specific	Diffuse	
			X	X	
			X	X	
			X	X	
Polit[illegible]	[illegible] outputs				
	Functional Scope				

Table adapted from Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 50

With regard to the objects in table 2.1., the political collectivity refers to those entities that participate in a common political structure and a common set of political processes within a common territory. This political collectivity is in turn divided into 'territorial' and 'personal' components, recognising that both territories such as nation-states as well as people may be members of political collectivities at several levels of analysis, be it the international, national or regional level. The political order refers to the organisation of the political

division of labour within the collectivity, where this comprises its political philosophy and institutional structure (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 41). Political authorities are the occupants of political roles at the international level. Policies are distinguished according to existent proposals or results and by functional scope; whether or not a particular policy is most appropriately dealt with at the supra-national level.

Modes of orientation are distinguished according to their behavioural relevance. Psychological involvement is the most passive form of concern with an object, and aims to capture non-evaluative respondent interest in a particular object[4]. By contrast, an evaluation alludes to a normative response as to how an object should act or be and perceptions of how an object is or acts, whether over the short or long term[5]. Normative ideas that guide evaluations can be based on different criteria, and the resulting evaluations are subdivided into specific and diffuse categories. These subdivisions consciously draw on Easton's selfsame concepts: the former is thought of as being rational and political system output-related, and is based on concrete interests and cost-benefit calculations while the latter concept is more value-based, generalised and affective. Secondly, value-laden diffuse support as specified by Easton should not fluctuate greatly over time, unlike the more short-term and volatile specific support. Support, then, is a multi-dimensional construct.

Clearly, Easton's diffuse and specific concepts are close to Lindberg and Scheingold's affective and utilitarian support discussed in section 1.3.2. Utilitarian support ('based on some perceived or concrete interest'; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 40) is similar to Easton's specific support, except that it is extended, and restricted to, political systems. Affective support ('a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity'; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, p. 40) is nearly identical to Easton's notion, except that it is restricted to orientations towards political systems. The objects of support are defined as systemic (the community and regimes, where political authorities are excluded for lack of data) and identitive. Niedermayer and Westle argue that this identitive category refers to 'underrated' social rather than political

[4] Niedermayer argues that the occasional Eurobarometer 'Interest in Politics' question is a measure of psychological involvement. In addition, the author shows that respondents with a higher interest in politics are more likely to go on to form specific and stable attitudes on political issues (1990, p. 3; see also section 7.4.).

[5] Evaluations can be in the form of a positive or negative judgement about an object, or in the indirect form of a demand, where this is assumed to contain an implicit evaluation. In this way Niedermayer and Westle manage to combine Easton's 'demand' and 'support' inputs in his *Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965).

orientations between publics, where Easton includes political interactions between publics within his notion of a political community (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 39). I use the Niedermayer and Westle, and Lindberg and Scheingold terminology interchangeably in this thesis. Behavioural intentions constitute the final mode of orientation, and includes all actions that might be taken with different degrees of subjective probability in regard to a particular object, such as voting or demonstrating. In table 2.1. I mark with an 'X' those combinations of modes of orientation ('evaluations') and objects ('Object as a whole' and 'political collectivity') that most occupy us here.

The adoption of the concept of 'evaluations' has so far sidestepped the definition of attitudes and opinions. Most commentators would agree that attitudes represent an enduring disposition to respond in a consistently positive or negative way towards a given object. Attitudes are only preceded by values, which might be thought of as enduring standards for what is desirable for an individual (Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1996, p. 228). In our model attitudes would be manifested in evaluations and behavioural intent, but not psychological involvement. An attitude, then, is a hypothetical construct, demonstrated empirically only when the components of an attitude correlate with some consistency amongst each other or over time. In section 2.2.4. I make an effort to identify the attitudes tapped by certain survey questions addressing European integration using exploratory factor analysis. Although an opinion may be the manifestation of an attitude, it is something altogether more ephemeral. Following Hodder-Williams, an opinion is 'an expression, either actual or potential, on a topic admitting of controversy' (1970, p.5). While an opinion may well mirror an attitude or behavioural intent, this correspondence is unlikely ever to be perfect. There are many reasons why this might be so. In some instances, a well-designed and administered survey increases the correlation between attitudes and opinions. For example, one might focus on eliminating question wordings that introduce response bias. In other instances, respondents may willingly misrepresent themselves when asked for, say, their political preferences[6]. Whether a particular survey question evaluation represents a mere opinion or a more meaningful attitude is therefore an open question, and Niedermayer and Westle do not pronounce on the issue. As I deal with large-scale survey data in this thesis, I tend to assume that responses tap attitudes rather than opinions, subject to any caveats regarding question

[6] Breen uses Latent Class Analysis to demonstrate that some extremist Northern Irish respondents deliberately misrepresent their true voting intentions in surveys (2000).

wording and so forth. To increase the certainty with which one can say that this is the case, in section 2.2.4. I scan survey questions for potential bias and other associated problems.

While there are many reasons why public opinion on an issue could be seen to vary, some authors have posited that public foreign and domestic policy attitudes are only partially consistent, inherently unstable or even random. If true, this would pose serious questions of the attempt in this thesis to explain mass attitudes towards integration. Converse, for instance, has argued that the mass public possesses a narrow belief system so that most people, for a lack of information about a particular controversy, offer meaningless opinions that vary randomly in direction during repeated trials over time (Apter, 1964, p. 245). This work taps a general stream of argument that devalues public opinion for its fickleness that stretches back two centuries. To take an example, the 19th century statesman Sir Robert Peel refers to:

> "that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy and newspaper paragraphs which is called public opinion." (Cited in Hewstone, 1986, p. 14)

In recent years Converse's approach has been criticised, so that many theorists now see the public as holding reasonably stable attitudes. Here, I simply draw attention to this important debate which is more fully discussed in section 7.2.

I end this section by noting a further range of caveats to public opinion research that typically form part of larger debates, and I do no more than flag my awareness of them here. To begin, one might employ discourse analysis to criticise the foundations of mass survey research. One of the themes of this approach is an appraisal of the function of the written and spoken word. Following Chomsky, grammatical rules in particular are not merely part of an economic form of description but representations of a person's psychologically real cognitive structures. From this starting point, theorists have gone on to argue that most people use language to construct versions of the social world. Other theorists such as Austin have stressed the role played by social convention in language, so that much of what we say or write is context-dependent. The main implication for researchers using survey data is that responses may not be an accurate translation of individuals' attitudes on any particular topic. In *Discourse and Social Psychology* the authors criticise a rather typical survey data analysis

of attitudes towards 'coloured immigrants' (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 44). For instance, the application of 'restriction strategies' by the survey designer leads in this case to responses being funnelled towards a series of perhaps exaggerated or misleading categories. In this regard, I note that in section 2.2.4. some questions do not include and so prohibit a 'don't know' response. Likewise, the context of the survey means that a certain attitude expressed on one occasion might not necessarily be expressed on another. The example is given of a person who is sympathetic towards immigrants in general, yet reacts negatively to the idea of immigrants in the context of welfare state 'abuse' by the same category of persons (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p. 47). In practise, King, Keohane and Verba speak of 'soaking and poking', emphasising sound cultural familiarity with the country being studied so as to interpret data obtained in the correct fashion (1994, p.36; see also Putnam, 1994). For example, a high proportion of neutral answers regarding support for integration could be used to support several hypotheses: lack of interest or knowledge, unwillingness to express an opinion on record and so on. It would appear, however, that such cultural familiarity is based more on, say, experience than following a specific methodology.

2.2.3. ISSP and Eurobarometer Data Sources

In this section I justify the selection of the Eurobarometer (hereafter also EB) survey series and the International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity (hereafter also ISSP) survey as the main sources of statistics on support for European integration. I also discuss the main strengths and drawbacks of each of these data sources. While the Eurobarometer surveys are better suited to providing descriptive statistics on support for integration and for testing non-attitudes towards European integration, the ISSP survey is more appropriate for testing the hypotheses I propound to explain support later in the thesis.

The Eurobarometer survey series is unmatched for general coverage of European affairs by country and over time. The surveys provide a 'barometer' of European Community public opinion on a wide range of issues usually directly or indirectly relevant to policy-makers. Since its original conception the Eurobarometer programme has expanded somewhat. Most of the standard surveys are accompanied by supplementary special surveys and a series of additional surveys such as the 'Flash' Eurobarometer polls, Europinion Continuous Tracking

Survey (now discontinued) and the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer surveys have been launched.

The Commission of the European Communities (Information, Communication, Culture and Audiovisual Media Directorate General), oversees the implementation of Eurobarometer surveys. The surveys are carried out by selected national institutes posing identical sets of closed questions to multi-stage, random samples of 1000 people per country aged fifteen and over[7]. Since 1975 (EB 3), a sample of 300 for Northern Ireland has been added to Great Britain to constitute the United Kingdom. Given the unification of Germany in 1990, an additional sample of 1000 persons have been interviewed since EB 34, so that there are a total of 2000 interviews for this country. Since 1991 (EB 35) 500 interviews were conducted in Luxembourg, where before this date the number was only 300. Where results are displayed here for the Community as a whole, these are weighted on the basis of the adult population in each country[8]. Results are open to replication, and the data files are stored at the Cologne University Central Archive[9].

Data has been collected over a relatively long time series, the first standard survey appearing in autumn 1973 (EB No. 1) with subsequent standard surveys being published biannually since this date[10]. Eurobarometer surveys have included Greece since autumn 1980 (EB 14), Portugal and Spain since autumn 1985 (EB 24), the former German Democratic Republic from autumn 1990 (EB 34), Finland since spring 1993 (EB 39) while Austria and Sweden are included from winter 1994 (EB42).

So, the breadth of geographical coverage over time makes the Eurobarometer survey series particularly suitable for measuring trends public support for integration. There is no equivalent supranational statistical survey series to Eurobarometer in the world.

[7] In multi-stage clustering a number of sampling points based on based on, say, city districts or households are drawn with a probability proportional to population size and density. From this a starting address is drawn randomly, using which other addresses are randomly selected. Generally speaking, cost considerations impose a trade-off between the number of clusters (i.e. city districts) sampled and the number of units within it subsequently chosen (De Vaus, 1995, p. 67).

[8] It is not mentioned in the Eurobarometer surveys what age group this refers to, and whether it is concomitant with the 15+ age group used for surveys.

[9] The data files are, however, available from several sources. The data used in this thesis have all been downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research website (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html).

[10] Some surveys that were later included in the Eurobarometer reports were in fact first carried out in 1970 (European Community studies). Moreover, some of the 'unification' questions that will be discussed below were asked in several public opinion surveys by the United States Information Agency between 1952 and 1967.

Eurobarometer surveys have appeared in a host of articles and books broadly investigating variation in the levels of public support for European integration (for examples amongst recent literature see Eichengreen (1999), Gabel (1998; 1998b), Niedermayer and Sinnott (1995) and Ray (1995)).

The single time period and the limited number of EU member states means that I do not make much use of the International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity for descriptive statistics on integration. The ISSP survey contains cross-national, individual level data loosely focused around the issues of local, national and regional identity and belonging[11]. Data are available for a total of 24 countries worldwide, although here only European Union member states are retained in the survey. The EU countries that the ISSP survey covers are as follows: Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Spain[12]. For each of the countries there are approximately 1000 cases, except in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands, where the sample size is approximately 2000.

However, the ISSP survey is used in preference to Eurobarometer in chapters five and six because it contains a variable list far more capable of testing the hypotheses explaining mass support for integration outlined in chapter four. Section 5.2.1. contains a more detailed comparison between the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys for the purposes of explaining support. For chapter seven, the case for using Eurobarometer rather than ISSP data to measure non-attitudes towards integration is made in section 7.5.1.

Aside from the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys, there are few alternatives to the pan-European measurement of attitudes towards integration. A series of World and European Values Surveys carried out sporadically over the period 1981-1997 under the auspices of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) address feelings of regional identity and belonging[13]. These questions, however, do not come close enough to tapping evaluations of support to be salient in this research. Two Reader's Digest surveys

[11] The data I use here was made available on CD-ROM from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (study no. 2880).

[12] The data for the UK is split into Britain and then Northern Ireland. Here I only analyse the results for Great Britain. On the other hand, the East and West German territorial distinctions preserved in the ISSP data are amalgamated in my results, except where specifically stated to the contrary.

[13] The World Values Surveys (WVS) grew out of a study launched by the European Values Survey group (EVS). In 1981, the EVS carried out surveys in ten West European societies; it evoked enough interest to be replicated in 14 additional

conducted in seventeen western European countries in 1969 and 1990 pose a number of questions enquiring into both utilitarian and affective satisfaction with the European Communities, support for various European-level policies such as agricultural support and even levels of satisfaction with the number of migrant workers. As these questions do little more than duplicate the efforts of the Eurobarometer surveys I do not make use of them. A final option might be to stitch together country-based surveys of attitudes towards integration. However, the methodological problems associated with inter-country comparison and the limitations in the number of included countries that would invariably result means that this would be very much a last resort.

2.2.4. Survey Questions

Having settled on the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys as sources of questions measuring attitudes towards European integration, I now specify these questions and what facet of support they measure. From section 2.2.2., we know that attitudes towards integration may contain utilitarian and affective dimensions, where a particular question might tap one or both dimensions. Using exploratory factor analysis, I identify two underlying factors in the questions examined below, which I interpret to measure affective and utilitarian facets of support towards integration. In addition, I list a question that assesses support for specific, policy-oriented aspects of the European Union.

To begin with general measures of support for integration, I note that four questions dealing directly with attitudes towards the European Communities have appeared more or less regularly in Eurobarometer surveys. One of these four questions also appears in the ISSP survey. A number of other Eurobarometer questions are more recently or less frequently posed (5a to 9). The questions are listed immediately below, so that we can then move on interpret what type of response they elicit from the interviewee.

(1) "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent

countries. From here the WVS expanded rapidly, so that for the 1995 wave the EVS group did not participate integrally. Nevertheless, the ICPSR carries combined EVS/WVS datasets for the 1981, 1990-1 and 1995-8 survey waves.

against or very much against?" (United States Information Agency surveys (USIA) conducted sporadically between 1952-67; European Community Study 1973; Eurobarometer No. 10 and many subsequent surveys. Question apparently discontinued from EB 44.2bis (1996))[14].

(2) "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" (European Community Study 1973; Eurobarometer No. 1 and many subsequent surveys)[15].

(3) "If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?" (European Community Studies 1970, 1971 and 1973; Eurobarometer No. 1 and many subsequent surveys. Question apparently discontinued after EB 43.1, excepting an appearance in the 25th anniversary EB 50)[16].

(4) "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?" (Eurobarometer No. 19 and many subsequent surveys; 1995 International Social Science Program National Identity survey)[17].

(5a) "In your opinion, how is the European Union, the European Unification advancing nowadays? Please look at these people. No. 1 is standing still. No. 7 is running as fast as possible. Choose the one which best corresponds with your opinion of the European Union, European Unification."

(5b) "And which corresponds best to what you would like?" (Eurobarometer No. 26, 28 and many subsequent surveys). This is the so-called 'Eurodynamometer'.

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[14] For the USIA survey, the relevant question is the bipolar "Are you, in general, for or against efforts toward uniting Western Europe?". For surveys from ECS 1973 until EB 10, the question wording is " All things considered, are you in favour of the unification of Europe, against it, or are you indifferent?" In EB 44.2bis, The word 'Western' is omitted from the question.

[15] From EB 41.0 the phrase 'European Union' was placed alongside and eventually superseded 'European Community'. In turn, the phrase 'European Community' relegated 'Common Market' to a position in brackets at the end of the question from EB 17 until it was finally removed in EB 35.

[16] The wording 'European Union' begins to replace 'European Community from EB 42. Concomitantly, 'European Community' relegates 'Common Market' to a position in brackets at the end of the question from EB 8 until it is finally removed in EB 35.

[17] Until EB 35 'Common Market' is included in brackets at the end of the question. For the International Social Science Program survey, the wording is very slightly different. "Generally speaking, would you say that (R's nation) benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union? (Benefits, Does not benefit, Never Heard of, Don't know)"

(6) "As for the future, do you think the movement towards the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed down or continued as it is at present (Speeded up, Continued as it is at present, Slowed down, No reply)?" (European Communities Study 1973; Eurobarometer No.s 4-7, 10-12).

(7) "Would you be willing to make certain personal sacrifices for example, on the financial level, to accomplish European unification? Would you be completely willing, fairly willing, slightly willing, or not at all willing?" (European Communities Study 1970, 1971 and 1973; Eurobarometer No. 3 and 4).

(8) "Some people talk of the idea of forming a "United States of Europe", putting together the member countries of the European Community. This means a kind of political union like there is between the fifty states of the U.S.A., or the ten provinces that form Canada. Does this idea of forming a United States of Europe some day, including (your country), seem a good or bad idea to you?" (Eurobarometer No. 22, 24)

(9) "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that in five years' time (your country) will be benefiting or not from being a member of the European Union?" (Eurobarometer No. 39 and some subsequent surveys)

It would seem that we have an abundance of questions tapping attitudes towards the European Communities[18]. However, only the first five questions have been asked with any degree of consistency over the lifespan of the Eurobarometer series. Concentrating on these five questions, then, it appears that they draw forth more affective or diffuse responses from respondents.

Question (1) appears the most diffuse measure of public sentiment on integration. The question wording does not refer explicitly to any form of supranational organisation or nation but rather to 'efforts being made to unify Western Europe'. From section 2.2.2., we might

[18] Indeed, there are many more Eurobarometer questions, especially in some of the earlier surveys, which purport to measure support for integration. Unfortunately most of these questions feature on only a few occasions. Other questions are similar to existing questions and so contribute little. In particular, questions (8) and (9) seem to have several similarly worded precursors in earlier surveys.

therefore expect support for question (1) to be more stable than that for other questions. Additionally, I argue that because the question addresses European integration only in the abstract, and without the attendant problems conjured up by a specific representation of integration, that it represents a theoretical maximum of underlying support for European integration[19]. Inglehart maintains that question (1) involves a 'floating referent': over time the degree of European integration has changed (1970, p.168). Whereas in 1952 the question may have evoked the fairly modest European Coal and Steel Community in the backdrop of the Second World War, in the new millennium the European Union agenda encompasses, for example, discussions on enlargement to admit former non-Western European Warsaw Pact nations following the end of the cold war. Because over time integration means different things one might make the argument that responses are not strictly comparable. One suspects, however, that there have always been some core values, such as the desire for peace in Europe, that have always been associated with the integrative process. It might thus be questions that measure less abstract aspects of integration than question (1) that are more prone to this problem of changing content. Yet even if the content of integration has altered, this cautions us to interpret survey responses within the context of the changing public discourse on European integration rather than necessarily discarding the question.

By asking respondents to evaluate their country's membership of the European Union as a 'good' or 'bad' thing, question (2) also seems to be tapping a diffuse evaluation of support for integration. Handley argues that because no precise policy outputs are referred to, the referent is probably ambiguous for all but the most cognitively mobile respondents (1981, p. 348). The counterfactual nature of question (3) would seem to imply that Handley's argument could also be applied so that the question can be seen as a (diffuse) measure of enthusiasm for integration in general. In a logically consistent world, one might roughly expect the results of question (2) and (3) to tally in an inverse sense as those who believe that their country should remain a member of the EU would not be relieved to see the EU scrapped. From figure 2.1. below, however, we can see that net support for question (3) is lower than that for question (2). This may be partially explicable by question-direction effects: some respondents tend to agree with questions fuelling a tendency towards 'yea-

[19] Eichengreen adopts a different tack, suggesting that there is a cosmopolitan/national distinction between question (1) and questions (2) and (4) in particular (1999, p. 19). Question (1), by speaking of 'efforts to unify Western Europe' evokes the elimination of borders and sovereignty that are seen to be at the heart of liberal, cosmopolitan arguments on integration, and there is no mention of national perspectives unlike in other questions.

saying'. Responses to questions worded in the same direction are thus more highly correlated with each other than with questions worded in the opposite direction (Heath, Taylor, Brook and Park, 1999, p. 159). I return to the differences in questions (2) and (3) in section 7.3., where both questions are candidates as a measure of non-attitudes. Question (4) is more utilitarian in the sense that it asks respondents to evaluate membership of the community according to the rather utilitarian wording 'benefited or not benefited'. Question (5a/b) seems studiously ambiguous as to what responses might be elicited. The seven-category response scale is undoubtedly an improvement on earlier questions[20]. So, questions (1) – (3) seem to be indicators of diffuse support, while question (4) taps utilitarian support. Question (5) would not seem to fit in either of these categories.

I employ exploratory factor analysis to test the theoretical impressions of what responses these questions might elicit. I use Eurobarometer 42 (2nd half 1994), the most recent survey to include questions (1) to (5). The results for the factors with the highest two eigenvalues are presented in table 2.2. below.

Table 2.2. Affective and Utilitarian factors in EB 42 (1994) data

Factor Analysis	Affective support	Utilitarian support
Unify Western Europe? (Qu. 1)	**0.67**	0.19
EU membership (Qu. 2)	**0.70**	0.30
EU dissolution (Qu. 3)	**0.60**	0.25
EU country benefit (Qu. 4)	0.27	**0.96**
Unification speed (Qu. 5)	-0.15	0.00
Eigenvalue	2.38	.98
Percentage of Explained Variance	47.68	19.51
Cronbach's alpha for factor	0.73	N/a
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)	4.97 (1)	

Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax

[20] Questions (1) to (4) are all to various degrees closed; that is, they only allow respondents to choose between selected categories rather than frame their own responses. This inevitably eliminates a great deal of repetitious and irrelevant material. However, there is a danger that choices will be forced so creating false opinions if there is an incomplete range of alternatives from which to choose. Referring to question (1), the original USIA survey only offered one positive and one negative response, the EC studies two positive and negative categories and a neutral category while the EB surveys follow this last pattern except that they do not offer an 'indifferent' category. With a neutral category only offered for four points in time one can expect responses to be to a certain degree biased. In addition to question (1), question (4) also does not offer a neutral category. Questions (2) and (3) only offer a single positive or negative category.

Given the eigenvalue figure of 0.98 for the second factor, I make the decision to relax the usual guideline of 1 so that two factors are extracted. The results show that while questions (1)–(3) load more heavily onto the first factor, question (4) loads most heavily onto the second factor. As noted above, the wording for questions (1)-(3) is diffuse in character, so that I label factor 1 'affective support'. On the other hand, I have noted that the wording for question (4) seems to evoke a utilitarian response, and factor 2 is labelled 'utilitarian support'. As expected, question (5) does not seem to belong with either factor.

In a slightly less satisfactorily manner, Gabel too manages to distinguish between affective and utilitarian support using EB 24 data (1998, p.22). In the affective category Gabel includes question (1), and a series of further questions on European identity and solidarity, as evidenced by the willingness of the respondent to pay higher taxes to ameliorate economic conditions in another EC country. Gabel takes question (2) as well as question (4) to be a measure of utilitarian attitudes towards integration. Any measure of support more specific than question (1), then, Gabel classifies as utilitarian[21]. I would argue that the question wordings, the results in section 2.3. and the above factor analysis would show this position to be overly sensitive. In any case, repeating Gabel's analysis on EB 24, using exploratory not confirmatory factor analysis, I am only able to extract one factor.

In a separate, proprietary survey relying on many more question items, Hewstone manages to distinguish between utilitarian and affective dimensions to support for European integration in West Germany, Italy, France and the UK using factor analysis (1986, p. 165). Hewstone also alerts us to the fact that measures of utilitarian and affective are highly correlated; this is also the case for the questions in EB 42[22]. Similarly, Wober carried out a public opinion poll of 816 UK residents using a sixteen-item attitude questionnaire (1981). Factor analysis revealed three factors underlying British attitudes towards Europe, which the author named 'political', 'cultural' and 'economic' (Wober, 1981, p. 181). There are precedents, then, for attitudes towards Europe being multi-dimensional.

[21] By contrast in Gabel and Palmer, the authors write that questions (1) and (2) form part of the same, uni-factorial dimension of support (1995, p. 18). On this basis the authors construct a single support index from the two questions in an attempt to arrive at more consistent measurements of support. Gabel does not continue this standardised support measure in his later work (1998, p. 50).

[22] The correlation between question (4) and question (1) is 0.37** (2-tailed test). Between question (4) and (2), (3) and (5) it is 0.48**, 0.4** and –0.07** respectively.

Finally, as well as looking at support for integration on an aggregate basis, we can break down support into policy areas to gain more focus. As Sinnott rightly points out, preferences at what level a policy issue is to be decided are the very stuff of legitimacy and support (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, p. 65). Question (10) addresses policy issues directly by taking a series of issues areas and asking whether Europe is the most appropriate decision-making level. Again, there are a number of questions that go some way to breaking down support for integration into discrete areas although none put the question of bounded legitimacy so directly as (10).

(10) "Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONALITY) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONALITY) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?" (Defence, Protection of the environment, Currency, Humanitarian aid, Health and social welfare, Basic rules for broadcasting and the press, Fight against poverty/social exclusion, Immigration policy, The fight against unemployment, Agriculture and fishing policy, Supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties, Education, Scientific and technological research, Information about the European Union, its policies and institutions, Foreign Policy towards countries outside the European Union, Cultural policy, Rules for political asylum, The fight against drugs) (Eurobarometer No. 32 and some subsequent surveys)[23].

In summary, the affective/utilitarian dimensions of supported advanced in section 2.2.2. can be tentatively said to exist in the data. Of the affective questions, I argue that question (1) represents a theoretical maximum to support for integration. 'Yea-saying' effects may account for the relatively low levels of support for question (3). In the sections that follow I choose not to draw on question (5) because it does not fit into the utilitarian/affective schema outlined.

[23] For earlier EB surveys such as EB32 which will be used later in the text below a slightly different set of issues is taken: Security and defence; Protection of the environment; Currency; Cooperation with developing countries, Third World; Health and social welfare; Education; Basic rules for broadcasting and press; Scientific and technological research; Rates of V.A.T.; Foreign policy towards countries outside the EC; Participation of workers' representatives on company boards; Protection of computer-based information on individuals.

2.2.5. Country Inclusion and Time Period

The approach taken here will be to include as many EU countries in our descriptive analysis consistent with EB survey data. The Eurobarometer surveys begin in 1973, although some data goes back before EB surveys to incorporate European Community studies and occasionally United States Information Agency findings. New accessions are generally included in the surveys either before or swiftly after joining the Communities. However, EU10/12 country sets are often used instead of EU12/15 groupings, as often only a small number of observations over time are available for the new member states.

2.3. Public Opinion Trends

In the following subsections I detail public support towards the EU as it is expressed principally in the EB survey questions selected and discussed above. The principal distinction I make is by diffuse and specific support. I also look at support for some of the specific issues comprising part of the integrative project. Within each of these categories I provide a snapshot of support, before identifying differences by question, over time and at the aggregate and country level. I finish with an analysis of the permissive consensus in the light of the trends in support identified in the preceding sections.

2.3.1. Diffuse Support

Figure 2.1. Diffuse Net Support Indicators among EU 10 and EU 15 Countries (EB 1973-2000)



Figure 2.1. provides a general overview of 'net support' for integration over time as measured by diffuse indictors (1), (2) and (3). Net support is calculated by subtracting negative response category results from positive result category findings. 'Don't know' or neutral response categories are hence not considered. For the period 1973-1993 the data covers the first ten European Community entrants (EU 10). From 1995-2000 EU 15 data is included for question (2)[24]. Country-level graphs for questions (1), (2) and (3) are presented in section A.1. of the Appendix.

Although one would be hard-pressed today to agree with Slater's view that that there is a 'vast reservoir of public support' for integration, positive net support is clearly very high (Slater writing in Tsoukalis, 1983, p.74). Between questions, however, support varies considerably. I interpret these differences as supporting the remarks made in section 2.2.4.

[24] For question (3) there is no EU 15 data for the period 1995-2000, while for question (1) there are only three data points so that I exclude this data here. All the aggregate level EU data are weighted by population in the Eurobarometer surveys. These weightings are adjusted over time to account for population changes.

that the most diffuse, positively-worded questions achieve the highest support levels[25]. From figure 2.1. we see that Question (1) has the highest net support results, providing evidence for the view that it represents a theoretical maximum of support for integration. Question (1) also appears to show notably less volatility than the other diffuse support questions. Then follows question (2), more specific insofar as it names the European Union as the instrument of regional unification. Question (3) has the lowest net support results, which come from a higher proportion of respondents answering that they would be 'relieved' if the EU was scrapped than answer that they believe membership is a good thing. This suggests a possible 'yea-saying' effect from respondents. Then, from figure 2.6. in section 2.3.2. net support for the 'utilitarian' question (4) is, as expected, lower than net support for question (3). While the affective/utilitarian split forms a useful conceptual device, we should nevertheless be wary of overattributing differences in support to this divide. For instance, the difference in support between diffuse questions (1) and (3) – 24 percentage points in 1990 – is greater than that between questions (3) and (4) – 10 percentage points.

Turning again to figure 2.1., there are a number of trends in support over time broadly echoed in all the survey questions. Niedermayer and Sinnott propose a useful schema to fully illuminate the significance of changes in support (1991, p. 57). Here, 'Europeanisation' of public opinion occurs if net support is increasing and 'nationalisation' denotes a decline in net support. To avoid any confusion of 'nationalisation' with nationalism and the theories of support that I introduce later in the thesis, I use the term 'anti-Europeanisation' instead. The authors note that Europeanisation can occur due to a shift from indifference (where the EB question gives this response category) or negative evaluations into positive categories. However, net support can also increase if positive support is unchanged, and negative support is transformed into indifference, or even if positive support declines and negative support declines further. Anti-Europeanisation can be explained by a combination of the opposite set of mechanisms.

The first of these trends is an anti-Europeanisation shift that reaches a trough with the three diffuse indicators in around 1981. This picture is confirmed by looking at plates (1), (2) and

[25] This ties in with Hurwitz and Peffley's notion that the more value-laden the question matter the higher and more stable the findings (1987; see also section 7.2.).

(3) in section A.1. of the appendix[26]. Figure 2.2. below shows all question (2) response categories for the EU 10, so that the decrease in net support can be attributed to a shift out of positive evaluations primarily into the negative category[27]. It is interesting to note that there is some degree of congruence between public opinion and the 'eurosclerosis' theory of integration, which posits that the 1970s and early 1980s were a period of integrative stagnation and dissatisfaction with the European Communities (Nelson and Stubb, 1998, p. 237).

Figure 2.2. Question (2) – EU 10 (EB 1973-1993)



In contrast with the preceding period, the 1980s is a time of swelling support, rising to a peak in around 1990 or 1991, depending on the indicator used. According to question (2), the indicator showing most variation, net support fell 39% from a peak in the second half of 1975 to the first half of 1981. However, from 1981 to the first half of 1991 net support increased by 91%. By the first half of 1991 there is only a 3 percentage point gap (66%-63%) between

[26] Country plates (1) and (3) in section A.1. of the appendix uses European Community and United States Information Agency studies to provide pre-1973 data for questions (1) and (3) in the case of the earliest six members of the European Community. The chief findings are that while German public opinion was more favourable towards unification in the 1950s and 1960s than in the late 70s, the French and Italian publics were originally far less 'European'. This gap progressively narrowed so that by 1975 support levels of all three countries were fairly similar; Italy even being more positive than Germany by 1975 on question (3) data. Inglehart explains the narrowing phenomenon by arguing that Communist supporters in France and Italy, initially hostile to unification efforts, were won over with the 1954 failure of the European Defence Community and the increasingly manifest benefits to workers (1970, p.168).

[27] Support decreased ten percentage points from the 2nd half of 1978 to the first half of 1981. Seven of these percentage points were redistributed to the negative category and the remaining three to the neutral category.

question (1) and (2), implying that this was the period in which support for the Community came closest to its theoretical maximum.

Plates (1), (2) and (3) show that the picture for individual countries is more varied and indeed imply that the strong trends visible can be explained by some sets of countries rather than others. There appears a distinction in the data between countries where support jumps rapidly over the 1980s (Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Spain and Portugal), countries where support increases reasonably (France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy) and countries in which support is level or even decreases slightly (Germany)[28]. Clearly, the last two sets of countries comprise the original six member states of the European Communities.

As the obverse to the decrease in the 1970s and early 1980s, both indifferent and net support categories increase with the decrease in negative opinions. Interestingly, indifferent responses also begin to decrease from the mid-1980s while net support continues to rise upwards. This suggests that over this extended 'boom' in support, many respondents at first hostile to the EU become indifferent as an intermediate stage to being supportive, in this way sustaining the increase in net support.

The third distinct trend in support visible in figure 2.1. is a spell of anti-Europeanisation that begins around 1990 and bottoms out in 1997. The low-point is slightly lower than for the previous low at the beginning of the 1980s. At the country-level there is an almost across-the-board reduction in net support. The exceptions are Ireland, where net support continues relentless upwards and Luxembourg, where support remains reasonably constant over the period. Probably the most controversial episode over this period with relevance to public opinion was the June 1992 negative Danish referendum result on accession to the Maastricht Treaty. According to questions (2) and (3), Danish net support for integration reached a peak in the second half of 1992 before then declining. This suggests that the referendum result cannot be agglomerated with the downward trend in support over this period. Franklin,

[28] Further intra-question analysis reveals that there was such a 'boom' in net support during some periods of the 1980s that for Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands question (2) outpaced question (1). On the view that question (1) is a theoretical ceiling for underlying support, it could be argued question (2) net support figures represent, in stock-market parlance, 'irrational exuberance'. In other words, question (2) net support is partially explicable in terms of short-term factors that do not coincide with underlying attitudes. Indeed, question (2) net support quickly returns below question (1) levels for these countries in the 1990s. So, there is also evidence of the expectation in section 2.2.4. that question (1) should display less variation than more specific measures of support.

Marsh and McLaren attempt to explain the Danish referendum result largely within a domestic politics framework, and rationalise this by adapting the 'second-order election' thesis of Reif and Schmitt to referenda (1994). On this approach, it may be that political parties can more easily make capital out of inter-national transfers than out of intra-national flows, while voters may take the opportunity to express a general protest against the government.

The latest visible pattern in aggregate net support is for a small, unsustained recovery from the 1997 low. The various country-level permutations to this picture means that there appears no overriding trend in support either positively or negatively. On the basis of April-May 2000 (EB 53) data, one might roughly distinguish three country groups: high-support countries comprising Belgium (52%), Greece (53%), Spain (61%), Ireland (69%), Italy (51%), Luxembourg (69%), Netherlands (67%), Portugal (59%), mid-support countries including Denmark (29%), Germany (26%) and Finland (18%) and the low-support countries UK (1%), Austria (8%), Sweden (-4%). So, we can see that Sweden and not the UK as popularly supposed is the most negative EU member state. Indeed, all the 1995 Union entrants are not particularly enthusiastic members of the Union. I also note that for all the noisy hostility surrounding the Maastricht referendum, on the whole the Danish are more favourable towards the EU than the Germans.

We have seen above that support for integration varies not just over time and by country, but also between earlier and later entrants to the EU. This becomes clearer if we look at the figures below that display levels of net support by question, and then by date of accession to the EU.

Figure 2.3. Question (1) – Net Support EU 6/10/12/15 (EB 1978-1997)



Figure 2.4. Question (2) – Net Support EU 6/10/12/15 (EB 1978-2000)



Figure 2.5. Question (3) – Net Support EU 6/10/12 (EB 1971-1995)



One can see a difference between the higher levels of net support for EU 6 countries and lower net support for EU 10/12 countries. Relatively large in the 1970s, the support 'boom' of the 1980s meant that the gap between the psychological 'core' of early entrants and the 'periphery' of later entrants dwindled to almost nothing by the early 1990s[29]. Of course, divisions in support by country still exist: beginning in chapter three I review the many theories that purport to explain inter-country support variations.

[29] If one removes the EU 6 from the EU 10/12 indicators, net support levels are marginally higher for the (EU 10/12 – EU 6) countries by the early 1990s.

2.3.2. Utilitarian Support

Figure 2.6. Question (4) – Net Support EU 10/12/15 (EB 1983-2000)



Figure 2.6. displays net support for integration for question (4) by EU 10, EU12 and EU 15 member states. Although the time series commences later than the diffuse net support indicators, we can pick out the same post-1983 trends visible in figure 2.1. Some of the country-level findings also mirror those reported in section 2.3.1. Over the course of the 1980s, several of the newer Union members, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal have enjoyed a strong growth in positive evaluations, often surpassing their own net support levels for question (1) or the net support of other EU 6 countries for question (4). Net support for question (4) in Denmark also exceeds net support for questions (1) – (3).

As anticipated in section 2.2.4. question (4) mean net support levels are the lowest of all the questions. Eight of the fifteen EU member states have reported negative net support figures at some time over the 1990s. From a casual look at plate (4) in section A.1. of the appendix, it seems that many of those countries with high net support levels are outlying states that have benefited from monetary transfers at the expense of some of the bigger members such as Germany, where net support is correspondingly weaker. Continuing this speculative line of argument, it may well be that while inter-country transfers do not provoke upset,

integration has not yet reached that point where inter-member state transfers are uncontentious (see Slater, 1983, p. 75; section 2.3.3.). So, the low levels of support for question (4) in some countries could be seen as an international manifestation of a familiar domestic politics problem; while people may be prepared to express high levels of support for the ideals behind European integration, when it comes to making personal sacrifices to support these ideals support evaporates. Utilitarian explanations of support are discussed at length in sections 3.2. and 3.3.

2.3.3. Support by Issue

In this section I provide an overview of levels of support by issue. To do this, I use question (10) data from EB32 (1989) and EB49 (1998) to examine respondents' opinions on whether a particular issue should be tackled at the European or National level.

Table 2.3. Degree of Europeanisation towards Specific Policy Issues

Categorising Issues by popularity

	EB39 Net Support		EB49 Net Support
High Europeanisation	*(for EC)*	*High Europeanisation*	*(for EU)*
Science/Tech Co-op	61	Humanitarian Aid	55
Humanitarian Aid	61	Anti-drug fight	49
Foreign Policy	42	Foreign policy	49
Environment	38	Science/Tech Co-op	45
		Currency	37
Moderate Europeanisation		Regional redistribution	33
		Environment	30
Currency	22		
V.A.T. rules	15	*Moderate Europeanisation*	
Broadcasting/press rules	4		
Defence	1	Immigration policy	20
		Political Asylum rules	19
Anti-Europeanisation		Info. On EU	13
		Unemployment Policy	12
Data protection	-7	Agriculture and fishing	8
Worker's representation	-16	Defence	6
Health and Social Welfare	-19		
Education	-28	*Anti-Europeanisation*	
		Fight against poverty	-8
		Health and Social Welfare	-25

In table 2.3. I present levels of net support for a series of policies. Following Sinnott, I make a rudimentary attempt to divide support into three categories: high Europeanisation (≥30 net support) , moderate Europeanisation (>0, <30 net support) and anti-Europeanisation (≤0 net support) (1999). Between the two surveys one can see a fair degree of consistency, only currency moves from moderate Europeanisation to high Europeanisation, and regulation of the media and press moves from moderate Europeanisation to anti-Europeanisation.

Table 2.4. Changes Over Time in Issue Europeanisation

How has support changed for issues over time?		
	1989 (EB32)	1998 (EB49)
Issue	*Net Support for EC*	*Net Support for EU*
Defence	1	6
Environment	38	30
Currency	22	37
Humanitarian Aid	61	55
Health and Social Welfare	-19	-25
Education	-28	-24
Broadcasting/press rules	4	-12
Science/Tech Co-op	61	45
Foreign Policy	42	49
Average	20.2	17.9

Table 2.4. offers a clearer insight into how opinions on the nine issues in common between the surveys have changed. Average support for the nine issues is down between the surveys, and there are sizeable drops in support for Broadcasting and Media, Environmental, Humanitarian Aid and Science and Technology co-operation policies. On the other hand, 'Europeanised' Foreign policy and Currency programs have seen a good deal more support. I note that the content of these issues has doubtless changed over time, so that strictly speaking the surveys do not compare like with like. For instance, in 1989 the context for the Currency issue was the loose shackles of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM); nowadays twelve of fifteen states are participating in complete monetary union.

Figure 2.7. EB 49 (1998) Net Support for Europeanised Defence



Before we adjudge that there is strong EU support for a certain policy, it is as wise to bear in mind national differences. Figure 2.7. shows the respective position for each member state vis-à-vis Defence using EB 49 data. Moreover, despite the specific nature of this question there is a suspiciously low 6% rate of 'Don't Know' responses (see also Sinnott, 1999, p. 11)[30]. There is also some inconsistency between responses. Table 2.3. shows that there is a clear support for helping out regions in difficulty, yet only moderate support for a Europeanised approach to unemployment policy. It is hard to believe that this disparity is accounted for by the publics' preference for macroeconomic regional aid over microeconomic individual level aid. The implication is that many positive or negative responses may actually reflect non-attitudes. I go on to investigate non-attitudes in the European Union at length in section 7.3.

2.4. Evaluating the Permissive Consensus

Introduced by Lindberg and Scheingold in *Europe's Would-Be Polity*, the permissive consensus is a term designed to explain the ability of "national and [European] Community decision-makers...to operate relatively freely without encountering significant opposition"

[30] The full question wording is "The European Union should have a common defence and security policy".

(1970, p. 121). With the theoretical deficiencies of the permissive consensus already touched upon in section 1.3.2., I am now in a position to evaluate the empirical evidence for its existence both currently or over the past few decades.

Before testing the permissive consensus empirically we must first operationalise it. In fact, Lindberg and Scheingold's statement quoted in the paragraph above is no more than an interpretation of descriptive empirical evidence. The authors used a raft of indicators to show that systemic support for the Community apparatus was broadly greater than for identitive support amongst both masses and elite figures. Secondly, the basis of Community support was more strongly utilitarian than affective. In this section I focus on the more important systemic measures of support, not least because Eurobarometer questions (1) – (4) appear to fall under this definition. Of the affective indicators, Lindberg and Scheingold use question (1) data from 1957 and 1962 to show that affective support for systemic integration in France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain was at least 50-60%, while dissatisfaction was only around 5-10% (1970, p. 59). To measure utilitarian support the authors take a 1957 and 1962 survey question asking whether the respondent approves or disapproves of the Common Market idea: for France, Germany and Italy support ranged between 60-85% while for Great Britain support was limited around the 40% mark (1970, p. 56). So, high affective and higher utilitarian systemic support for the Community forms the mainstay of the permissive consensus. Because Lindberg and Scheingold only use two data points, it may not have occurred to them to add that for a permissive consensus to exist, support must surely be relatively stable over time, with no sharp downturns. One might also speculate that the notion of a permissive consensus implies if not indifference then lukewarm support towards the Community; respondents are surely not supposed to care too much.

With reference to the affective basis of the permissive consensus, taking evidence from question (1) shows that the theory would seem to hold, although I argue that this rather leads one to question the suitability of the question. From figure 2.1. we can see that net support, which subtracts negative from positive responses, hovers around 60% for most of the lifetime of the question. Meanwhile, from plate (1) we can see that if not for Germany and Great Britain, for the other members of the original six (except Belgium), the Iberian countries, Ireland and Greece net support was even higher than 60% in the mid-1990s. However, question (1) is not an ideal measure of support for further integration of the EU. In the first

instance, from section 2.3.4. we know that question (1) contains no indifferent or undecided response category, possibly exaggerating the number of positive responses. More pertinently, support for the idea of unifying Western Europe is clearly vaguer than support of the European Communities. In figure 2.1. we see that support for question (2), that specifies the EU as the motor of integration, is far lower than that for question (1).

The net support levels for questions (4) sit rather uneasily with the central piece of evidence in Lindberg and Scheingold's argument; that utilitarian support for the Common market was even higher than affective support (1970, p. 56). Despite a reference to the Common Market in the question wording, it is clear from figure 2.6. that net support levels are far lower than the reference figures of Lindberg and Scheingold. This fits the pattern of the findings in this chapter, that utilitarian support for integration enjoys less popularity than affective support (see also Shepherd, 1975, p. 93-125 and Hewstone, 1986, p. 138). I note that we are not entirely comparing like with like: Question (4) asks if respondents have 'benefited' from the EC and the Common Market, while the question used by Lindberg and Scheingold merely asks if the respondent is in favour of the Common Market 'idea'. Yet the former question is surely a more appropriate measure of utilitarian support. Moreover, although the term 'Common Market' is dropped entirely from question (4) from EB 35 (1991), by this time the Common Market was subsumed within a bigger whole, no more a measure of utilitarian support for the EU overall than support for the EURO today[31].

Evidence from aggregate level trends also does much to dent the permissive consensus theory from the 1970s onwards. Even if we are not yet able to make a judgement on the motivations behind these trends, the various 'Europeanisation' and 'anti-Europeanisation' shifts in public opinion demonstrate that European publics have evaluated integration responsively from at least the 1970s. Even in 1981, the downturn in net support from the peak of 1975 exceeded 20% for question (2), for the 1980s and 1990s the downturn from peak to trough was over 30%. This rather goes against the findings of Lindberg and Scheingold that even during crises in the integrative process, such as de Gaulle's vetoes of British entry and the empty chair crisis, public support for the Community failed to weaken and even strengthened on

[31] Feld and Wildgen analyse public opinion on particular policy areas to determine whether, and to what extent a permissive consensus exists (1976). They find, as I do in table 2.3., that some policies carry more consensus than others. I would argue, however, that this approach is no substitute for taking an overall opinion on Europe, rather than of its parts.

occasion (1970, p. 254)[32]. In addition, throughout the 1970s a series of (often contentious) national referenda lead to Denmark, the UK and Ireland joining and Norway rejecting membership of the European Communities.

So, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that the permissive consensus never existed. There are, however, some country-level exceptions to this rule. The best example is Ireland, where support has not only been rather high, but grown even during the 1990s. Similarly, support has been very high and stable in Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands for many decades. Moreover, there have been trend periods in aggregate support, such as in the 1980s, where to all intents and purposes support was high enough to speak of a temporary permissive consensus. Dating the end of this period of permissive consensus has in this way become a matter open to considerable interpretation. Many commentators only speak of a definitive end to the permissive consensus after the Maastricht treaty, with the subsequent referenda in Ireland, France and Denmark and absence of a return to the support levels of the 1980s[33]. Reif believes that there was a consensus, but that it began to erode before the signing of the Maastricht treaty, and as early as 1987/8 in Italy and France (lecture given at the University of California, Berkeley, 03/05/2000). Finally, Gabel unequivocally states that the permissive consensus was an erroneous construct relying on inflated survey measures of support (1998, p. 112). I argue that the evidence from this section can be used to confirm Gabel's interpretation that there has been no consensus, albeit with the exception of particular countries. The closest one comes to evidence of a permissive consensus in this thesis is the suggestion from section 2.3.3. that non-attitudes towards integration have, and occasionally still do, allow governments, as Lindberg and Scheingold speculated, to operate freely towards Europe without public interference (see section 7.2. for a theoretical discussion of non-attitudes). In this case the 'permissive' consensus is surely a misnomer, as it hardly befits non-attitude holders to give their permission to integrative advances.

[32] Franklin and Wlezien argue that these trend movements can be explained by public preferences towards EU policy levels (1997; see also section 3.2.). The authors demonstrate that, since 1981, as lines of EU legislation increase as measured in the Official Journal, relative preferences for policy decreases. Relative preferences for policy are measured by question (2). The idea that the public respond to the volume of legislation seems intuitively unappealing. Setting aside statistical issues, problems of ignorance concerning the number of lines of legislation arise, and the issue of quality as opposed to quantity of legislation is not dealt with. Nevertheless, such a theory is in firm contrast to any permissive consensus.

[33] As Franklin, Marsh and McLaren argue, "Maastricht pushed the 'permissive consensus' regarding Europe beyond its limits" (1994, 458-9). Ancillary to this viewpoint is the belief that the 1992 Single European Market forced firms to compete and hence brought the issue of jobs and wages right down to the level of the public.

2.5. Conclusion

I am mainly concerned in this chapter with charting aggregate and country-level trends in public opinion on European integration since the 1970s. I show that there have been three distinct trend periods in net support. Although in recent years support has not regained the heights of the 1980s, it must be remembered that the scope of integration has expanded hugely, so that the Union itself is a very different creature. For much of the period surveyed there was a significant difference in support between EU 6 countries and newer entrants. The social learning effect implied is a useful corollary to explanations of support that will be discussed in the next chapter.

This chapter also tackles many other topics. The significance of non-attitudes is broached, although a full treatment of this topic must wait until chapter seven. The combined evidence of non-attitudes and trends in support leads me to the conclusion that while the permissive consensus as defined by Lindberg and Scheingold has not held since at least the mid-1970s, there are segments of the population in every country who prefer to let national leaders get on European Union issues unhindered. I also argue that survey data on public support for integration provides an appropriate measure of the legitimacy role performed by the public. To understand public support I adopt Niedermayer and Westle's model of respondents' orientations towards objects to single out an affective and utilitarian dimension to evaluations of support for integration. This division is re-employed in the subsequent chapter as a means of characterising various explanations of support.

3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE TACKLING ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTEGRATION

3.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

In this chapter I review the most pertinent attempts to explain attitudes towards integration using survey data. On the back of this review I then look to identify any gaps in the literature, so that in the following chapter I can turn my hunches into empirically testable hypotheses. The literature review is also invaluable in drawing attention to control variables to be included in future empirical analyses of support.

There are two dimensions used to inform the structure of this chapter. The first is based on the affective/utilitarian split defined in section 2.2.2. and present throughout the thesis. Secondly, I dichotomise between explanations that potentially affect all members of the public in or between particular nations and those concerned more with private groupings of individuals either within or across countries. Essentially, this is an analogous division to that between public and private opinion marked out in section 1.2. So, while all EURO-zone citizens are potentially affected by European Central Bank decisions on the level of interest rates, only certain, private groups of farmers would be directly affected by changes to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). These two dimensions to support can be used to construct a matrix, visible in table 3.1. below. For utilitarian explanations of support, public and private divisions are labelled respectively as 'general' (cost-benefit issues impacting upon all members of the public) or 'specific' (cost-benefit issues having an effect on only certain groups of people). For the affective dimension, public explanations of support might include such factors as national identity, while private explanations would look to invoke societal cleavages or special interests. I proceed below to cover explanations for integration in a systematic way based on this graphic.

Table 3.1. Square Matrix of Support for Integration

	Utilitarian	Affective
Public	General factors (section 3.2.)	National Traditions (section 3.5)
Private	Specific factors (section 3.3.)	Social Forces (section 3.4.)

By way of a caveat, this table is simply a tool to give structure to the multifarious explanations of support. It is emphatically not designed or even able to neatly categorise every conceivable explanation of support; indeed, one could conceive of many points of dispute. In the first instance, some explanations of attitudes towards integration do not fit neatly into the two-way matrix outlined. This holds true for non-attitudes, of which I reserve treatment until chapter seven. Secondly, it may not be clear into which category a particular variable belongs. The analysis of gender in section 3.4. reveals that while men's attitudes are at least partially determined by 'traditional role' values, for women evaluations of economic benefits are more important.

In summary, it is incontrovertible that many of the instrumental and affective approaches discussed below have some merit, despite the specific failings of certain variables or methods. It is not the aim of this thesis to discredit existent research into explanations of support or indeed to provide an exhaustive summary of the evidence available for each and every possible hypothesis. Nevertheless, I do make the point that existent theories of support, not least theories adopting a utilitarian approach, cannot explain all variation in support. Solely as an example of this failure, I draw attention in section 3.5. to persistent inter-country differences in support that remain in the data. I then attempt to complement previous micro-level research by drawing attention to national identity and tolerance as hitherto underrated

and understudied sources of affective attitudes towards integration. Specifically, I focus on European and national identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism.

3.2. National Economies

In this section we are concerned with the public, utilitarian area of table 3.1. I focus on explanations of support located at the international and then national level, principally EU budget dispensations, the level of intra-EU trade and national macroeconomic performance. Some of the more sophisticated empirical research shows net EU budget receipts and especially EU trade to be significant in explaining support (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 1997, 2000; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998). However, both factors fail to explain the fall in support in the early 1990s or to take much account of respondents' perceptions, preferring instead to rely on objective measures of budget and trade levels unlikely to trip off the tongue. Macroeconomic variables are able to explain cyclical changes in support, although it is unclear whether this is due to a domestic 'feelgood' factor affecting support for integration or a more rational evaluation of the EU based on its role as guarantor of price stability.

From 2.2.2., utilitarian explanations of support suppose a response based on some perceived economic or political interest such as higher living standards. We can seek to refine this definition by including the concept of a payoff, where this invokes the idea that an agent will change his or her behaviour in the expectation of future returns. In the context of support for integration, then, theorists in the utilitarian tradition expect citizens to evaluate the European Union and integration process on the basis of certain tangible costs and benefits and expectations thereof, where to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs citizens are willing to support integration.

Moving on to investigate international explanations of support, I begin with the EU budget. On the most straightforward account, Bosch and Newton hypothesise that aggregate support is higher in countries that receive direct support in the form of a net surplus from the EU budget. Bosch and Newton use Ardy's (1988) calculations of average net budget receipts for the EC 10 countries from 1982-4, and contrast these figures with question (2) support figures.

With Ireland and Greece coming sixth and seventh respectively in terms of levels of support, but receiving by far the highest net payments, there is little obvious pattern in the results (Niedermayer and Sinnot, 1995, p. 80). The authors, however, appear to be labouring under the misapprehension that the EU does not publish net budget figures and instead have to be calculated painstakingly. Since at least 1982 figures for net contributions and receipts have been presented in the Court of Auditors annual report. In fact, despite a number of anomalies, there would appear to be a basic, positive association between support and budget receipts. In figure 3.1. I plot mean net support (question (4)) for EB 49 and 50 against absolute net receipts (€ bn) from the 1998 EU budget[1].

Figure 3.1. 1998 EB Net Support (Question (4)) vs. Net Balance (€bn)



We can consider a number of modifications to the basic Bosch and Newton hypothesis. erry Wynn MEP proposes a change to the formula for calculating net contributions. Here, gricultural levies and customs duties collected by states are removed from net contribution gures on the grounds that they are really part of the Community's own resources. This voids the 'Rotterdam effect' whereby the vast volume of EU imports passing through the ort unfairly bolsters the Netherlands budget contribution (European Voice, 1998). Figure 2. shows that recalculating net receipts to remove own resources does not significantly alter e broadly positive association between support and receipts demonstrated in figure 3.1.

Question (4), which I argue in section 3.2.3. draws on more utilitarian attitudes, is used then in preference to question (2). s surprising that Bosch and Newton use question (2) data as the basis for their comparison with net budget figures, given it they too accept that question (4) "comes closest to asking about specific support" (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.).

Figure 3.2. 1998 EB Net Support (Question (4)) vs. Wynn-Adjusted Net Balance (€bn)



The original hypothesis for net receipts makes no allowance for how much individual countries are willing and able to pay. Clearly, Germany, while the largest net 'loser' from the EU budget, is more able to afford large contributions than many other countries. Taking net receipts as a percentage of national income could resolve this, and indeed this definition is used by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 1997; 2000), and Anderson and Reichert (1996) in their articles examined below. Secondly, the net benefits figures available from the Court of Auditors only take account of direct payments from community funds to individuals of a particular member state. No mention is made in these calculations of the indirect benefits of EU membership, more complex to calculate but generally more sizeable. The Cecchini report estimated the benefits of the removal of 'static' non-tariff barriers to trade by the SEA at approximately 4.5% of Community GDP. This figure is, however, potentially dwarfed by the dynamic benefits arising from economies of scale and competitive pressures over the longer term (Cecchini, 1998, p. 97). On this methodology, Smith and Wanke estimate the real beneficiaries of the Single Market to be the northern states and in particular Germany, precisely those countries that at present shoulder a greater burden of the EU budget (1992, p. 551). Without greater consideration of the distributional consequences of dynamic economic benefits, EU budget analysis is heavily biased.

Plotting support against net budget receipts is also no substitute for more rigorous statistical analysis: the positive association shown to exist in figure 3.1. could possibly be accounted for

by a third, missing variable. Moreover, the reverse hypothesis may be true; more pro-European nations might be willing to make larger budget contributions. The evidence from researchers using more statistically advanced methods is mixed. Eichenberg and Dalton conceptualise net support as the result of a number of economic and political variables, each operating either at the national or international level (1993, p.520)[2]. The authors take the first nine EC member states (minus Luxembourg) and pooled time series data from 1976-89 Eurobarometer surveys and estimate an Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) model for an average net support dependent variable constructed from question (2). Their 'EC budget return' factor fails to achieve statistical significance in any of the models they test. Anderson and Reichert construct Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression models using question (2) data from three separate EB surveys at different points in time (1982, 1986 and 1990). As well as a Budget Return variable constructed from the relevant Court of Auditors reports, their model includes variables for age, gender, farmers, income, education, postmaterialism and EC-trade, of which more later. Their results show that for the 1982 and 1990 time-periods the EC budget return did significantly affect support (Anderson and Reichert, 1996, p. 241). The impact of the EC budget return, however, is small (coefficient 0.1 (1982), t-ratio 9.6). Even a EU budget surplus amounting to the relatively large figure of 2% of GDP would only be associated with an increase in support of 0.2 on the response scale of 0 (membership a 'bad thing') to 2 (ã 'good thing').

For the final word in this discussion, however, I note that the EU budget effect is unable to explain cyclical variations in net support, while net receipt figures are an attempt to deal objectively with what is in many ways a subjective issue. As is, the net receipts hypothesis assumes that some critical proportion of citizens is aware either of the figures or the direct effects of the EU budget. However, if it supposedly requires calculations to be made on the basis of a Court of Auditors report to arrive at the net figures it seems absurd to argue that the public is aware of this issue. In this light it seems rather tongue-in-cheek of Eichenberg and Dalton to suggest that factors such as the 'Thatcher effect' of publicising the budget debate mean that citizens throughout the EU are aware of the intricacies of this issue (1995, p.524).

[2] The model constructed includes inflation, unemployment and GDP (national economic factors); intra-EC exports, EC budget return (international economic factors); a measure of Soviet-US conflict (East-West conflict), variables to measure the impact of the UK referendum, the Danish and Irish Single European Act (SEA) referendum and the 1979 European Parliament direct elections (international political factors); finally there are variables included attempting to capture 'national traditions' of support in the UK, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy and France. The R^2 for the model is 0.72.

Ultimately, we are really grappling with subjective perceptions or expectations towards budget returns; not so far an issue covered in public opinion surveys. Secondly, while the EU budget effect may be able to explain relative, inter-country support it is not suited to predicting absolute levels of support for integration. Without a contraction in the budget it is unclear, for example, on what basis there was a downturn in support over the 1990s (see figure 2.1. in section 2.3.1.).

The empirical strength of the relationship between inter-country trade and support is probably the strongest in the payoff literature. Eichenberg and Dalton include in their regression equation a variable that measures the level of intra-EC exports as a proportion of total exports, where the hypothesis is that a growth in the proportion of EC exports is a stimulus to pro-European sentiment. With the overall share of intra-EC exports growing from 34% of total EC exports in 1960 to 60% in 1988, and taking a coefficient value of 0.38 (t-ratio 3.5) this translates into an almost 10% increase in the dependent variable, average net support for question (2) (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, p. 523). The same model, applied to the original six member states (minus Luxembourg) and the three newer members (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) demonstrates a greater effect for the latter group of countries (coefficient 1.15; t-ratio 10.34). Eichenberg and Dalton speculate that this is down to the 'learning curve' effect of Community membership (1993, p. 527; see also section 3.5.). In a later paper aimed an extending their earlier findings to include the years 1973-1996, the authors find the same positive effect of EC trade on support and differential between the Original 6 and the later three entrants, albeit with reduced coefficients in both cases (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1997). Similarly, Anderson and Reichert include a variable measuring the percentage of a country's total external trade (imports plus exports) that is conducted with other member states. This trade variable achieves significance in two out of the three years tested in their model (1986 and 1990). The impact of trade in this model, however, is relatively small (coefficient 0.002 (1986), t-ratio 5.2). If a country's trade with the EU increased from 0% to 60% of its total trade, the impact on support would have been 0.12 on a question (2) response scale ranging from 0 to 2.

In a separate approach, Gabel bases his explanations for EU support on the premise that judgement is made by citizens only in terms of the policies that the EU has enacted (the 'policy appraisal' model). This approach, then, credits respondents with more sophistication

than "merely checking the economic thermometer and adjusting their opinions of integration accordingly" (Gabel, 1998, p. 38). Gabel uses pooled cross-sectional EB question data from 1975-1992, combined with OECD economic datasets where appropriate, to arrive at an OLS regression equation modelling variations in support. For ease of interpretation the dependent variable, EU support, is a normalised version of question (2), to give a (non-continuous) index of support running from 0 to 100. Gabel tests several individual-level utilitarian explanations of support (see section 3.3.), however he also tries to explain support through the impact of integration on national economies. Specifically, Gabel tests for the effects of EU trade dependence (the ratio of a nation's intra-EU import and exports to GDP), where as this ratio grows, the benefits for the national economy grow and hence the propensity to support integration grows. Gabel also hypothesises that for nations whose industries are uncompetitive internationally, benefits and support will be correspondingly lower. This is operationalised by looking at a nation's intra-EU trade balance divided by population, where support is positively related to this variable. The same regression equation includes a number of country dummies and two further variables. The first variable is 'war deaths', measured by the number of civil and military casualties per 1000 population on 1939 population data from World War II, along with an interaction term to estimate the impact of time on the relevance of security concerns in EU citizens' utilitarian evaluations of integration. This tests the hypothesis that support is a function of the threat of national destruction a war would entail (the security hypothesis). The second hypothesis makes the case that for citizens who support a democratic capitalist political system, the EU has benefited the stability of this system (the political stability hypothesis). This is measured by creating a pro-stability dummy variable from a measure of political allegiance, and so dividing respondents into "opponents" or "supporters" of democratic capitalism. An interaction term consists of the pro-stability variable multiplied by the level of electoral opposition to democratic capitalism as measured by averaging the percentage support won by anti-system parties over the last two elections relative to the year the respondent was surveyed. Gabel's results confirm all the hypotheses except that relating to political stability. Nevertheless, the effects of the trade hypotheses on support are not major; a single standard deviation increase in a nation's intra-EU trade dependence (25.9% of GDP) is associated with a 2.85 average increase in his support index. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in a nation's intra-EU trade balance ($51.29 per capita) is associated with a 2.97 average increase in support (Gabel, 1998, p. 85). Despite these and other studies pointing to the significance of intra-EU trade as

an explanatory factor in support (see also Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000), the fairly minor coefficient and absence of any contractions or marked slowdowns in intra-EU trade levels suggest that this group of hypotheses is unable to account for the sharp mid-1990s downturn in support.

We now move to consider a series of hypotheses deriving from national macroeconomic variables such as GDP, unemployment and inflation figures. This approach at least has the advantage of taking indicators about which citizens are surely more aware than EU net budget receipts and trade figures. To begin, Bosch and Newton put forward two hypotheses based on this approach; that "wealthier countries with stronger economies will be able to compete more effectively in a larger market and more open market" so promoting higher levels of support, and that "poorer countries think that they will gain most, in the long run, from the modernising effects of the EU" and they too will show higher levels of support (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.82). There are two points here, 'wealthier countries with stronger economies' is an incomplete idea. Stronger economies may well fare better under increased competition, but it is not clear on this account what a 'strong' economy is, and there is no reason presented for association of this concept with the wealthier countries of Europe. France is a relatively wealthy country, although whether its economy is 'strong' is debatable. It is also assumed, in the first hypothesis in particular, that further integration will be concomitant with some form of increased economic liberalisation. This is explicitly conceived as occurring in the first hypothesis through a 'larger market', so implying an increase in competition through 1992-style single market measures. The majority of such measures have already been enacted, so that many of the supposed economic benefits of future years, save a larger market through enlargement, will have to rest on alternative foundations. Economic arrangements such as a single currency may well have economic implications deleterious or advantageous to countries on a separate schema, unrelated to whether a country is wealthy or possesses a 'strong' economy. Finally, if both poorer and wealthier countries are supposed to gain from integration, it is hard to see where this leaves any explanatory principle. Either support increases because a nation is rich or because it is poor![3] The two co-existing hypotheses are meant to show that membership of the community

[3] One could argue that the poorer and wealthier countries, those countries at the extremes, are more likely to gain. Thus plotting countries on an x-axis from the poorest to the richest against support on the y-axis, would give a U-shape. However, it would be difficult to demonstrate such a relationship with the small sample of countries available. One might also argue that the effects on stronger and weaker economies would be felt over different time periods.

is not a zero-sum game in national economic terms; however it has been shown that in their present form testing one hypothesis demands that the other be ignored. Perhaps fortunately, Bosch and Newton announce that EC Question (2) support figures versus GDP per capita over the years 1975, 1980 and 1985 show only a random relationship (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.82)[4].

Other authors have greater success in demonstrating a link between macroeconomic measures of economic well-being and support. From section 2.4. Franklin and Wlezien argue that as lines of EU legislation increase relative preferences for policy decrease. Relative preferences for policy are measured by question (2). This is seen as a good proxy for relative preferences because as economic well being increases, a higher level of public expenditure is sanctioned. Question (2) for the EU from 1971-94 is plotted against a so-called 'misery index', the sum of EU unemployment and inflation rates, averaged across countries and weighted by population (1997, p. 354). From 1977-94, the two measures are in step to a remarkable degree (a correlation of 0.92) so that a high level of misery is associated with a low level of support. Given that question (2) is, after all, a measure of support for integration, it seems more likely that the link between macroeconomic variables and support is evidence that the public appraise integration according to national economic performance. Inglehart and Rabier demonstrate a correlation between national indices of industrial production and consumer prices and support for integration in the mid-1970s (1978, p. 74). In their study outlined above, Eichenberg and Dalton show that between 1976-88 a 1% increase in the inflation rate produces a decrease in net support across the community of almost 2% (coefficient –1.8, t-ratio –3.2) (1993, p.522). Unemployment and GDP figures fail to achieve statistical significance (see also Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000). In their Generalised Least Squares analysis of EB data from 1973-93, Anderson and Kaltenthaler show that inflation and unemployment affected support significantly, and as predicted, using question (2) data (1996, p. 189; see also Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett, 1996). Only Gabel pours cold water on any link between national macroeconomic conditions and support. On his 1975-1992 Eurobarometer model, GDP, unemployment and inflation are all significant, but they act in

[4] In the light of the 'feelgood' effect introduced below, it is regrettable that Bosch and Newton did not extend their macroeconomic variables to include, say, house prices. Milton Friedman's permanent income hypothesis splits consumer income into permanent and temporary categories, where consumption is mainly a function of the former more reliable source of income (Mankiw, 1992, p.410). An increase in house prices would serve to increase permanent income in a more direct way than, for instance, lower inflation or an increase in real GDP. This more concentrated effect could then be contrasted with support for the EU.

the opposite direction predicted. That it, as GDP rises, and inflation and unemployment fall, utilitarian support decreases (Gabel, 1998, p. 105). However, Anderson, who addresses subjective impressions of personal and national economic conditions rather than objective financial indicators, successfully manages to demonstrate a link between subjective economic conditions and support for integration in Eurobarometer 34.0 (1990) data.

It may be that the findings of Franklin and Wlezien and others can be taken as evidence that the EU benefits from a 'feelgood' effect based on the business cycle that spills over into the domain of EU support. In the domestic sphere it has long been contended by commentators, politicians and academics alike that strong national economic performance is associated with increased support for the government of the day[5]. This approach benefits from not requiring that people have any particular knowledge of, or hold the EU responsible for specific policies. Indeed, as the evidence below suggests, people might well consider the EU ancillary to national governments in the policy-making process. In common with the European Union's second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), could it be that support is second-order too?

For an alternative 'policy appraisal' perspective, citizens do not simply respond to national economic factors but are more sophisticated, instead judging the EU on the success of its many initiatives to maintain price stability. Indeed, the use of price stability as a measure to control adverse currency movements has been a highly visible feature of European policy-making since the 1972 'Snake'. In keeping with this view, many of the macroeconomic empirical findings reviewed above single out inflation as the macroeconomic variable most commonly linked with support. In addition, this approach allows us to make sense of the seemingly new 'Post-Maastricht' relationship between support and inflation of the 1990s: that is, as inflation decreased, so did support. This is a result of inflation control coming to be associated with unpopular domestic policies required to ensure adhesion to strict entry requirements to the third stage of EMU (Eichenberg, 2000; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000)[6].

[5] For a quantitative approach to relationship between economic conditions and evaluations of national governments see Lewis-Beck (1988). As an example, between 1960-84, the annual growth rate of real GDP correlates 0.63 with the percentage of the popular vote going to the party currently in the White House (Lewis-Beck, 1988, p. 10).

[6] Bednar, Ferejohn and Garrett argue that the post-Maastricht fall in support amongst the original EU6 countries can be explained by the switch from the unanimity rule born out of the Luxembourg Compromise to the majoritarianism introduced by the SEA and especially Maastricht (1996). The argument goes that these institutional changes have lessened the probability that integration will be in these core countries interests. As we have seen in chapter two, however, there does not appear to be a valid distinction between post-Maastricht 'core' and 'periphery' decreases in support.

The survey data is unclear as to whether respondents perceive the EU as responsible for price stability and are hence inclined to evaluate support according to the 'objective' reality of the situation, or if respondents evaluate the EU on the basis of 'feelgood' spillover effects or simply subjective perceptions of economic performance[7]. Gabel and Dalton draw our attention to Q. 134, Eurobarometer 22 (1984) which asks

(11) "Which one of the following do you think is the most important cause of the current economic problems in (your country)?" One answer only from worldwide recession, developments within (your country), American economic policies, Japanese economic policies, EEC economic policies, low cost imports from the less developed countries.

Only around 12% of respondents blamed the EEC for their current woes, compared to about 23% who look to internal developments, while 39% blamed adverse worldwide conditions and 16% the US[8]. It seems unlikely therefore that the European publics hold the EU primarily responsible for their nation's economic well-being. (Gabel and Dalton, 1995, p. 5). On the other hand, Niedermayer and Sinnot refer to Q. 271, Eurobarometer No. 27 (1987) which asks

(12) "What things, in your opinion, bring the countries of the European Community together most? Could you tell me by choosing from this list those which appear to be the most important ones" (the economic links that they have developed with one other; the efforts these countries make for peace in the world; the wish to form a counter-balance faced with domination by the superpowers; the democratic and humanitarian values they share; the need to unite their efforts in order to master the technologies of the future; their culture and their ways of life; the need to defend themselves against outside threats; other)

[7] Subjective perceptions of economic performance affect both the 'feelgood' and 'policy appraisal' models. Respondents might quibble over the level of inflation they feel exists, but they may also fail to associate the EU with, say, price stability (see Gabel and Whitten, 1997).

[8] Strictly speaking, respondents might see the EU as playing a larger role in positive economic developments than negative ones. This would mean that more people might be prepared to support the EU than express contrary attitudes towards it during times of good economic performance and hence we run the risk of underestimating the role of the EU in economic developments. However, I take the attitude here that the conclusions drawn in the main text from this question would most likely not be changed radically by this knowledge.

This data shows that most people (approximately 40% in both cases) answered in terms of 'the economy' or 'world peace' or both (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 77). On the limited and rather out-of-date evidence we have, then, it would seem that the EU is perceived as co-responsible, or perhaps as a lesser partner in economic policy-making. Although this evidence might be sufficient to argue that the public is unlikely to associate the EU with its lesser-known policies or effects, I would argue that this evidence is inconclusive in deciding between 'feelgood' effects, subjective perceptions or more rational evaluations of national macroeconomic conditions.

In summary, evidence of utilitarian impact on support at the general level is present, although muddied. The more sophisticated analyses of the EU trade and budget hypotheses suggest that these variables do have explanatory power. Nevertheless, they ignore subjective perceptions and cannot explain well cyclical variations in support, in particular the 1990s. National macroeconomic variables also seem to play an explanatory role, although here there is controversy over whether this represents subjective perceptions, a 'feelgood' reaction or a more reasoned response to EU attempts at price stability. Given the previous evidence of non-attitudes that would imply citizens lack the information to make rational economic calculations concerning the EU, let alone towards specific EU economic policies, I would argue that the role for expectations and perceptions rather than objective data appears underdeveloped.

3.3. Individual-level Payoffs

The utilitarian approach characterised as 'individual payoffs' in table 3.1. involves the examination of payoff support for integration amongst focused interest groups rather than whole nations. I maintain an open mind as to whether specific groups operate at the intra-national or trans-national level, although only the former option is specifically catered for under table 3.1. This section looks primarily at farmers' attitudes towards integration, where support is expected to vary over time and by nationality.

On the basis that the grouping that has most to gain (and lose) from the EU budget is farmers, their attitudes towards the EU are taken as a litmus test of the specific-utilitarian approach.

In 1998 the CAP swallowed 48.1% (ECU 38,810m) of the EU budget, far and away the largest budget allocation to any single policy (Official Journal of the European Communities C 349, 1999, p. xiv). That this money is often dispensed for reasons as simple as leaving fields idle would lend strong weight to the supposition that farmers display relatively greater support *ceteris paribus* towards the EU than other occupational groups.

However, there are problems with hypothesising that farmers will automatically translate their appreciation for subsidies into support for the EU. Although the CAP has for many years been one of the cornerstones of integration, European policy-maker attitudes have hardened towards it in recent years. A series of reforms have succeeded in cutting agricultural support as a percentage of EU GDP from circa 2.8% (1986-88) to approximately 1.6% (1999 estimates) (The Economist, 24th June 2000, p. 145). So, when looking at survey data, we might tentatively expect that farmers are relatively more supportive than other occupational groups either before the beginning of the substantive reform process in the mid-1980s or the more biting 1992 MacSharry reforms. One might further point out that the levels of subsidies maintained by individual nations such as Germany before the CAP were even higher as a percentage of GDP, so that certain national groupings might not be distressed at the thought of a return to national farm policies. Certainly, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland all maintain more generous regimes than the CAP (The Economist, 24th June 2000, p. 145). Nevertheless, it would be to go against all the evidence to suggest that farmer's groups were pressing for an end to the CAP in the aim of reaping more generous national subsidies. Less tenuously, the impact of the CAP is not homogenous, meaning that certain groupings of farmers are far more likely support it than others. Broadly, the CAP has favoured efficient northern producers over smaller southern farms, with arable crop support alone accounting for around 43% of European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) expenditure, the vehicle by which most CAP spending is funded. By contrast, typically southern and Mediterranean crops such as Olive oil (6.6%) and Tobacco (2.2 %) are not so heavily prioritised in the EAGGF (Official Journal of the European Communities C 349, 1999, p. xii). Hence, it may well be reasonable to differentiate support for the CAP by country.

Bosch and Newton first attempt to assess the impact of farmers upon support by comparing the balance of support for EU membership between farmers of the EU12 and other employed

people (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 97-99)[9]. Taking Eurobarometer data from between 1973 and 1992/3, farmers as a whole were marginally more supportive of EU membership than those in the non-agricultural sector until 1981. After this date their support was not statistically significantly different from others outside their sector. Inter-country differences were more marked, generally between farmers in France, Germany and Italy who were relatively less supportive than other people in employment, and between farmers in the smaller countries such as Denmark and Ireland who were more positive. These results would not seem to provide the clear evidence we are looking for regarding the impact of specific economic considerations on support.

Bosch and Newton then turn to regression analysis to assess specific explanations of support. Analysis is made using question (2) as the dependent variable and is on a country-by-country basis for the EU 12. Because some questions used in their analysis are posed only at irregular intervals, a maximum of seven separate years are taken for data analysis between 1973 and 1990 depending on the country. Included in the analysis are variables testing for farmers and fishermen taken together, social class, employment and family income[10]. Results are moderate, with individual variables generally explaining up to 30% of the proportion of variance in support and often far less (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.95-96). The results for farmers and fishermen combined are mostly significant at the 0.05 level, although directionally surprising; farmers and fishermen are associated with less support in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and German and positive support only in Denmark and Ireland. Other economic variables do not perform particularly well; indeed, non-economic control variables, class in particular, are often more powerful and with more frequent statistically significant observations (see section 3.4.). If the effects of nationality on support are surprising, support by farmers over time behaves a little more as predicted. Andersen and

[9] The authors subtract the proportion of non-farmers supporting EC membership (question (2)) from the proportion among farmers and their dependent spouses. In fact, the occupational category of farmers is shared not just with their spouses but also with fishermen. Bosch and Newton, however, rightly claim that Eurobarometer samples only a minimal number of fishermen, as evidenced by data in Eurobarometer No. 33 where for once farmers and fishermen were coded separately (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 98). Only two fishermen are sampled across the whole survey, as compared to 204 farmers. Britain is excluded from the analysis due to lack of data, while the Benelux countries are taken as a whole.

[10] The model also includes variables measuring subjective economic expectations and attitudes including expectations of more/less strikes next year, whether respondents believe governments should play a greater role in reducing income inequality, or favour more government intervention in economic affairs and expansion of public ownership. Seven non-economic control variables are also included; age, gender, age the respondent left school, overall life satisfaction, satisfaction with democracy, optimism and pessimism about the next year and left-right party support. We are warned in the main text that these variables may be measured using slightly different survey questions between surveys.

Reichert, in an aggregate OLS model described at greater length in section 3.2. test for the effect of farmers for the years 1982, 1986 and 1990. Only for the two earlier time periods the results are statistically significant (coefficient 0.15 (1982); coefficient 0.11 (1986) – both results significant to at least the 0.01 level).

In a regression model in a similar format to that presented in section 3.2., Gabel focuses on the distributional consequences of economic integration. Occupational categories and measures of educational attainment are included on the basis that EU labour market liberalisation affects citizens differently according to level of education and occupational skills, where human capital is an indicator of a citizen's ability to adapt to changing circumstances. This effect will be compounded by citizen assessments of capital market liberalisation and moves towards EMU, which will allow the more wealthy to exploit greater investment opportunities provided by more open financial markets. On the other hand, people on low incomes will find welfare spending constrained by capital mobility and EMU and mobile capital making it more difficult to bargain for higher wage settlements[11]. Finally, Gabel includes farmers in the model, who are again hypothesised to benefit from CAP, while Gabel argues uniquely for distance from a border as a determinant of support, on the basis that border residents are best placed to gain from the benefits of freer cross-border traffic.

Gabel's results confirm all his hypotheses. Between 1975-92 a farmer was associated with an average increase of 4.81 points in utilitarian support on Gabel's normalised scale running from 0 to 100, while the wealthiest EU respondents expressed on average 6.51 points more utilitarian support than the poorest respondents. Higher levels of education are also associated with higher support for integration[12] and border residents average a 1.42 increase in support. The adjusted R^2 of the model is 0.13 (Gabel, 1998, p. 53).

In summary, scholars have at best shown that economic explanations constitute a partial and weakening explanation of support. Evidence solely from 1990s Eurobarometer data suggests that in the post-Maastricht era coefficients of inflation, trade and GDP have decreased and

[11] For an alternative view, Wood uses the Heckscher-Ohlin model to show that wage equalisation may occur when relatively unskilled labour-abundant countries open up to international trade with more skilled labour-abundant countries (1994, p. 28).
[12] Respondents completing their education before 15 were labelled 'low', those finishing between the ages of 14 and 20 were labelled 'low-mid', respondents completing at ages 20 or 21 were coded as 'high-mid' and those finishing their education after 21 were coded as 'high' (Gabel, 1998, p.53). This fails to account for national differences in education. For example, it would be highly unusual to complete a degree in Germany by 21 years of age, whereas this is fairly common in the UK.

even changed in direction, where Eichenberg argues that respondents now evaluate the EU less according to objective economic performance and more on the success of redistribution policies (2000). A broader criticism of the economic hypotheses is that they overlook the crucial fact that the economic consequences of integration are typically achieved through political means, a process that in all its complexity is often anything but utilitarian in character. Indeed, evidence from section 3.2. shows citizens as viewing the EU as only partially as an economic vehicle. Bosch and Newton confirm this finding by examining support in Spain and Portugal, two countries that are prime net beneficiaries from the EU budget. Using a 1985 EB survey, measures of association between responses to the expected economic, political and diplomatic benefits of EU membership are all closely linked ($r = 0.8$, 0.73 and 0.91 respectively for Spain and 0.87, 0.84 and 0.87 respectively for Portugal). Those who expect their country to benefit economically also expect political and diplomatic benefits (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.100). It appears that we also must evaluate the EU on a non-payoff basis.

3.4. Individual Non-Economic Explanations

This section examines individual social forces as a counterpart to individual utilitarian explanations of support, and is represented by the 'social forces' area in table 3.1. The starting point for the analysis is a schema elaborated by Leonard Ray (1996) that explains support drawing on the social cleavages model established by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in order to explain the nature of party systems. Divisions are made along similar lines; centre v. periphery, church v. state, urban v. rural, owner v. worker. The urban v. rural distinction is not examined here, on the basis that this cleavage in large part reflects the tension between those individuals employed in agriculture and other primary sector activities and those dependent on commerce, services and manufacturing. As such this cleavage is tested for in the previous section using data on support amongst farmers. In addition, Ray adds a cleavage postulated since Lipset and Rokkan's work; postmaterialism v. materialism. I also consider the impact of political orientation (the left v. right cleavage) and trust in national and supranational institutions on support, and finally a host of socio-economic variables; age, sex, education, income and occupation. While some of these variables, such as income, might equally qualify for another category this reminds us that the categories distinguished in table

3.1. are not watertight. In summary, class, income and education offer the most reliable associations with support for integration.

The centre/periphery cleavage is understood as a geographical and cultural concept, separating those who possess political, economic and cultural power from those who do not. Testing an inter-country variant of this thesis warrants an examination of social deprivation or exclusion. Taking unemployment and education as indicators of exclusion, Ray finds that a significant relationship with support exists only for the latter variable (1996, p. 14)[13]. This is not especially convincing, as we see below that education is often used as an independent variable in its own right. One might then consider the core/periphery cleavage from an EU viewpoint. In the first instance, we have seen in section 2.3. that so-called EU periphery states such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, whether defined geographically or by date of entry, tend to have recorded faster increases in support over the 1980s. Secondly, we can look at intra/trans-national periphery nations or regions. Intergovernmentalists would argue that the EU is another tool by which national governments are able to maintain control over domestic groups and the policy-making process (see Moravcsik (1994) and section 1.3.4.). On the other hand, other authors see the EU as a 'multi-level' polity in which regional actors can take advantage of resources independently of the state (section 1.3.5.). Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that regions may be more pro-European than the member states of which they form part. Data from the 1997 Scottish Election Study demonstrates that Scots are less Eurosceptic than the English and Welsh. Only 22.7% of Scots versus 31.4% of the Welsh and English surveyed would leave the EU, while 13.2% of Scottish respondents fell into the highest category of positive feeling towards the EU, against 9.2% in England and Wales (Keating, 2001, p. 5). The suspicion is that for the Scots, European Union membership is associated with devolution and increased self-determination (see also sections 4.5. and 6.4.2.).

The church/state cleavage offers little new insight into support for integration. Of the little evidence available, Ray computes correlation coefficients between Catholic and Protestant denominations and support, and finds that only in Northern Ireland does support significantly alter by denomination, while throughout the EU a few predominantly Catholic countries are

[13] Ray constructs the dependent variable by combining EB questions (1) and (2) and uses data from EB surveys 37 and 38.

associated weakly with positive EU support. Other minority religions are not considered (Ray, 1996, p. 7).

Analysis of a left-right political cleavage provides a useful insight into support, especially where the issue is broadened to encompass extremist viewpoints and top-down political influences on individuals. However, because the content of the left-right cleavage is so country-specific, it is difficult to generalise about aggregate effects. Historically, it may not be unreasonable to dichotomise between more pro-European, free trade centre-rightists and the economic concerns of anti-European leftists (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Shepherd, 1975). In recent years, however, Hix claims to have identified a specific pro and anti-European cleavage that cuts across traditional party lines (1994). In this way it has become more difficult to generalise between countries about differences in support by political orientation. Certainly, in the more eurosceptic United Kingdom differences of opinion over European integration have at times been genuinely cross party. In Scandinavia, however, opposition has come specifically from new left and agrarian centre parties and the left wings of social democratic parties (Nelsen and Guth, 2000, p. 274). At the present time, the distinction may be more clear-cut between support for mainstream and extremist parties, from the right or left end of the political spectrum. As we have seen in section 3.2., Gabel successfully demonstrates a negative link between support for integration and electoral support for anti-system political parties.

Notwithstanding Hix's cleavage, there is a branch of literature in which the view is taken that citizens adopt attitudes towards integration that reflect the position of opinion leaders, whether they be the political party they support, the government of the day or the media. Deutsch's 'cascade' model is an example of theory in this area. On this view there are five different levels of communication: at the top are socio-economic elites, followed by political elites. Then there are opinions as represented by the mass media, a 'net' of opinion leaders and finally ordinary citizens (seen as 60-90% of the adult population). Elite opinion guides mass opinion through a trickle-down effect (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 138)[14].

[14] Even Inglehart subscribes to a version of the 'pull' argument to a degree (1970). An output from the political system first has to be perceived by the mass public before the feedback from public to elites is effective.

There is a fair amount of empirical evidence to support the view that citizens adopt attitudes towards integration that reflect the position of the party they support (Feld and Wildgren, 1976; Inglehart and Reif, 1991; Anderson, 1998). Carey, for instance, shows using EB data from 1976-1994 that as one's attachment to a pro-EU centre/centre-right party increases, individuals are more likely to support the EU (1999). A variety of macroeconomic and socio-economic controls are included. Wessels makes the further point that parties are more likely to be successful in reducing, than in increasing support (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p.158)[15].

A slightly different line of research suggests that citizens project the evaluations of the party (or person) of the national leader onto integration. Rasmussen tests this top-down approach by studying the effect of the Conservative Party and Lady Thatcher, a long-in-office conviction politician, upon public opinion. Despite Mrs Thatcher's sniping against Brussels and strong stance over budgetary contributions, absolute support levels increased and volatility was lowered from the early to mid-1980s[16]. This lends weight to Rasmussen's analysis: by regressing net EC approval against voting preferences and net satisfaction with Thatcher and the Conservative government Rasmussen shows that the stance of the Conservative party, generally pro-European, may have had more impact on citizens (1997, p. 113). So, we can expect political extremists to be more anti-integration than other respondents, and respondents themselves to be influenced in a 'top-down' way by opinion leaders such as politicians coming from parties they vote for. The problem with this latter approach, however, is that it can say very little *a priori* concerning in what direction respondents will be influenced or the motives of those elites in positions of influence.

As well as demonstrating the positive impact of establishment parties on mass attitudes towards integration, Anderson uses Eurobarometer 34.0 (1990) data to show that satisfaction with democratic institutions as a whole translates into higher levels of support for European integration (1998, p. 590). Ranged against Anderson, Sánchez-Cuenca propounds an institutional hypothesis: all other things being equal, the better the opinion citizens have of

[15] There are a number of other approaches modelling the flow of opinion from elite to mass levels e.g. Rosenau's four-step foreign policy model. Reviewing this and other evidence, however, Wessels argues that research based on these competing models is rare (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 139).

[16] Rasmussen assumes that people perceived Mrs Thatcher as anti-European. While attacking Europe on repeated occasions one could take the view that fundamentally she accepted the EU; Thatcher signed the 1986 Single European Act, which handed sovereignty in several key areas over to the Brussels decision-making mechanism.

the relative performance of European institutions, the stronger their support for integration. Sánchez-Cuenca shows convincingly that in countries with high levels of corruption or low levels of welfare spending, citizens are more inclined to support the EU (2000). If the impact of welfare spending on support seems reminiscent of Gabel's model of the distributional consequences of integration (see section 3.3.), this is because Sánchez-Cuenca is openly attempting to introduce a political dimension to the international political economy approach of Gabel, even if this new approach is still very much in the payoff tradition. The author then uses Eurobarometer 44.1 (1995) data to show that lower levels of trust in national governments are related to higher levels of support for the EU. This allows Sánchez-Cuenca to make the claim that a European *demos* is not needed for European democracy, just an efficient European system of institutions, or correspondingly inefficient national alternatives. Part of the problem at hinting at a vision of European civic republicanism founded on nation state incompetence is that the popular perception of European institutions is little better. Moreover, precisely the reverse hypothesis may be true: the stronger the support for national government and satisfaction with national democracy, the greater the support for integration. In section 3.2. we have seen how the EU may benefit from 'spillover' effects as regards national economic performance, while in chapter six I show that pride in one's nation is linked to higher support for integration[17]. I would argue, then, that the need for a European *demos* can be bypassed not by satisfaction with European institutions but rather with support for, rather than identity with, the European Union. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, the work of theorists such as Anderson and Sánchez-Cuenca suggests that domestic politics matter in explaining support for European integration.

Class divisions as a basis of support for integration offer a promising insight into support. We have already seen that Bosch and Newton's results in section 3.3. view class as an explanatory factor. This is backed up by Ray, where class correlations with support are statistically significant for eight of twelve EU nations for the two 1992 EB surveys[18]. The

[17] Of course, it may be that trust in national institutions is negatively related to support for the EU, while national pride is positively related to support for the EU. The problem for Sánchez-Cuenca is that he defines satisfaction with national governments in broad terms (2000, p. 152). Unfortunately, by 2001 no ISSP or Eurobarometer survey exists including both national pride and trust in institutions questions to test this impression.

[18] For EB surveys, which all the research here draws on, class is measured as subjective social class.

direction of the correlations indicates that individuals from higher social classes are associated with more favourable attitudes towards integration than those from lower classes.

The social cleavage to which most space in the literature has been devoted undoubtedly relates to Inglehart's theory of a Silent Revolution (see section 1.3.3.), although empirical evidence from a number of studies is not particularly favourable towards the theory. According to this theory, two independent variables can be distinguished: political value-orientations and the level of political skills. Any attitude towards integration is at least partially a function of these two characteristics. Inglehart distinguishes between two different value-orientations: materialists and postmaterialists, where the former give priority to material things such as economic factors and physical security, whilst the latter are more directed by the need for intellectual fulfilment. Inglehart argues that European integration fulfils the needs of postmaterialists, and justifies this by stating that integration appeals to intellectual needs, where materialists are more parochial and less cosmopolitan than postmaterialists. Secondly, postmaterialists are more eager to fulfil a need for belonging, and are more able to fulfil this with the EU, where the nation-state is seen as too materialist. So, in the aggregate, the more post-materialist the value-climate the higher Inglehart expects public support for integration to be. With regard to the level of political skills, these are meant to determine how able a person is to cope with and interpret the abstract content of political messages, where distance from the source is taken as the best indicator of the level of abstraction. The higher the level of this cognitive mobilisation then, the higher we can expect support for the EU to be. Furthermore, Inglehart supposes that pre and post-war generations differ in an especially notable way towards the two independent variables, because both are related to different youth experiences. Skills are, he postulates, related to education and values result from levels of affluence, where both these variables are supposed to have increased over time. In summary, then, we have several postulates that we can test empirically.

Both Inglehart's two main variables are open to criticism. The exact reasons why individuals who are preoccupied with intellectual concerns should support the EU are never clearly set out (Ray, 1997, p.11). The EU owes many of its origins and its current policies to economic ideas, and as we have seen above many people evaluate the EU on utilitarian lines. The EU may represent an alternative to nationalism and offer some improvements over national

legislation, but only in an environment of secrecy and remoteness. Moreover, it would also seem strange to relate abstractness in cognitive skills to physical distances. The affairs of many national governments can surely be just as complex in detail so as to make the abstractness of the issue irrelevant. Indeed it could be argued that Italians are positive towards the EU because it offers a more effective, clearer form of governance. Inglehart's age argument may also work against him. Whilst it seems reasonable to assume that those cohorts who received their basic socialisation in the aftermath of World War II were living in a period in which nationalism was discredited, the further away from the formative experience of the Second World War presumably the less powerful this effect will be[19]. These theoretical criticisms make it more difficult to construct a working hypothesis within which to look empirically at postmaterialism, and if taken to the extreme one might argue that the EU was just as likely to exhibit materialist as postmaterialist tendencies.

The empirical evidence concerning the theory of the Silent Revolution is at best inconclusive, and hampered by methodological issues. While EB surveys show that, since the early 1970s, the quantity of postmaterialists has risen and the number of materialists has decreased, Clarke and Dutt argue that the four-item question battery in EB data used to measure postmaterialism is sensitive to short-term fluctuations in economic conditions, in particular unemployment rates (1991). Specifically, as unemployment rises, postmaterialism can be expected to rise spuriously as the unemployed increasingly select the supposedly post-materialist question response 'give people more say in government' as to their top issue priority.

Using the EB postmaterialism measure we can see that Inglehart's faith in the inter-generational, socialisation impact of postmaterialism may be questioned. Partially no doubt because the theory 'birth-date' of 1970 is hardly a good baseline in itself to measure long-term changes in attitudes, Inglehart has demonstrated that post-war generations are more positive about a 'United States of Europe' than are pre-war generations (1970). However, Janssen demonstrates that the effect of age varies according to the dependent variable; that is, splitting question (1) data between 1973-88 into pre-1931 and post-1946 year-of-birth groups

[19] This implication is present in Inglehart's own writing when he declares that generations that received their basic socialisation in the aftermath of WW2 would more readily abandon their reservations about political integration (1970, p.768).

yields no substantial differences in support, while the same methodology applied to question (2) does confirm Inglehart's hypothesis (1991, p. 461). Both authors fail to control for several alternative explanations such as higher levels of income and education amongst young people. Or could it instead be that older generations, more traumatised by war, are more willing to co-operate? Gabel successfully shows that support for integration is partially conditioned by the number of war deaths suffered by a country in World War II, the implication being that those older generations, most closely affected are more prepared to countenance international cooperation (1998, p. 81). Other authors demonstrate an association between increased age and increased support in respondents surveyed by Eurobarometer before 1986, but rarely after (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Anderson and Reichert, 1996).

Direct tests of the EB postmaterialism variable with support for integration do not give more encouraging findings. Janssen shows that the distinction between materialists and postmaterialists seems to be irrelevant for attitudes towards European integration. Janssen constructs two pooled data sets using 1973-88 EB data showing the proportions of net support for question (1) and then question (2) grouped by both values and cognitive skills. Although in both instances postmaterialists with higher cognitive skills are slightly more supportive of integration than materialists with lower cognitive skills, when one controls for skills, the relationship disappears. That is, while a higher level of cognitive skills is associated with higher support for integration, postmaterialists are no more supportive of integration than materialists (1991, p. 458). Thirdly, looking at Inglehart's theory from the aggregate position, there are a number of anomalies. Most strikingly, 1988 data on Italy show us that a relatively materialist country, and with relatively low cognitive skills is very supportive of integration (Janssen, 1991, p465). Given these results, methodological criticism of Janssen's study could even be seen as a hopeful sign for Inglehart's theory, and Gabel duly laments the limited, four-country approach of Janssen comprising West Germany, Britain, Italy and France, as well as the absence of controls for other factors such as income that are potentially related to both support for integration and cognitive skills (1997, p.5).

Several other studies also test the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration using EB data, and again the evidence is not encouraging. In brief, Deflem and Pampel find weak support for postmaterialism, with many of their regression results for this

variable failing to achieve significance (1996, p. 132)[20]. For Ray, regression results are in mixed directions (1996, p. 13; see also Mathew, 1980), while for Anderson and Reichert the hypothesis held for citizens in the original six member states but not in newer members (1996, p. 243). Gabel also finds that materialists are more likely to be supportive of integration (1998, p. 98).

Socio-economic variables income, education and occupation are treated together here for the reason that they perform similarly. Simply, as levels of income and education increase, and individuals hold white-collar jobs as opposed to manual jobs or being unemployed, support for integration increases by most accounts (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Anderson and Reichert, 1996). Only on Bosch and Newton's regression analysis are the effects more ambiguous (Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 95).

The evidence of gender support for integration tends to suggest that males are more supportive of integration than females. Ray shows using 1992 EB data that women are most opposed to the EU in seven of twelve states, and most strongly in Britain and Denmark (1996, p. 11). Nelsen and Guth show that women in many of the northern European states tend to be less favourable towards integration than men, while women comprised most of the no votes in the 1994 series of Nordic referenda (2000, p. 270; see also Børresen, 1997). In the same paper, the authors argue that this gender gap is partially explained by economic evaluations: certain women do not appear confident that benefits enjoyed under the welfare state will be maintained in the face of EU-induced economic change (Nelsen and Guth, 2000, p. 286; see also Ray, 1996, p. 13). This is contrary to many standard approaches, which view female attitudes as more a function of lower levels of knowledge or interest, or more conservative political orientations. Another innovative approach is taken by Liebert, who explains the gender gap in support for integration using a psychological 'relative deprivation' approach, whereby there is a discrepancy between a person's current position and that which is expected (1997). Thus the author critically re-examines the process of European integration from the perspective of, for instance, EU measures to promote equal opportunities or the social policy dimension to integration.

[20] The authors measure the dependent variable by taking questions (1), (2) and (3), performing factor analysis to reveal one underlying factor which is represented by a scale, with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Deflem and Pampel, 1996, p. 128).

At first sight it would seem that class, in conjunction with income and education, offers the most promising line of specific social explanations for support. Inglehart's Silent Revolution theory, perhaps the main theory in opposition to payoff explanations of support performs poorly. In the final analysis, however, there is a high level of methodological uncertainly at play that limits the strength of the conclusions drawn. Studies are not usually comparable, despite typically drawing on the same EB data, because of differences in survey years, calculation of the dependent variable, inclusion of different controls and choice of analytical tools. Moreover, the undoubtedly complex interplay of variables on one another is rarely disentangled in the work above.

3.5. National Traditions

The impact of national non-economic factors on support for integration is the last category I consider in table 3.1. Even theorists from a payoff background have noted the force of national traditions of support. However, it seems that this has not lead to much attendant speculation regarding the role of national non-economic factors in explaining support at the micro-level. In this section I aim to remedy this, making the suggestion that explanations of support for European integration can be improved by taking account of some specific components of the concepts of identity and tolerance: European identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism.

I take the starting point for an analysis of national non-economic factors as the inclusion of dummy variables controlling for the impact of inter-country differences in support in some 'utilitarian' public opinion analyses. Eichenberg and Dalton include dummy variables in their regression analysis for those countries whose patterns of support, in the words of the authors, depart significantly from the general model (Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Italy and France as the control variable). The effects of these so-called 'national traditions' dwarf the impact of economic variables. For instance, just by virtue of being from the United Kingdom, support is reduced by almost 45% (coefficient 44.9, t-ratio 8.1)[21]. Eichenberg and

[21] The authors do not specifically mentioned the omitted category in the country dummy analysis. However, Eichenberg and Dalton look at support for the EU 9 (minus Luxembourg), and include as dummies in their regression analysis the UK,

Dalton's analysis gives statistically significant coefficients of 12.3 -41.0 and 22.4 for the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy respectively for the period 1973-88 (1993, p. 522; see also Gabel and Palmer, 1995, p. 10).

The selfsame authors who produce evidence of these inter-country differences generally decline to investigate this area much further. Gabel does at least take measures of external and internal stability to explain inter-country differences. From section 3.2., external stability is measured by World War deaths per capita and decay in stability concerns over time, while internal stability concerns the percentage of the vote received by anti-system parties. Despite this, all the five country dummies introduced into a model measuring external and internal stability were significant (Gabel, 1998, p. 134). In a direct comparison made by Eichenberg, inclusion of the external and internal stability indicators in a regression equation explaining support barely altered the coefficients of the country dummies (2000, p.32). Eichenberg and Dalton rather limply suggest that the dummy variables represent the residue of historical foreign-policy traditions that erode only slowly. Indeed, the interesting question is whether "controlling for these national effects, there are additional factors that move opinion above or below its traditional baseline of support" (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2000, p. 13). I contest this presumption of inter-country differences as the somewhat irrelevant legacy of past foreign-policy traditions. Despite the label 'National tradition' a correct interpretation of Eichenberg's results is national differences due to any factor at all, where tradition implies country differences founded on, for instance, cultural heritage.

While noting the force of national traditions in support, I explicitly do not intend in this thesis to account for unexplained cross-national variation in support, where the correct way to proceed in this case would be to employ multi-level statistical models (see section 5.3.). Rather, I wish to use these national differences as a starting point to explore new micro-level variables explaining support, thereby relying on more standard fixed effect statistical models. Of course, even if all factors that accounted for national differences could be modelled at the aggregate level, national differences might still persist, perhaps either because of a different qualitative impact of a variable on support at the country level (size, direction and significance of the coefficient) or by a different quantitative sociological makeup. In this

Netherlands, Denmark Italy and Ireland. Therefore Germany and Belgium would appear to form the missing category. Given the omitted category, the results for Ireland (coefficient –19, t-ratio –5.7) appear curiously low.

latter case, for example, there is a smaller proportion of farmers in Britain than on the continent, and to the extent that farmers are successfully shown to be more pro-European than the typical citizen equally across member states this would have the effect of meaning support across the UK is, ceteris paribus, lower than the EU average. However, my point is that with a little lateral thinking, national differences in support highlight the degree to which affective factors have been neglected in existing analyses: the emphasis is on 'national' as much as 'differences'.

One national non-economic explanation of support has already come to light in chapter two. However, the evidence suggests that this 'social learning' hypothesis is only so useful in explaining support. On the social learning approach, membership of the Union is a socialisation process; over time citizens become more familiarised with the workings of the institutions and the benefits of integration. Niedermayer and Sinnott provide evidence for a form of the social learning thesis by using trend data in an attempt to show that support for integration grows slowly but consistently over time (1995, p. 91). As it stands this appears an inadequate argument; it may just be that the most Europhile countries joined the Union first. Indeed, the principle that earlier Community entrants are more positive towards integration is successfully tested in the 'timing of entry' variable included in the regression models of some authors (see Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996, p. 187; Mathew, 1980).

However, there is clear evidence of social learning effects in figure 2.4. from section 2.3.1. We can see that there is a yawning gap of around 20 percentage points in question (2) net support between the EU original 6 and the EU 10 until the mid-1980s, when the gap closed sharply. Moreover, if the narrowing of inter-country differences over the last decade means that it is more difficult to demonstrate significant differences in levels of support between the EU6 and other countries simply by looking at graphs of net support, a distinction can still be made by calculating the volatility, or standard deviation, of support.

Figure 3.3. Average Net Support vs. Volatility (EB 1973-2000)



Figure 3.3. presents the question (2) mean net support scores by country for the EU 15 from 1973-2000 and the counterpart volatility figure in diminishing order, the standard deviations of the biannual net support findings for question (2) from 1973-2000. It can be seen that there is a mild association between higher levels of average volatility of support and lower levels of average net support. Once support is relatively high, then, it tends to stay there: lower drawdowns in net support are experienced. We can then demonstrate that the countries with higher volatility readings tend to be the later EU entrants. With reference to the country markings above each pair of volatility and support readings in figure 3.3., we can see that the later entrants tend to dominate the bottom of the table, with higher volatility and lower net support scores, while the more established members tend to be at the top of the table. Denmark and the UK are very much exceptions to this rule[22]. In the literature, Eichenberg (2000), Gabel (1998) and Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) find length of membership to be a significant variable in regression equations explaining support for integration. Nevertheless, from the same authors it is clear that significant national difference in support still exist in spite of controlling for social learning effects.

I make the suggestion here that two hitherto underrated and understudied dimensions of support are respondents' sense of identity and tolerance. The reasons behind this interest in

[22] Eichenberg takes a different approach and measures the pooled standard deviation of net support for question (2) over time. The results show that intra-Community volatility has indeed declined from 28.0 (1976-80) to 22.6 (1996-99) (Eichenberg, 2000a, p. 16).

different forms of identity come from the content and tone of the popular debate around integration in many EU countries, which emphasises loss of sovereignty. Risse, Marcussen, Engelmann-Martin, Knopf and Roscher, for example, document the British concern with transferring sovereignty to the EU (1999). As for tolerance, we shall see in chapter four that xenophobic and racists attitudes can be viewed as affective influences on support that highlight outgroup inferiority, as against nationalism which focuses on ingroup superiority. In particular, Adorno *et al.* view racism, xenophobia and nationalism as forming part of the concept of ethnocentrism (see section 4.5.).

Secondly, I contend that scholars who promote a view of public support as based on utilitarian preoccupations tend to assume a model of the EU's institutional architecture that no longer exists, or indeed may never have existed. To see this, I take as given from section 2.2.1. that the EU makes considerable claims on state sovereignty, so that it has been labelled an 'Emerging Federal System' by Börzel and Risse (in Jorges, Mény and Weiler, 2000, p. 53). If we then consider Polsby's four methods of securing citizen acquiescence; coercion, indoctrination, loyalty and custom (in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, p. 264) I argue that in a democracy, loyalty is at least the principal method of acquiring acquiescence or, rather, legitimacy. In the domestic politics arena, loyalty might be tested in survey data by a combination of factors: it is a minor slight of hand to replace loyalty to the system with pride in national social institutions and certainly Almond and Verba point to national pride as necessary for system legitimacy (1989, p. 68; see also section 4.4.). Moreover, national pride is in itself an expression of attachment to one's national identity, which could then be tested directly (see section 4.4.). Although in section 2.2.1. I make the case that loyalty based on a fully-fledged European identity is not necessary for EU legitimacy, it certainly does no harm to track its impact through support. Moreover, we shall see in chapter four that for many of the affective factors, including national pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, the identity component has a 'negative', national side potentially impeding support for integration rather than generating legitimacy for the European Union. In any case, the point is that utilitarian measures of support do not tap affective factors, so that to maintain that the principal basis of EU support is utilitarian implies, consciously or otherwise, a model of the EU that does not require identitative, legitimacy-inducing attachment.

Specifically, then, I advocate testing how attitudes of European and national identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism relate to support for integration. Overall, there is very little research into the effect of these five factors individually on support (see just Charillon and Ivaldi, 1996; Hewstone, 1986; Müller-Peters, 1998; Routh and Burgoyne, 1998 - all reviewed in chapters five and six). Certainly, to the best of this author's knowledge it is the first time that the whole gamut of factors has been tested together, and across so many counties. The strategy will be to define these concepts and hypothesise how they might affect support for integration in the next chapter. I then move on to determine the makeup of these factors, before considering how they affect support for integration.

3.6. Conclusion

So, the outcome of this chapter has been a decision to investigate further the effect on support of a set of variables relating to identity and tolerance; European and national identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism. This hunch has been sparked by criticism of the assumption underlying utilitarian accounts of support that the Union does not require much public legitimacy, coupled with the sizeable impact of country dummy variables on support in many regression models explaining support for integration. I propose here that a respondent's sense of identity provides the underlying theoretical unity between the five concepts, so enhancing the legitimacy of treating them together. This is discussed at greater length in section 4.2. where I review the most current social psychological theories of identity.

The survey of the literature has also revealed a number of control variables to be included in subsequent analyses. Amongst those variables having the clearest effect are macroeconomic indicators, EU trade figures, socio-economic variables such as class, income, education and occupation, and political orientation. It has, however, been a feature of this literature review that comparison between results, and results themselves have been clouded by methodological problems and differences. Hence the theories of postmaterialism and the impact of other economic variables such as farmer support also deserve appraisal where possible.

Finally, while we have deliberated over what variables might explain support, we only touch on 'non-support' or non-attitudes. We have seen that to the extent that citizens are not very well informed about European Union politics, perhaps comparable to the lack of information citizens have been shown to display concerning foreign policy in general, it seems likely that they make recourse to domestic proxies such as subjective economic conditions or the views of their chosen political parties (Anderson, 1998). Given the clear significance of non-attitudes shown in section 2.4. this short treatment is an omission, and one that will be rectified in chapter seven.

4. A DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS AND FORMALISATION OF HYPOTHESES

4.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

The principal aim of this chapter is, with the aid of the existing theoretical literature, to build on the insights of section 3.5. in order to arrive at firm hypotheses that purport to explain support for integration. The actual empirical operationalisation of the concepts defined herein is left to later chapters. I also speculate on the interrelationships between each of the concepts, in view of the empirical analysis conducted in chapter five.

Because identity, nationalism, national pride, xenophobia and racism, the concepts taken to investigate support for integration, are complex and often multifarious in meaning, I attempt to single out as far as is practicable one particular interpretation. I will thus steer clear of a general review of these concepts, to which it would be hard to add profitably to the already voluminous literature.

Placing the aforementioned concepts on a firm theoretical footing before hypothesising about them is, I would argue, a highly valuable exercise. I note a tendency in the more empirical social science literature to minimise the treatment of contested theoretical concepts such as nationalism and instead rely on hypotheses derived from well-worn quotations or common understandings, which may be more or less appropriate to the issue under scrutiny[1]. While this approach may be to some extent excusable in a journal article or essay, this is less so in a thesis.

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[1] Elsewhere in the thesis I argue that the authors of a couple of articles that do not devote a large amount of space to defining their terms confuse nationalism with national pride (see McCrone and Surridge (1998) in section 5.2.4. and Charillon and Ivaldi (1996) in section 6.2.1.). Other authors define nationalism using short quotes from established scholars such as Gellner (see, for example, Heath, Taylor, Brook and Park, 1999). While in themselves not erroneous, such definitions fail to do justice to, say, the wide variety of nationalist thought and the attendant implications for hypotheses on the topic.

I begin with an overview of the principal social psychological theories of identity in section 4.2. The reason for this focus on social identity theory and self-categorisation theory is that the clear definition of ingroup identity, and in particular of national identity, they afford brings an underlying theoretical unity to the concepts under consideration here. Moreover, the processes of individual categorisation, depersonalisation and ingroup/outgroup relations form a consistent and powerful explanatory tool for theorising about the effects of our often multi-faceted chosen concepts on support for integration. With this in mind, the more a respondent has a sense of European identity the more likely, *ceteris paribus*, I expect them to be in favour of European integration. I understand national pride to measure utilitarian or affective attachment towards the nation as an ingroup, with few implications for support for integration. On the other hand, nationalist sentiment is characterised by a feeling that the nation should wield ultimate state political power, so that I assume that any infringement of state sovereignty by the European Union would be rejected. Similarly, I understand racists and xenophobes to be hostile towards the EU, for facilitating or failing to halt the cross-border movement of non-nationals and extra-communitarians. Lest these hypotheses come as little surprise to the reader, one should note that the strength of the relationship with support, as well as the existence of any relationship, will be useful in determining whether affective factors really can explain any of the inter-country differences in support identified in section 3.5.

4.2. Social Psychological Theories of Identity

In this section I briefly review the main tenets of social identity theory and self-categorisation theory, the most current social psychological theories of identity. The justification for this diversion lies in the fact that nationalism, national pride, xenophobia, racism and of course identity can all be profitably understood employing the ingroup/outgroup language of group identity. So, a study of social psychological theories of identity reveals a consistent set of rules within which these often more political concepts operate. This review, albeit far too brief to do justice to this rich topic, provides a more profound insight into, and an underlying theoretical unity between, the concepts under consideration, and goes some way to justifying their treatment together in the thesis.

Social identity theory refers to a body of social psychological research into intergroup relations. The key insight provided by this theory is that the act of social categorisation by itself, seemingly a purely cognitive division of persons into groups, is often sufficient to produce discriminatory behaviour in favour of the 'ingroup' over the 'outgroup'. An individual applies this categorisation process in social interaction for similar purposes as in basic perceptual activity, namely as a

> "system of orientation for *self-reference*, creating and defining the individual's place in society. [It is] Individuals' 'self-definition in a social context..." (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 81).

There are many different forms of ingroup to which an individual might belong or identify with, including nations, religions and races. For many of these groups, individual members may never know, meet or hear of their fellow members. Nowhere is this more true than for the nation, famously described by Anderson as an 'imagined community' (1983, p. 15)[2]. The actual content of an 'imagined national community' or national identity might include a number of components: common ethnic background, common cultural traditions and common experience. The emphasis accorded to each factor varies considerably, so that while some authors focus on a shared linguistic heritage, others such as Weber stress a commitment to a political project (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 15). There is a further split between primordialists and constructivists over whether these national identities are created, or are somehow natural (see section 4.5.) Writers in the constructivist tradition might point out that identities have changed in conception over time, so that the religious communities of the Middle Ages were imagined in very different terms from the modern nation (Billig, 1995, p. 68). Today, we might expect national identities to contain visions of social and political orders, and perhaps federalist or more intergovernmentalist notions concerning the European Union. Turning to consider national outgroups, this appears roughly analogous to the concept of the 'Other' current in some continental philosophy and International Relations writings. Neumann and Welsh write that the Other reminds us that "a thing is perceived as much in terms of what it is not as in terms of what it is" (1991, p. 331). Europe's Others are, for instance, frequently constructed as territorially defined entities (America; Russia; Turkey;

[2] It should be noted that some theorists treat the nation only as a 'quasi-group', on the basis that national identity only becomes important in times of war (Müller-Peters, 1998, p. 703).

Asia), but also as the continent's own past of wars and nationalist rivalries (Risse, 1998, p. 12).

Social identity theory assumes that the commonness between group members is accentuated by a sense of difference with regard to other communities. Individuals are postulated as having a need to view the group with which they identify in a more positive way than the outgroup. The main tool for group members to establish 'positive distinctiveness' is the stereotype. A stereotype can be seen as a collection of attributes believed to characterise the members of a particular social group. This process of characterisation in itself does not imply any deliberate positive or negative bias in content towards an object. In essence, stereotyping is a cognitive short cut designed to help the receiver cope with information overload. Indeed, it is argued not only that stereotypes can be context-dependent and flexible, but also that they are quite often appropriate. Oakes, Haslam and Turner invite us to consider the case of a poll tax demonstrator in London, 1990 faced with a policeman. Rather than consider the policeman as an individual, the authors suggest that the more contextually important features would instead be considered; as a policemen, he has the power to arrest you, is in possession of a truncheon, and has a presumed antipathy towards demonstrators (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 127). Nevertheless, most authors accept that stereotyping does inevitably lead to some distortion of perception and accentuation of perceived intergroup differences. As we shall see with regard to nationalism, xenophobia and racism, stereotypes can also serve political and ideological functions.

Self-categorisation theory builds on social identity theory by looking at the processes underlying self-categorisation in greater detail than social identity theory, although in reality the theory attempts more than this and there is a good deal of overlap between the two approaches. Self-categorisation approaches suggest that categorisation is a dynamic, context-dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given context (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 95). The theoretical artifice employed to give life to this proposition is the principle of meta-contrast. This states that a given set of items is more likely to be categorised as a single entity to the degree that (inter-group or in-group) differences within that set of items are less than the differences between that set and others (intra-groups or out-groups) within the comparative context. For example, a group of Europeans might perceive themselves as fellow Europeans when dealing with Americans,

while emphasising national differences when interacting mainly with each other. In this way, the meta-contrast principle incorporates the intuition that group identities are both multiple and relative.

To the extent that an individual categorises oneself with a particular group, the greater the degree of depersonalisation of the self, and accentuation of differences with the outgroup, that occurs. The principle of meta-contrast can be used to calculate the 'prototypical' ingroup member, or the person who is simultaneously most different to the outgroup and least different to the ingroup. The prototype thus exemplifies what ingroup members share and what they do not share with the outgroup. As far as group members are prototypical, personal identity depends on social identity, so that the individual's self-perception is depersonalised. This inverse relationship between self-perception as a unique individual and as an ingroup member is at the heart of group behaviour.

A further result from self-categorisation theory is that extremists tend to make more polarised judgements due to their relative intergroup positioning. Let us imagine that an ingroup comprised of Scottish nationals becomes more extreme in the intergroup context, as the outgroup switches from English to Russian nationals. In this situation, the ingroup's more extreme members gain in prototypicality over more moderate ones. Extremists tend to display greater assimilation of certain stimuli and greater contrast of others (relative to their own position) than people whose own position is moderate and hence the group as a whole ends making more polarised judgements. The point here is that people with moderate views are bound by the same psychological processes as racists or other extremists. This context-bound view of extremism contrasts with the work of personality theorists such as Adorno, who argued that only persons with distinct psychological profiles are inclined to hold and use stereotypes (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994, p. 129).

In summary, this brief overview of social identity and self-categorisation theory has outlined the principal rules of intergroup behaviour to which the concepts that we investigate below adhere. After all, nationalist, xenophobic and racist attitudes are clearly explicable in terms of stereotypical relations between in-groups and out-groups, while national pride can be viewed as the degree of attachment to the national ingroup. Secondly, self-categorisation theory teaches us that the process of stereotyping is psychologically valid, in that it is

efficient, adaptive and useful. That is to say, more tolerant persons apply many of the same psychological process as racists. This is in contrast to what might be socially and politically valid, from the point of view of the accuracy of the content of a particular stereotype. The emphasis in explaining racist or nationalist behaviour, then, moves to the individual level and enhances the validity of the sociological analysis of the concepts considered in chapter five. Finally, the social psychology literature provides an underlying theoretical unity between the five concepts under consideration that helps to justify their selection and treatment together.

4.3. European and national identity

The clearest and most direct application of the socio-psychology literature can be made to discussions of national and European identity, leaving aside for now world, regional and local identity foci. I argue that respondents who see their identity in purely national terms are less likely to be supportive of European integration than respondents who hold a more European sense of identity. The caveat here is that if national identities themselves adapt to contain a European facet, this relationship may not hold.

I choose to focus on the interrelationship between European and national identities, rather than one or the other in isolation, because this more readily captures the multiple identities that people hold. As we will see in figure 5.1., only a tiny minority of people report to feeling exclusively European. However, many more people claim to feel European and national loyalties. So, the insight of multiple identities from the socio-psychological literature means that I am not expecting people to choose between Europe and the nation, and in turn this means that I concentrate on people's relative attachments to Europe vis-à-vis the nation rather than any absolute sense of belonging.

The definition of European and national identity themselves follows directly from section 4.2. That is, both identities constitute types of ingroup belonging, and 'imagined communities' as specified by Anderson (1983)[3]. As discussed above, the content of

[3] I note that identity may contain utilitarian and affective dimensions; however, because I am unable to capture these subtleties in the ISSP survey questions used for identity (see section 5.2.1.), I delay discussion of this facet of identity until section 4.4. on national pride.

European and national identities may vary by country and, for constructivists, over time. I do not propose here to detail the content of individual national identities, although there is no shortage of authors that do (see, for instance, Michalski and Tallberg, 1999; Risse *et al.*, 1999). I note, however, that an analysis of national identities does play a role in interpreting the empirical results in chapters five and six. With regard to European identity, however, some of the theoretical works on the topic have important implications for hypothesising about European identity that I try to cover briefly here.

To begin, 'What is Europe?' is a contested concept; to some authors Europe lacks a strong common linguistic, ethnic and historical heritage to compete with entrenched national equivalents (Smith, 1992). Indeed, insofar as European nations might be said to share a common set of values such as respect for human rights and democracy, one might question the extent to which they are specific to Europe and so provide the basis for a European, rather than, say, universal identity. In short, while experiences working for EU institutions might engender a more cosmopolitan outlook amongst policy-making elites (Laffan, 2001), a mass European identity is unlikely to develop. Other authors point to the fact that Europe's leaders have instead focused on Europe's potential future together, rather than the divisiveness of the last century. In the words of Helmut Kohl:

> "Germany is my Fatherland, Europe is my future" (quoted in Howe, 1995, p. 32).

One could interpret this vision as a calling for the creation of a European identity, sitting alongside national identities. On these two approaches, it would seem reasonable to suppose that respondents with a more European sense of identity will be more supportive of integration than those who retain a purely national orientation. However, one might also see this vision as an invitation for nations to reorientate themselves towards a European vision, however hazy it might be. This would imply that national identities would increasingly contain a European element, possibly varying from country to country as different pros and cons are selected[4]. Risse *et al.* (1999) adopt this constructivist approach, and expect the emergence of a common European identity in addition to and strongly related with nation-

[4] Haller lists five understandings of Europe circulating amongst its member states and past applicants. For some countries, Europe is a prop or crutch to overcome domestic difficulties (Mediterranean countries and Ireland) , to others it is a necessary evil (UK and Scandinavia) or a bureaucraticised superstate to be avoided (Norway and Switzerland), while it is also seen as a vehicle for the realisation of economic and political interests (Original Six members) or as a substitute for a weak sense of national identity (Germany) (Haller in Kriesi *et al.*, 1999, p. 273).

state and regional identities. In this situation, there is no real trade-off to be made between European and national identities and, certainly, figure 5.1. shows that the modal respondent is as close to Europe as the nation. So, on this understanding of European identity, national and European identities might both be related to support for integration. To continue the focus on the effect of Europeanisation on a person's identity structure, I sidestep this problem by looking at relative European identity. That is, despite Risse's point, one might expect respondents who are *more* attached to Europe to be more pro-integration than those who are *less* attached. So we have

H1: the more European a respondent feels, ceteris paribus, the more likely he or she is to support the European Union. Similarly, the more national a respondent feels, the less likely he or she is to support the Union.

Of course, this assumes that respondents link the idea of Europe with the specifics of the European Union. Lest this link appear obvious, it would certainly be a revealing reflection on the state of the Union if European identity and support were shown not to be linked. Secondly, the strength of any relationship is useful appraising different affective explanations of support.

Turning to the relationship between identity and other concepts, one would be very surprised if pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism did not relate to identity to some degree. It is, after all, unlikely that a nationalist or a racist would not consider themselves close to their nation. However, this relationship is less likely to be reciprocal; while a nationalist is very likely to feel, say, English, it does not follow that all English are nationalists.

4.4. National Pride

In this section I define national pride as an affective or utilitarian expression of belonging to the nation. Thus national pride is a theoretically distinct concept to nationalism, as it has no ideological content. Because these two types of attachment imply no necessary contradiction with sympathies towards Europe, and have no political content that conflict *a priori* with

European integration, I do not foresee any relationship between national pride and support for European integration.

National pride can be defined as evoking a positive sense of attachment based on belonging to the nation, so that at one level the term is effectively synonymous in all but degree of attachment with patriotism, or love of country. In socio-psychological terms, we can think of national pride as representing a fairly positive level of attachment to the nation as an ingroup, or as a favourable comment on a respondent's national identity. In other words, a question asking a respondent about his or her national pride presumes a belonging to the ingroup in question. To illustrate this point, it would be nonsensical to ask someone who considers themselves Dutch whether they are proud of Germany's macroeconomic policy-making record. While one must be in possession of something before being proud of it, the reverse is not necessarily true; a German may well not feel proud of his or her country's sporting achievements. Hence the interest in measuring levels of national pride.

Earlier questions from section 2.2.4. also ask respondents to evaluate the European Union broadly in terms of 'membership' (such as question (4) which is used as the dependent variable in chapter six). We learn from section 2.2.2. that such questions elicit both utilitarian and diffuse evaluations from respondents and, although in the case of pride attachment is based on belonging not membership, there seems no reason why this same schema cannot be applied here. Indeed, backing for this approach can be found in the work of several authors in the field of national identity. Cinnirella (in Breakwell and Lyons, 1996) questions the simplistic model of the self within the social identity paradigm outlined in section 4.2., where the motivation for social identity is self-esteem maintenance. For Cinnirella, individuals might come to customise their social identities according to the type of attachment they adopt (Breakwell and Lyons, 1996, p. 267). The author essentially endorses the schema put forward by Kelman (in Rosenau, 1969). That is, attachment to the nation can have a utilitarian or affective basis. In turn, this approach appears to derive from the work of scholars such as Almond and Verba (1963) and Easton (1965) discussed in section 2.2.2., so that this sub-stream of thought seems rather duplicative. Nevertheless, Kelman does propose three specific forms of sentimental and instrumental attachment to the nation; the normative (either a commitment to the 'sacredness' of the state or to law and order), ideological (either a commitment to specific social institutions or to cultural values) and the role-participant

(either the respondent identifies with the role of a national or is committed to his or her social role) (see also Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989).

The first of three main implications of this work is that there are likely to be two dimensions to national pride, so that a single question asking respondents about their levels of 'national pride' appears undesirable. Secondly, both dimensions of national pride might be thought of as sources of system legitimacy, or the right to exercise authority in the distributive and procedural aspects of social justice (see Tyler in Hewstone and Manstead, 1995). This is especially the case for instrumental national pride; it is a minor slight of hand to replace pride in national social institutions with loyalty to the system. One should not, however, push this point. If instrumental national pride in particular is a good proxy for system legitimacy, there are many other forms of obtaining citizen acquiescence including coercion, indoctrination and custom (Polsby in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975, p. 264). Moreover, questions mentioning pride in the nation, even at an instrumental level, introduce an unmistakeable identity dimension that may cloud other issues[5].

The third implication of Cinnirella's work is the potentially differential impact of any instrumental and affective dimensions to national pride on support for European integration. Routh and Burgoyne suggest that one feature of affective, cultural attachment is a backward-looking and regressive desire to avoid change in one's national identity. On the other hand, the instrumental attachment is more open to changes on the basis of the perceived benefits. (Routh and Burgoyne, 1998, p. 4). This analysis suggests that cultural pride holders are likely to be unfavourable towards integration, with instrumental pride holders being ambivalent or perhaps even positive. Underlying this approach is the social identity viewpoint that if the outgroup, or for that matter the ingroup, of national identity and hence national pride turns out to be Europe it is no longer realistic to assume that pride and support are unrelated. In turn, the constructivist view of the nation as an artificial creation discussed in section 4.3. provides a particularly clear path for such identity development. On this view, any relationship between national pride and support for the EU is due to the alteration of national identity either to an contain an anti-European element or, likewise, national identity may actually come to incorporate some aspects of a European identity. However,

[5] To see this, consider the difference between the question "Are you satisfied with the functioning of democracy in the country where you live?" and "Are you proud of Britain's unique parliamentary democracy?"

constructivist explanations of the relationship between national pride and European integration focus on detailed study of the content of national identity, something that cannot be accomplished here. Instead, I argue that findings regarding the relationship between national pride and support can be used as supporting evidence for constructivist theses, and I return to this point in section 6.4.1.

Despite the claims of constructivism and Routh and Burgoyne's attributes of instrumental and affective pride, I argue that the contrast between nationalism and national pride demonstrates that there is unlikely to be a strong relationship between national pride and European integration; unlike nationalism, national pride has no attendant anti-European ideology or political content and is non-exclusive in character. Thus there is a clear theoretical difference between national pride, as a specific type of attachment to an ingroup, and nationalism, which complements ingroup attachment with, minimally, the political theory that any given nation should be constituted as a state, and that a state should be founded in a nation. This distinction has been recognised by several theorists of nationalism and patriotism: in one of the most influential works, Adorno *et al.* sees the genuine patriot as "free of rigid conformism, outgroup rejection, and imperialistic striving for power" while 'pseudopatriots' possess "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (Adorno *et al.*, 1950, p. 107)[6]. Kosterman and Feshbach use factor analysis techniques to empirically demonstrate that respondents distinguish between patriotism and nationalism (1989). However, one might expect nationalists and possibly xenophobes and racists to hold attitudes of national pride. Indeed, for Smith and Jaarko, national pride is a "prerequisite" for nationalism (1998, p.1). On the other hand, while patriots may hold some hostility towards national outgroups, to the extent that all categorisation involves stereotyping, there is no expected link between affective attachment to the nation and ideological hostility towards outgroups; for instance, one would not expect to see strong evaluations of racial or national superiority from such respondents. Indeed, from section 4.2. it follows that (national) identities, and pride therein are non-exclusive, so that a respondent might feel, say, both French and European.

[6] From section 4.5. we know that Adorno *et al.* consider that only nationalists or pseudopatriots engage in stereotyping, and that genuine patriots do not. Given that in section 4.2. social identity theory teaches us that all individuals stereotype to a certain extent, this may lead to an unnecessarily polarised distinction between patriotism and pseudopatriotism in the work of Adorno.

As a further point of contrast between national pride and nationalism, the former concept is often seen as a constructive social force, while nationalism tends to be viewed as an affliction on society. Almond and Verba suggest that a certain level of national pride may actually be necessary for the legitimacy and stability of a political system (1989, p. 68). Taylor, who equates a strong sense of identity with the polity as a measure of commitment to it, echoes this point (Taylor in Beiner, 1999, p. 228)[7]. Against this view of national pride and patriotism as a healthy national self-concept, nationalism has historically been viewed as morally shabby, and as the jingoistic cause of wars (see section 4.5.; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989, p. 258). As a result, some authors have proposed patriotism as a beneficent alternative to nationalism (see Viroli, 1995).

Thus national pride as defined here is a very different beast to nationalism. I define national pride as a measure of belonging, multidimensional and non-exclusive in nature. Because of its non-exclusivity, there would appear to be little conflict between supporting the EU and one's own nation; indeed, one might hold a series of multiple identities. Hence we have

H2: pride in a particular nation is not linked, ceteris paribus, with levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

4.5. Nationalism

I begin this section with a brief, general classification of the different dimensions to nationalism. Evidently focusing here on nationalist sentiment rather than behaviour or ideas, I review literature both from the contested political theory of nationalism and more straightforwardly extremist psychological perspectives on nationalist sentiment. This allows the construction of a hypothesis proposing a negative relationship between nationalist attitudes in respondents and support for integration. As a caveat, this picture may not hold

[7] There is an interesting contrast, however, between national pride as something socially beneficial or useful, as implied in the text above, and pride as an absolute moral 'good'. Christian theology has long railed against pride, and Thomas Aquinas states representatively that "inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin" (1978, p. 144).

for stateless nations, where nationalists from such areas tend to display ambivalent or even pro-European sentiments.

Smith identifies five separate actual uses of the term nationalism (Beiner, 1999, p. 55).

1. the process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states.
2. a consciousness of belonging to or identity with the nation amongst the mass public or political elites, together with sentiments for its security and prosperity.
3. a language and symbolism of the 'nation' and its role. (Political Rhetoric)
4. an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and national will and prescriptions for the realisation of national aspirations and national will.
5. a social-political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realise its national will.

Each of these five practical uses is further reducible to at least one of the core, more abstract components of ideas, sentiments or political actions. In the first sense nationalism is understood primarily as the work of intellectuals. Sentiments can be taken to refer to attitudes, values or the 'consciousness' that characterises a particular culture, while in the third sense nationalism is understood as an organisation or movement which purports to promote the national interest in some way. Evidently, the most relevant nationalist component in a thesis concerning public opinion is sentiment, or point 2 on Smith's schema.

I proceed to hypothesise a negative link between nationalist sentiment and support for integration. From social psychology it is evident that, in common with patriots or persons with sentiments of national pride, nationalists identify very strongly with the nation of which they are members. However, only from political theory do we learn the content of nationalist ideology shared by nationalists. The core nationalist belief is that the national unit provides state legitimacy, so that nations should also be constituted as states and vice versa. To many authors nationalism thus conceived constitutes a benign recognition of cultural differences, while other writers see nationalism as more often than not descending into a bigoted and outmoded ideology. Arguably, for either of these two characterisations of nationalism the impact on support for integration could be seen to be negative. In the end, I test a relatively extreme version of nationalism, not least because Adorno's psychological conception of nationalism takes a similarly negative view, while in section 5.2.4. we see that the

International Social Science Program (ISSP) survey questions used to measure nationalism seem to tap a more extremist viewpoint.

From section 4.1. we can assume that nationalists, like patriots, identify strongly with the 'imagined community' of the nation to which they belong. Moreover, the presence of an outgroup illustrates the point that nationalism is not inward-looking but sees the nation in reference towards other nations or non-nationals. However, it is the specifically nationalist ideas regarding the distribution of political power that separates nationalism from patriotism. To begin with a definition, Gellner highlights that for all persuasions of nationalist the legitimacy of the state is provided by the cultural unit, that is, the nation. He writes

> "Nationalism is a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond. Whatever principles of authority may exist between people depend for their legitimacy on the fact that the members of the group concerned are of the same culture... In its extreme version, similarity of culture becomes both the necessary and the sufficient condition of legitimate membership: *only* members of the appropriate culture may join the unit in question and *all of them* must do so." (1997, p. 4)

We can make do here by defining the state as that agency within society that possesses a monopoly of legitimate political power. The definition of a nation is altogether more problematic. For some writers, a nation is a historically constituted community of people that possesses a combination of certain characteristics, such as a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up (Stalin in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 20). Other contributors stress the contingent nature of nations, arguing that its members must mutually recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. For Renan, the nation is an "everyday plebiscite" (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 17). These two approaches hint at the division in the literature between conservatives, who see the nation as primordial and natural, sidestepping political institutions and actors altogether, and constructivists, who tend to believe that

> "the unmitigated link between the cultural raw material and political identities is broken by an active process of identity-formation entailing manipulation of cultural symbols...It is up to the political activist to select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilised or suppressed." (Cederman, 1996, p. 3).

On any account, the nation is a cultural concept, set aside the more legal and political character of the state. This conception clearly has immediate application for a state such as the United Kingdom, where people share a common legal citizenship but may have differing notions of whether they belong to a Scottish, Irish, Welsh or English nation.

While it follows from Gellner's definition that state power must be apportioned on national lines, within the EU context this does not imply absolute legal and political sovereignty. MacCormick disputes from a legal perspective the intergovernmentalist understanding of integration (see section 1.3.4.), arguing that it is mistaken to apply an Austinian analysis to European integration, whereby parliaments delegate rather than transfer power to the EU's law-making organs, making the commands they issue binding on citizens in virtue of their pre-adoption by the sovereign body (1993, p. 3). Instead, MacCormick asserts the primacy of an evolutionary interpretation of Hartian theory of law, whereby legal systems have at their apex a rule of recognition for law based on deliberative practise and emergent custom. As an example of this approach, the *Factortame* case saw the UK government accept the striking down of certain parts of the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act by the European Court of Justice because the rules and norms of European Community law came to constitute a new criterion of validity for UK law. Taken to its conclusion, this view of law that allows different legal systems to overlap and interact on potentially equal terms, leads to a divorce of statehood from legal sovereignty. Only in this way, MacCormick argues, can one allow for international law, canon law and what is sometimes called the 'living law' of social institutions like universities, firms or families (1993, p. 14). The implication for the study of nationalism is that calls for full political and legal state sovereignty are unrealistic. Arguably, the force of these arguments is recognised by many nationalist movements and in the accompanying literature. Catalan nationalists are seen to adopt a 'post-sovereign' stance, stressing a historic tradition of shared sovereignty, while on the other hand Basque nationalists arguably reject this discourse and continue to demand full independence (Keating, 2001). This opens the door for post-sovereign nationalists to potentially be pro-European integration, and this point is discussed below. The question, then, of what degree of sovereignty is required for statehood might be thought of as varying by nation, and indeed we can see in section 6.4.1. how different minority nationals react to the idea of independence within the ambit of the EU.

Whatever the requisite amount of state sovereignty demanded, Hobsbawm makes the point that for extremists nationalism is able to function as a 'trump' card that can subordinate other interests to its achievement.

> "[The relationship between nationalism and, for instance, the choice between capitalism and socialism] is of no significance to nationalists, who do not care what this relationship is, so long as Ruritanians (or whoever) acquire sovereign statehood as a nation, or indeed what happens thereafter" (Hobsbawn quoted in Beiner, 1999, p. 13)

From section 4.2. we learn that extremists hold more polarised opinions regarding outgroups than more moderate ingroup members. In the context of nationalism, extremists often construct a self-righteousness morality justifying their claims to state power on the basis of biased assessments of superiority over national outgroups, either other nations internal to the state in question or in the international domain. At its most intense, Dunn points out that this is no less than ethical relativism, a doctrine that gives an agent no good reason to deny themselves anything that they desire and are able to appropriate (Dunn writing in Beiner, 1999, p. 30-2). As a particularly poignant example, many nationalist ideologies are exclusive in character, and the worst historical instances have laid claim to spurious racial advantages that serve to differentiate a particular nation. The results have invariably been bloody, and in Gellner's words "many people had to be either assimilated, or expelled or killed" (1994, p. 116). Unsurprisingly then, for many people nationalism has an air of moral shabbiness, a challenge to the universalist morality that pervades Western societies, whether in the form of Christianity or legal arrangements that see humans as possessing identical rights.

On the other hand, the view that human values are in some sense specific to particular cultures, together with the understanding that this implies a geographical limit to ethical competence, has lead to some of the most benign nationalist thinking. Following Plamenatz, western nationalism has more often than not served as a vehicle for the celebration of culture idiosyncrasy, exemplified by the historicist thought of writers such as Herder and Mazzini. Isaiah Berlin has insisted that Herder took the view that cultural nationalism was necessarily opposed to any hegemonic infliction of its own cultural proclivities, as this would be hypocritical (Beiner, 1999, p. 42).

More recently, some theorists have tried to show that there is no inconsistency in fusing nationalist elements to liberalism, or in bringing a liberal face to nationalism. Civic nationalism attempts to find a role for collective identity alongside liberal conceptions of citizenship. On such accounts, it is recognised that the liberal ideal of universalistic citizenship can never be realised in a pluralistic world of nation-states. Nevertheless, citizenship can be based on accidental territorial coexistence (*jus soli*) rather than according to, say, bloodlines (*jus sanguinis*). So, in non-exclusive states such as the United States, Canada, Britain or Sweden there is supposedly equal access to the cultural goods of and in the civic nation. Amongst many criticisms, however, Kymlicka argues forcefully that civic nationalism is necessarily based on a cultural component, even where it is something as innocent as promoting a common language (Beiner, 1999, p. 133)[8]. Kymlicka explains the violence in Turkey against the Kurd minority not because Turkey refuses to accept Kurds as Turkish citizens, but because it refuses to accept that Kurds are a separate national group. So civic nationalism too often falls back into exclusivity and a negative form of nationalism.

Advocates of Liberal nationalism typically call for intra-state cultural and national differences to be taken account, so weakening the idea of a homogenous national state. For Tamir, the "ideal of the nation-state should...be abandoned" although national identities should have the opportunity to be displayed in a "public space" (Tamir quoted in Beiner, 1999, p. 8). This means that the feature of nationalism as a 'trump' is diluted. For many authors, however, Tamir's position is simply a form of liberalism that is not indifferent to concerns about national identity; liberal nationalism itself being quite possibly an oxymoron (Levison, 1995). The concern is, that when it comes to the crunch, liberal nationalists will be forced to drop either the liberalism or the nationalism elements. According to Beiner, this irreconcilability derives from a basic problem, "how to privilege the majority cultural identity in defining civic membership without consigning cultural minorities to second-class citizenship" (1999, p. 9). That is, while it would seem unlikely that any real nationalist

[8] Civic nationalism reappears in the work of Habermas as 'constitutional patriotism' or the political loyalty of citizens to universal values and the free polity that they share (1989). However, as Canovan shows, advocates of this 'new patriotism' leave many vital questions unanswered, such as where the state draws its power. For many, the answer to this question is the nation (Canovan, 2000, p. 423).

would agree to abandon the idea of a nation-state, it is hardly liberal to favour any one group of people over another within the boundaries of a shared civic life[9].

Nationalism in the psychological literature is understood in more extremist terms, with attendant implications for the link between nationalist sentiment and support. In *The Authoritarian Personality* Adorno *et al.* see nationalism as a species of ethnocentrism, which is characterised by anti-Semitism, hostility towards other minorities, and a narrow, aggressive loyalty to the national ingroup ("patriotism") (1950)[10]. Indeed, xenophobia and racism also form part of this broad concept of ethnocentrism, with the implication that we can expect nationalist, racist and xenophobic attitudes to be positively associated with one another. On the other hand, viewing identity and pride as the necessary but not sufficient conditions for nationalism, racism and xenophobia means that the relationship here is likely only to be one-way: nationalism, racism and xenophobia should not expected to determine their logical antecedents, identity and pride.

Ethnocentrism itself is a concept associated with a certain psychological type, the authoritarian. The authoritarian is known for his or her 'conventionalism' or rigid adherence to convention based on the fear of being different, which in turn implies a susceptibility to fascism or other outside moral guidance. The Berkeley group of Adorno and his co-authors build on the work of Freud to explain this occurrence as an externalisation of the conscience or superego, the result of a failure to internalise the moral rules of the conscience within the self or ego. While an authoritarian individual wishes to satisfy his or her id, or primitive emotional needs, conflict with the superego prevents this. In a strangely Marxist twist, the authors posit that this conflict is the result of sexual repression, itself a by-product of bourgeois capitalist society. The result of these unconsciously repressed and unsatisfied desires is a compensatory exaggerated emphasis on convention for its own sake ('conventionalism'), a vengeful authoritarian aggressivity as well as destructiveness and cynicism; in short, anti-democratic behaviour. So, authoritarian attitudes such as the

[9] Nationalism and Liberalism can, arguably, be more successfully linked with regard to national self-determination. Liberalism, when taken to mean the right of a community to self-defence and freedom from oppression (emancipation), has formed part of many early nationalist movements (see also Loth, 2000, p. 22).

[10] Ironically, Adorno *et al.* take patriotism to refer to 'pseudopatriotism', or blind attachment to national cultural values and rejection of other nations as outgroups (Forbes, 1985, p. 55). This pseudopatriotism can be distinguished from genuine patriotism, or love of country.

predisposition to think in rigid stereotypes and aggression towards those who violate conventional values are at the root of nationalism. The nationalist, then, is an all-round bigot; suspicious of foreigners, he or she is also inclined to find fault with his or her own countrymen, particularly minorities (Forbes, 1985, p. 54).

As a caveat, in section 4.2. we learn that all individuals who engage in self-categorization also engage in stereotyping and ingroup promotion over outgroups. On the other hand, Adorno *et al.*'s approach suggests that only authoritarian personality types engage in stereotyping. The danger is that Adorno redefines all nationalist stereotype holders as ethnocentrists, or extreme nationalists. In this way, Adorno's definition of nationalism could be too extreme and polarised, perhaps artificially distinguishing it to too great a degree from national pride.

In summary, I have (somewhat artificially) characterised nationalism into more moderate and extremist variants. It seems possible, however, that both types of nationalist sentiment can be associated with anti-EU evaluations. For extremists, then, nationalism may be little more than a doctrine of ethical relativism and ethnic superiority, so that we can without great difficulty imagine extremist nationalism sentiment to oppose the creation of a regional organisation aiming to bind its members into patterns of co-operation. Moreover, although this is not the place to definitively judge how successfully some theorists have fused nationalism and liberalism, it is evident that even more benign takes on nationalism struggle to avoid envisaging a single, hegemonic national culture as providing state legitimacy. One might also expect, then, liberal and civic nationalists to resist EU encroachments on national sovereignty. However, this dogmatic rejection of sovereignty encroachments may be exaggerated in the case of moderate nationalists, as it makes no allowances for differences between 'high' politics sovereignty issues, such as foreign policy cooperation, and the more mundane 'low' politics of, say, international waterway management. Nevertheless, the expected attitudinal similarities between the two variants of nationalism towards the European Union mean that I am agnostic about which variant to test. I hypothesise nationalist attitudes to be concomitant with negative evaluations of European integration. This is based on the interpretation that nationalist attitudes derive from a self-righteous morality that generally maintains that state power must be in the hands of legitimate national representatives. In turn, the nation is, at the very least, *primus inter pares* in the international

system. As supporting evidence, Laffan points to the revival in fortunes of nationalist popular parties in some EU countries as a reaction against growing the growing cosmopolitanism fostered by the EU (1996, p. 89). So we have

H3: nationalist sentiment in a particular state is linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

While the relationship between nationalism as defined above and support might seem rather self-evident, we are still interested in the strength of any relationship. Moreover, it is clear from the operationalisation of nationalism using pre-existing survey questions in section 5.2.4. that it is difficult to capture the extreme version of nationalism defined above. Especially in the light of this, the relationship between nationalism and support is more controversial than it might seem at first. Although the Treaties establishing and building the European Communities and the Union have doubtless involving the signing away of sovereignty, some theorists have argued that this has strengthened the nation-state. Recalling section 1.3.4., Milward *et al.* (1992) argue that the purpose of European Community policies was not to supersede but to reinforce the nation-state, while Moravcsik (1994) makes the claim that opaque central bargaining amongst member-states has enhanced their control of the domestic policy arena. Both these hypotheses are, however, somewhat counter-intuitive and controversial. I incline to the view that for a proposition to affect the mass public consciousness it must be, as with a Hollywood movie plot, kept very simple.

As a further caveat, I begin by noting the distinction between nationalist sentiment and the state in the hypothesis above. For many countries, a single, unchallenged national grouping is in control of or privileged by the organs of the state, so that this distinction is of little import. However, there are a smaller number of countries that contain recognised, stateless nations within their confines. In the European Union, Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom would seem to be the clearest examples of states with minority nations in their midst. In the most straightforward case, the European Union may be seen as an ally in achieving statehood for 'post-sovereignty' nationalists from certain minority nations, either because the EU functions as a prop for nation-states (see Milward *et al.*, 1992) or for the quite opposite reason that European integration has contributed to the demise of centralised nation-states (Lynch, 1996, p. 14). Keating argues that in the case of Scotland, the former

view has strengthened support for the 'post-sovereignty' position within the Scottish National Party, as it allows one to claim that Scotland could quite feasibly become an independent state within the orbit of the European Union, rather like the Netherlands, by acceding to the *acquis communautaire* (2001, p. 2). As we have seen in section 3.4., opinion poll data suggests that the Scots as a whole are less Eurosceptic than the English. On the other hand, the continuing widespread support for classical statehood means that I treat Scottish nationalists' evaluations of the EU as an open question. For Catalonia, the data is slightly more clear-cut, indicating that Catalan residents are more likely to feel European the more than they feel Catalan rather than Spanish (Keating, 2001, p. 10). Other stateless nations may be more ambivalent towards the EU, possibly the result of historic traditions emphasising pactism, accommodation and shared authority. Amongst Welsh nationalists, where support for independence is weaker than in Scotland, nationalist discourse appears on the whole more focused on a Europe of the regions rather than an independent Wales within Europe (see Lynch, 1996). Keating argues that Welsh nationalists are

> "more concerned with maximizing the degree of autonomy and influence open to the nation than with the trappings of sovereignty, and are usually ambivalent as to their ultimate aims, preferring to see how the world evolves before they commit themselves." (Keating, 2001, p. 3)

I treat Welsh nationalist attitudes towards integration as likely to be ambivalent. A third option is that minority nationalism and European integration are incompatible, on the grounds that European institutions undermine state sovereignty. The most likely candidate for this category is the Basque country, where Keating sets out data showing this to be the Spanish region with least identification with Europe (Keating, 2001, p. 11). In section 5.2.4. I analyse minority nation results based on this three-way typology rather than any specific country-by-country hypotheses.

Within the confines of this section I have attempted a broad outline of the range of nationalist thought. I use a simple one-dimensional scale, with extremists and moderates at either end, to characterise these different approaches. For both practical and theoretical reasons, I hypothesise a negative relationship with support for the EU. This hypothesis, however, is shown to be theoretically coherent only for those nations that have achieved statehood, so that nationalists in stateless nations such as the Basque country may well evaluate the EU in a very different light. The potential acquiescence of some minority nations within the EU

project highlights the fact that full political and legal state sovereignty is rather unrealistic project, only pursued by a few nationalist movements. Finally, nationalism is seen by Adorno *et al.* as positively related to xenophobia and racism, but, while most nationalists are proud of and identify with their home nation, the reverse is unlikely to be true.

4.6. Xenophobia and Racism

The similarities between the two concepts of xenophobia and racism mean that they are investigated together here. Socio-psychological approaches to xenophobia and racism highlight common, ethnocentric origins with nationalism, including a presumed antipathy towards European integration. A number of other individual and group-level approaches to xenophobia and racism are also briefly discussed, although they do not alter substantially the hypotheses towards integration.

Rather than viewing xenophobia and racism as irrational, inscrutable psychological dispositions, both concepts can be clearly located in the socio-psychological framework outlined above. Put simply, xenophobes hold prejudicial attitudes towards foreigners and strangers, which one might think of here as an outgroup defined by non-nationals. Racists are predisposed towards certain 'races' while at the same time consigning other such groupings to outgroup status. There are, of course, differences between the two concepts. One might see the strict meaning of xenophobia as fear of the other, where there has been a subtle shift from 'separation' to 'adversity' towards the outgroup. For this reason, some writers have seen xenophobia as intimately related to nationalism. For instance, the following witticism is labelled by Karl Deutsch as a European saying

> "A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours" (1969, p. 3).

On the other hand, racism retains a more explicit sense of hatred for particular 'races'. As discussed in the following paragraph, racism can be at least partially understood in terms of cultural and ideology theories of biological superiority; that is, many historical forms of racism made their way into the open under the guise of science.

Here, I understand 'race' to denote a class of people related by common descent, the supposed signs of which are skin colour and physiognomy. This is in spite of the fact that scientific and pseudo-scientific attempts to divide humanity into separate subspecies or 'races' have been thoroughly discredited. The so-called 'father' of modern racism, Gobineau, recognised three races, the white, the yellow and the black, in descending order of superiority and argued that all races achieve their characteristic greatness when unmixed (Scruton, 1982, p. 189). Modern genetics has definitively shown that characteristics such as skin colour are genetically superficial, while it is generally recognised that 'interbreeding' among humans has taken place continuously throughout history. However, to the extent that people may exhibit prejudice based upon perceived racial grounds, the phenomenon is still of interest here.

This lack of an objective base to distinguish between races often leads 'practitioners' themselves into confusing xenophobia and racism. A European Commission DGV report 'Racism and Xenophobia in Europe' compiled on the basis of Eurobarometer 47.1 remarks that many people who openly declared themselves racist in the opinion survey were in fact xenophobic, "as the 'minorities' who were the target of hostile feelings in each country, varied according to its colonial and migratory history and the recent arrival of refugees" (1997, p.1). Because of this confusion, it may not be possible in the general sense to say whether a particular set of survey questions measures xenophobia or racism, it may depend very much on the particular circumstances of the country in question. On the other hand, Eurobarometer figures for 1992 show that more of the foreign resident population in EU countries came from outside the EU (an average of 2.8% as against 1.5% from inside the EU) (Melich, 1995, p. 11). So, the confusion surrounding racism means that it is probably best that treated theoretically in conjunction with xenophobia.

From section 4.5. we know that one of the more common ways to understand the phenomena of xenophobia and racism is, in common with nationalism, using Adorno *et al.*'s umbrella concept of ethnocentrism. In this instance, an ethnocentrist is someone who judges foreign groups by domestic standards, and so is to be contrasted with cosmopolitanism and cultural relativism (Forbes, 1985, p. 22). For Adorno *et al.*, the driving force underlying this crude political ideology, ethnocentrism, was an 'authoritarian' personality type, itself principally a product of early sexual inhibition common in bourgeois capitalist society. So, one might

expect a positive statistical association between nationalist, xenophobic and racist sentiment (see section 5.4.). Certainly, for many right wing movements and political parties in Europe, nationalism and racism go hand in hand. Consider, for example, the French 'Front National', the Austrian 'Freedom party' and the Belgian 'Vlaams Blok'[11].

Although social-psychological theories may adequately describe the actual process of stereotyping and prejudice, a number of different approaches compete to explain the causal factors behind racism and xenophobia. Amongst the individual-level theories of prejudice, the most straightforward approach takes individual correlates of racial and xenophobia prejudice in attitude surveys. Self-interest theories postulate that individuals develop negative stereotypes towards those with whom they are in competition and conflict (Quillian, 1995, p. 587). Other theories investigate prejudice at the group-level, where the phenomenon is typically explained by threats to the dominant group's interests or privileges by a subordinate group. Quillian distinguishes between theorists such as Bobo that stress threats to a group's subjective perception of their own interests and the work of authors such as Blumer, who posit that groups respond to threats against their real interests. Interesting as these diverse threads of thought are, the limitations of the survey data used in this thesis, as well as its scope, mean that I only attempt to locate the causes of racist and xenophobic attitudes at the individual level and from a predominantly sociological standpoint.

Theorising about the relationship between xenophobia, racism and European integration, I take the view that xenophobes and racists will associate a closer European Union with an influx into local communities of members of the out-groups that they are hostile towards. Certainly with respect to xenophobia, the free movement of persons forms a key part of the 1985 Schengen Agreement, incorporated into the EU framework from May 1999 as a protocol to the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, and the 1986 Single European Act's focus on an internal market. Similarly, the EU may well be associated with an influx of non-Caucasian 'races' in the minds of racists. This may be thanks to a series of initiatives such as the Schengen Agreement's joint Visa policy, which allows legal extra-communitarians to travel freely within 13 of the 15 EU countries. More fundamentally, a cosmopolitan value system underpins the whole EU project: Article O of the Treaty of the European Union states that

[11] It is worth noting that racist politicians such as Le Pen and Haider have occasionally expressed racist and pro-European sentiments, regarding their own racial group as Europeans.

any European state may apply to become a member of the Union. This definition might include states as 'undesirable' as the ex-Warsaw pact countries and even Turkey.

H4: xenophobic sentiments in a particular state are linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

H5: racist sentiments in a particular state are linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

Socio-psychological approaches suggest that xenophobia and racism are theoretically rather similar concepts, and the subjective nature of racism acts to reinforce this notion. I predict that both concepts react negatively to the reality of integration and the cosmopolitan thinking that forms part of the EU's guiding principles.

4.7. Conclusion

In the introduction to this chapter I made the argument that definitions are too often neglected in the empirical social science literature. This argument forms a key motivational force behind this chapter, even if the space is not available for a completely fluent treatment of the concepts under consideration.

I show in section 4.2. that social psychological theories of identity can provide the building blocks for a thorough understanding of identity, nationalism, national pride, xenophobia and racism. Not only does this aid in our understanding of these concepts, in particular the multi-faceted nationalism, but also acts to justify the treatment here of the five concepts together.

In section 4.5. I argue that one can, very crudely, distinguish historically and theoretically between moderate and extremist variants of nationalist ideology. I argue that nationalists of both types are generally hostile towards the European Union. Even so, the negative link between nationalist sentiment and the EU is placed into question for stateless nations. In section 4.5. I also introduce Adorno's psychological explanation of nationalism, xenophobia and racism. Despite a number of caveats, I expect nationalism, xenophobia and racism to be

positively associated with one another in the chapter five results. On the other hand, I expect to see no causal link run from national pride to nationalism, xenophobia and racism (although vice versa I posit a link), nor even between national pride and the EU, as the former concept is a measure of attachment to the nation rather than an ideology. I posit a negative link between the closely related attitudes of xenophobia and racism and the EU, which both in actions and underlying philosophy has shown itself to be a cosmopolitan organisation. Finally, I propose that the more European someone feels, the more likely they are to support integration. National identity in particular might be a necessary condition for attitudes of national pride, nationalism, racism and xenophobia, although the opposite is rather unlikely to be true. Even if some of these hypotheses appear uncontroversial, from section 3.5. we know that there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate this. Moreover, we are also interested in the strength of any prospective relationship.

So, having defined identity, nationalism, national pride, xenophobia and racism and hypothesised how such attitude holders might view European integration, I proceed in chapter five to operationalise the concepts and empirically analyse their make-up, including their relationships to each other. In chapter six I test the hypotheses established here against support for integration.

5. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL PRIDE, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, NATIONALISM AND RACISM USING ISSP DATA

5.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

The main aim of this chapter is to demonstrate empirically using International Social Science Program survey data some of the principal determinants, at least from a political sociology perspective, of European and national identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism, concepts that are theoretically defined in chapter four.

The motives to investigate the determinants of what will serve as independent variables in later chapters are threefold. From section 4.4., one might expect a positive link running from nationalism, xenophobia and racism to national pride and European identity, but not vice versa. Similarly, the theories of Adorno *et al.* discussed in section 4.5. suggest that xenophobic, racist and nationalist attitudes are positively associated with each other and indeed stem from an underlying psychological disposition. So, the research herein can serve to (in)validate earlier theoretical definitions. Moreover, the relative theoretical proximity of the five concepts taken makes it useful to show their distinctiveness in the data, as well as on what basis they do relate to each other. Thirdly, from a wider sociological perspective, this research stands to shed light on the basis of several relatively common attitudes in society at large. There is also an interesting contrast that can be highlighted here between the components of European identity and national pride, generally seen as benign attitudes, and the determinants of nationalism and racism, which are typically viewed in more negative terms.

The building blocks for the construction of the necessary statistical models are presented in the opening section 5.2. of this chapter. Here I introduce and explain the selection of the

ISSP data, operationalise, with the exception of xenophobia due to lack of data, all the concepts defined in the previous chapter and also bring in a number of relevant control variables. In section 5.3. I describe the series of models and the Weighted Least Squares regression technique used to investigate the determinants of national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism before presenting the results at the aggregate and country level. These results are interpreted in section 5.4.

The key aggregate level findings modify the earlier predictions. As expected, I show initially that there is a cultural and political dimension to national pride. In fact, there are two key factors underlying the survey data; political and cultural pride and nationalism load onto one factor, while racism loads predominantly onto a second. Although the first factor appears similar to Adorno's concept of ethnocentrism, the weak loading of racism and the positive relationship between national pride and support exposed in chapter six suggests that this is not the case, and I instead treat it as a measure of affective, cultural support for the nation. The grouping together of national pride and nationalism also places into doubt the chapter four hypothesis that national pride is unrelated to support for integration. The second factor seems a more straightforward measure of racism.

5.2. Constructing the Model

In this section I begin by giving an overview of the ISSP National Identity survey data. I then operationalise one-by-one the concepts outlined in chapter four. I also state how common each concept is in the survey data selected. After all, setting aside statistical issues, if only a small handful of respondents are, say, nationalist then the effort devoted to explaining both their attitudes towards integration and their determining factors would seem misplaced. Finally, the control variables are considered, so that in the sections that follow I can present the statistical models used, the results and the interpretation thereof.

5.2.1. The ISSP Survey

I decide to use the International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity survey in preference to the Eurobarometer survey series in both in chapter five and six because it contains a variable list capable of measuring our central concepts over a broad, representative sample of European Union member states.

The ISSP survey contains cross-national, individual level data collected over a single time period (1995)[1]. Data are available for a total of 24 countries worldwide, although here only European Union member states are retained in the survey. The EU countries that the ISSP survey covers are as follows: Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Spain[2]. For each of the countries there are approximately 1000 cases, except in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands, where the sample size is approximately 2000. Rather than allow sample size by itself to influence the aggregate level findings, I weight the data by population, which allows one to draw EU-wide conclusions from the eight countries in question. The 1995 population figures are expressed in millions and, in brackets, as a percentage of the total population of the eight countries: Germany – 81.9 (30%), UK 58.5 minus 1.6 for Northern Ireland (21%) (see 1998 Northern Ireland Annual Abstract of Statistics), Austria – 8.1 (3%), Italy 57.2 (21%), Ireland – 3.6 (1%), Netherlands – 15.5 (6%), Spain – 39.2 (14%) and Sweden – 8.8 (3%) (World Bank, 1997). Clearly, while Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain are weighted up, the impact of the smaller countries such as Austria and Ireland on the aggregate results will be very small.

I choose the ISSP survey data over the Eurobarometer surveys on the basis of the variable list present in each of the surveys. While the strengths of the ISSP survey variables are evaluated in the sections below, I note here that the Eurobarometer surveys are not particularly

[1] The data I use here was made available on CD-ROM from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (study no. 2880). All the results based on this data are available in digital format on request from the author.

[2] The data for the UK is split into Britain and then Northern Ireland. Here I only analyse the results for Great Britain. On the other hand, the East and West German territorial distinctions preserved in the ISSP data are amalgamated in my results, except where specifically stated to the contrary.

successful at measuring national pride, nationalism, racism or xenophobia. Racism and xenophobia receive the best coverage; several slightly erratic question series are supplemented by two special Eurobarometer reports (No. 30.0 and 47.1.). The report 'Racism and Xenophobia in Europe' (1997), drawn from Eurobarometer 47.1., is examined briefly in sections 4.5., 5.2.5. and 6.2.5. Unfortunately, the coverage for national pride and nationalism is poor. There are several questions concerning citizens' fears over the potential loss of sovereignty or identity that the EU might bring about, and over where the dividing line over public policy is between national governments and European institutions[3]. However, it would appear difficult to argue that these types of questions elicit responses based overwhelmingly on nationalist considerations. A question is posed on national pride; however, this question is put infrequently, and not necessarily in combination with any other items of interest. This lack of coverage is unfortunate; Eurobarometer surveys typically include all current EU member states at the time of issue and are also available over an unmatched time period (see section 2.2.3.). So, the use of the Eurobarometer surveys is restricted to explaining non-attitudes (see section 7.5.1.) and evaluating the meaning of various types of dependent variables and provide measures of absolute levels of support for integration (see chapter two).

5.2.2. European and National Identity

Identity is operationalised here using the only two suitable questions in the ISSP survey:

"How close do you feel to...? (Very close, close, not very close, not close at all, can't choose/don't know)"

(13) Your country

(14) Europe

[3] In lieu of listing all such questions, the interested reader is directed towards the search engines run by the German Social Science Infrastructure Service (http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/search/index.htm) and the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (http://www.nsd.uib.no/atle/eurob/eurosok.cfm). These engines greatly facilitate question searches amongst the large number of Eurobarometer surveys.

From these two variables, I construct a measure that compares national and European attachment by subtracting responses to these two questions. I do this by coding the 'can't choose/don't know' category as missing, and coding question (13) from 1 to 4, where 4 refers to 'very close' feelings towards one's country. Question (14) is coded from –1 to –4, where –4 refers to 'very close' feelings towards Europe. In this way, a single scale is constructed from 3 to –3, where –3 captures greater attachment to the nation than Europe, and 0 implies equal attachment to Europe and the nation (see figure 5.1. below).

Figure 5.1. Levels of European and National Identity (1995 ISSP)



This scale is almost identical to that constructed by Citrin and Sides using Eurobarometer data (2001, p. 11). The advantage of combining the two questions is that it allows respondents to express attachment to multiple territorial foci (see section 4.2.). So, this is neither a measure of European or national identity, but rather of both, and in relation to one another. As such, it is a 'strong' measure of identity attachment; that is, while one might well feel a certain level of Europeanness, feeling more European than national is a tougher hurdle. So, this measure captures the extremes of European or nationalist sentiment. As for disadvantages, this measure cannot tell us about the strength and direction of the relationships between absolute levels of national and European identity and the dependent variables. Moreover, one would have to accept that the term 'closeness' appears vague and indistinctive, not quite synonymous with the 'membership' necessary for identity of a group. Certainly, it does seem surprising that the modal respondent is as close to Europe as to his or

her nation. However, these finding do not differ substantially from the following Eurobarometer question

(15) "In the near future do you see yourself as...(nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only?"

Here, over the last decade between 80-90% of respondents consistently see themselves as belonging to only their nation, or their nation and then Europe (Citrin and Sides, 2001, p. 20). As can be seen from figure 5.1., the vast majority of valid responses fall between 0 and –3, implying a similar pattern (Mean = -0.65; Variance = 0.80). The real problem may be that respondents who are equally opposed to the nation and Europe fall under the 0 category. Again, the best way to interpret this scale is as a relative not absolute measure of identity.

In figure 5.2. I present a graph giving an overview of relative mean European identity by country, where respondents in countries with scores closer to zero are more European.

Figure 5.2. Relative European Identity (1995 ISSP)



As a caveat to the operationalisation of identity herein, other theorists have noted that identity is a multi-dimensional construct, something that we are unable to capture here. From section 4.4., Cinnirella argues that identity possesses both utilitarian and affective dimensions (in

Breakwell and Lyons, 1996). Bruter goes some way towards operationalising what he labels 'Civic' and 'Cultural' dimensions of national identity, revealed by employing factor analysis on a ten-item proprietary survey of 210 university students from the UK, France and the Netherlands (2001). From the broader perspective of collective self-esteem, Lilli and Diehl find evidence from 200 German university students of four dimensions to national identity: an individual's self worth as a group member (Membership), an individual's view of the ingroup's value (Private), the views of others towards this group (Public) and the contribution of ingroup membership to the person's self-conception (Identity) (1999). So, the measure of national and European identity proposed here is necessarily more simplistic than that proposed in some of the social psychological approaches to identity and which is successfully applied to national pride in the section below.

5.2.3. National Pride

National pride is operationalised in the ISSP survey by taking the following questions[4], which roughly correspond to a set battery of questions concerning national pride stretching back at last as far as the work of Almond and Verba (1963, p. 64; see also Müller-Peters, 1998 and below). The same set of questions is taken to measure national pride by Smith and Jarkko, who also use the ISSP National Identity survey to investigate national pride (1998)[5].

"How proud are you of (R's country) in each of the following?" (Very proud, somewhat proud, not very proud, not proud at all, can't choose/don't know)

(16) the way democracy works.

(17) its political influence in the world.

[4] I choose not to include the variable that asks: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be a citizen of (Respondent's Country)." (Agree strongly, Agree, Neither agree or disagree, Disagree, Disagree strongly). Unsurprisingly, this variable correlates highly with question (21) (r=0.588; significant at the 0.01 level for a two-tailed significance test). I prefer question (21) as the response categories for the question elaborated here differ slightly to those for the rest of the pride questions.

[5] On the other hand, Dogan uses national pride questions in the Eurobarometer and World Values Survey data as an indicator of nationalism (1994). Dogan does at least take national pride as one in a battery of five indicators of nationalism, which also comprises level of confidence in one's army, willingness to fight for one's country, trust in neighbouring countries and support for European integration. However, it should be clear that all of these questions, and of course the last one in particular, could quite easily be thought of tapping a variety of attitudes rather than just nationalism. Because the World Values Survey is not used in this thesis (see section 2.2.3.) and the questions it contains are not all available in the ISSP data, I refrain from detailed criticism of this approach.

(18) its economic achievements.

(19) its social security system.

(20) its scientific and technological achievements.

(21) its achievements in sports.

(22) its achievements in the arts and literature.

(23) its armed forces.

(24) its history.

(25) its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society .

The responses to the three questions are coded from 1 through 4, where 4 signifies the most proud response ('agree strongly'). The 'can't choose/don't know' responses are dropped, as they are not fully integrated with the other national pride response categories, appearing rather as an addendum in the question wording above. In keeping with this, categories 2 and 3 in the national pride questions, supposedly sitting either side of an indifferent response, typically receive a far higher percentage of responses than the indifference category. For instance, while 43% of all respondents were somewhat proud of their country's economic achievements, and 25% were not very proud, only 7% couldn't choose. On the other hand, indifferent responses for the nationalist variables above vary between 20-30%.

To test the idea from section 4.4. that there are both instrumental and affective dimensions to national pride I employ factor analysis on questions (16) to (25). I use the maximum likelihood method to extract factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. In the interests of clarity, I assume an orthogonal design between factors, and rotate to a final solution using the Varimax method. The final, rotated solution is shown in table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Aggregate Level Factor Analysis of National Pride (1995 ISSP)

Are you proud of...?	Political Pride	Cultural Pride
Way democracy works	**.73**	.11
Political influence in the world	**.65**	.30
Economic achievements	**.64**	.19
Social security system	**.68**	.04
Scientific achievements	*.36*	*.42*
Sports achievements	.17	**.63**
Arts achievements	.08	**.62**
Armed forces	.24	**.56**
History	.09	**.62**
Fair treatment of groups	*.55*	*.26*
Eigenvalue	3.77	1.58
Percentage of Explained Variance	37.70	15.81
Cronbach's alpha	0.77	0.71
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)	1430.11 (26)	

Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax

We can indeed see that two quite distinct factors rather than one are extracted. My initial interpretation is that the first group of factors highlighted in bold (questions (15)-(18)) all refer to a more instrumental or political dimension to national pride while the second highlighted group (questions (21)-(24)) refer to a more affective, cultural element. Because questions (20) and (25) load to a sizeable extent on both factors I do not attempt to allocate either of these two variables to one or the other latent factor. I go on to construct variables in the ISSP data from these two extracted factors, the former named 'Political Pride' and the latter 'Cultural Pride'. Interestingly, Müller-Peters administers a pan-European survey with a very similar battery of questions measuring national pride to that appearing in the ISSP survey, and also extracts two factors using principal component analysis (1998, p. 709)[6]. The

[6] This survey takes 15,088 respondents from all fifteen EU member states. The nine questions ask whether respondents are proud of their country's *economic power, political influence in the world, welfare system, public safety*, currency, head of state, cultural traditions and customs, national language and finally history (Müller-Peters, 1998, p. 9). The italicised

factors are labelled 'Economic-Political pride' and 'Cultural-historical pride' by the author. Almond and Verba too distinguish between political and non-political pride on very similar lines using a very similar battery of questions (1963, p. 65). From section 4.4. I note that instrumental pride in particular can be seen as a possible proxy for system legitimacy. To the caveats mentioned before concerning other potential sources of citizen acquiescence and the overriding role of national identity, I add here that questions (16)-(19) are worded in a relatively vague way that invites identity rather than instrumental considerations to come to the fore. Additionally, for models B, C discussed in section 5.3. below I include a control for system legitimacy in the form of a variable measuring political allegiance. From section 3.2., we have seen how Gabel has measured system support by creating a pro-stability dummy variable from a similar measure of political allegiance, and so dividing respondents into 'opponents' or 'supporters' of democratic capitalism.

A potential criticism of the use of questions (16)-(25) to measure national pride is that they only elicit responses from selective groups of people, those who are in themselves only interested in science, sport, history and so on. I would argue that national identity necessarily takes as its content individual dimensions of national pride, so that there is a national identity or pride component to discrete activities, institutions, symbols and traditions. Nevertheless, one can test for the possibility of selective responses by performing a logit regression on two dummy variables created from political pride (question (16)) and cultural pride (questions (21)), where 'don't know' and 'can't choose' responses are coded 1, and all other responses are coded 0. In both cases, women are significantly more likely to hold non-attitudes. For question (16), women are supplemented by younger and less educated voters, while for question (21) nationalists and racists are significantly less likely to hold an attitude. Hence, for national pride attitude-holders, the opposite selective response tendencies are visible. However, before reading too much into these findings it must be born in mind that response rates are very high overall; the lowest figure for all the national pride questions is 89%. It is also not clear that these 'selective' responses cannot instead be explained by response trends amongst non-attitude holders. Against this, we have already noted that 'don't know'

questions form part of economic-political pride while the underscored questions constitute cultural-historical pride. The two other questions were seen to fall between the two categories. The eigenvalues constitute a further similarity between the two sets of extracted factors; both political prides have an associated eigenvalue of greater than 3, while for both cultural prides the figure was approximately 1.5. Regrettably, on request this survey data was not made available by the author.

responses in this specific instance may not tap non-attitudes. A discussion of when survey responses measure non-attitudes is delayed until section 7.2.

Table 5.2. Factor Analysis of National Pride by Country (1995 ISSP)

	Austria		GB		Italy	
Are you proud of...?	pol. pride	cul. pride	pol. pride	cul. pride	pol. pride	cul. pride
Way democracy works	**0.79**	0.05	**0.66**	0.27	**0.61**	0.16
Political influence in the world	**0.61**	0.42	**0.74**	0.27	**0.62**	0.20
Economic achievements	**0.53**	0.40	**0.64**	0.32	**0.61**	0.26
Social security system	**0.56**	0.25	**0.59**	0.11	**0.75**	0.10
Scientific achievements	0.18	**0.67**	*0.37*	*0.45*	0.21	**0.58**
Sports achievements	0.12	**0.63**	0.19	**0.60**	0.12	**0.55**
Arts achievements	0.21	**0.49**	0.25	**0.45**	0.08	**0.50**
Armed forces	0.31	**0.47**	0.18	**0.74**	*0.35*	*0.29*
History	0.25	**0.47**	0.23	**0.66**	0.15	**0.42**
Fair treatment of groups	**0.53**	0.26	*0.45*	*0.42*	**0.66**	0.14
Eigenvalue	3.99	1.25	4.26	1.25	3.51	1.41
%age Explained Variance	39.86	12.45	42.64	12.48	35.06	14.12
Cronbach's Alpha	0.76	0.63	0.77	0.74	0.77	0.50
Chi-squared (df)	111.289 (26)		151.38 (26)		155.25 (26)	

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Bold indicates question forms part of a single factor; *italics* indicates question loads onto the factors highlighted.

Note: Cronbach's alpha is measured for the ***aggregate level*** two factor structure

Table 5.2. Factor Analysis of National Pride by Country continued

	Germany		Netherlands		Sweden	
Are you proud of...?	pol. pride	cul. pride	pol. pride	cul. pride	pol. pride	cul. pride
Way democracy works	**0.78**	0.17	**0.71**	0.13	**0.68**	0.16
Political influence in the world	*0.53*	*0.48*	*0.36*	*0.44*	**0.54**	0.33
Economic achievements	*0.50*	*0.54*	**0.48**	0.36	**0.58**	0.09
Social security system	**0.62**	0.16	**0.54**	0.16	**0.65**	0.04
Scientific achievements	0.29	**0.65**	0.32	**0.47**	0.24	**0.43**
Sports achievements	0.16	**0.70**	0.09	**0.62**	0.16	**0.50**
Arts achievements	0.12	**0.61**	0.23	**0.54**	0.03	**0.55**
Armed forces	0.35	**0.50**	0.10	**0.56**	0.11	**0.46**
History	0.29	**0.48**	0.18	**0.45**	0.04	**0.58**
Fair treatment of groups	**0.57**	0.31	**0.51**	0.14	**0.59**	0.12
Eigenvalue	1.19	4.45	1.28	3.41	3.09	1.61
%age Explained Variance	11.91	44.49	12.81	34.09	30.89	16.06
Cronbach's Alpha	0.75	0.73	0.68	0.65	0.74	0.59
Chi-squared (df)	330.97 (26)		198.36 (26)		107.28 (26)	

	Ireland			Spain	
Are you proud of...?	pol. pride	cul. pride	3rd factor	pol. pride	cul. pride
Way democracy works	**0.60**	0.03	0.21	**0.63**	0.25
Political influence in the world	**0.69**	0.18	0.07	**0.80**	0.17
Economic achievements	**0.59**	0.28	0.11	**0.79**	0.16
Social security system	0.36	0.14	0.30	**0.60**	0.22
Scientific achievements	0.40	0.35	0.13	*0.41*	*0.53*
Sports achievements	0.15	**0.66**	0.12	0.16	**0.73**
Arts achievements	0.13	**0.62**	0.06	0.17	**0.74**
Armed forces	0.24	0.31	0.17	*0.46*	*0.42*
History	0.09	0.31	0.39	0.21	**0.58**
Fair treatment of groups	0.21	0.06	**0.80**	*0.47*	*0.33*
Eigenvalue	3.25	1.23	1.08	4.44	1.38
%age Explained Variance	32.54	12.30	10.82	44.44	13.75
Cronbach's Alpha	0.68	0.60		0.81	0.74
Chi-squared (df)	71.324 (18)			82.50 (26)	

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Bold indicates question forms part of a single factor; *italics* indicates question loads onto the factors highlighted.

Note: Cronbach's alpha is measured for the *aggregate level* two factor structure

We can see in table 5.2. that at the country level the two-factor model is subject to a number of country-specific fluctuations. However, the differences are not so fundamental as to necessitate abandoning the clarity and consistency of the two-factor model at the country level. While a two-factor solution is repeated for all countries except Ireland, only for Great

Britain does the solution involve exactly the same combination of variable loadings as at aggregate level. The most common difference is that question (25) involving the fair treatment of groups loads more heavily on political pride for five countries, whereas at the aggregate level this variable appears to load equally on both factors. For Germany and the Netherlands, questions (17) and (18) load more or less equally on both cultural and political pride at the country level, rather than more heavily on the political pride factor as at aggregate level. In the case of just these two countries, cultural pride explains more variance in the observed variables than political pride[7]. On the other hand, for Italy and Spain, both countries with former fascist governments, pride in the armed forces loads slightly more onto political more than cultural pride, although the loading of this question on either factor is not exceedingly heavy. However, for Germany pride in the armed forces and its history appear to load predominantly on cultural pride as predicted, while together with Sweden and Italy, pride in their scientific achievements loads onto cultural pride rather an assuming its usual, 'neutral' status. For Ireland, there is a three-factor solution; while political and cultural pride are typical in make-up, a third factor is formed from question (25) concerning the fair treatment of groups. By concentrating on political and cultural pride, I do not capture a third dimension to pride in Ireland. Despite these four sets of exceptions, I take the decision to maintain the aggregate two-factor solution.

We can see that national pride is quite prevalent in the survey data and, by inference, in the population. Overall, 63% of all respondents from the EU member states in the ISSP survey declare themselves to be proud or very proud of the way democracy works in their country (Qu. (16) - a component of political pride). 81% of all respondents declare themselves to be proud or very proud of their nation's achievements in the field of arts (Qu. (22) - a component of cultural pride)[8]. Figures 5.3. and 5.4. break down these high mean levels of political pride and cultural pride by country using the saved factor scores derived from factor analysis, where I include all variables not just those shown in bold in the tables above

[7] I continue to use the aggregate level factor scores for both Germany and the Netherlands, because the correlations between the aggregate level and country-specific factor scores are very high. For Germany, the aggregate and country level political pride correlation is 0.96, while in the Netherlands the same correlation gives a figure of 0.96. The aggregate and country level cultural pride correlation is 0.95 in Germany, and 0.97 in the Netherlands. All results are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).

[8] For both these questions, it was possible to generalise from the sample to the population: the mean scores of 2.7 (democracy) and 3.0 (arts) out of a possible 4 points passed a 2-tailed one-sample T-test at the 0.001 level of probability.

(aggregate mean = 0.00; variance = 0.78 (political pride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range = 4.77 (PP), 4.88 (CP) where the higher the positive score, the higher the level of national pride). We can see that Italy displays markedly less political pride than the other countries surveyed, a finding seemingly unchanged since Almond and Verba's 1960 survey findings on the same subject (1963, p. 64). Interestingly, West Germany shows relatively positive levels of political pride, where for a long time it was assumed that 20th century events had rendered national pride in the political sphere unacceptable (see Hewstone, 1986, p. 155). We can now concur with Topf, Mohler and Heath, who use 1988 survey data to show that pride in the political sphere has caught up to broadly similar levels to that expressed in Britain (1989, p. 125; see also Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 64)[9]. Rather, both East and West Germany display very low levels of cultural pride, where two questions address history and the role of the armed forces. It would seem that if the Germans have not put their past wholly behind them, then at least it is confined to certain demarcated spheres rather than tainting the whole political system.

Figure 5.3. Mean Levels of Political Pride by Country (1995 ISSP)



[9] The political pride chart would suggest that Britain has lower levels of political pride than Germany, so that one could argue that since 1988 Germany has gained even more self-confidence. This conclusion is right for the wrong reasons. Political pride as measured here combines indicators of both economic and political pride, where in the Topf, Mohler and Heath and ISSP data Germany strongly outscores Britain on levels of economic pride. In fact, the ISSP data shows that Britain and (West) Germany have very similar levels of pride in the way democracy works. Back in 1988, however, Britons were more proud of its monarchy than Germans of the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law).

Figure 5.4. Mean Levels of Cultural Pride by Country (1995 ISSP)



5.2.4. Nationalism

I operationalise nationalism in the ISSP survey by taking the following three questions:

"How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)"

(26) "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the people in (R's country)."

(27) "Generally, (R's country) is a better country than most other countries."

(28) "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong."

All three questions appear a valid measure of the moral self-righteousness dimension of nationalist sentiment, with an emphasis on international rather than domestic sovereignty concerns. McCrone and Surridge use questions (26) to (28) above, along with questions (16)-(25) in section 5.2.3., to measure national pride rather than nationalism (1998, p. 7). In view of the definitions of national pride and nationalism put forth in chapter four, as well as the existence of alternative questions (16)-(25) in the ISSP data set that could be said to better

measure national pride, I would argue that using questions (26) and (28) for this purpose is simply mistaken. By contrast, McCrone and Surridge do not justify, empirically or theoretically, their choice of indicators for national pride[10].

The focus in the questions above on the international dimension to nationalism means that respondents are grouped not by nations but states, so that the 'Respondent's country' parameter in the question above only offers a list of states. So, if the state is in national hands, and that state contains just one nation, then the questions appear to tap the pejorative view of nationalism focused on in section 4.5. While this may hold for most of the states under consideration in the ISSP survey, this is conspicuously not the case for Spain and the United Kingdom. One might attempt to account for 'minority nations' by creating interaction variables between the nationalism variable above and respondents from Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and the Basque Country[11]. However, if we accept that minority nationalists will score poorly on the nationalist variable, because they are hostile to the nation-states referred to in questions (26) and (27), then they will be grouped with respondents from minority nations who identify with the nation-state but are simply not nationalists. In this way, respondents in favour of Scottish independence might be indistinguishable from Scots who see themselves as non-nationalist but British, clearly an undesirable outcome. I note that attempts use party allegiance as an indicator of minority nationalism are thwarted by lack of data on minority nationalist parties, and in any case might exclude nationalist respondents not intending to vote for a designated nationalist party. I settle on the following measure of minority nationalism from the ISSP survey

(29) "Which of the two statements comes closer to your own view?

1. It is essential that (R's country) remains one (nation/state/country).

[10] The empirical evidence suggests that the nationalism and national pride questions tap distinct factors. Performing a factor analysis (maximum likelihood estimators, varimax rotation) on the questions (26)-(28) and (16)-(25), we can see that three factors are extracted (eiginvalues of 4.2, 1.7 and 1.3). The factors with the two highest eigenvalues, it is suggested in the section below, tap different dimensions of national pride, while questions (26)-(28) form part of a third factor, presumably nationalism. A goodness-of-fit test indicates that the results are significant at the 0.001 level (chi-squared 1430; df 42).

[11] Choosing which sub-state nations to include here is not without controversy. For instance, the Galician Nationalist Coalition presses for the independence of Galicia from Spain. By only looking at Catalonia, the Basque Country, Wales and Scotland, I follow Keating's (2001) evaluation of the most significant independence movements in the EU countries considered by the ISSP survey.

2. Parts of (R's country) should be allowed to become fully separate if they choose to."

So, I include question (29) in the regression models below, and additionally create interaction variables for respondents that choose response (2) to this variable and reside in Wales, Scotland, Catalonia or the Basque country respectively. Question (29) is not asked in Ireland, possibly because there is little cause to investigate separatism within the Republic. To allow the inclusion of this variable in the aggregate level data, I replace Irish missing cases with the average score (1.07 or a little over 6% of respondents) of the two other countries in the ISSP survey, Austria and the Netherlands, with no separatist movements to speak of. The variables created in this way should allow us to control for minority nationalists in the main nationalism variable, as well as to observe directly how minority nationalists view the European Union. On the basis of the analyses made in section 4.5., I expect Catalan nationalists to be pro-European, while Basque nationalists are more likely to be anti-EU. For Welsh and Scottish nationalists, I note that there is some ambiguity as to their likely relationship with the EU.

As a caveat, question (29) is unable to measure the impact of regional identity on support for the European Union. For instance, it would undoubtedly be interesting to observe the relationship between respondents inhabiting the Lega Nord-labelled region of 'Padania' and the European Union, where at the time of the ISSP survey the Lega Nord was in favour of independence, although perhaps without adhering to values of, say, multiculturalism that underpin the European Union. In any case, the focus of this thesis is not at the sub-national level.

The responses to the three nationalism questions are coded from 1 through 5, where 5 signifies the most nationalist response ("agree strongly"). One can estimate the internal reliability of the three questions by taking Cronbach's Alpha, which gives a reasonable score of 0.68. I also perform this calculation on a country-by-country basis; results are broadly similar, although for Ireland I note here that the figure is a slightly lower 0.51[12]. The three

[12] The country level results are as follows: Germany (0.71), Great Britain (0.70), Austria (0.70), Italy (0.60), Ireland (0.51), the Netherlands (0.65), Sweden (0.64), Spain (0.72).

questions are then used to construct a balanced Likert Scale, where each of the five response code items is added to the other so that the overall scale runs from 3 to 15, high scores indicating higher levels of nationalist sentiment (mean = 2.55; variance = 1.14). In the analysis of nationalist sentiment featured below, I transform this Likert scale into more easily interpretable quartiles[13]. In the ISSP data sample the mean level of nationalism as measured by the Likert scale is 8.69, with a standard deviation of 2.58. Thus many people are ambivalent or mildly nationalist, while the top quartile of respondents are nationalist; that is to say, they score between 11-15 points on the Likert scale. Performing a one-sample T-test confirms that the mean overall score in the ISSP sample can be generalised to the population, with a 0.001 probability of error for the 2-tailed test. To get a further feel for the distribution of the data, figure 5.5. below shows the mean scores by country on the Likert scale, where the overall mean level of nationalism is also marked. It is readily apparent that Ireland, Great Britain, Spain and Austria score higher than the mean level, while both East and West Germany score furthest below the mean.

Figure 5.5. Mean Levels of Nationalism by Country (1995 ISSP)



[13] The quartiles are recoded from the Likert scale as follows: 1 = (3-6); 2 = (7-8); 3 = (9-10); 4 = (11-14).

5.2.5. Racism and Xenophobia

The ISSP survey offers a number of questions broadly covering xenophobic and racist attitudes, without it being entirely clear which of the two concepts is being tapped, or both. However, by examining the likely composition of the outgroups mentioned in the questions listed below, I would argue that racist attitudes are most probably being elicited. We have:

(30) "Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?

1. It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions.
2. It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society."

"How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)

(31) "Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions."

(32) "Immigrants increase crime rates."

(33) "Immigrants are generally good for (R's country's) economy?"

(34) "Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in (R's country)."

(35) "Immigrants make (R's country) more open to new ideas and cultures."

(36) "Refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in (R's country)?"

(37) "Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be...?" (Increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot)[14].

[14] All the question responses are coded from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the highest level of racist response. The exception is question (30), where there are only two responses that are coded in the main text above.

For the eight questions listed above the outgroups mentioned are 'immigrants', 'refugees' and simply 'groups'. All three of these terms could apply to many categories of non-nationals. I argue that racist attitudes are most likely being tested, on the basis that the most likely composition of these outgroups are people from outside the European Union. Specifically, in every one of the EU12 except Belgium and Luxembourg the number of non-EU foreigners as a percentage of the total population was greater than the number of EU foreigners as a percentage of the population in 1992 (Melich, 1995, p. 11). Moreover, for Belgium the percentage of non-EU foreigners was a highly visible 3.4% of the population, the third highest figure in the EU 12 behind Germany and the Netherlands.

I perform a factor analysis on these questions using the Maximum Likelihood method of extraction and Varimax rotation, with the results presented below.

Table 5.3. Aggregate Level Factor Analysis of Xenophobia and Racism (1995 ISSP)

Question	Racism	Factor 2
Help minorities to preserve traditions	.16	**.84**
Maintain traditions or adapt in society	.17	**.39**
Immigrants increase crime	**.64**	.12
Immigrants good for the economy	**.56**	.21
Immigrants take jobs away from people	**.60**	.10
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture	**.59**	.19
Refugees should be allowed to stay	**.48**	.22
Number of immigrants should be increased	**.68**	.25
Eigenvalue	3.20	1.10
Percentage of Explained Variance	39.94	13.73
Cronbach's alpha	0.78	0.52
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)	505.70 (13)	

Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Varimax

I assume that the first factor extracted is a measure of racism, so that I do not measure xenophobia in the ISSP data, while the other extracted factor is ignored in this research. So, from the saved factor score of the first latent variable extracted above I construct the racism variable, where all items and not just those highlighted in bold are included (mean = 0.00;

variance = 0.75; range = 5.48). The second factor is ignored because of the extremely weak eigenvalue and the poor reliability of the factor at the country and combined level, doubtless partially due to the poor factor loading of question (30). It is easy to agree with McCrone and Surridge, who also analyse the same ISSP data and conclude that people's attitudes towards immigration is characterised by 'complexity' and a lack of predictability (1998, p. 14). Certainly, a complex series of attitudinal relationships might be seen to exist where questions (35) concerning immigrants bringing new ideas and culture and question (31) asking whether respondents agree that minorities should preserve traditions do not to load onto the same factor, so implying that openness to new ideas is not closely related to support for maintaining their cultures and traditions. There is a clear reference to the economic benefits of allowing immigrant communities into the respondent's country in three questions for the first extracted factor. However, the other questions contained in the first factor suggest there are no grounds to distinguish an economic or 'utilitarian' racist dimension in the ISSP data (see section 4.6. for 'utilitarian' theories of racism).

Table 5.4 Factor Analysis of Racism by Country (1995 ISSP)

Rotated Factor Matrix	Germany		Great Britain		Austria
	Racism	Factor 2	Racism	Factor 2	Racism
Help minorities to preserve traditions	0.13	**0.80**	0.31	**0.68**	**0.49**
Maintain traditions or adapt in society	0.25	**0.49**	0.09	**0.49**	**0.39**
Immigrants increase crime	**0.66**	0.17	**0.69**	0.31	**0.66**
Immigrants good for the economy	**0.49**	0.21	**0.56**	0.29	**0.60**
Immigrants take jobs away from people	**0.76**	0.09	**0.75**	0.08	**0.65**
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture	**0.54**	0.27	**0.57**	0.26	**0.60**
Refugees should be allowed to stay	**0.43**	0.33	**0.53**	0.27	**0.55**
Number of immigrants should be increased	**0.64**	0.29	**0.64**	0.37	**0.72**
Eigenvalue	3.39	1.08	3.62	1.07	3.42
%age Explained Variance	42.40	13.49	45.22	13.44	42.77
Cronbach's Alpha	0.80		0.82		0.80
Chi-squared (df)	104.04 (13)		42.45 (13)	176.84 (20)	

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Bold indicates question forms part of a single factor; *italics* indicate question loads onto the factors highlighted.

Note: Cronbach's alpha is measured for the *aggregate level* two factor structure

Table 5.4 Factor Analysis of Racism by Country continued

	Italy		Ireland		
	Racism	Factor 2	Factor 1	Racism	Factor 3
Help minorities to preserve traditions	0.24	**0.50**	0.06	0.24	0.32
Maintain traditions or adapt in society	-0.08	**0.28**	0.12	0.05	0.16
Immigrants increase crime	**0.65**	-0.10	0.37	0.17	0.19
Immigrants good for the economy	**0.57**	0.12	0.22	**0.62**	0.12
Immigrants take jobs away from people	**0.60**	-0.07	**0.89**	0.13	0.12
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture	**0.63**	0.20	0.08	**0.67**	0.24
Refugees should be allowed to stay	**0.47**	0.03	0.10	0.10	**0.57**
Number of immigrants should be increased	**0.73**	0.01	0.24	0.33	**0.44**
Eigenvalue	2.95	1.15	2.50	1.07	1.01
%age Explained Variance	36.88	14.34	31.31	13.35	12.65
Cronbach's Alpha	0.77		0.68		
Chi-squared (df)	37.61 (13)				

	Netherlands	Sweden		Spain	
	Racism	Racism	Factor 2	Racism	Factor 2
Help minorities to preserve traditions	**0.53**	0.30	**0.58**	0.14	**0.71**
Maintain traditions or adapt in society	**0.51**	0.12	**0.62**	0.06	**0.28**
Immigrants increase crime	**0.66**	**0.54**	0.41	**0.67**	0.04
Immigrants good for the economy	**0.51**	**0.65**	0.32	**0.41**	0.18
Immigrants take jobs away from people	**0.62**	**0.67**	0.16	**0.70**	0.09
Immigrants bring new ideas/culture	**0.64**	**0.73**	0.17	**0.34**	0.20
Refugees should be allowed to stay	**0.58**	**0.67**	0.30	**0.30**	0.08
Number of immigrants should be increased	**0.78**	**0.60**	0.49	**0.48**	0.12
Eigenvalue	3.56	4.01	1.02	2.39	1.13
%age Explained Variance	44.53	50.08	12.75	29.91	14.13
Cronbach's Alpha	0.80	0.86		0.66	
Chi-squared (df)	203.50 (20)	69.98 (13)		36.19 (13)	

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Bold indicates question forms part of a single factor; *italics* indicate question loads onto the factors highlighted.

Note: Cronbach's alpha is measured for the *aggregate level* two factor structure

At the country level results were roughly consistent with the factor analysis above, although with a notable exception. For all countries except Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands, the same two-factor solution with a very high Cronbach's Alpha figure was recorded. For Austria and the Netherlands, a one-factor solution was recorded, which presents our analysis with little difficulties given that the cause was the two variables in factor 2 loading more heavily on racism. For Ireland, however, the solution is messy. Three factors are extracted, with racism seemingly divided into factors according to which questions invite yea-saying

anti-racist answers (questions (33) and (35)) or yea-saying racist answers (question (34)). A third factor measures attitudes towards refugees (question (36)). Of the three extracted factors, the second factor has the highest correlation (0.65**; two-tailed test significant at the 0.01 level) with the aggregate level racism factor. Because this result is given for only one country, in the interests of consistency I use the aggregate factor solution at the country level, noting accordingly the position of Ireland.

According to the European Commission report 'Racism and Xenophobia in Europe' levels of racism (or xenophobia) are quite high in European Union member states (1997). 9% of respondents openly declared themselves as 'very racist'. In Belgium and France this figure was 22% and 15% respectively. The cumulative percentage of those declaring themselves to be 'quite' or 'very' racist is 33% for the European Union as a whole. Only 34% of respondents declared themselves 'not at all' racist. For the ISSP data the results are no less startling. 41.7% of all respondents 'agreed' or 'agreed strongly' with the statement that immigrants take jobs away from people, while only 6% of all respondents believed that immigrant numbers should be increased either 'a little' or 'a lot'[15]. We can see how racist sentiment varies between countries in figure 5.6. Italy and East Germany contain the most racist respondents, while at the opposite end of the spectrum is Ireland. Lest this finding concerning Ireland come as a surprise, Ward and Greeley use World Values Survey data to show that the Irish appear to be the most tolerant people in the English-speaking world, and the most tolerant people in Europe, tied with the Dutch (1990). At first sight, one might deduce that the reason for this tolerance is simply a response to the exceedingly low number of non-EU foreigners in Ireland (estimated at 0.9% of the total population in 2000 according to Eurostat, 2000). Yet this is figure is not so different to that of Italy (estimated 1.9% of the total population (Eurostat, 2000)), a country whose high level of racist attitudes is rather surprising, insofar as being very pro-European does not seem to rule out racist attitudes amongst the population. A better explanation is the low perception of the number of foreigners in Ireland: 51% of Irish Eurobarometer respondents in 1994 thought that there were 'not many' non-nationals in the country, against an EU12 average of just 11% and a mere 8% in Italy, notwithstanding the low actual number of foreigners in the aforementioned

[15] For both these two questions, the mean response was statistically significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed test), strongly implying that one can generalise from the sample to the population.

country. So, it would indeed appear that it is the tolerance of the Irish influences the subjective perception of the number of foreigners in the country.

Figure 5.6. Mean Levels of Racism by Country (1995 ISSP)



5.2.6. Control Variables

In this section I display the choice of control variables used in both the analysis below and in later chapters, as well as summarising in what form such variables are included in the analyses so as to ease their later interpretation. I will also consider some of the problems of inclusion of variables of interest that could not be used. In particular, I dwell on the distinction between fixed and random effects models.

For ease of reference the coding and exact description of the control and indeed the other variables included in the models in this and the next chapter are summarised in table 5.5. below, as well as in section A.2. of the appendix. As can readily be seen, this list comprises mainly socio-economic control variables. For some countries, data is missing for one or more of the control variables. The problems associated with some of the controls, and the attempt to include further variables, are now discussed.

Table 5.5. Variable Coding (1995 ISSP)

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION
Dependent/Independent variables	
European/National identity	Scored from –3 to 3. Negative score indicates more national attachment [Mean = -0.65; variance = 0.80]
National Pride	Factor analysis scale [mean = 0.00; variance = 0.78 (political pride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range 4.77 (PP), 4.88 (CP)]. Levels of pride increase positively with variable score
Nationalism	Variable split into quartiles derived from Likert scale (scored from 3-15). Levels of nationalism increase positively with variable score [mean = 2.55; variance = 1.14]
Minority Nationalism	1=Favours unitary position 2=Holds separatist attitudes. Data on Ireland initially missing; coded to 1.07. Interaction variables are created for **Scotland, Wales, Catalonia** and the **Basque Country** by combining minority nationalism response with regional origin of respondent as appropriate
Racism	Factor analysis scale [mean = 0.00; variance = 0.75, range = 5.48]. Levels of racism increase positively with variable score
Support for European Integration	Bivariate scoring - either pro/anti-integration or attitude/non-attitude holding. 1=Pro-European or attitude holder respectively
Control variables	
Sex	1=Male, 0=Female
Age	From 14 to 96 years. Coded as cohorts (1 - ≤29;2 - 30-39; 3 - 40-49; 4 - 50-59; 5 - 60+)
Education	Coded from 1-7 (1 – no education; 2 – incomplete primary; 3 – primary completed; 4 – incomplete secondary; 5- secondary completed; 6 – incomplete university/semi-higher; 7- university completed). Some national variations apply[16].
Subjective Social Class	Coded from 1-7 (1 – Lower class; 2 – Working class; 3 - Lower Middle class; 4 - Don't know; 5 – Upper middle class; 6 – Upper class; 7 - Middle class). This variable is treated as categorical. **Middle class** is the base category. No data for GB or the Netherlands.
Political Affiliation	Coded from 1-6 (1 – Far left; 2 – Left, centre left; 3 - Right, conservative; 4 – Far right; 5 – Other, Don't Know; 6 - Centre, liberal). We code this variable so that 'N/A' (previously coded '0') and 'answer-refused' (previously coded '9') are coded system-missing. 'No party' ('7') and 'Don't know' ('8') are coded along with 'no specific party' ('6'). This variable is treated as categorical; **Left** being the omitted category. No data for Italy.
Income	Coded from 1-5 as quintiles in each country. Hence, this is a measure of the relative income of a respondent. Higher value equals greater wealth. Italy data missing.
Country dummies	With **Spain** as the omitted country.
Religion	Coded from 1-3 (1 - Protestant and Lutheran respondents, 2 - Roman Catholic, 3 - No religion professed). Taken as categorical variable, with **no religion** as the base category. ISEI coding from 16 to 90. Occupational status increases with score. Data missing for GB, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (coded to the mean of 43.5).
Occupation	
Occupation Dummy	1=no occupation data available, 0=occupation data available
Farmers	1=Agricultural worker; 0=non-agricultural worker

[16] The coding for Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Great Britain departs from this general model to take account of different national educational qualifications. These categories are broadly, however, the national equivalents of the qualifications set out in the general coding and are hence comparable.

Although the ISSP survey does include a variable designed to measure respondent occupation, the lack of comparable data across counties hinders the attempt to measure the effect of occupation on support. The UK, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands adopt idiosyncratic national classification schemes that prove particularly resilient to attempts to translate them into a standardised scale[17]. Of the other countries only Ireland uses the most up-to-date 1988 International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) measure promoted by the International Labour Organisation, the rest of the countries use ISCO 1968 coding. Once these ISCO two scales have been standardised[18], I apply a further transformation to the data with the aim of constructing a simple, continuous variable; by itself the ISCO scale itself is simply a list of occupations classified by tasks and skill levels. Of the three main varieties of occupational status scales; prestige measures, socio-economic scales and nominal class categories, the most widely-accepted class category, the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) scale can be ruled out on the basis that it requires two additional variables for self-employment status and supervisee numbers that the ISSP survey does not provide. Given that the model already includes a subjective measure of social standing in subjective social class, I chose Ganzeboom and Treiman's International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) of occupational status. These authors conceive of the ISEI as measuring the attributes of occupations that convert a person's education into income. Accordingly, the ISEI index is generated by the optimal scaling of occupation unit groups to maximize the indirect effect of education on income through occupation and to minimize the direct effect of education on income, net of occupation (with both effects net of age) and using the International Stratification and Mobility File (for more details see Ganzeboom, Treiman and De Graaf, 1992). The resulting set of scores was rescaled to a range of 16-90, with 'Judges' gaining the highest score. Two unit groups jointly hold the lowest score: 'Farm-hands and Labourers' and 'Helpers and Cleaners in Offices, Hotels and Other Establishments'.

[17] The ISSP codebook does list the various national coding schemes. However, to the best knowledge of the author there are no tools available to convert from these four national coding schemes to the ISCO schemes. Particularly unfortunate is the case of the UK, where a special 2-code version of the easily convertible 3-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) is used.

[18] Conversion between different ISCO and occupational status scales is relatively simple, thanks largely to a series of scripts written by Prof. Harry Ganzeboom and Prof. Donald Treiman and made available by the University of Utrecht (http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/hg/ismf).

This ISEI variable is included in the aggregate level models and in appropriate country level models. Because of the high number of missing cases I code all missing responses to the mean (43.5)[19]. A separate dummy variable is created to track the incidences of these recoded missing responses. In this way, the number of cases in the ISEI variable is increased, while the difference in support on integration between missing and regular responses can be studied.

For the four ISEI countries we can test a micro-economic explanation of support, namely the pro-integration behaviour of farmers, derived from their receipt of EU subsidies (see section 3.3.). A dummy variable was created directly from the ISCO occupational indices, containing all the occupational categories contained under major group 6 (skilled agricultural and fishery workers) except that of forestry workers, who presumably do not benefit from agricultural subsidies[20]. Only 182 respondents are characterised as farmers, working out at 4.4% of the available 4122 cases, a fairly representative figure when one also considers that some 5% of the EU labour force is employed in agriculture (Economist, 12th October 2000). Another potential problem circumvented is that the majority of agricultural workers are coded as farmers or farm supervisors, people who one suspects would be highly aware of the CAP, rather than casual farm labourers who might be less in tune with the issue of subsidies.

From sections 3.2. and 3.3. we know that explanations of support have often drawn upon general and specific economic explanations, from the positive effect of nation-state growth on support to the pro-integration impact of farmers who benefit from subsidies. Even if the hypotheses formulated in chapter four do not focus on utilitarian explanations of support, it seems desirable to include a series of economic controls in the analysis. Unfortunately, the ISSP National Identity survey does not include any appropriate variables. One possible response is to add to the survey data some key indicators of national economic performance

[19] Of the 4122 cases available from the four countries taken here, over half were missing. The specific reasons for this, while not elaborated in the ISSP survey, might well just reflect labour force participation rates. Much of this missing data could be due then to respondents such as the elderly or the young, or the unemployed not covered in the ISCO classification scheme.

[20] Section 6 in the ISCO indices is also shared with fisherman. While for ISCO-68 fisherman are placed in a separate category, in ISCO-88 some occupational categories are shared between farmers and fisherman section. Section 3.3. footnote 9 reports a similar, but more serious problem in the Eurobarometer proprietary occupation index. Here the numbers are too small to trouble us. For ISCO-68 only one respondent was coded in group 6-4, denoting fishermen, hunters and related workers. For ISCO-88 no respondents were coded in the potentially contentious groups 61 or 62, denoting skilled agriculture/fishery workers and subsistence agriculture/fishery workers respectively.

such as unemployment, GDP and inflation, taking data from, say, the OECD Economic Outlook report containing data for 1995 (OECD, 1997). However, efforts to include these variables directly in the model are stymied by perfect multicollinearity between the economic indicators and the country dummy variables for the aggregate level model. One might attempt to get round this problem by taking the most basic model formed in section 5.3. (model A) and substituting for the country dummies a new control variable composed of the country dummy coefficient for each case taken from model A in tables 5.6.-5.10., with a coefficient of 0 for the omitted country. One then proceeds by measuring the impact of the macroeconomic variables firstly with reference to the overall log likelihood or R^2 of the model, and secondly by the impact on the new control variable for the country dummies. In the model without the macroeconomic variables the coefficient for this variable should be one, where this refers to one unit of the original country dummy coefficient. If this coefficient falls below one, we can see that the addition of the macroeconomic variables has in some way reduced the country effects on the dependent variable[21].

In the end, however, I do not test for the macroeconomic controls. The basic point is that as I explicitly state in section 3.5., I am interested in pursuing micro-level explanations of support. This being the case, there is little justification in tagging on this rather *ad hoc* method of estimating country-level variations in support to a fixed effects statistical model, where cross-national variation is best explained using multi-level statistical models. To explain this issue a little further, one can imagine a fixed effects model to be of the type

$$y_{ic} = b_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{J} b_j x_{ij} + u_{ic} \qquad (1)$$

where i subscripts individuals and c countries. One might expand b_0 to allow for a separate intercept per country:

[21] These measures hardly constitute an ideal test of the effects of macroeconomic indicators on support. It is unclear whether respondents look to relative or absolute levels of these indicators, or both. For instance, unemployment in a particular country may be relatively low compared to other countries, but nevertheless at a historic high for the country in question. On the other hand, respondents might not be so worried about a relatively low growth rate in GDP if absolute incomes are quite high. In common with other authors, I could be criticised for taking just first differences for GDP and CPI, and only absolute rates of unemployment (see section 3.2.). In any case the macroeconomic variables can be shown to be almost wholly irrelevant in explaining country-level differences in pride, identity *et al.*

$$b_0 = d_0 + \sum_{c=1}^{C-1} d_c z_c \qquad (1a)$$

where $z=1$ if *country*=c and there are C countries. Fitting a dummy variable for each country accounts for all the between-country variation that is not captured by contextual variation. Contextual effects are captured by $\sum b_j x_{ij}$ in equation (1). Thus a comparison between

$$y_{ic} = d_0 + \sum_{c=1}^{C-1} d_c z_c + w_{ic} \qquad (2)$$

(where w is the error term in this case) and (1)+(1a) would tell us how much of the gross differences between countries (captured by the dummy variable coefficients in (2)) is accounted for by the contextual effects. This model type is suitable for my purposes and is adopted in this chapter. However, if one wants to introduce specific country level variables like GDP that might explain cross-national variation the model is unable to handle them; as we see above the result is multicollinearity. The correct thing to do, in this case, is to turn to random effects or multi-level models. Again beginning with equation 1, the intercept is expanded differently

$$b_0 = a_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} a_k z_{kc} + e_c \qquad (1b)$$

Here the z variables (of which there are K) are now country characteristics, where there are now no country dummies and e is an error term, common to all individuals in the same country. Each individual's error term has a unique component (u) and a component shared with fellow countrymen (e). The variance of u measures residual variation between individuals while the variance of e measures residual variance between countries, where the aim is to reduce u as much as possible through the use of both contextual and country level variables. So, using this two-level form of the multi-level model, where level 1 is individuals and level 2 is countries, one can observe cross-national differences in support and keep the

macroeconomic variables in the model (see also Goldstein, 1995). However, as this is not my aim I stick with the fixed effects models and sacrifice the macroeconomic variables.

5.3. The Results

In this section I present abridged results from regression models investigating the make-up of national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism, before reflecting upon their meaning in the following section. Results are provided for both at the aggregate and at the country level. At the aggregate level, missing data in some countries means that I adopt a strategy of looking at particular subsets of countries to maximise the use of the available data. These arrangements are discussed here, as is the choice of weighted least squares regression model.

Table 5.5. in section 5.2.6. makes it clear to us that data for certain independent variables are missing for particular countries. To avoid the missing cases for each particular variable unnecessarily invalidating the use of the remaining country data, I adopt a strategy of analysing particular subsets of countries. Specifically, for all aggregate level results I include a first, 'basic model' which features all eight countries (Model A) through the exclusion of all variables that contain missing data for one or more country: Subjective Social Class (data missing for Great Britain and the Netherlands), Political Affiliation (no data for Italy) and Income (no data for Italy)[22]. Model B adds Political Affiliation and Income, so removing Italy from the analysis. Model C adds Subjective Social Class to the variables from model 2, so removing Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain from the analysis. So, in series of tables below we have the results of the European identity, nationalist, national pride and racism analysis at the aggregate level (models A-C) and country level. As already noted, the missing data for Ireland for the minority nationalism variable is 'plugged' by assuming a certain response for all the cases. Although this allows minority nationalism to be included in all the aggregate models, the variable is naturally excluded from the country level analysis for Ireland due to lack of variance.

[22] For the occupation index data are missing for the UK, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. However, this issue is resolved in a different way, and as detailed in section 5.2.6.

I employ an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with robust estimators on data weighted to equalise sample sizes, in order to minimise the risk of heteroscedasticity affecting the results. Heteroscedasticity does not destroy the unbiasedness property of OLS estimators, but the estimators are no longer efficient. To counter heteroscedasticity, the robust model applies a transformation to the data before simply fitting the OLS model. The appropriate transformation often depends on the assumptions made about the error variance of the model. In this case, comparing the error variance of the OLS models against various x variables in the model results in a number of possibly heteroscedastic disturbances. I thus employ White's method of obtaining robust estimators of the variance. White shows that under very general conditions, appropriate variance estimates can be constructed without specifying the type of heteroscedasticity (Greene, 1990, p. 403).

Because the resultant regression results are rather lengthy, I only present here an abridged version of the results, so that only the aggregate level findings for each concept are included here, and where the control variables in each of these models are suppressed. Full versions of all the results, including the country level findings, are placed in section A.3. of the appendix.

Table 5.6. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Political Pride of the Independent Variables (abridged)

	Model A	Model B	Model C
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Cultural Pride	0.21 *	0.18 *	0.20 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Identity	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nationalism	0.20 *	0.19 *	0.18 *
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Minority Nationalism	-0.11 *	-0.11 *	-0.14 *
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Basque Country	0.05	0.10	0.15
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Catalonia	0.17 *	0.10	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Scotland	-0.04	-0.01	-
	(0.08)	(0.11)	
Wales	0.09	0.04	-
	(0.09)	(0.12)	
Racism	-0.22 *	-0.20 *	-0.19 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	-4.15 *	-4.17 *	-3.18 *
	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.32)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.39	0.26	0.29
F stat. (DF)	127.54 (24)	38.10 (29)	28.2 (31)

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

Table 5.7. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Cultural Pride of the Independent Variables (abridged)

	Model A	Model B	Model C
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	0.18 *	0.18 *	0.20 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Identity	-0.05 *	-0.07 *	-0.05 *
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nationalism	0.12 *	0.13 *	0.17 *
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Minority Nationalism	-0.16 *	-0.19 *	-0.18 *
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Basque Country	-0.39 *	-0.26 *	-0.27 *
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Catalonia	-0.08 *	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Scotland	-0.16	-0.10	-
	(0.11)	(0.15)	
Wales	0.02	0.09	-
	(0.10)	(0.10)	
Racism	0.10 *	0.10 *	0.13 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	1.11 *	1.09 *	0.81 *
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.33	0.35	0.36
F stat. (DF)	115.76 (24)	80.17 (29)	60.6 (31)

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

Table 5.8. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on European Identity of the Independent Variables (abridged)

	Model A	Model B	Model C
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cultural Pride	-0.08 **	-0.10 **	-0.07 *
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Nationalism	-0.07 **	-0.06 **	-0.06 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Minority Nationalism	0.22 **	0.19 **	0.16 *
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Basque Country	0.26 **	0.09	0.10
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Catalonia	0.36 **	0.27 **	0.28 *
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Scotland	0.18 *	0.21 *	-
	(0.08)	(0.10)	
Wales	0.12	0.15	-
	(0.11)	(0.15)	
Racism	-0.12 **	-0.14 **	-0.16 *
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
	-0.62	-0.03	0.04
	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.39)
[illegible]	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.12
F stat. (DF)	30.65 (24)	16.42 (29)	13.15 (31)

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

Table 5.9. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Nationalism of the Independent Variables (abridged)

	Model A	Model B	Model C
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	0.30 *	0.30 **	0.30 *
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cultural Pride	0.21 *	0.21 **	0.26 *
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Identity	-0.08 *	-0.07 **	-0.07 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Minority Nationalism	-0.14 *	-0.11	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Basque Country	-0.19 *	-0.29	-0.29
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Catalonia	0.04	0.06	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Scotland	0.05	0.03	-
	(0.08)	(0.11)	
Wales	-0.21	-0.19	-
	(0.11)	(0.16)	
Racism	0.28 *	0.35 **	0.31 *
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	3.95 *	3.53 **	2.99 *
	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.39)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.31	0.35	0.37
F stat. (DF)	118.27 (24)	92.40 (29)	55.71 (29)

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

Table 5.10. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Racism of the Independent Variables (abridged)

	Model A	Model B	Model C
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	-0.23 *	-0.21 *	-0.20 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Cultural Pride	0.12 *	0.11 *	0.13 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Identity	-0.09 *	-0.10 *	-0.12 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nationalism	0.20 *	0.23 *	0.20 *
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Minority Nationalism	0.05	-0.07	-0.13 *
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Basque Country	0.11	0.20	0.19
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Catalonia	0.06	0.14 *	0.14 *
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Scotland	-0.11	-0.12	-
	(0.09)	(0.15)	
Wales	0.05	0.12	-
	(0.11)	(0.14)	
Constant	-2.71 *	-1.25 *	-0.74 *
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.26	0.28	0.33
F stat. (DF)	79.31 (24)	41.51 (29)	32.60 (31)

ote: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

5.4. Interpretation of Results

I interpret the findings from section 5.3. by independent variable type and at both aggregate and country level. The relatively high degree of theoretical correspondence between the four concepts mean that I am interested here in the interrelationships between pride, European identity, nationalism and racism at the aggregate and country level. I then analyse the effect of the remainder of the control variables by dependent variable at aggregate and country level, and with reference to other empirical studies. Because the ten regression models spawn a large amount of data, information on control variables and country level data, which is not included in the model summaries above, is presented in section A.3. of the appendix.

5.4.1. Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism at the Aggregate Level

In this section I summarise and interpret the aggregate level relationships visible in the tables above. For ease of interpretation, I summarise the percentage changes in the expected value of the dependent variable in tabular form. Beyond this, I show that attitudes towards pride, European identity, nationalism and racism are guided by two underlying factors; attachment in all its forms to the cultural side of the nation and a second factor based on racism.

From tables 5.6.-5.10, we can see that the aggregate level relationships between the five central concepts are very strong. Where there is a relationship between any of the five concepts and minority nationalism, it is typically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) in models A-C. In figure 5.7. below I convey an overall sense of the directional relationships between the concepts. We see that many of the variables positively predict one other so that it seems that they share some underlying factor in common. Exceptions are the relationships between political pride and racism, which is negative in both directions, and between European identity and political pride, where the relationship is not significant in either direction. This is despite the fact that by substituting question (14) for identity, thus measuring absolute rather than relative closeness to Europe, one can show a positive link

with political pride[23], suggesting that national identities are moving to incorporate a European element (see section 4.3.). So, being politically proud is consistent with a certain absolute level of European identity, although not necessarily with feeling more European than national, or vice versa. Furthermore, European identity is positively related only to minority nationalism and negatively related to cultural pride, nationalism and racism. It seems that relatively pro-European respondents are less likely to share in the same underlying factor that binds cultural pride, nationalism and racism.

Figure 5.7. Directional relationships between concepts



Although I do not include minority nationalism in this graphic, this variable is negatively related to nationalism, cultural and political pride, and positively related to relative European identity. On the whole, then, minority nationalists are pro-European and anti-state. There is no statistically significant link between minority nationalists and racist attitudes: differences

[23] Duchesne and Frognier find that national pride and European identity do not correlate in the Eurobarometer data (in Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 202). This is not altogether surprising given the age of the survey data (1982-88). Moreover, the Eurobarometer question does not distinguish between cultural and political pride. In lieu of this, the authors embark on a rather spurious attempt to distinguish more affective and utilitarian dimensions to pride by strength of response to the existent national pride question – 'very proud' or 'not proud at all' being seen as more cultural responses and 'rather proud' and 'not very proud' being seen as closer to the measure of political pride adopted here.

between nation and state are not conceived along racial, but rather cultural lines. Minority nationalists from Catalonia and Scotland hold an even stronger pro-European identity then the typical minority nationalist as, surprisingly, do the Basques to a certain extent. As expected, Welsh minority nationalists are more ambivalent towards Europe. For the Basques, however, there is a relatively strong negative relationship between Spanish cultural pride and nationalism, suggesting that Basque nationalism is more firmly rooted in independence from Spain than Europe (see section 5.4.2.). Catalans too tend to be less likely to be culturally proud than the typical minority nationalist, however, they are more likely to be politically proud; perhaps an indication that they view themselves as more European than anti-Spanish[24].

To arrive at a further understanding of the results I assess the relative and absolute strength of the various coefficients on support. For ease of interpretation I do not look at the regression coefficients but rather the percentage change in the expected values of the dependent variable means by explanatory variable in table 5.11. below.

[24] The effect on the dependent variable of being Basque, Catalan, Scottish and Welsh is equal to the sum of the minority nationalism coefficient plus the nation coefficient. The standard error for the nation+minority nationalism coefficient is equal to the square root of the two coefficient estimates plus twice their covariance. In the models above, all the combined variable coefficients are statistically significant.

Table 5.11. Change in Dependent Variable Expected Value by One Standard Deviation Increase in the Independent Variable (1995 ISSP)

Dependent Var.	*Political Pride*	*Cultural Pride*	*Identity*	*Nationalism*	*Racism*
Independent Var.					
Political Pride	**0.20** **(0.12/0.29)**	-0.35 (13%) (-0.46/-0.25)	Not significant	2.71 (9%) (2.45/2.77)	-0.09 (-175%) (-0.22/0.02)
Cultural Pride	0.27 (35%) (0.15/0.38)	**-0.40** **(-0.49/-0.32)**	-0.87 (-13%) (-0.96/-0.80)	2.73 (10%) (2.67/2.80)	0.19 (58%) (0.06/0.21)
Identity	Not significant	-0.49 (-23%) (-0.60/-0.38)	**-0.77** **(-0.85/-0.70)**	2.37 (-3%) (2.31/2.43)	0.07 (-42%) (-0.06/0.18)
Nationalism	0.44 (120%) (0.32/0.56)	-0.19 (53%) (-0.30/-0.09)	-0.86 (-8%) (-0.95/-0.80)	**2.48** **(2.45/2.51)**	0.31 (158%) (0.18/0.42)
Racism	-0.03 (-115%) (-0.14/0.08)	-0.34 (15%) (-0.45/-0.24)	-0.81 (-5%) (-0.90/-0.73)	2.68 (8%) (2.62/2.75)	**0.12** **(0.02/0.2)**

Figures in **bold** are basic model results with all variables set to mean or standard response

Numbers in brackets correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

Percentage in brackets conveys percentage change between central explanatory variable result and original expected or predicted value.

All expected values displayed are significant to at least the 0.05 level.

Expected values of the dependent variable are arrived at using the simulation methodology of King *et al.* (1998). On this approach one approximates the mean of the dependent variable hrough drawing simulations of the parameters of the model estimated from their asymptotic ampling distribution. The approximation becomes more accurate as we increase the number of draws. In CLARIFY (1999), the Stata add-in which allows one to apply simulation echniques to data, the number of draws is set by default to 1000 and I use this number to rrive at all my results in this chapter and elsewhere. One of the principal advantages of hese simulation techniques is in the ease of interpretation of results. Rather than interpret nodel coefficients, we can now interpret independent variable effects in terms of the xpected or predicted value of the dependent variable, and with the additional benefit of a neasure of uncertainty around this mean result (King *et al*, 1998, p. 350).

To measure the change in effect on the expected value of the dependent variable for a change in an explanatory variable one needs to specify a reference model. I choose just such a model capturing the characteristics of an imaginary, average respondent. I begin by selecting model A on the grounds of its relative simplicity and because it includes all eight countries. The categorical nature of the countries considered as a whole makes selecting a modal value meaningless and I remove all country dummies from model A. I then set age, sex, education, religion and the ISEI occupation variables to their modal values, giving a *40-49 year old female, Roman Catholic respondent, with an incomplete secondary school education*[25]. As more or less continuous variables, I set political and cultural pride, European identity, nationalism, minority nationalism and racism to their means, while I assume that the average respondent is not Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh.

So, the bold numbers in table 5.11. above represent this basic reference model for each dependent variable. For the average respondent default expected value scores of about 0 should result for pride and racism, 2.55 for nationalism and -0.65 for European identity, their mean values. We can see from table 5.11. that very roughly this is what we find, where deviation from 0 could result from the use of modal values for some variables in the simulation model or the omission of several key variables such as the country dummies. For each dependent variable I then vary by one standard deviation the main independent variables one-by-one and record the differences in expected outcomes in table 5.11. along with 95% confidence intervals[26]. The percentages visible in the table refer to the percentage change in the dependent variable brought about by the one standard deviation change in the relevant independent variable (or the first difference, the difference between two expected values, as a percentage of the original expected value[d5]). As an example, we can see that for the modal respondent, a one standard deviation increase in cultural pride would lead to a 35% increase in political pride, plus or minus about 50%[27].

[25] For the principal ISEI occupation variable, the mean and the mode is 43.5 (see section 5.2.6.). The occupation coding is such that several jobs are numbered either 43 or 44, such as Firefighters, Bookkeepers, Foremen and Airline stewardesses (Ganzeboom, Treiman and De Graaf, 1992). So, in this instance, there is no single, 'average' job that can be imputed to the imaginary respondent in the reference model. As a secondary, related point, I assume that the farmer and ISEI dummies are set to 0.

[26] The standard unit of increase for all variables is one standard deviation or from 0 to approximately 0.86 for racism, and cultural and political pride; nationalism is increased by 1.1 (from 2.55 to 3.6) and European identity changes by 0.9 (from -0.65 to 0.5).

[27] The final interpretative hurdle involves relating the one standard deviation increases in the independent variables to actual survey question responses. For European identity, the simple, two question scale means that the standard deviation increase

As already noted, the incompatibility between racism and political pride and the positive interrelationships between cultural pride, nationalism and racism lead one to speculate that underlying these concepts are two factors. One can test this idea through factor analysis on pride, European identity, nationalism and racism. I use the maximum likelihood method to extract factors having eigenvalues greater than 1. In order to allow for the possibility that the two pride factors can load onto the same factor, I assume an oblique (direct oblimin) design between factors, and rotate to a final solution using the Varimax method. The final, rotated solution is shown in table 5.12.

Table 5.12. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Factor Analysis of Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism

Concept	Nation	Racism
Political Pride	**.306**	-.261
Cultural Pride	**.471**	.011
Identity	-.240	-.034
Nationalism	**.738**	.104
Racism	.221	**.975**
Eigenvalue	1.186	1.626
Percentage of Explained Variance	23.7	32.5
Cronbach's alpha	0.43	N/A
Chi-squared Goodness of Fit (df)	33.65 (1)	

Extraction method: Maximum Likelihood; Rotation method: Direct Oblimin (Delta: 0)

in scores from –0.65 to 0.5 implies a small shift from a relatively national to a relatively European identity position. For nationalism, an increase in the variable score by one standard deviation to 3.6 implies that a respondent is just outside the top quartile of nationalist respondents. This roughly translates as 10 points on the nationalist likert scale, an increase of about 2 points. So, from being rather neutral concerning the nationalist questions before, the typical respondent now tends to offer one nationalist response from the three questions he or she is confronted with. As far as political and cultural pride and racism can be translated back into ISSP question responses, we recall that the four political pride questions are coded from 1 to 4, where 4 indicates a strongly positive feeling of national pride. It can be shown that a respondent from the 50-60% percentiles generally amasses around 10 response category points against 13 points for a respondent in the 80-90% percentiles. Typically, this might signify that the average respondent answers mildly positively to three questions and negatively concerning one other, while the positive respondent answers positively to all four questions. The difference between the two, imaginary respondents is in the response to one question. For cultural pride, the same interpretation applies, so that the difference between the average and positive respondent is about 3 points from four questions coded from 1-4. For racism, the average respondent typically scores 18 points over 6 questions coded from 1-5. In one likely scenario, this means that the respondent returns neutral answers, with perhaps one mildly 'racist' response amongst the six. Those respondents with a high level of racism (84th percentile) typically score about 24 points, implying a mildly or strongly racist response to all survey questions.

In keeping with the earlier prognosis, two factors are indeed extracted[28]. With political and cultural pride and nationalism principally loading onto the first factor, I treat this as a measure of national attachment ('nation'). It seems unlikely that this factor is the underlying 'ethnocentric' dimension advanced by Adorno as racism loads rather weakly. The linkage of cultural and political pride with nationalism offers strong evidence against the hypothesis that national pride is unrelated to support for integration, although as we shall see in chapter six the directional effect is different to nationalism. The second factor appears a straight measure of racism, so leaving relative European identity as something entirely separate. As a final remark, minority nationalism is, unsurprisingly, negatively linked to cultural and political pride and positively related to European identity. Some minority nations in particular may see Europe as a means to strengthen their sovereignty, and the data backs this up for Catalonia, Scotland and to a certain extent the Basques. On the other hand, the Basques are also relatively strongly anti-state, while the Catalans do not see themselves so much in opposition to the Spanish state.

5.4.2. Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism at the Country Level

An overview of the country level results unsurprisingly gives a broadly similar picture to that at the aggregate level. The focus here, then, is on pointing out and interpreting some of the country specific variations to the aggregate level picture. The main findings are that the main (negative) determinants of relative European identity are either racism or cultural pride, but rarely both. Secondly, the country level data affords a series of insights to minority nationalism. There is evidence to suggest that supporters of regional independence, as well as minority nationalists, tend to be relatively pro-European. The exception is Basque

[28] The same factor analysis is performed at country level. For Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden the same factor structure and approximate loadings are maintained. For Germany, Great Britain and Ireland, a similar two-factor structure is derived, where political pride, cultural pride and nationalism (but not racism) load onto one factor, and racism, cultural pride and nationalism (but not political pride) load onto another. Relative European identity loads negatively onto both factors. My interpretation of the results from this second group of countries is that a conception of patriotism composed of political pride *et al.* exists separately from a 'cultural' variable comprising racism, nationalism and cultural pride. Racism, then, is more mainstream, not being associated with system legitimacy, while cultural pride and nationalism contain two dimensions.

nationalism, which is less concerned about its position vis-à-vis Europe, and more concerned with distancing itself from Spain.

Because the country level results are rather voluminous, they are placed in tables 5.6b.-5.10b. in section A.3. of the appendix. Even if the aggregate level findings are rarely mirrored exactly at the country level, the overall picture is of course very similar. Below, I tackle some of the most pertinent country level exceptions from the aggregate picture as well as taking interest in the performance of the minority nationalist states in Spain and Great Britain.

- Because minority nationalist sentiment in the *Basque country* is negatively linked to Spanish cultural pride, while being unrelated to relative European identity, one suspects that the Basques have an anti-Spanish, rather than a particularly strong pro or anti-EU conception of their identity. Again reflecting the aggregate level findings, we see from table 5.8b. that *Catalans* are more likely to be pro-European than the typical Spanish respondent.

- While the minority nationalism variable is significant and negative in the *Great Britain* nationalism country level model, the findings for *Scottish* and *Welsh* minority nationalists are not significantly significant.

- Minority nationalism has a more regional flavour in the *Netherlands*, *Austria*, *Germany*, *Italy* and *Sweden*. Without further analysis of the ISSP data to determine the exact geographical provenance of such respondents, the limitations of question (29) means that it is not immediately evident what these local foci or identities might be. However, the absence of sizeable national minorities and the relatively pro-European outlook of most of this group of countries suggests that respondents are more likely to be pro-regional devolution rather than in favour of national independence. For instance, Swedish minority 'regionalist' respondents might well see themselves as belonging to Scania, a self-declared bloc containing over one million people on the southern tip of Sweden who demands include official recognition of the historic Scanian language. Likewise, for Italy it may well be the

case that this result refers to supporters of the Lega Nord, or perhaps the rather less numerous real national minorities in Italy, in Trentino-Alto Adige, Val d'Aosta and Fruili-Venezia-Giulia. In table 5.10b. we can see than Italian minority nationalists are also more likely to be racist, certainly an accusation frequently (and justly) levelled at the Lega Nord. Less clear are the findings from Austria, where minority nationalists are less likely to be nationalists or politically proud, and the Netherlands, where such respondents are less likely to be culturally proud. Perhaps because minority 'nationalists' in these countries are no more pro-European than other national respondents, one might interpret these findings as evidence of sub-regional discontent, or strong local identities that do not aspire to national or regional status. Ultimately, however, further analysis of the ISSP data is necessary to determine the exact geographical provenance of such respondents.

- From table 5.6b. we can see that racist attitudes do not impact significantly on political pride in *Ireland*. Similarly, table 5.10b. shows us that political pride is not significant in the model of racism. At first sight this suggests that, unlike in other countries, there is no contradiction between being racist and politically proud. However, this may reflect the fact that the racism variable, which is part of a three-factor solution in Ireland (see table 5.4.), is not an especially good determinant of anything. On the other hand, this also might be due to the extremely low levels of racism measured in Ireland (see figure 5.6.). Interestingly, racism is significant and negative in the identity model, implying that people associate the EU with increased levels of immigration. So, if mean levels of racism in Ireland were low at the time of the ISSP survey (1995), those respondents that were racist held particularly strong views. Speculatively, the explanation for this phenomenon might be that as the absolute number of racists in Ireland is comparatively low, the mean level of racism amongst those racists left in the sample is correspondingly higher than in other countries as only 'hard core' racists remain.

- In *Great Britain* cultural pride is an isolated factor, not explicable by any other of the main variables but identity. At the same time, only cultural pride is significant in the modelling of identity (although the model as a whole is not significant). So,

European identity and cultural pride are closely bound together in Great Britain as in no other country in the survey. In section 6.4.2. the suggestion is made in more detail that cultural pride is a substitute for nationalism in Great Britain.

5.4.3. Aggregate Level Control Variables

Here I analyse the impact of the control variables in tables 5.6b.-5.10b. by variable, although as in the sections above I also aim to point out the similarities and differences between variables. The results are compared against published findings in the literature. The principal findings from this section are that older, less educated voters tend to be more likely to hold racist and nationalist attitudes, where right wing political beliefs also play a role in determining racist attitudes. Right wing respondents (as well as far left respondents) are also more likely than leftists to be culturally proud, and this contrasts markedly with the tendency for religious, wealthier, better-employed, male respondents to be politically proud. Finally, the macroeconomic variables tested have little explanatory power.

As a caveat, I note that the significance of certain variables depends on which subsets of countries are analysed (models A-C), pointing to the influence of single countries on the aggregate results. For instance, model C only includes Germany, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Spain. The division between the aggregate and country level analysis is weakened appropriately, and one must exercise caution in imputing country subset findings to the aggregate level. I would argue that the most robust aggregate level conclusions come from model A in which all countries are included, or those models in which a control variable is included for the first time. Of course, the distinction between country and aggregate results is already weakened by weighting the data by country population, so that results for, say, Germany are accorded greater significance than those for Ireland.

The most consistent findings from table 5.6b. are that increased levels of political pride are significantly related to wealthier, male respondents who profess a religious denomination, while respondents who consider themselves upper or upper middle class are more likely to be politically proud than the middle classes. So, 'better-off' male members of society seem to

be more political proud. On the other hand, far left and fringe party supporters are less likely to be politically proud than people to the left of the political spectrum.

Although the determinants of cultural pride are rather less clear than those for political pride, it would seem that the two concepts are rather differently constructed (see table 5.7b.). For models B-C we can see than right and far right respondents are more likely to be culturally proud than leftists. Interestingly, model C also shows that far left-wingers are more likely to be culturally proud. In models B and C for political pride, far left-wingers are associated with being less political proud with respect to leftists. So, as well as being distinct from political pride, cultural pride shares with racism the impact of right wing support. However, cultural pride also shares with the identity model the fact that the controls offer more insight into dependent variable variation than the main independent variables.

Because other findings typically do not acknowledge more than one dimension to national pride it is difficult to directly compare results. Even by examining closely what dimension of pride other authors are measuring, the main commonality that arises is the focus on a common set of control variables: sex, education, religion, extremism and age. Smith and Jerkko find no statistically significant gender difference in national pride for any country in the ISSP survey, although they only consider one dimension to pride (1998). Topf, Mohler and Heath seem to tap cultural pride by showing that women in Britain are more likely to be proud of the monarchy (1989, p. 128). However, the country level results for the UK in the ISSP data show that men are more likely than women to be culturally proud. Rose (1985) and Almond and Verba (1989) all point to rising education levels as related to increased pride. For aggregate level political pride, this claim can be directly refuted. Only at the country level is there some evidence that education leads to higher political pride (the Netherlands and Sweden), while evidence from other countries points to the opposite phenomenon (Germany). However, there is support at the country level for Topf, Mohler and Heath's result that the less educated are more likely to take pride in the UK monarchy (1989, p. 128). The importance of religion is generally recognised in the literature. For all of the fifteen countries in the European Values Survey surveyed by Rose, those who said they were not religious were less likely to be proud of their country (1985, p. 89). Religious respondents were seen as more likely to display both 'political' and 'cultural' pride in Great

Britain and Germany (Topf, Mohler and Heath, 1989, p. 128). Finally, Smith and Jarkko argue that for most countries in the ISSP survey, national pride has generally been declining across cohorts born before 1965, whereupon this decline has levelled off and even reversed, especially in some of the ex-communist Eastern European countries included in the survey. The drop in national pride is sharpest between 1931-1950, and is often explained by war guilt and other reactions to World War II (see also Rose, 1985). It is an open question whether this decline in national pride is generational or life-cycle driven, or both. However, it is unreasonable to expect these age effects to show up in the single period ISSP data.

Interpreting the determinants of identity presents some difficulties. The only variable consistently significant over the three models is the Protestant dummy, so that Protestants (but not Catholics) are less likely to feel relatively European than non-believers. The interpretation of this result is unclear: although some fringe national politicians have painted the European project as a 'Papist conspiracy'[29] it seems hard to believe that these ideas have currency throughout the Union or Germany, the largest country in the weighted regression model (see also section 5.4.4. below). From model B and C, far left and far right respondents are less likely to feel relatively European than leftists. This conveys the more standard idea that political extremists feel threatened by Europe. The only similar research in the literature is carried out by Duchesne and Frognier, who measure straight European identity in the Eurobarometer data rather than relative European identity, and show that education, income, age and gender are all significant socio-demographic correlates with European identity (in Niedermayer and Sinnott, 1995, p. 209).

We see from table 5.9b. that nationalism is clearly linked with older, less educated respondents. Interestingly though, neither political affiliation nor subjective social class is significant in explaining nationalism, which is more a function of the 'objective' social characteristics of age and education. As we see in section 5.4.4., however, political affiliation does determine nationalism in some instances at the country level. Turning to other empirical work in this field, Heath, Taylor, Brook and Park rightly note that the main

[29] See, for example, 'The conspiracy behind the European Union: what every Christian should know' by Arthur Noble, contained and endorsed by Dr. Ian Paisley, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) politician on his website (www.ianpaisley.org). On this view, the EU is a resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire, an attempt to construct a Catholic superstate that threatens the interests of all Protestants.

political theories of nationalism do not give us any especially clear or detailed leads in identifying the sociological bases of nationalist sentiment (1999, p. 165). These authors suggest a distinction between ethnic forms of nationalism, where ethnic markers such as language or religion would be strongly associated with nationalist sentiment, and more civic forms of nationalism based on a shared culture rather than common descent. Heath *et al.* assume that they are investigating this latter form of nationalism in Britain, also finding that age and education have the strongest associations with British national sentiment (1999, p. 166).

We can readily see from table 5.10b. that racism is a function both of the 'objective' characteristics of age, education, occupation as well as political affiliation. In common with nationalism, older, less educated respondents are more likely to be racist. Moreover, respondents with a lower socio-economic occupational status tend to be slightly more racist. In common with cultural pride, however, it is clear that right and far right supporters are considerably more likely to hold the attitude in question (i.e. racism) than leftists. The politically charged nature of racism can hardly come as a surprise; there is a fairly clear right/left wing split in the European political arena between parties on issues of immigration, asylum and so forth. While Quillian uses Eurobarometer data to provide confirmation of the importance of gender, education and social class in explaining racism (1995), it is clear that a series of other factors is at work that cannot be captured using the ISSP survey. The European Commission report 'Racism and Xenophobia in Europe' (1997) highlights job insecurity as a contributory factor while Quillian points to a range of individual and group-level theories (discussed briefly in section 4.6).

5.4.4. Country Level Control Variables

Once again, the aggregate level results are broadly represented at the country level. It is the aim of this section to cover the main exceptions to the aggregate level findings with reference to tables 5.6b.-5.10b. in section A.3. of the appendix. I proceed on a control and dependent variable basis. The chief findings are as follows:

- The aggregate levels findings are not able to adequately capture inter-state differences in the impact of religion on the dependent variables. At the aggregate level, Protestant respondents are seen to be more likely than atheists to be politically proud, and less likely to feel relatively European. Catholics too are more likely than atheists to feel politically proud. This suggests that religious respondents tend to see the nation-state as a political focus point. Although in Germany Protestant respondents tend to be less likely to feel European, in Italy Catholic respondents are a force of political and social conservatism, being less likely to feel European, and more likely to feel culturally proud, racist and nationalist. Similarly, in Spain Catholics are more likely than atheists to be racist. The role of Protestant respondents in Spain at first appears counter-intuitive; such respondents are pro-European, with a strong sense of cultural pride but weak political pride. However, further analysis reveals that, despite the significant coefficient results, there are only three respondents coded as Protestants in the Spanish data sample. In Italy, there are not even enough Protestant respondents to draw a comparison. So, one is tempted to conclude that Catholicism remains a powerful conservative force in Spanish and Italian society.

- Aggregate level findings concerning political affiliation are broadly repeated at the country level, although there are some interesting permutations that reveal national political debate on the issues analysed here. At the aggregate level, we know that for political pride, extremists at either end of the political spectrum tend to be anti-pride, while for cultural pride right-wingers tend to be more likely to be pro-cultural pride than those on the left. Similarly, there is some tendency for those who are relatively anti-European, nationalist and racist to be right wing. For Germany, we can add to this picture by noting that while extremists tend to be less politically proud than centrists and right-wingers, far right supporters are more likely to be racist, and relatively anti-European only. This suggests that a preoccupation with immigrants is behind far right opposition to Europe in Germany.

  For Great Britain, although far left rather than far right respondents are consistently less politically and culturally proud and nationalistic, this segment of the political spectrum is represented by just six respondents who, we are informed by the ISSP

codebook, consider themselves supporters of the Green party. Rather disappointingly, the ISSP survey fails to include class in, of all cases, Britain.

For Sweden, left wing supporters tend to be pro-political pride, while right-wingers are more culturally proud and racist. Extremist left-wingers are anti-European, the only example from the eight countries taken here. Finally, in Spain, nationalism has a more polarised, political dimension than in many other countries. Every shade of political opinion apart from the control, leftist respondents, is strongly anti-nationalist. The pro-nationalist behaviour of farmers points to an urban/rural division on this issue.

Turning now to examine issues by dependent variable, we have:

- Age and education are significant at the country level for political pride, although directionally different by country. Younger people are more politically proud in Germany, while the opposite tends to be true in Ireland. Similarly, while the less educated tend to be more politically proud in Germany, the opposite is the case in the Netherlands and Sweden.

- The country level findings for cultural pride are sparse; only in the Netherlands are more than two control variables significant. In common with identity, the central concepts give us more of an insight into this variable's makeup. For Great Britain, both males and the less educated are more likely to be culturally proud, suggesting that here the concept fits a similar profile to nationalism. Gender and education are not significant for Great Britain in the nationalism country model (table 5.9b.), and this provides some evidence for the suggestion made in section 6.4.2. that nationalism in Great Britain could well be best captured by cultural pride variables.

- In Austria, farmers are significantly less likely to be culturally proud than non-farmers.

- The aggregate level impact of income seems to largely explain nationalist attitudes in the Netherlands and Sweden. On the other hand, nationalism in Italy is less utilitarian in nature, being associated with older, less educated Catholic respondents. In Spain, farmers and the less educated tend to be more nationalist.

- Turning to racism, education is the most common explanatory control variable, and is only not significant in Ireland and Austria. In the case of these two countries, the control variables do not explain a lot of variation in the dependent variable. For Ireland, the R^2 of the model is rather low, again pointing to problems with the three-factor racism solution highlighted in section 5.2.5.

5.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I began by attempting to operationalise national pride, identity, nationalism, xenophobia and racism in the ISSP data. This lead to the creation of five core variables after it was found through factor analysis that national pride contains a political and cultural element, while none of the questions surveyed were deemed to tap xenophobic attitudes. I include with the nationalism variable a series of controls to account for minority nationalism, especially pertinent for respondents from the Basque country, Catalonia, Scotland and Wales.

The principal findings from this chapter relate to how the five concepts interact with each other. That is, all the variables predict each other positively, with some exceptions. Racism and political pride are negatively related in both directions, the relationship between identity and cultural pride, nationalism and racism is similarly negative, while identity and political pride are not significantly related in either direction. Using factor analysis one can distinguish two underlying factors in the data; the first I label a 'cultural' measure of attachment, comprising all the factors to a degree, but above all tapping into the interrelationships between pride and nationalism. This closer than expected linkage between national pride and the other factors leads me to the conclusion that Adorno's concept of ethnocentrism is not visible in the ISSP data, and that national pride may well not to unrelated to support for European integration. The second factor seems a clear measure of

racism, leaving European identity, which loads negatively onto both factors, as something entirely separate.

The minority nationalism results are rather more clear-cut. The Catalans and Scots, and to a certain extent the Basques are fairly pro-European, while this is less obvious in the case of Wales. This may reflect the attachment of many Welsh respondents to the UK, and brings a certain degree of balance to the oft-heard argument that UK opposition to the Europe is English opposition to the Europe. The identity of Basque respondents is more defined by their anti-Spanish outlook than any overwhelming warmth towards Europe, and in this respect there is a strong contrast to be made with the Catalans. Other minority nationalism results are less clear, although there is some evidence to suggest that the aspirations of citizens in sub-state territories, possibly including Padania and Scania, are towards Europe.

An analysis of the control variables reveals that nationalists and racists tend to be older, less educated respondents, with racism also containing a more political element. While cultural pride clearly differs from political pride in its make-up, it cannot be clearly linked to nationalism or racism. Indeed for cultural pride and identity, the main independent variables offered far more insight into dependent variable variation than the controls.

At the country level there are a number of variations to the aggregate level models that are worth conveying. The role of the Catholic Church in Italy and Spain can be seen as a force of social conservatism being, in particular, an explanatory factor of racist attitudes, whereas in other countries political affiliation plays a notable role. It seems likely that German far right-wingers appear to base their opposition to Europe on fears of immigration, while for Great Britain and Spain cultural pride, or rather loss of cultural identity, seem to be the dominant concerns. The suggestion is made that cultural pride in Great Britain is a substitute for nationalism, both because of the sociological make-up of cultural pride and the apparent dearth of nationalism as measured in the ISSP survey. One might also point out the greater preponderance of low-income earners to display nationalist sentiments in Sweden and the Netherlands.

6. EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION USING ISSP DATA

6.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

In this chapter I examine differences in support for integration among eight European Union member states using International Social Science Program 1995 National Identity survey data. Specifically, I test the series of hypotheses constructed in chapter four that predict the attitudes towards European integration taken by nationalists, racists and those exhibiting national pride or a sense of national or European identity.

The organisation of the chapter is as follows. In each of the various subsections of section 6.2. I recapitulate a different hypothesis from chapter four and the operationalisation of the accompanying concept as laid out in chapter five, along with any existent empirical evidence that may have a bearing on the hypothesis. I contend that while the existing evidence does not act to fundamentally oppose the hypotheses put forward here, the paucity and the lack of methodological robustness to this previous research makes further evidence all the more desirable. In the discussion of the dependent variable in section 6.2.6. the decision is taken to predict favourable over negative attitudes towards integration, and at a later stage attitudes themselves versus non-attitudes, both at the aggregate and individual level. This decision lends itself to a two-way classification of models, giving a total of four models to be analysed. In this chapter I predict favourable over negative attitudes towards integration at the aggregate and national level, while only in the next chapter addressing non-attitudes do we consider the two further models - attitudes versus non-attitudes at the aggregate and nation-state level.

The pair of dichotomous dependent variables that are constructed as part of this two-way set of models favours the use of logit regression techniques in the results section 6.3. By way of

summary of the principal aggregate logit regression results in section 6.4.1., I find that higher levels of nationalism, racism and a relatively national sense of identity are all associated with decreased support, as predicted. However, there is also a positive link between political and cultural pride and support for integration, so that we can reject hypothesis 2. This may be a manifestation of Risse *et al.*'s (1999) expectation that national identities, and hence pride in these identities, adapt in the face of changing perceptions of Europe. The remainder of the country level key independent and control variable findings are summarised in sections 6.4.2. to 6.4.4.

6.2. Constructing the Model

In this section I very briefly justify the choice of the ISSP National Identity survey data. I then recap the hypotheses constructed in chapter four that purport to explain how European identity, national pride, nationalism and racism interact with support for European integration. I also review the operationalisation of these concepts from chapter five, before assessing any empirical explanations of support in the scholarly literature. We shall see that overall this body of empirical evidence, while broadly in keeping with the hypotheses, is unsatisfactory both in its paucity and its methodological robustness. Finally, the dependent and control variables are considered. Again, the controls are identical to those taken in chapter five, while on this occasion the dependent variable is split into two components: favourable over negative attitudes towards integration, and then attitudes themselves versus non-attitudes. In this chapter I look at only favourable versus negative attitudes towards integration.

6.2.1. The ISSP Survey

The reasons for selecting the ISSP survey to carry out this analysis of attitudes towards integration are entirely the same as those expounded at length in section 5.2.1. Essentially, the superior choice of independent variables over the Eurobarometer data series better allow us to test the hypotheses listed in chapter four.

6.2.2. European and National Identity

The identity hypothesis from section 4.3. is reproduced below. Identity is operationalised in section 5.2.2. by taking two questions asking respondents how close they felt to their country and the Europe.

H1: the more European a respondent feels, ceteris paribus, the more likely he or she is to support the European Union. Similarly, the more national a respondent feels, the less likely he or she is to support the Union.

I note that the measure taken in section 5.2.2. tests relative Europeanness; whether or not respondents feel more European than national, or vice versa. The disadvantages of this measure are that it cannot tell us either about different dimensions to identity (see section 4.4. and 5.2.2.) or the strength or direction of the relationship between absolute levels of European identity and support. One might bear in mind, however, that national pride is a reasonable indicator of absolute levels of national identity, with the caveat that not all people who consider themselves as belonging to a country are proud of it.

In general, then, one might expect a close relationship between respondents with a strong sense of European identity and support for integration. From section 2.2.1., European identity can be viewed in this context as a more demanding form of loyalty to the European Union than support for further integration. Notwithstanding the low R^2 of the European identity models in section 5.3., it will be interesting to observe the similarities and differences in the make-up of support and European identity. Although a critic might claim that relationship between relative Europeanness and support for integration is so likely to be positive as to be almost tautological, any negative or weakly positive relationship would point to a serious juncture between what one might term 'underlying' support for European unity and the reality of the European Union. Moreover, this strong relationship is likely only to be one-way; from section 2.2.1. I note that there is no reason to expect that supporters of integration necessarily feel European (although support may be a necessary condition for this). From the ISSP data we can see that around 5800 of 11000 respondents see themselves as 'benefiting' from EU membership while only around 1400 feel 'very close' to Europe.

Even if a further 3800 feel 'close' to Europe, from figure 5.1. we can see that extremely few respondents are relatively European on the tougher measure taken here. So, a distinction between (relative) European identity and support for integration can be made in the data and so would seem apparent to respondents.

Of the little research into European identity and support for European integration that exists, Müller-Peters shows that while European patriots tend to be pro-single currency, there is no statistically significant relationship between national patriots and support for the EURO (1998). Here the author surveys a total of 15,088 persons from all fifteen EU member states in a specially commissioned study in 1997. Factor analysis is used to distinguish between putative nationalist, national and European patriotism variables arising from questions put[1]. The results from regression analysis show that for most of the EU15, national patriotism is weakly associated with lower support for the EURO (-0.048, p=0.001), while European patriotism is strongly associated with EURO support (0.418, p=0.001). For Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg, however, national patriotism is associated with increased EURO support (0.252, p=0.001). Of course, we must remember that the EURO is one policy issue amongst many (see section 2.3.3.), and attitudes towards the EURO are not concomitant with attitudes towards integration in general.

6.2.3. National Pride

The national pride hypothesis from section 4.4. is reproduced below. National pride is operationalised in section 5.2.3. by taking eight ISSP questions which after factor analysis reveal two underlying 'political' and 'cultural' dimensions.

H2: pride in a particular nation is not linked, ceteris paribus, with levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

[1] The questions "If I had the chance to set up home in another country I would leave (COUNTRY) straightaway" and "I feel attached to (COUNTRY) and its people" load negatively and positively respectively onto the 'national patriotism' variable, which seems similar to the definition of national identity adopted herein. European patriotism is measured by the question "I feel attached to Europe and its people". See footnote 3 for a description of the dependent variable.

The original rationale for supposing that national pride does not interfere with support for integration was the observation from the socio-psychology literature that identity, or pride, in one group does not preclude membership of another. In this way, not only are multiple identities possible, but also it should not matter to our hypothesis how many dimensions there are to national pride. Reality, however, may be complicated by the knowledge from chapter five that national and European identities may overlap; for instance, the outgroup for respondents holding one dimension to pride might be persons with a European identity. In particular, the closeness of cultural pride to nationalism and racism demonstrated in table 5.13. suggests that those with a European identity may well be an outgroup for respondents with high levels of cultural pride. On the other hand, the two dimensions to political pride revealed in the same factor analysis means that it is hard to predict how this variable might relate to support. One might see the cultural dimension to political pride dominating or, alternatively, the civic republican dimension might be shown to be strongest, where this might well be more compatible with European Union membership. Routh and Burgoyne suggest that one feature of affective, cultural attachment is a backward-looking and regressive desire to avoid change in one's national identity. On the other hand, instrumental attachment is more open to changes on the basis of the perceived benefits. (Routh and Burgoyne, 1998, p. 4).

Unfortunately, because the ISSP survey only takes place over one time period, we are unable to judge definitively whether any relation between pride and support is inherent, or part of a more dynamic process of identity construction. From section 4.3., writers in the constructivist tradition such as Risse *et al.* (1999) presume that national identity and pride can be 'reprogrammed' to incorporate various degrees of European identity. For instance, one might point to the increased propensity for European flags to be displayed alongside national flags in Italy or, conversely, the rise of an English nationalist form of national identity. Moreover, constructivist analysis often focuses in depth on the content of national identity, something that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, any relation between national pride and support, especially at the country level, may well offer support or insight into constructivist theses and I return to this point in section 6.4.1.

The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between national pride and support for integration seems to confirm some link between pride and support. However, this evidence

can be criticised for lack of thoroughness, and uses distinctly different dependent and independent variables to those analysed herein. Routh and Burgoyne examine the negative effects of cultural-historical pride on support for the EURO in the United Kingdom (1998). The authors focus on what they term 'sentimental attachment reflecting cultural symbols'; pride expressed in the Queen, history, the Pound and cultural traditions and customs. This is placed alongside an 'instrumental' measure of attachment, which asks respondents how well-functioning is the legal system, health care system, economic system, income level and distribution of wealth and the education system[2]. The results from a causal path model based on approximately 1,100 responses from a 3,000 strong mail survey conducted by the authors in 1997 suggest that cultural attachment is directly linked with anti-EURO sentiment. Instrumental attachment does not directly impact anti-EURO sentiment, but only acts through the medium of a 'EURO benefits' variable, in which respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with a number of opinions about the introduction of a single currency[3].

In the work of Müller-Peters, both the economic-political and cultural-historic strains of national pride that she identifies are hypothesised to have no impact on EURO support, although ordinary least squares regression results show that for most countries the two national prides have a weakly positive impact on support for the EURO, with economic-political pride having a slightly stronger impact (1998, p. 715). However, country level correlations between cultural pride and EURO support show that in six of fifteen countries the relationship between the two variables is negative.

As we have already noted support for the EURO is not concomitant with attitudes towards integration in general. However both articles show that pride has some effect on support for the EURO. Can we reconcile the opposite findings concerning cultural pride in the two

[2] This focus on how well certain social institutions function is distinctly different from asking a respondent whether he or she is proud of such institutions, as questions on political pride seem to do. Rather, the emphasis on the functioning of institutions suggests that the survey questions elicit evaluations not solely of pride but rather of procedural and distributive justice, which could perhaps be summarised as measures of system legitimacy (see section 5.2.3.; Routh and Burgoyne, 1999, p.3; Manstead and Hewstone, 1995, p. 574).

[3] Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with a number of opinions about the introduction of a single European currency using the following response categories: strongly disagree, disagree, neither, agree, and strongly agree and don't know. The three opinions were as follows: the introduction of a single European currency will make trade between European countries easier; the goal of a strong European economy will encourage greater cooperation across Europe; a single European currency will be better able to compete with the Dollar and the Yen and will therefore gain more influence in the world. The overall impact of the 'Euro benefits' variable is pro-EURO. Unlike instrumental

works? In the former analysis, the authors include pride in national currency as part of their cultural pride variable. In the factor analysis performed by Müller-Peters pride in one's currency loads equally onto both political and cultural factors, and consequently is treated as a variable in its own right. Indeed, pride in one's currency is shown by Müller-Peters to correlate more strongly with nationalism than either political or cultural pride (1998, p. 716). Could it be that Routh and Burgoyne are closer to measuring nationalism in their survey than cultural pride? Although the authors perform factor analysis on their variables, I note that there is no confirmatory factor analysis testing cultural pride items with those more likely to fall under an economic-political pride or nationalism latent variable. I also note that Routh and Burgoyne focus in their work on the UK where, as Müller-Peters shows, respondents generally have an extremely hostile attitude towards the EU (1998, p. 713). In any event, the confusion present in the work of these two sets of authors certainly leaves one with the impression that further research in this area would be desirable.

6.2.4. Nationalism

After a survey of the theoretical literature, the nationalist hypothesis was defined in section 4.5. thus:

H3: nationalist sentiment in a particular state is linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

Nationalist sentiment was operationalised in section 5.2.4. through the creation of a variable splitting into quartiles a Likert scale comprising three ISSP survey questions and I do not dwell on this point here. In section 5.2.4. a minority nationalism variable was also created, where the missing cases for Ireland were replaced with the average score (1.07 for a little over 6% of respondents) of the two other countries in the ISSP survey, Austria and the Netherlands, with no separatist movements to speak of. Also created from the minority nationalism variable were interaction terms for respondents from Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and the Basque Country. I do include specific hypotheses as to how nationalist respondents

attachment, cultural pride is linked negatively with the 'Euro benefits' variable, so that respondents with high levels of cultural pride see few EURO benefits.

from these regions might view the European Union. However, it is clear both on the basis of the analyses made in section 4.5. and results from the relative European identity model (table 5.8.) that one might expect Catalan and Scottish nationalists to be pro-integration, with perhaps a less enthusiastic welcome to the EU coming from Basque nationalists. For Welsh nationalists, I note that there is some ambiguity as to their likely relationship with the EU.

Although one might criticise the nationalist hypothesis as uncontroversial, even obvious, the strength of the nationalist coefficient still remains of interest. Moreover, as the evidence below demonstrates, there have been surprisingly few successful efforts to link nationalism and support for integration. Müller-Peters demonstrates that respondents holding nationalist attitudes are less likely to be in favour of the EURO (1998). As noted above, the author uses factor analysis to distinguish between putative nationalist, national and European patriotism variables arising from questions put in a specially commissioned study in 1997, surveying a total of 15,088 persons from all fifteen EU member states. The results of ordinary least squares regression analysis strongly suggest that in all member states nationalist attitudes are associated with weaker support for the EURO. However, this survey is not ideal supporting evidence for our nationalism hypothesis primarily because the dependent and independent variables are too different to those taken here. While two of the three questions that load most heavily onto the nationalism latent variable are in much the same spirit as questions (26)-(28) from section 5.2.4., a third question invites the respondent to agree or disagree as to whether "a country which does not have its own currency is a true country" (1998, p.8)[4]. Again, the EURO is one policy issue amongst many and, without the benefit of going back to this privately held data series, I propose that the nationalism regression coefficient might well be less negative if an alternative, less acutely political form of the independent variable had been taken.

Charillon and Ivaldi attempt test the link between nationalism and support for integration using the Eurobarometer survey series (1996). In a first approach, the authors investigate Europeans' desires to preserve national sovereignty in several key areas. For three countries, France, Germany and the UK, a list of eleven issue areas is displayed from EB 42 (November-December 1994), along with the percentage of the population in each country

who believe that national governments should retain control in each one[5]. The authors construct an index with one point for each Euro-sceptic response. This index is then crosstabulated with a measure of support for integration. There is a neat negative correlation, those very much in favour have an average score of 1.87, those only to some extent in favour score 2.98, those only to some extent against score 5.05 while citizens very much against score 6.94. Breaking down the index by country, average scores are highest in the UK (4.46), then Germany (3.22) and then France (2.88). Impressive as these results are, Charillon and Ivaldi seem to be engaged in the methodologically dubious activity of explaining support for the EU using support for EU policy areas.

Charillon and Ivaldi go on to another test of the nationalist hypothesis. An index of nationalism from four EB questions is constructed from EB 42, with a point given for each answer highlighted in bold.

(15) "In the near future do you see yourself as...**(nationality) only**, (nationality) and European, European and **(nationality)**, European only?" (see section 5.2.2. for Citrin and Sides' (2001) use of this question)

(38) "Would you say that you are **very proud**, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be (nationality)."

(39) "On this list are some opinions about national pride. Please tell me which one of these opinions comes closest to your own." **National pride is a duty for every citizen**; national pride is natural; national pride does not make sense, because nationality is a matter of chance; national pride does not make sense, because everyone is different; national pride is arrogant, because it is directed against persons of other nationalities; national pride is dangerous, because it often leads to extreme nationalism and even to wars; none of these opinions (spontaneous); I don't care about national pride (spontaneous); Don't know.

[5] Although the authors do not mention which EB 42 question they use, it would appear to be Qu. 30, which asks respondents whether they believe a list of policy proposals should be decided by national governments or jointly within the EU. The policy areas taken seem most likely to be Defence, Protection of the Environment, Relations with Developing Countries, Monetary Policy, Foreign Affairs, Immigration, Drugs, a Single Currency, Europe.

(40) "You said that you feel fearful about the Single European Market. Amongst the following statements, could you tell me the main reasons for your fears about the Single Market?" Show cards, one of which reads **'The loss of national identity'**.

Table 6.1. shows the distribution of scores on national lines. The order is different from the eleven-question index, where now Germany now has the least number of nationalists (those respondents scoring between 2-4 points), although the UK still heads the list.

Table 6.1.Nationalism score by country (EB 42: 1994)

	Score 0	Score 1	Score 2-4
France	50.1%	30.0%	20.0%
Germany	59.7%	26.0%	14.3%
UK	32.1%	29.0%	38.9%

There is a neat correlation between the national sovereignty and nationalism indices, the implication being that nationalists are anti-European. Respondents with a score of zero on table 6.1. are characterised by an average score of 2.44 on the sovereignty index, and this increases to 3.81, 4.94 and 6.05 for the scores 1, 2 and 3 respectively (1996, p. 68). The propensity to be anti-European ties in very well with nationalist respondents scoring between 2 and 4. Taken against the question "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for this, or only to some extent? If against, are you only to some extent against or very much against?" (Question (1) from section 2.2.4.), 87% of people with a score of zero on the nationalism scale are in favour of integration. This percentage declines as the score increases to 44% for those in the '2-4' category. Euro-scepticism, as measured by all anti-European responses in question (1), unites 69% of the 'ultras' (with a score of 3 or more) on the nationalist scale, as against only 18% of those individuals in the '0' category.

Interpreting the significance of this evidence involves recognising the severe limitations of Charillon and Ivaldi's paper. Their hypothesis that forms of nationalistic sentiment reduce support for integration is weakened by the presence of only three European Union countries,

and the authors fail to take advantage of one of the strengths of the Eurobarometer survey series by not including data from more than one time-period. There is little in the way of rigorous statistical analysis, while the choice of questions is not ideal for the authors' purposes. Questions (37) and (40) seem a better measure of identity than nationalism, while questions (38) and (39) would seem to capture attitudes of national pride. While responses to the four questions taken together might tap an underlying nationalism factor, there is no supporting analysis for this claim. Doubtless part of the reason for this, as I suggest in chapter four, is that in common with many other empirical studies the authors fail to define theoretically their concepts before proceeding to empirical analysis. It is clear that the available empirical evidence on the link between support for integration and nationalism, while not discouraging, is hardly satisfactory and there appears a need for more rigorous research in this area.

6.2.5. Racism

As ever, the racism hypothesis below is derived from an analysis of the theoretical literature in section 4.6. and this hypothesis is operationalised as outlined in chapter 5.2.5., so that xenophobia is not tested:

H5: racist sentiments in a particular state are linked, ceteris paribus, with lower levels of support for the European Union amongst its citizens.

There is very little evidence either supportive or hostile to the above hypothesis. The European Commission report 'Racism and Xenophobia in Europe' is of some aid. Overall, a very high percentage of respondents (approximately 33%) openly declared themselves to be 'racist' or 'very racist' (1997, p. 1). This report also presents data showing the percentage of people declaring themselves quite or very racist throughout the EU who are for, against and neutral concerning question (2) - "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the Common Market is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?" (1997, p. 4). 45% of this racist category declared themselves against integration, while 26% were in favour. It seems that there is a clear need for further research on the link between support for integration and our hypotheses concerning racism and xenophobia.

6.2.6. Dependent Variable Selection

The hypotheses recounted in section 6.2. above can be tested at different levels of analysis. I analyse ISSP 1995 National Identity data at the aggregate and country level. In this way one can both collate the ISSP data, to maximise the number of included control variables and the chances of obtaining statistically significant results, and break it down, to better analyse the country level picture. To give a second dimension of analysis, I recode the dependent variable below to make the distinction between positive and negative attitudes towards the European Union, and between attitudes themselves (comprising both positive and negative responses) as opposed to non-attitudes. Non-attitudes are defined here as the 'Don't Know' or 'Have never heard of' survey response, where a fuller discussion of what exactly are non-attitudes is left to chapter seven.

(41) "Generally speaking, would you say that (R's country) benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union?" (Benefits, Does not benefit, Have never heard of the EU, Don't Know/Can't choose)[6]

The result is a two-way classification of analytical models pictured in table 6.2. below.

Table 6.2. Two-way Classification of Support for European Integration

	Aggregate Level	Country Level
Pro vs. Anti Integration	Model 1 (chapter six)	Model 2 (chapter six)
Attitudes vs. Non-attitudes	(chapter seven)	(chapter seven)

[6] In fact the ISSP codebook question text includes the phrase 'appropriate association' rather than 'R's country'. However, an analysis of the individual country codebooks confirms that in all cases the appropriate association taken is the state in which the survey was carried out (as opposed to, say, nations within that state).

As the above table makes clear, in this chapter I only analyse models 1 and 2 that deal with pro and anti integration sentiments. In the following chapter, I specifically focus on attitudes versus non-attitudes towards integration. I make this distinction because, as is argued at greater length in chapter seven, non-attitudes comprise an important and poorly understood segment of responses towards integration. In any case, one would discard the 'don't know' and 'never heard of responses' in a standard ordinary least squares or binomial logit regression analysis of attitudes towards integration. That is, unless one argues that 'don't know' responses constitute not a non-attitude but rather a balanced, middle-way response by those respondents who have carefully weighed up both sides of the integration argument and cannot come down on either side. Most likely, however, this response category is a mix of both types of responses (see section 7.3.). Indeed, the ambiguous nature of this middle response for question (4) is one reason why the attitudes vs. non-attitudes model used in chapter seven uses Eurobarometer not ISSP data (see section 7.5.1.).

The choice of dependent variable is conditioned by the decision to use the ISSP survey. There is only one other question in the survey that asks respondents to evaluate the European integrative project.

(42) "Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?

1. (R's country) should do all it can to unite fully with the European Union.
2. (R's country) should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Union. "

Because respondents might be generally for membership of the European Union, but not in favour of the closer form of Union implied by question above, a clear difference can be noted between questions (41) and (42). In section 2.2.1. I make the case for measuring general support for European integration rather than any more specific proposal. That, and the fact that question (42) does not include data for Germany and Sweden means that use question (41), although in section 6.4.1. I use the above question to verify the aggregate results. The wording of question (41) is reasonably close to question (4), where both question the benefits to EU integration, so that the ISSP question also appears a utilitarian measure of support. Testing for the impact of affective factors on integration using a utilitarian dependent variable

can only increase our confidence in the importance of any statistically significant affective results.

Of course, it makes little sense to study support if this variable does not vary, so that in figure 6.1. below I plot both aggregate (weighted) and country mean support levels.

Figure 6.1. 1995 ISSP Mean Support for European Integration by Country ('DK' and 'Never Heard of EU' Responses Excluded)



Overall, mean levels of support are high and, for Ireland and Italy, are so positive towards the EU that they come close to not varying. It must be borne in mind, however, that support is increased by removing 'DK' and 'Never Heard of EU' responses from consideration in this chart, just as they will be removed from the regression analyses in this chapter. I note that this summary of attitudes towards integration also serve to place into context the probability charts 6.3.-6.7. later in the chapter, which display how the main independent variables affect the likelihood of a respondent being pro-integration.

6.3. Model Methodology and Results

The model methodology is largely imported from chapter five. That is, I use the same set of control variables presented in section A.2. of the appendix. Concomitantly, the aggregate

level data taken in model 1 is split into three subsets (A, B and C) to account for the control variables missing in certain countries (see section 5.3.). I apply the same weighting to the data in order to render the sample sizes equal by country. However, the bivariate response category of the dependent variable favours the use of logit regression techniques.

So, I estimate a logit model at both aggregate and individual level. Aldrich and Nelson (1984) show that a reliance on a linear regression model such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression when the dependent variable is dichotomous, and interpretable in terms of probability, imposes constraints on the marginal effects of exogenous variables that are not taken into account by the model. The logit model surmounts this obstacle by imposing a non-linear transformation on the underlying linear relationship between y and x, so that the 0-1 probability constraint is satisfied without also constraining the right-hand side of the regression equation. The logit is a non-linear model of the probability of being in one category of the dependent variable rather than the other. However, the model is linear in the logarithm of the odds of being in one category rather than the other. Thus the coefficient for an explanatory variable, x, tell us the expected change in the log odds of being at one, rather than the other, category of y, for a one unit change in the value of x. In addition, the logit model, while preserving many of the features of the OLS model, makes less onerous model assumptions (Demaris, 1992, p. 42).

In the remainder of this section I present the abridged results of the logit models showing just the effect of the main independent variables on aggregate level support in table 6.3. Because the regression models spawn a large amount of data, information on control variables and country level data, which is not included in the model summary below, is presented in tables 6.3. and 6.3b. in section A.4. of the appendix.

Table 6.3. 1995 ISSP Aggregate Level Impact on Support of the Independent Variables (abridged)

Model	1a			1b			1c		
	b		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	0.49	**	1.64	0.60	**	1.83	0.60	**	1.81
	(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.08)		
Cultural Pride	0.21	**	1.24	0.21	**	1.24	0.26	**	1.30
	(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.07)		
Identity	0.46	**	1.58	0.53	**	1.70	0.46	**	1.59
	(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.06)		
Nationalist Attitudes	-0.12	**	0.89	-0.13	**	0.88	-0.06		0.94
	(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.06)		
Minority Nationalism	-0.40	**	0.67	-0.30	*	0.74	-0.45	**	0.64
	(0.10)			(0.13)			(0.17)		
Basque Country	-0.50	*	0.61	-0.51		0.60	-0.46		0.63
	(0.21)			(0.31)			(0.32)		
Catalonia	0.48	**	1.61	0.35	*	1.42	0.43	*	1.54
	(0.14)			(0.17)			(0.18)		
Scotland	0.46		1.59	0.50		1.65	-		
	(0.26)			(0.32)					
Wales	0.29		1.34	0.10		1.11	-		
	(0.26)			(0.30)					
Racist Attitudes	-0.64	**	0.53	-0.67	**	0.51	-0.66	**	0.52
	(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.08)		
Constant	-7.53	**	0.00	-3.90	**	0.02	-2.05	*	0.13
	(1.03)			(1.08)			(0.97)		
Number of Cases	4990			3354			2318		
Pseudo R^2	0.21			0.19			0.20		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	1235.65 (25)			795.68 (30)			568.62 (32)		

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

6.4. Interpretation of Results

I interpret the findings from section 6.3. by independent variable type and at both aggregate and country level. I first look at the effect of the main independent variables, pride, European identity, nationalism and racism on support at aggregate and country level. I then analyse the

effect of the remainder of the control variables at aggregate and country level, and with reference to other empirical studies. The full regression models are placed in tables 6.3. and 6.3b. in section A.4. of the appendix.

6.4.1. The Impact of Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism on Support at the Aggregate Level

At the aggregate level the impact of the main independent variables tends to be consistent and in contrast, as we shall see below, to the more variable country level picture. Essentially, racism, nationalism and European identity act as predicted on the dependent variable while the national pride hypothesis can be rejected. After a summary of these raw findings, in the remainder of the section I go on to interpret and explore the results using CLARIFY and a variety of other statistical approaches.

The raw aggregate level findings are that the main independent variables behave in a fairly consistent way in models 1a-1c in table 6.3. Hypothesis 1 and 5 concerning Europeaness and racism respectively are confirmed, while hypothesis 3 treating nationalism is confirmed for models 1a-1b. Both cultural and political pride are positively related to support for integration, so that we can reject hypothesis 2[7]. The models themselves fit the data reasonably well, each one correctly predicting at least 75% of cases in the samples, while the χ^2 statistic is strongly significant in each instance. As a simple check on the validity of the dependent variable I repeat the aggregate level analysis taking as dependent variable question (42) measuring respondents' desires to either unite fully or preserve one's country's independence from the EU. Despite the different question wording and absence of date from Germany and Sweden the results are fairly similar; increasing levels of political pride are associated with a greater likelihood to support greater unity with the EU, while the opposite is true for higher levels of racism. The cultural pride and nationalism variables are not statistically significant.

[7] In chapter seven I construct a model to measure non-attitudes using EB 42. Replacing the non-attitudes dependent variable with a modified version of question (3) to exclude all but pro and anti-integration sentiments but otherwise changing nothing from the model outlined in detail in section 7.5., the variable measuring national pride is positive, and significantly related to support for integration. The variable measuring European identity is also positively related to support, while the racism variable is strongly negatively related to support for integration. So, to the extent that the EB 42 survey measures the central concepts of pride, identity and racism (see section 7.5.3.) the results in this section are all confirmed.

Reflecting on the rejection of hypothesis 2, it appears that pride in one's country and support for Europe are linked positively. How might one reconcile these findings with those in table 5.12. that treat political and cultural pride and nationalism as part of the same factor, where nationalism is clearly linked with lower EU support? Moreover, from section 5.4.1. and 5.4.2. we see that cultural pride and nationalism can be explained by similar socio-demographic factors. The explanation may lie in the fact that nationalism loads most heavily onto the 'nation' factor extracted in table 5.12. Political and cultural pride are surely necessary yet not sufficient conditions for nationalist attitudes, and it may be that this relationship is reflected in the factor loadings.

Unlike for nationalism, it may be that political and cultural pride are based on a flexible sense of national identity. Returning to some of the arguments raised in section 4.4., the link between pride and support for integration has an interesting parallel in the work of Risse *et al.* (1999). These authors argue that pro-European changes in citizens' identities often find their outlet in attitudes towards national or regional symbols and institutions. That is, since individuals hold multiple identities, one does not expect to find the emergence of a common European identity overcoming national identities, but rather the evolution of collective European identities in addition to and strongly related with nation-state and regional identities. Thus for pro-European citizens one would expect to see a realignment of their existing national or regional identities towards Europe. Perhaps the clearest example of this phenomenon might be the increased propensity in some countries for European Union flags to appear alongside their national counterparts on public building and so forth. This implies a more dynamic, two-way causality than that shown here. However, one might well suppose that these identity changes might take place over a long period. The single time period data used here cannot tell us if the link between pride and integration is recent or longstanding, and hence whether it reflects the changes in nation-state identities so meticulously tracked by Risse *et al.*

If we assume that national pride and nationalism share a fixed conception of national identity, the positive link between pride and support might be explained by the system legitimacy dimension to pride (see section 4.4. and 5.4.1.) Anderson (1998; see also section 3.4.) demonstrates a link between satisfaction with democracy and support for integration,

although this is contested by Sánchez-Cuenca (2000). Moreover, table 5.12. offers evidence of a system legitimacy dimension only to political pride and not to cultural pride. In summary, then, the finding that pride and support are linked resonates with the work of some theorists, although there is not the conclusive empirical evidence available to give a firm explanation to the phenomenon.

Continuing with the model analysis, one can attempt to gauge the overall explanatory power of the key independent variables by noting the effect of their inclusion on the logit model. In table 6.4. below I present three logit models, the first with only the country dummies included, followed by a second model with the main independent variables added. Finally, I run the standard logit model 1a, so that I can successively judge the impact of the country dummies, the main independent variables and the controls on the explanatory power of the model. To allow one to compare the log likelihood results between models, I keep the number of cases constant between models by excluding those cases not included in model 1a, which would 'naturally' include the fewest cases. Using this approach, one can also attempt to see how successfully the main independent variables explain away inter-country differences in support. After all, the findings in the literature that did most to stimulate interest in the variables studied here were those in section 3.5. concerning national traditions, where several authors found that, after controlling for a number of utilitarian explanations of support, sizeable country differences in support remained. This technique is especially pertinent given that the ISSP data do not allow us to directly test European identity, pride *et al.* using the same variable list taken by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993; 2000), and Gabel (1995; 1998) in section 3.5. So, the only variable coefficients reported along with the model summary statistics are the country dummies.

Table 6.4. 1995 ISSP Independent variable impact on country dummies

	Country dummies		Country dummies + main variables		Model 1a.	
	b	*Odds ratio*	B	*Odds ratio*	B	*Odds ratio*
Germany	0.90 *	2.46	1.02 *	2.78	1.05 **	2.85
	(0.09)		(0.12)		(0.15)	
Great Britain	0.14	1.15	0.42 *	1.52	0.33 *	1.39
	(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.16)	
Austria	-0.18	0.84	-0.32	0.73	-0.29	0.75
	(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.21)	
Italy	2.15 *	8.61	3.12 *	22.69	2.99 **	19.82
	(0.11)		(0.14)		(0.15)	
Ireland	2.28 *	9.77	2.09 *	8.09	2.30 **	10.00
	(0.40)		(0.41)		(0.42)	
Netherlands	1.36 *	3.91	1.24 *	3.47	1.20 **	3.30
	(0.18)		(0.20)		(0.22)	
Sweden	-0.09	0.91	0.12	1.13	0.02	1.02
	(0.20)		(0.22)		(0.25)	
Number of Cases	4990		4990		4990	
Log Likelihood	-2593.22		-2297.10		-2284.57	
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	618.34 (7)		1210.58 (17)		1236.65 (25)	
Pseudo R^2	0.11		0.21		0.21	

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

It is clear the five dependent variables are good predictors of support compared to the other variables included in the model: the increase in log likelihood between the country dummy only and country dummy + main variables models is much larger than between the country dummy + main variables model and model 1a, so that a chi-squared test of the log likelihood ratio between model 1a and the main variables model is only just significant at the 0.05 level.

Switching focus to inter-country differences in support, the inclusion of the explanatory variables in the second model seem if anything to have increased the coefficients for the four statistically significant country dummies in the first model. However, given that the inclusion of the key independent variables improves the overall model, I suggest that the perseverance of these significant coefficients can be explained by the more or less equal effect of nationalism *et al.* on each country, so that the relative differences in support still remain. In the case of Great Britain, controlling for the key independent variables even serves to reveal a significant country dummy coefficient that was not apparent before[8].

Given that the inclusion of the main independent variable improves the explanatory power of the model, I shift my attention to presenting in a clear fashion the strength of effect of these main logit coefficients. In figure 6.2. below I present a clear, crude overview of the coefficients derived by modelling weighted individual independent variables one at a time against the dependent variable at the aggregate level, and with no control variables included. All things considered, it would appear that the European identity variable has the strongest impact on support, followed by racism and then nationalism, while the impact of political and cultural pride is the slightest of the variables.

[8] The dummy variable coefficients are calculated with reference to the omitted variable, in this case Spain. However, altering the omitted country variable does not substantially change the findings.

Figure 6.2. 1995 ISSP Individual Impact of Independent Variables on Support for Integration at the Aggregate Level



Photo: Sundial, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico di Fiesole

To provide a more intuitive measure of independent variable impact, one can translate logit regression coefficients into probabilities by adopting the simulation methodology of King *et al.* (1998) outlined in section 5.4.1. As previously noted, this method of simulating the expected values or probabilities of the dependent variable makes for a more intuitive measure of the real world impact of the coefficients than, say, the expected log odds of a nationalist being in favour of integration calculable from figure 6.2. above.

I proceed by setting the characteristics of an average respondent and varying one-by-one those independent variables of interest to us here. I begin by selecting model 1a on the grounds of its relative simplicity and because it includes all eight countries. The categorical nature of the countries considered as a whole makes selecting a modal value meaningless and I remove all country dummies from model 1a. I then set age, sex, education, religion and the ISEI occupation variables to their modal values, giving a *40-49 year old female, Roman Catholic respondent, with an incomplete secondary school education*[9]. As more or less continuous variables, I set political and cultural pride, European identity, nationalism,

[9] For the principal ISEI occupation variable, the mean and the mode is 43.5 (see section 5.2.6.). The occupation coding is such that several jobs are numbered either 43 or 44, such as Firefighters, Bookkeepers, Foremen and Airline stewardesses (Ganzeboom, Treiman and Leeuw, 1992). So, in this instance, there is no single, 'average' job that can be imputed to the imaginary respondent in the reference model. As a secondary, related point, I assume that the farmer and ISEI dummies are set to 0.

minority nationalism and racism to their means, while I assume that the average respondent is not Basque, Catalan, Scottish or Welsh. Whereas in the previous chapter I made do with increasing the main independent variables by one standard deviation and tabulating the results, here I vary by small increments each of the variables individually, and plot probability and 95% confidence intervals against the variable score. In addition, I mark with a circle those data points that represent a one standard deviation shift either side of the mean independent variable score. Where the mean is not more or less 0 (-0.65 for figure 6.5. and 2.55 for figure 6.6.), this data point too is marked on the *x*-axis. Above the circle and confidence intervals marking the standard deviation shift in either direction from the mean, I add the accompanying percentage change in support between the two data points. This allows one to swiftly see the effect of a change in the independent variable on support. We can see the results in figures 6.3.-6.7. below. All the data points are statistically significant, and make use of aggregate weighted data.

Figure 6.3. Probability of Support Integration by Political Pride Score (1995 ISSP)



Figure 6.4. Probability of Supporting Integration by Cultural Pride Score (1995 ISSP)



Figure 6.5. Probability of Supporting Integration by European Identity Score (1995 ISSP)



Figure 6.6. Probability of Supporting Integration by Nationalism Score (1995 ISSP)



Figure 6.7. Probability of Supporting Integration by Racism Score (1995 ISSP)



The five charts show unequivocally that national pride and relative Europeanness are linked with higher support for European integration, while nationalism and racism lower support. We can see from the graph slope and the percentage change in support resulting from a standard deviation change in pride that the effect of political and cultural pride on support is rather similar. Relative Europeanness has the strongest effect on support of all the variables. As expected, relative Europeanness and support for integration are extremely closely related: there is no discrepancy between feeling European and supporting the European Union, brought on by, say, frustration with the actual institutional working of the EU. Turning to nationalism and racism, the percentage change in support from a standard deviation change in the independent variable is similar in each case, as well as being roughly the same as the equivalent figures for political and cultural pride.

As well as discussing the standard deviation changes in the independent variables, one can see clearly that the linearity of the variable slopes differs (compare, for instance, figure 6.6. with figure 6.7.). Of course, the log linear regression model will lead to a non-linear pattern in the x variable when plotted against the y variable. Nevertheless, we can see that non-linearity is most marked for European identity and racism, and less marked for national pride and nationalism. For European identity, the effect on support of extremists of both pro and anti European persuasions is relatively stronger than respondents with opinions closer to the mean. For racism, only extreme racists have a stronger effect on support than respondents closer to the mean.

Another interpretation of the figures above concerns the variation in responses for a one standard deviation change in support either side of the mean. That is, in figure 6.6. a one standard deviation shift in nationalism covers almost the entire response spectrum, so that there is far less consensus amongst respondents than, say, concerning racism. So, it appears that there is considerable variation in nationalist attitudes relative to the other concepts. Certainly, this fits with the notion that nationalism is a quite contested concept; by contrast, even if there are a small number of extreme racists in many societies, most people do not share their views.

Turning to the minority nationalism variable, the results are a reversal to those reported in chapter five. That is, while minority nationalists were shown to be more likely to feel

relatively European than ordinary respondents, they are less likely to support European integration. For minority nationalists, there would appear to be some discrepancy between feeling European and supporting the European Union. Catalan respondents are the only exception to this rule, where overall they are very slightly more likely to support integration than normal respondents in two of the three models (model 1a -0.40 (Min. Nat. coef.) + 0.48 (Catalan coef.) = 0.08; combined coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 level).

In the previous chapter, the sociological foundations and the interrelationships between the five concepts on test were examined. In this chapter, measures of affective support are shown to be good predictors of attitudes towards the European Union. The hypotheses regarding nationalism, European identity and racism were confirmed, while increasing levels of political and cultural pride were both linked with rising support for the EU, so invalidating hypothesis 2. Racist attitudes and relative pro or anti-Europeanness seem to have the strongest impact on support, while the nationalism variable is notable for the high amount of variance. Of the minority states, the post-sovereignty discourse seems to inform the feelings of many Catalans towards Europe, while Basques seem more old-fashioned believers in the nation-state.

The only other successful investigation of overall 'affective' attitudes on support is conducted by Hewstone (1986). Here, the author demonstrates a positive relationship between affective support and European integration in aggregate level data from approximately 500 students sampled in the early 1980s from West Germany, France, Italy and the U.K. However, what Hewstone labels affective support is something of a misnomer in our context. The battery of eight questions used to construct this measure generally asks respondents about their willingness to make personal sacrifices for other European countries and confidence/trust in other countries and the EEC institutions (Hewstone, 1986, p. 165). This seems to measure only a rather mild form of attachment to Europe, and is perhaps closer to measures of system legitimacy (see section 4.4.). Certainly, Hewstone's measure of affective support is incapable of capturing strong identitative feelings such as nationalism. It would seem, then, that the findings presented herein are somewhat unique.

6.4.2. The Impact of Pride, European Identity, Nationalism and Racism on Support at the Country Level

We are able to view the country-specific permutations to the aggregate level results in table 6.3b. of the appendix. All the main independent variable coefficients, where significant, act in the same direction as the aggregate level and to this extent do not alter any of the findings from the preceding section (see also table 6.5.). However, while political pride, European identity and racism are significant for most of the eight countries, nationalism only achieves significance for Great Britain, and cultural pride is only significant in the Netherlands and Austria. In the remainder of this section, I shall try to shed light on any variations in variable performance on a country-by-country basis. However, I do this without attempting to exhaustively test any hypotheses that might exist in the scholarly literature concerning a particular country's relationship with Europe. Rather the country summaries provide a quick overview of the findings and aim to raise some ideas that may in themselves be a boost to further research.

We can see the extent to which the country level findings support the aggregate results by considering table 6.5. Here, the coefficients for each independent variable at the country and at the aggregate level are reported (as taken from table 6.3. and 6.3b.).

Table 6.5. 1995 ISSP Aggregate and Country Level Findings in Comparison

Variables	Identity	Political Pride	Cultural Pride	Nationalism	Racism
Aggregate (Model 1a)	**0.46**	**0.49**	**0.21**	**-0.12**	**-0.64**
Germany	**0.40**	**0.43**	0.20	0.02	**-0.87**
GB	**0.60**	**0.89**	-0.37	**-0.52**	**-0.98**
Austria	**0.67**	**1.06**	**0.56**	-0.03	**-0.71**
Italy	0.19	-0.01	0.21	-0.05	**-0.69**
Ireland	-0.28	**0.88**	0.49	-0.36	**-1.42**
Netherlands	**0.64**	**0.50**	**0.37**	0.02	-0.26
Spain	**0.42**	**1.14**	0.29	-0.12	-0.35
Sweden	**0.83**	**0.48**	0.27	-0.21	-0.25

Significant coefficients at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) or better are highlighted in bold

From table 6.4. we already know that the main independent variables are good predictors of support compared to the other variables included in the model. This table makes clear that for most of the variables there is remarkable consistency between countries: identity, political and cultural pride have a positive coefficient for seven of eight countries, the racism coefficient is always negative and the nationalism coefficient is negative in six of eight cases. Given this impressive consistency between country coefficients, I am curious to see whether insignificant coefficients that are not too close to zero are generally paired with small sample sizes. In fact, the number of respondents who are very culturally proud or racist is often rather low[10]. However, it is hard to draw any conclusions from these figures, as they are scarcely different from those for the political pride and European identity, for which most coefficients are statistically significant. For nationalism the variable is split into quartiles, so

[10] I identify respondents with high levels of cultural pride and racism by referring not to the variable generated from factor analysis but rather an attitude scale constructed from questions (21)-(24) and (32)-(37) respectively. Respondents who score 13+/16 for cultural pride and 24+/30 are deemed to be very cultural proud or racist (see footnote 28 from chapter 5 for more detailed information on this method).

we know in advance that low sample size will not be a problem for more nationalist respondents.

Interpreting the findings from table 6.5. we see that for all countries except *Italy* political pride is positively and significantly related to support for integration, this is only true for cultural pride in *Austria* and the *Netherlands*. While it is not immediately apparent why cultural pride is only significant for these two countries, I note that for the remainder of the countries save *Great Britain* the cultural pride coefficient is at least positive, if insignificant. This negative, insignificant cultural pride coefficient for Great Britain is not anomalous if one considers that Britain is the only country in which nationalist attitudes are significant. Could it be that pride in sport, history, the armed forces and so forth may have acquired nationalist connotations in Britain, just as has pride in one's currency (see section 6.2.3.)? Moreover, the finding that nationalism is only significant in Great Britain shows that, for *Austria* and *Sweden*, both relatively new entrants to the European Union in 1995 and with extremely low levels of support for membership, nationalism would not seem like the decisive factor in explaining support. At least for Sweden, the decisive factor is surely the debate over welfare state reform (see section 6.4.4.).

Italy is the only country in which neither political nor cultural pride is significant. For what it is worth, the political pride coefficient is even slightly negative. We have seen in section 5.2.3. that for Italy mean levels of political pride are far below the average, while mean levels of cultural pride are above average. It is tempting, if a little presumptuous, to suggest that cultural pride acts as a substitute in some way for political pride, with Italians defining themselves more in terms of their cultural and sporting achievements that in their political institutions. Secondly, being strongly pro-integration, as many Italians indubitably are, does not seem to rule out some respondents linking racism and integration (for further evidence see Hewstone, 1986, p. 154). Indeed, one might even suppose that European integration, perhaps through a resultant increase in the freedom of movement of persons, has increased racist attitudes. From section 5.4.4., both racist and nationalist attitudes in Italy were at least partially linked to Catholicism. However, in both Germany and Ireland high support for integration is also juxtaposed with a role for racist attitudes, where Catholicism was not shown to be a factor. In the case of *Ireland*, it would seem that even if average levels of

racism are extremely low (see figure 5.6.), those respondents who are racist are extremely virulent in their opinions.

Sweden and *Italy* are the only countries in the survey where minority nationalism is significant. The coefficient is strongly negative in both cases: for Italy the anti-integration minority nationalists in question might be Lega Nord or perhaps the rather less numerous real national minorities in Italy, in Trentino-Alto Adige, Val d'Aosta and Fruili-Venezia-Giulia. In the case of Sweden, the only minority nationalist voter block would seem to be the Scanians (see section 5.4.2.). These findings are somewhat surprising, given that from table 5.8b we can see that Italian, Swedish (and German) minority nationalists tend to be pro-European. One possible explanation for a pro-European, but anti-integration point of view is dissatisfaction with the current institutional arrangements or direction of the EU. This points to a possible question-wording effect, as minority nationalists, who are pro-European generally, feel unable to see integration as benefiting their country whilst their minority nations have still not achieved statehood. However, without a further in-depth analysis of minority nationalism in the ISSP survey it is hard to come to firm conclusions on this point. Secondly, it is perhaps surprising that minority nationalism is not significant in Great Britain or Spain, where the distinct national minorities in the two countries originally lead to the inclusion of the minority nationalism variable in the first place. However, the dummy variables for Catalonia and the Basque country do achieve significance in the aggregate level model, suggesting that while the difference in support derived from residing in either of these regions is not significant within Spain, where support for the EU is fairly lukewarm (see figure 6.1.), at the EU level this difference does become significant. Because support in Spain is relatively low at around 55% (see figure 6.1.), the significance of the country dummies at the aggregate level might come from the lower level of variance at the aggregate level, where support is around 71%.

So, at the country level there is a remarkable degree of directional consistency between all the coefficients. On the other hand, racism, European identity and political pride tend to be significant far more frequently than cultural pride and nationalism, suggesting an 'inner' and 'outer' core of variables. Certainly at the aggregate level, racism and European identity seemed to have the strongest effect on support. We have also seen that minority nationalism has a negative effect on support in Italy and Sweden, quite the opposite to its impact on

European identity in section 5.4.2. Again for Italy, as well as Ireland and Germany, a pro-integration stance is not incompatible with often quite strong racist attitudes amongst segments the population. Great Britain appears the most nationalist country in the sample, where these attitudes might even have spilt over into cultural pride.

6.4.3. Aggregate Level Control Variables

At the aggregate level those control variables that are most use in explaining support for integration seem to be age, sex, occupation, and some strands of political affiliation. In addition, it is interesting to note those hypotheses disproved by the ISSP data, notably sections of Inglehart's post-modernism enterprise and the impact of farmers on support

Occupation (ISEI score) is the most consistently significant control variable in the aggregate dataset. From the ISEI occupational index described in section 5.2.6., support increases with job status, so that a rise on the scale from the mean (43.5) to the top category (90 - Judges) results in a hefty rise in the likelihood of supporting integration (an increase of approximately 90% at around 2% for each unit). Excepting model 1a, the dummy variable is insignificant, suggesting that there is no difference in support between those who declare an occupation and those respondents who do not declare an occupation, possibly because there are not participating in the labour force. One should remember, however, in interpreting this variable that data is available only for Germany, Austria, Spain and Ireland: for other countries the missing data is coded as the mean score.

Age and sex both hold positive, significant coefficients in models 1b and 1c. Older, male voters tend to be more pro-integration. We can use this information to reject Inglehart's two hypotheses recounted in section 3.4.; that younger generations will be more pro-European both because of the link between affluence and education, which leads to higher levels of political skills, and because of post-war socialisation against nationalism. However, because the ISSP survey is conducted over only one time period, it is not possible to distinguish between cohort or life cycle differences in support for integration. Another hypothesis that can be rejected on the basis of the ISSP data is the hostility of farmers to integration, where the variable in question is insignificant in models 1a-1c.

Political affiliation has a fairly marked impact on support for integration, with respondents categorised as far left or 'other' being significantly more anti-European in model 1b with respect to leftists, who comprise the omitted category. Indeed, in model 1c all coefficients except right-wing support are significant and negative. However, it should be born in mind that by switching the omitted variable we can show that left-wing respondents are the most pro-European category of respondents, hence the tendency for other political affiliation categories to show negative coefficients[11]. Given the pro-European tendency of left-wing respondents, these findings can be taken as cautious support for a difference between left and right wing respondents towards European integration. At least in 1995, then, the left-right wing divide is not obsolete in understanding support for integration (for a different view see Hix (1994) in section 3.4.). Moreover, the findings also tend to support research based on Eurobarometer surveys from 1975-1992 by Gabel, who demonstrates a negative link between support for integration and electoral support for anti-system political parties (see section 3.3.). It may also be the case that support for far right parties can be seen as a proxy for racism, so that the findings could be used in support of hypotheses 4. Certainly, table 5.10 in section A.3. of the appendix shows that right-wing respondents are more likely to be racist. So, these results can be imputed to the aggregate level with the proviso that data for Italy is missing. Briefly turning to subjective social class, working class respondents are less supportive of integration with respect to the omitted category, middle-class respondents. There is no similar relationship between lower class respondents and support.

6.4.4. Country Level Control Variables

Section 6.4.3. has already afforded us a glimpse into the country effects of control variables on support. Here I interpret the results from table 6.3b. in section A.4. of the appendix displaying support for integration models by country. Again, this is not an exercise in testing existent hypotheses but rather a summary and reflection on the available information.

[11] The rationale behind choosing left-wing respondents to comprise the omitted variable is the high number of respondents in this category, where for some categories there are often just a few or even no respondents.

For *Germany* the only significant control variables are age, sex and occupation. As noted in the section above, although it is clear that older people are more pro-EU, it is not clear whether this is a life cycle or cohort effect.

In *Italy* females are more likely to be pro-European than males, while the lower one's education, the more likely one is to support integration. It is hard to speculate as to the psychological processes at work behind these results, although one might speculate that the European Union is associated with increased employment for the low skilled or unemployed. Unfortunately, occupation data is not available for Italy to control for this effect and shed further light upon this notion.

Swedish data throw into doubt whether or not some aggregate level findings are not in fact country level findings. In certainly seems possible that the extremely strong impact of the far left and conservatives in *Sweden* could have influenced the reduced sample (models 1b-1c). The strong coefficients seem likely to have arisen from the debate over Union membership and the implications for welfare state reform in Sweden (Goldmann and Gilland, 2001). The coding of the ISSP survey means that the far left respondents who are so strongly anti-European are in fact Green party supporters. Supporters of the Conservative party are exceptionally pro-European, with a 139% increase in the likelihood of support for integration over respondents professing left party attachment. However, the opinions on integration for supporters of the Social Democratic party, categorised in the data as left-wing, which 33% of Swedish respondents felt closest to, as compared to 18% for the Conservatives and 4% for the Greens, was not significantly different to centrists or those with no professed party attachment. This may well reflect the internal dissent at the time within the ruling Social Democratic Party.

Spain is the only country in which farmers have a significant impact on support for integration. Farmers are far less likely to support integration than non-farmers. The two immediate questions that spring to mind are, why are farmers less likely to support integration, and why is this result only significant in Spain? One possible explanation, which would account for the farmer variable not being significant in the other countries surveyed, is the relative impact of the CAP in Mediterranean and northern European countries. Spain is the biggest olive oil producer in the world and, although recent reform to the olive oil sector

outside the framework of Agenda 2000 seems to have firmly linked subsidies to production, we know from section 3.3. that the CAP heavily prioritises northern European foodstuffs such as cereals over crops typically produced in the south of Europe. For instance, recent expenditure by the EAGGF on olive oil constitutes only 6.6% of total spending, while 43% is spent on arable crop support (Official Journal of the European Communities C 349, 1999, p. xii).

In summary, although the overall impact of the country level models is positive, as witnessed by the goodness-of-fit tests, the controls themselves do not an enormous amount to our understanding of support. Indeed, for Ireland, no control variables are significant. Looking at table 6.3b., one of the most striking factors is how many categories, especially for the categorical variables such as political affiliation and subjective social class are not available or highly insignificant. Aside from the high number of missing variables, it seems that for many categories there are simply not enough cases available. This is particularly evident for the extreme right and left political categories, as well as for upper class respondents. In these cases, the log-odds ratios are often very high, while the number of cases under consideration for each category often is in single figures. Of course, it may be that some controls that cannot be included here, especially testing utilitarian explanations of support, may have proved to be significant.

6.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have shown in this chapter how the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between pride, European identity, nationalism, racism and support is characterised neither by its depth nor by its robustness. Spurred on by this academic lacuna, I show that racism and nationalism are indeed negatively related to support for integration, whereas relative Europeanness and political and cultural pride are positively related to support. Except for national pride, these findings confirm the hypotheses constructed in chapter four. Aside from falsifying hypothesis 2, the political and cultural pride finding are in keeping with the work of Müller-Peters reviewed above. Moreover, the behaviour of pride could well be a manifestation of Risse *et al.*'s (1999) expectation that national identities adapt themselves in the face of changing perceptions of Europe.

Especially at the country level, the impact of European identity, political pride and racism tends to be more consistent and stronger than that of nationalism and cultural pride. Given the high percentage of Europeans who openly declare themselves to be racist (see section 6.2.5.) as compared to the fairly mild absolute levels of xenophobia in the ISSP survey (see figure 5.5.) perhaps it is the strength of racist rather than nationalist attitudes that are the main affective obstacle towards support for further integration between EU member states.

Although the control variables as a whole are shown not to add a great deal of explanatory power to our model, age, sex, political affiliation and occupation are the most relatively powerful controls explaining support. However, as with the key independent variables, there are often a number of country level alternations to this picture. Although I did not set out to test other explanations of support for integration, it is nevertheless easily notable that some popular theories of support are not confirmed by the analysis. Farmers are not seen to hold different views of integration compared to other respondents, while the fact that support tends to increase with age tends to act against Inglehart's notion that younger generations will be more pro-integration.

Caveats to these results include the lack of (especially economic) control variables, and to this we can add the lack of comparison over different time periods that is a particular strength of the Eurobarometer surveys. We might also add the opinions may well have changed since 1995, the date of the execution of the survey. It is to be regretted that the ISSP survey does not include other European countries renowned to be jealous of sharing their sovereignty with Europe such as Denmark, or even such countries that have not joined the Union as yet where concerns over sovereignty might readily be seen as a reason why. On the other hand, for Austria and Sweden, both relatively new entrants to the European Union in 1995 and with extremely low levels of support for membership, nationalism would not seem like the decisive factor in explaining support.

7. NON-ATTITUDES TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

7.1. Chapter Aim and Summary

In this chapter I complete the analysis of public opinion towards European integration by focusing on non-attitudes.

I begin in section 7.2. with a summary of over fifty years of debate on public attitude-holding, largely concerning matters of foreign policy. The crux of this debate revolves around understanding whether much public opinion can be interpreted as stable, consistent and relevant to policy-makers. Although it is eminently useful in the light of earlier thesis chapters to examine theories that view public opinion as not entirely random and inconsistent, in this chapter the key point is to highlight those factors that explain so-called non-attitudes, where they can be shown to exist in public opinion data. I identify in the literature political knowledge, interest in politics, education and income as key explanatory factors. In sections 7.4. to 7.6. respectively I move on to formally hypothesise, model and then test the key explanatory factors for non-attitudes on aggregate and country-level data from Eurobarometer 42 (2^{nd} half 1994). I select Eurobarometer data above ISSP data for the simple reason that the latter survey does not allow one to directly test a definition of non-attitudes towards European integration. I also present an empirical *exposé* of the level of non-attitudes towards integration in Eurobarometer data in section 7.3. After all, if non-attitudes are not particularly pervasive our interest in them diminishes.

In summary, logit regression analysis shows non-attitudes to be negatively related to higher levels of the socio-demographic variables interest, knowledge and education. At least at the aggregate level, there is also a clear gender and age difference amongst respondents, with older males being more likely to hold an attitude than younger females. Interestingly, higher levels of national pride and European identity are also linked with a lower propensity to hold non-attitudes. Because higher levels of these variables are also associated with support for European integration, it seems that pride and identity may have a strong enough effect on respondents to 'convert' non-attitudes into positive support for integration.

7.2. A Theory of Non-Attitudes

Understanding the debate about the stability, structure and relevance of mass attitudes means first addressing two more-or-less polarised viewpoints: the so-called Almond-Lippmann consensus views public opinion as at best superficial, while the revisionist critique grants public attitudes more depth and structure. Between these two positions, authors such as Zaller (1992) and Delli Carpini *et al.* (1996) posit 'spur of the moment' mass attitude generation. Following Sinnott (2000), I make sense of these stances by viewing attitudes and non-attitudes not as a brutal dichotomy but rather as being located at either end of a real-to-random continuum. Although this conclusion helps to validate the public opinion findings from earlier chapters, I am more interested here in drawing out from the diverse approaches surveyed those factors responsible for encouraging mass attitude formation and, conversely, promoting non-attitudes. These factors include question-wording effects and levels of education, information and interest in politics amongst respondents.

The Almond-Lippmann consensus, for a long time the conventional wisdom concerning public foreign policy attitudes, broadly makes the case that public attitudes are so ill-informed, unstructured, unstable and irrelevant to policy-makers that they may as well be

described as 'non-attitudes'. As Holsti (1992) so well describes, the origin of this viewpoint lies in the conflict between the realist school of international relations and a more liberal-democratic tradition. According to a stream of thought that can be traced back to Bentham and Kant, and which was first embodied at a high political level by President Wilson, the foreign policies of democracies tend to be peaceful, at least in part because the public can play a constructive role in constraining leaders who might otherwise be tempted to yield to their war-making proclivities (Holsti, 1992, p. 440). Most memorably railing against this, first Lippmann and then Almond drew attention to the risks of trusting the public with such a role, especially in a nuclear age. Lippmann, writing as a journalist and political commentator, portrays the common man as neither sufficiently informed by the media nor, due to the daily requirements of earning a living, sufficiently interested to properly participate in foreign policy-making (1922). Supplementing this approach, on Almond's 'mood theory' public opinion is invariably indifferent to foreign policy issues and only responds to immediate threats (1950). With the pressure removed opinion tends to snap back and this 'moody' volatility in opinion was not interpreted as constructive to foreign policy formulation (Shapiro and Page, 1988, p. 212). The clear implication of this volatility is that policy-makers can and should ignore mass opinion.

For a long time, the definitive empirical contribution to the study of mass beliefs was provided by Converse, where on the basis of American Panel Study data from the 1950s the author showed that as many as 80% of Americans were without attitudes on important issues of the day. Specifically, Converse hypothesised that as one moves down from elite sources of belief systems the quality and range of information held by people decreases. As a consequence, the character of the objects in a belief system shifts from the more abstract to the increasingly simple, the range of belief systems become narrower and 'constraint' declines[1]. Coupled with the psychological predisposition of respondents to

[1] Constraint is taken to mean the interdependence that exists between different attitudes. For instance, there is a logical constraint on attitudes concerning public spending and taxation. Other constraints might be loosely ideological or social, and require internal consistency. Dynamic constraints refer to the probability that a change in belief about an object would require some compensating change in attitudes elsewhere in an actor's belief system. Lack of information fuels lack of constraint, so that amongst the mass public one finds a narrow cluster of ideas amongst which little, even

attempt to conceal their ignorance rather than admit they do not understand an issue (see also Rossi, Wright and Anderson, 1983, p. 212), the result is that people tend to offer meaningless opinions that vary randomly in direction during repeated trials over time (Converse in Apter, 1964, p. 245). These opinions are characterised by Converse as 'non-attitudes' as opposed to true attitudes. So, the conventional viewpoint brings out the insight that random 'non-attitudes' or moody, volatile responses arise because the average citizen is simply not interested or informed enough to possess well thought-out attitudes towards foreign policy. In addition, Converse recognises that information is perhaps only an intermediate variable in explaining non-attitudes. Prior to this factors such as education, implicit in his ordering of belief systems from elite to mass levels, as well as specialised interests and tastes are seen as important (Converse in Apter, 1964, p. 212-3).

Converse's work has provoked many responses both from a methodological and more theoretical standpoint. Underpinning Converse's empirical results is the Black-White model, which makes the rather strong assumption that the population can be divided into two sharply contrasting subsets: a minority proportion of the population giving exactly the same response over time (in practise a period of many years), and a majority submitting random responses. A number of other methodological criticisms have been attached to this model, including the measurement of stability over time and concerns over the effect of question wording (see, for example, Achen, 1975 and Brooks, 1994). Some authors, while accepting as legitimate Converse's focus on whether citizens have attitudes towards a subject in the first place, attempt to shift the debate towards a more realistic understanding of public involvement in politics than that afforded by the Black-White model. As Converse acknowledges, the Black-White model leaves no room for the 'grey' area of meaningful change of position or 'conversion' (Converse in Apter, 1964, p. 243). Brooks floats the idea of a 'selectively' political citizen, where non-attitudes are less a function of issue complexity and lack of information than the current interests and concerns of an individual. As an adjunct to this argument, some theorists

logical, constraint is felt. Opinions may be inconsistent, subject to change and less responsive to objectively relevant information.

have labelled the 1950s a particularly quiet historical period, marking the 'end of ideology' (Holsti, 1992, p. 458). Compared then with the turbulent 1960s, the prevalence of non-attitudes is unsurprising.

Another more nuanced effort to understanding attitude formation is set out by Hurwitz and Peffley (1987; 1992; see also Wittkopf in Munton and Rattinger, 1991). With a nod to the social psychological approaches covered in section 4.3. respondents are viewed as cognitive misers who rely on information shortcutting strategies or cognitive heuristics in an attempt to improve on their limited capacities (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987, p. 1103)[2]. Paucity of information held by the public on matters of foreign policy, which the authors at no point challenge, is less an illustration of non-attitudes but rather of simplification to aid understanding. In common with stereotyping, then, lack of knowledge assumes a certain rationality. The result is that while constraint might not be found at the level of specific and immediate issues, US foreign policy opinions are often stable where they can be related to an underlying, abstract value. There is a further parallel here with Easton's understanding of diffuse and specific support outlined in section 2.2.2., where survey questions that tap into diffuse support are seen as less likely to give volatile responses. Indeed, we can see from figure 2.1. that question (1), which asks respondents if they support European integration in the most general terms, registers a far higher and more stable level of support than question (4), which focuses on a more specific measure of support (see figure 2.6.). So, the lesson here is that the less a question requires a predefined level of knowledge and the more it taps into a respondent's value-system, the more stable responses we can expect.

An alternative tack is a focus on the reasonableness of aggregate rather than individual level public opinion. Shapiro and Page use data from over 6000 survey questions posed over the period 1935-1982 by five major survey organisations to argue that aggregate measures of US foreign and domestic policy opinion have been remarkably stable over

[2] A similar approach is advanced by Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock (1991). These authors also accept in a head-on way the information-deficiencies of the public, but argue the public can still arrive at reasoned opinions . According to their education and levels of information and awareness, members of the public reason with the aid of a variety of more or less sophisticated heuristical, or shortcutting, techniques.

time, so that of the 20% of questions that were asked more than once well over half showed less than a modest 6% shift in responses from one period to another (1988). Where public opinion does change more sharply, or even reverses over a short period of time, Shapiro and Page place the data in a historical context to suggest that these changes have generally has been the result of the incorporation of new information. For instance, the sharp decrease in public support for the Vietnam War in 1968 is placed in the context of the increasingly successful progress of the Tet offensive (1988, p.234). Certainly, the Eurobarometer findings in section 2.3. would seem to bear out the point that, at the aggregate level, opinions can be rather stable. However, Shapiro and Page's argument rests on the assumption that much individual-level instability cancels itself out at the aggregate level, the corollary of this being that at the individual level, on which this chapter is focused, instability remains. So, this approach cannot be used to address the all-important question of why and how individuals change their minds on an issue[3]. The revisionist approach, then, although it challenges the Almond-Lippmann consensus, builds on its insights into the causes of non-attitudes. There is, for instance, no opposition to the idea that the public is poorly informed about foreign affairs, nor that *ceteris paribus* a better informed public would make for more stable opinion (Holsti, 1992, p. 447). In common with the conventional approach, political knowledge and education levels are seen as promoting attitude holding, while the work of Hurwitz and Peffley focuses our attention on whether the question posed is more abstract or specific.

The most recent wave of theorising has painted the distinction between attitudes and non-attitudes as a somewhat false dichotomy by arguing that the notion of attitude stability is a fuzzy one. That is, the search for some underlying 'true attitude' is mistaken; people rather possess a "series of partially independent and often inconsistent ones" (Zaller, 1992, p. 93; see also Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1996, p. 229). This is based on a revised understanding of individuals as 'ideologically inconsistent', where there is no reason to

[3] A further caveat to Shapiro and Page's work is that the public seems to react just as readily to biased as unbiased information. The authors declare themselves agnostic over whether public opinion changes are a response to false or correct information. Moreover, many opinion changes were seemingly taken on cues from political leaders, implying that the public can be manipulated. Evidently this leads to a picture of the public as only so sophisticated.

suppose that just because a person might feel, say, pro-abortion the same individual need not feel comfortable with killing foetuses (Zaller, 1992, p. 93). Even if one feels that this is rather an example of two different aspects to the same policy issue where views need not coincide, the implications are the same; individuals are very sensitive to survey question wording and context, which might explain response variability even for identically worded questions[4]. In the same vein, Zaller argues that opinions can be constructed on the spot during an interview, and that such a construction need not necessarily be random (Zaller, 1992, p. 33). Delli Carpini *et al.* concur with this position, and go on to argue that knowledge is the key explanatory factor in determining the quality of opinions. The authors posit that the link between opinions, attitudes and values is facilitated by knowledge, or accurate beliefs, so that the opinions of better-informed citizens should be more consistent (Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1996, p. 236). Moreover, more knowledgeable citizens will be able to parse new information more consistently with their values and possess opinions on a wider range of subjects. The authors provide a wide range of evidence from the US to show that a higher level of knowledge is a strong predictor of opinion structure, stability, responsiveness to new information and *opinionation* - that is, the number of issues on which the respondent provides an opinion rather than a 'Don't Know' response (Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1996, p. 230-7).

The first conclusion from these successive waves of theorising is that, with the appropriate caveats, opinions can be held to be representative of underlying attitudes. However, rather than make an 'either/or' declaration for each opinion, the issue of 'true attitudes' versus 'non-attitudes' can be seen as a matter of degree (Sinnott, 2000, p. 116). One might imagine a continuum with 'non-attitudes' at one extreme and 'true attitudes' at the other. Secondly, those factors which appear in the literature to have most hold over individual attitude-holding include the level of an individual's knowledge, an individual's

[4] Zaller and others have also focused in more detail on survey design by criticising the non-attitudes thesis as arising specifically out of measurement error. Indeed, as Zaller points out, where measurement 'error' typically constitutes one-half to three-quarters of the variance of opinion items in empirical studies, one wonders if this is not rather a euphemism for 'unexplained variance' (1992, p. 32). Chief amongst the potential causes of this variance are question-wording effects and response effects such as the race of the interviewer that distort respondents' essentially stable attitudes (see also Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991). However, these effects may be offset in surveys measuring levels of knowledge by guessing, which acts to overstate individuals' levels of knowledge (Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1996, p. 66).

interest in politics, an individual's level of education, question-wording and the abstractness of the question. I follow up on these findings by hypothesising on individual non-attitude formation in section 7.4. Finally, the discussion of non-attitudes throws new light on the permissive consensus discussed in section 1.3.2. and 2.4. To the extent that the public holds non-attitudes towards integration, the notion of European publics consciously abiding by a permissive consensus towards European integration becomes more and more untenable.

7.3. Non-Attitudes Amongst the European Publics

Because much of the theory and evidence concerning non-attitudes comes from discussions surrounding US foreign policy, often centred on the Cold War, one might legitimately ask whether all this is applicable to the European Union. Despite the methodological problems associated with measuring non-attitudes in the Eurobarometer and ISSP data, the evidence suggests that non-attitudes towards European integration are a widespread phenomenon.

From a theoretical perspective, one might argue that non-attitudes towards European integration are of more relevance than non-attitudes towards US foreign policy. Even if as, say, a liberal democrat one believes that the public should play an important role in foreign policy, and many people do not hold this view, the reality has often been that the public has been marginalized in such matters (Holsti, 1992, p. 454). On the other hand, the steady expansion of the European Union has meant that, over the decades, the importance of public opinion has assumed a degree of centrality in the integration process. One need only think of the frequency of domestic referenda on EU treaties and the increased role played by a directly elected European Parliament (see section 1.4.). Indeed, on the understanding of some authors, the EU is best conceived as a domestic-politics system, with a concomitant promotion in the importance of the role played by public opinion (Hix, 1994).

While non-attitudes might be thought of as especially relevant to the study of European integration, their measurement is not particularly straightforward. There is little controversy over exactly what a non-attitude is; essentially an opinion, or lack of opinion, which indicates the absence of an underlying attitude in a respondent. However, we have seen how in practise attitudes and non-attitudes are best viewed as a continuum. The implications are that making a judgement on non-attitudes involves considering all the factors that might affect attitude holding, and accepting a loss of certainty in the final result. Having said this, the aggregate level empirical data would seem to bear out Shapiro and Page's point that opinions can be rather stable (1988). To illustrate this, I reproduce below Eurobarometer question (1).

Figure 7.1. Question (1) – Support (EU 10) (EB 1978-1997)



Unfortunately, as already noted in the previous section, aggregate findings cannot shed light on the individual level picture and are ultimately not useful in this context. The two principal survey series used in this thesis, the Eurobarometer and ISSP National Identity studies, obviously provide individual level data. However, identifying non-attitudes is far from straightforward as for many survey questions regarding attitudes towards integration

it is unclear whether non-attitudes or simple indecision is being measured. For instance, question (4), which is used in the ISSP National Identity and Eurobarometer survey contains no response category that one could definitely point to as capturing non-attitudes.

(4) "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?"

Respondents who do not wish to state that their country 'Benefits' or 'Does Not Benefit' from being a member of the EU can respond that they have 'Never Heard of the EU' or that they 'Don't Know'. While only very small percentages of respondents, typically less than 2% in each EU country, confess to having never heard of the EU, for Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 'Don't Know' is the second highest response category (see figure 7.2. below). The uncertainty over whether the 'Don't Know' category measures indecision or non-attitudes means that I categorise these responses 'non-committed' rather than non-attitudes, and is the reason why I do not use ISSP data in the statistical analysis of non-attitudes that follows in sections 7.5. to 7.6.

Figure 7.2. Non-Committed Attitudes in the 1995 ISSP Data



As regards the Eurobarometer survey series, from section 2.2.4. we can see that questions (1) and (5) do not even include a 'neutral' response category, leaving just questions (2) and (3) amongst the frequently posed questions on respondents' attitudes towards European integration. For question (2), respondents can evaluate their country's membership of the EU as a 'good thing', a 'bad thing' or as 'neither good nor bad'.

(2) "Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership in the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?"

Because the wording of this final category asks respondents to evaluate the good and bad points to integration, this would imply a more reasoned sort of indifference to integration, so that the 'No Reply' category for this question might well capture non-attitudes. On the other hand, for question (3) respondents are asked whether they would be 'very sorry', 'relieved' or 'indifferent' were the EU scrapped.

(3) "If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?"

I argue that in this case the indifferent category is not a reasoned form of 'non-committed' attitude, this form of evaluation can be largely attributed to the 'don't know' category, but instead captures the feeling of not caring about the EU. Because I am only able to make the theoretical and not empirical case that indifference measures non-attitudes rather than non-committed attitudes, this risk must remain an as important caveat to the results. Figures 7.3. and 7.4. display non-attitudes as identified in questions (2) and (3) respectively.

Figure 7.3. Question (2) – EU 10 (EB 1973-1993) (Formerly Figure 2.2.)



Figure 7.4. Question (3) – EU 12 (EB 1985-1995)



Figure 7.3. suggests that non-attitudes have been running at a modest 5-10% over the lifetime of the question. However, in figure 7.4. indifferent responses typically form the second highest response category over time or a stable 40% of responses. Indeed,

indifference was the most common response for the whole of 1984, and has been only a few percentage points behind positive support over the lifetime of the question. One might explain the difference between the two questions by noting that question (3) is a more explicit measure of non-attitudes, with the indifference response category being included in the main question wording. Moreover, the rather emotionally charged wording of the 'sorry' and 'relieved' response categories might have channelled respondents towards an 'indifferent' response. It is, after all, very possible to be in favour of the EU without being emotionally attached to it. With regard to question (2), the wording is a little more abstract than question (3), where we expect questions that tap into core values to have lower levels of non-attitudes (see section 7.2.). Overall, however, these two questions provide evidence of significant levels of non-attitudes since the 1970s. A further, incidental, observation again regards the permissive consensus introduced in sections 1.3.2. and 2.4. On the graphical evidence presented in this section, non-attitudes towards European integration extend back several decades, throwing into even further doubt the existence of any permissive consensus.

The equation of indifference with non-attitudes as outlined above is a clear departure from Converse's approach to non-attitudes, which measures those respondents that hold (unstable) opinions on a particular topic but no underlying attitude. This is a result of the methodological approach taken here: the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys do not contain panel data. I argue that in this particular instance this alternative, indifference approach to measuring non-attitudes does not have major implications for the interpretation of the results of the analysis below. Underlying the indifference approach is the assumption that respondents with no expressed opinion on a given subject hold no underlying attitude. Although this might not be an appropriate assumption in opinion polls concerning voting behaviour for extremist parties (see, for instance, Breen, 2000) I do not believe that there are any reasons for respondent insincerity on the issue at hand here. On the other hand, treating only indifferent responses as non-attitudes means discarding those positive or negative opinions that in fact do not correspond to an underlying attitude. I would argue that including the indifference category in the main question (3) ensures that a high proportion of non-attitudes are captured in this response category:

tables 7.3. and 7.4. make plain the contrastingly small number of indifferent responses to question (2). As a second point, while it may be the case that the indifference approach fails to capture some Converse-style non-attitudes, it is equally true that Converse's approach cannot account for non-attitude holders with no corresponding opinion. So, both approaches have their weaknesses but the key point is both tap non-attitude holders. Whether it is better to do this through a focus on opinion holders or non-opinion holders does not seem clear *a priori* and this is not a question I attempt to answer here.

In fact, Sinnott makes an original attempt to demonstrate Converse-style non-attitudes in EB 49 (1998). Responding to the rather involved question "The European Union should have a common defence and security policy" Sinnott observes a suspiciously low 6% average rate of 'Don't Know' responses amongst the 15 EU member states (see also Sinnott, 1999, p. 11). Sinnott also identifies some inconsistency between responses. From Table 2.3. in section 2.3.3. we can see that there is a clear support for helping out regions in difficulty, yet only moderate support for a Europeanised approach to unemployment policy. It is hard to believe that this disparity is accounted for by the publics' preference for regional aid over individual level welfare payments. This latter instance of 'non-attitudes' might be rebuffed with recourse to Zaller's characterisation of individuals as 'ideologically inconsistent'. That is to say, while it is inconsistent and arguably irrational to wish for, say, higher state spending and lower taxes this has no necessary repercussions on attitude stability. Nevertheless, the impression remains that estimates of non-attitudes based on 'indifferent' or 'Don't Know' responses could well be underestimates as they fail to capture those respondents who express an opinion but who are without an underlying attitude.

Taking a different tack, further evidence of non-attitudes might be gleaned from proxies for attitude holding, such as respondents' levels of knowledge towards European integration. As I have yet to demonstrate the link between knowledge and attitude holding, however, this is perhaps a little premature. So, I move on to hypothesising non-attitudes towards European integration.

7.4. Hypothesising Non-Attitudes Towards European Integration

In this section I take the explanatory factors first identified in section 7.2. and turn them into hypotheses. I also present any empirical evidence concerning the European Union that supports these hypotheses. I particularly focus on levels of knowledge, interest in politics or issue salience and the socio-economic variables education and income in explaining non-attitudes.

The factor most widely deemed to affect non-attitudes is a respondent's level of political knowledge. We have seen in the section 7.2. how Converse, Hurwitz and Peffley, Shapiro and Page, Zaller and Delli Carpini *et al.* all specifically cite lack of information as a barrier to attitude-holding, where better informed respondents are viewed as more likely to hold stable opinions. Following Delli Carpini *et al.* I define political knowledge as a range of factual information about politics stored in the long-term memory (1996, p. 10). I assume that measures of political knowledge address a range of general political matters, rather than domain-specific fields of knowledge such as knowledge about the make-up of a particular national government (Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1995, p. 15).

Empirical research conducted by Sinnott suggests that higher levels of knowledge are indeed associated with a more coherent attitude structure amongst respondents (2000). In this work, Sinnott first divides respondents into five discrete categories based on their general levels of knowledge and understanding of the EU displayed in EB 39. On this scale, 10% of respondents are well informed, a further 24% are moderately well informed, while approximately two-thirds of respondents are coded as possessing 'some but not much knowledge' or less (Sinnott, 2000, p. 121). Sinnott then takes two further questions from the same EB survey that together offer a long list of policy proposals in four main areas: economic policy, immigration and asylum policy, drugs and crime and

common foreign and security policy[5]. The idea is to use factor analysis to show that respondents from higher knowledge groups are more likely to be able to recognise constraints or linkages between question items. For instance, one might expect respondents who support joint decision-making with regard to a common currency to also support some degree of joint economic policy-making. Sinnott reports that attitude structure does indeed decline with knowledge, especially concerning attitudes towards foreign policy (2000, p. 119).

Sinnott also cross-tabulates an index of knowledge amongst respondents with Eurobarometer question (3) (in Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998, p.102). The table is reproduced below (table 7.1.) and is especially interesting as I use EB question (3) as the dependent variable in the statistical analysis that follows (see section 7.5.1.).

Table 7.1. EB 41.1 (1994) Knowledge and Non-Attitudes

Attitude to hypothetical EU dissolution	Knowledge of the EU				
	Very well informed	Moderately well informed	Some but not much knowledge	Very little knowledge	No knowledge
Very sorry	59	55	44	40	29
Indifferent/DK	30	35	44	48	59
Very relieved	11	10	12	12	12
N (% of total)	2,486 (20%)	2,008 (16%)	2,597 (21%)	2,293 (18%)	3,082 (25%)

Source: Eurobarometer 41.1.; Sinnott (1998, p. 102). Figures in percentages except N.

The knowledge index is constructed by Sinnott from a battery of questions included in Eurobarometer 41.1. (1994) asking respondents to name key Commission personnel and

[5] For the full question texts, the reader is invited to consult Appendix 1 in Sinnott (2000).

the correct members of the Union[6]. The absolute levels of knowledge are also visible in the table above, so that we can see that a quarter of all respondents fall into the 'no knowledge' category. This seems broadly in line with other research that suggests citizen general knowledge on the structure of the EU and politics in general is limited. In an earlier study on attitudes towards the EU amongst students in four member states, Hewstone borrows from Kriesberg the term 'dark areas of ignorance' to describe the chronic lack of knowledge of Community affairs displayed: a miserable 12.3% of all respondents could name exactly all member states (1986, p. 158). So, table 7.1. shows a clear association between increased levels of knowledge and positive attitude holding. As knowledge increases amongst respondents, the drop in the indifference category is the gain of the pro-integration 'very sorry' category. The 'relieved' category is barely altered by changing levels of knowledge amongst respondents.

The fairly simple form of the findings in Table 7.1. means that they are challengeable on several grounds, as Sinnott is quick to acknowledge. Could it not be that lack of knowledge is simply the function of an omitted variable, namely interest in politics? If so, the two factors might well be collinear in any regression model constructed. Table 7.2. shows another cross-tabulation, this time between levels of knowledge and interest in politics.

[6] Respondents' knowledge is classified as being between 0-4 points, so that those scoring 0 are deemed to possess 'no knowledge' and those with 4 are characterised as being 'very well informed'. One point is available for, respectively, naming the then President of the Commission (in 1994 this was Jacques Delors), a then Commissioner from their own country, naming 9 or 10 countries of the then EU12, and naming the 11th and 12th country earns a fourth point.

Table 7.2. EB 41.1 (1994) Knowledge and Interest in Politics

Interest in EU Politics	Knowledge of the EU					
	Very well informed	Moderately well informed	Some but not much knowledge	Very little knowledge	No knowledge	N
A great deal	31	25	20	14	10	1,175
To some extent	19	21	24	19	17	4,025
Not much	10	15	22	24	29	4,313
Not at all/DK	4	8	18	22	48	2,841

Source: Eurobarometer 41.1.; Sinnott (1998, p. 99). Figures in percentages except N

While table 7.2. does appear to reveal a relationship between knowledge and interest, there are respondents who, despite their interest in EU politics, do not possess much knowledge[7]. For instance, one quarter of those who claim to be very interested in European politics score one or less on the knowledge scale. There is, then, a failure on the part of at least some of the public to translate interest into knowledge (Sinnott, 1998, p. 99). Next, one might point to a relationship between positive attitude holding or support for integration and knowledge, so that support for the Union might well incentivise respondents to increase their levels of knowledge on the subject. Even if it seems unlikely that all the impact of increased knowledge is explained by positive support and interest in politics, as a first stage to testing the relationship between knowledge and attitude-holding I take the hypothesis

H6: Ceteris paribus, the higher a respondent's level of knowledge on the EU, the more likely they are to hold an attitude concerning European integration.

[7] The full text of the interest in politics question is as follows: "To what extent would you say you are interested in European politics, that is to say matters related to the European Union: a great deal, to some extent, not much or not al all?" This question (43) is discussed at greater length in section 7.5.2.

The next hypothesis attempts to formalise a position raised by Brooks (1994), namely that there is a link between attitude holding and higher levels of interest in (European) politics. Eurobarometer surveys have repeatedly enquired into respondents' interest both in politics and specifically in European politics, so that one can show a link between interest and attitude holding by again taking a cross-tabulation between interest in EU politics and attitudes towards the dissolution of the EU (see Table 7.3. below).

Table 7.3. EB 41.1 (1994) Interest in EU Politics and Non-Attitudes

Attitude to hypothetical EU dissolution	Interest in EU politics			
	A great deal	To some extent	Not much	Not at all
Very sorry	78	61	35	16
Indifferent/DK	13	31	53	68
Very relieved	9	8	12	16
N (% of total)	1,177	4,030	4,321	2,841

Source: Eurobarometer 41.1.; Sinnott (1998, p. 101). Figures in percentages except N.

Table 7.3. shows us that there is a strong association in the Eurobarometer data between interest in politics and support. Drawing on Eurobarometers No. 30, 31 and 31A (1988-9) and the EU 12, Niedermayer also present empirical evidence to demonstrate that as levels of interest in EU politics rise so does 'attitude-consistency' or attitude holding towards questions (1)-(4) concerning support for integration (1990, p. 26). Of course, this is far from being able to say that higher levels of interest lead to decreased non-attitudes and higher levels of support for integration; the relationship may well be reciprocal. One must also bear in mind the argument that in measuring interest one is really measuring affect, making the relationship between support for integration and interest in EU politics circular. However, the Pearson's correlation between support for integration and interest in politics questions in table 7.3. is a not unreasonably high 0.283 (significant to at least the 0.01 level on the 2-tailed test). Indeed, Zaller claims that measures of cognitive engagement such as knowledge outperform measures of affective

engagement or political interest in explaining stability (Zaller, 1992, p. 43; Zaller, 1990). So we have

H7: Ceteris paribus, the higher a respondent's level of interest in the EU, the more likely they are to hold an attitude concerning European integration.

A different sort of caveat is that, as Niedermayer argues, 'interest in politics' may only be an intermediary variable linking citizens' socio-structural location with their political attitudes and behaviour. Typically, higher levels of interest in politics are more likely to be pronounced among high-earning, well-educated males (Niedermayer, 1990, p. 2). This approach relates somewhat with Inglehart's supposition that levels of political skills determine how able a person is to cope with and interpret the abstract content of political messages. Skills are, he postulates, related to education and values result from levels of affluence, where both these variables are supposed to have increased over time. From section 4.4. Janssen uses pooled EB data from 1973-88 for Britain, France, Germany and Italy to show that not attitude-holding but support for integration is related to levels of political skills. So, it would be reasonable to control for education and income levels in the statistical analysis of non-attitudes[8]. Not only this, but the anticipated close relationships between education, income, knowledge and interest reminds one that in the sections that follow one must be careful to ensure that the independent variables included in any regression model are just that (see section 7.5.2. for further discussion of this issue).

Aside from the factors discussed, there are a number of other potential explanatory factors which I mention for completeness but for which I do not construct a hypothesis either because they are already covered by existing hypotheses or because they are simply too difficult to operationalised in the EB data. To begin, Hurwitz and Peffley's core values approach to non-attitudes stresses that the closer a question to an individual's core

[8] In a similar vein, Delli Carpini *et al.* show that levels of political knowledge amongst US citizens is predicted to be higher for older, non-minority males, and those respondents possessing factors such as intelligence that cannot be accurately measured here (1996, p. 201).

values, the greater likelihood that he or she will hold a stable attitude. We have already seen in sections 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. how Eurobarometer questions comprising diffuse, affective measures of support for integration attract more support for integration than those asking respondents about more utilitarian aspects of integration. Amongst the diffuse measures of support, question (1) asking respondents whether they are in favour of unifying Western Europe seems closer to many core political values concerning integration and attracts higher levels of net support than question (2), which asks respondents if their country's membership of the Union is a good or bad thing[9]. So, we could try to gauge how close a question is to respondents' core values simply by asking ourselves how abstract a particular question is, or how little recourse is needed to outside information, presumably political knowledge, in order to make a rational judgement on the issue in question. This of course implies subjective interpretation of the dependent variable. However, it is unclear how this 'abstractness' could be included in any regression equation as presumably there would be no variation in a variable that captured this. So, this possible explanation for non-attitudes is dropped from our analysis.

Shapiro and Page mention that quality of information is a crucial factor in determining public opinion output (1988, p. 244). Evidently, if the public rely on biased sources of information coming, for example, from political organisations or the news media then one might expect rationality, a particular focus of Shapiro and Page, to be compromised, but not necessarily the stability of responses. However, a more realistic example might be where members of the public are exposed to multiple sources of 'competing' bias, for example, for more than one political party. One might plausibly expect greater response instability as respondents lurch from one position to another, depending on the source of the analysis and information they receive. I argue that this argument fails to take into account the ability of respondents to assimilate or reject incoming information in keeping with their political beliefs according to their levels of political knowledge. Zaller shows as the Vietnam war progressed the opinions of better informed citizens became more

[9] An alternative explanation of the high net support levels for question (1) is the lack of a neutral category. Evidence from Sinnott (1999) presented in section 7.3. shows that lack of an appropriate neutral category may well contribute to artificially high positive or negative (non) attitudes.

polarised, whilst amongst the less well informed there was little difference between hawks and doves in terms of support for the war (1992, p. 200). So, other factors already discussed arguably already account for Shapiro and Page's concern with the quality of information.

So, we have seen that there is a reasonable amount of evidence pointing to the impact of knowledge and interest in EU politics in attitude holding. The major caveat to this evidence turns out to be risk that both factors are really intermediate variables for other, underlying socio-economic phenomena. Certainly, this will have to be controlled for carefully in the final regression model. In addition, much of the evidence presented here refers to Eurobarometer survey data, which if not exactly out of date, could well benefit from being updated. However, the strategy taken here is to provide a completely new type of evidence in the explanation of non-attitudes, rather than revisit existing approaches that are in any case not entirely adequate for our purposes.

7.5. A Model of Non-Attitudes

In this section I consider in turn the choice of survey data, the operationalisation of the dependent variable, the relevant control variables and the appropriate model methodology to better understand non-attitude holding.

7.5.1. The Choice of Eurobarometer Survey Data

I choose to test a model explaining non-attitudes towards European integration using Eurobarometer not ISSP data, breaking the pattern of earlier chapters. As ever, the criterion on which this decision is based lies in the suitability of the questions available for use as dependent and independent variables. As discussed in section 7.3. using single

time period survey data involves taking non-opinions not volatile opinions as indicators of non-attitudes, a different method to Converse's.

From the point of view of maintaining continuity, it would surely have been beneficial to use the ISSP survey to explain non-attitudes, to include national pride, identity, nationalism and racism as control variables and to place these results alongside those from chapters five and six. Unfortunately, we have seen in section 7.3. that question (4) from the ISSP survey, which we have been using up until now to measure support for European integration, does not include a response category that clearly captures non-attitudes. Even if it did, the ISSP survey is not equipped to operationalised even one of the hypotheses from section 7.4. There are no questions that can be construed as directly testing a respondent's level of political knowledge, and likewise no questions that enquire about a respondent's interest in politics[10]. Indeed, the only variable available which taps reasonably closely knowledge, interest and political skills is the education level of the respondent. The problem here is that we have one variable to measure three hypotheses, and that in any case education is not an ideal proxy for all of these three hypotheses[11].

Instead, I choose to measure non-attitudes from Eurobarometer survey 42 (2nd half 1994). As well as being the most recent Eurobarometer survey containing question (3) that measures non-attitudes, and questions on knowledge and interest in the EU, the survey is also conducted at a similar time to the ISSP National Identity 1995 survey. Unfortunately, while the Eurobarometer survey series fulfils the necessary condition for measuring non-attitudes, this means compromising slightly on variables that capture national pride, nationalism, identity and racism. However, it should be remembered that

[10] Question (19) in the ISSP survey asks respondents "How much have you heard or read about the EU? A lot, quite a bit, not much, nothing at all." At a push, this could be construed as a test of respondents' subjective knowledge on the EU. However, the question also seems to be getting at how successfully the EU has been promoted through media outlets.

[11] From section 4.4. it can be seen that education, along with levels of affluence, has acted as a proxy for political skills. On the other hand, this is less true for knowledge and interest in politics, where education might be seen as a particularly strong causal factor amongst many. True, Delli Carpini *et al.* take education as a proxy for knowledge when dealing in evaluating some of the evidence to do with non-attitudes (1996, p. 231). The same book, however, provides detailed information on the stability of knowledge levels amongst the American public since the 1940s, whereas overall levels of education have risen. From 1947-89, the median increase in levels of public knowledge over fifteen factual questions mainly regarding US political institutions was 4.5% (Delli Carpini *et al.*, 1996, p. 116).

none of the Eurobarometer surveys contained a variable list as complete as the ISSP survey for measuring these factors.

As a reminder from section 2.2.3., Eurobarometer surveys are carried out by selected national institutes posing identical sets of closed questions to multi-stage, random samples of 1000 people per country aged fifteen and over[12]. Since 1975 (EB 3), a sample of 300 for Northern Ireland has been added to Great Britain to constitute the United Kingdom. Given the unification of Germany in 1990, an additional sample of 1000 persons have been interviewed since EB 34, so that there are a total of 2000 interviews for this country. Since 1991 (EB 35) 500 interviews were conducted in Luxembourg, where before this date the number was only 300. Where results are displayed here for the Community as a whole, these are weighted on the basis of the adult population in each country[13]. Results are open to replication, and the data files are stored at the Cologne University Central Archive[14]. As a final point, question (3) appears far less frequently in Eurobarometer surveys after EB 42, with the possible implication that maintaining up-to-date research on non-attitude holding will become more difficult in this particular survey series.

7.5.2. The Dependent and Independent Variables

In this section I operationalised the dependent and independent variables. I show that the variables measuring interest in EU politics, subjective and factual knowledge all appear to form part of the same underlying dimension in the Eurobarometer data.

[12] In multi-stage clustering a number of sampling points based on 'administrative regional units' are drawn with a probability proportional to population size and density. From this a starting address was drawn randomly, using which other addresses were randomly selected.

[13] It is not mentioned in the Eurobarometer surveys what age group this refers to, and whether it is concomitant with the 15+ age group used for surveys.

[14] The data files are, however, available from several sources. The data used in this thesis have all been downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research website (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/index.html).

To begin by operationalising the dependent variable, I argue in section 7.3. that the use of the word 'indifferent' in Eurobarometer question (3) makes it a more adequate measure of non-attitudes than question (2). The caveats to bear in mind are that given the earlier discourse on a continuum from real to non-attitudes, the adequacy of this 'indifferent' response in question (3) is relative, and that there is a risk that indifference measures non-committed attitudes rather than non-attitudes. Nevertheless, the full question text of the dependent variable is:

(3) "If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or relieved?"

I code responses into two categories, where indifferent responses are coded 1 and all other responses coded 0, except for the handful of N/A responses that are discarded. I code DK responses along with other attitudes on the basis that they represent balanced attitudinal responses. So, this coding schema allows the use of logit regression techniques in the final model. I also note that figure 7.4. gives a description of the level of aggregate non-attitudes for the EU 12 from 1985 to 1995.

To operationalise interest in politics I use the following question from EB 42:

(43) "To what extent would you say that you are interested in European politics, that is to say matters related to the European Union (European Community): a great deal, to some extent, not much or not at all?"

The variable is coded from 1-4, where 1 represents higher levels of interest in EU politics. The mean level of interest in EU politics is 2.8, while the respective country means are not significantly different from this figure.

To test the hypothesis concerning respondents' knowledge of the EU the following question presents itself:

(44) "All things considered, how well informed do you feel you are about the European Union, its policies, its institutions? Very well, quite well, not very well, not at all well."

This question clearly invites a respondent to subjectively appraise his or her levels of knowledge concerning the EU. Hayo goes as far to argue that subjective knowledge is more an attempt to communicate perceived interest in politics (1999, p. 646). The Pearson's correlation coefficient for subjective knowledge and interest in EU politics is a notable 0.433 (significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)). It would surely be preferable to measure a respondent's level of objective, factual knowledge, and there are a number of factual questions relating to the European Commission in the Eurobarometer survey

(45) "Do you happen to know when the European Commission, that has been in office for the last few years, will end its mandate and a new Commission will take office?" (Yes, in 1994; Yes, in 1995 [CORRECT ANSWER]; Yes, in 1996; Yes, later; No/DK).

(46) "Do you happen to know the name of the person who has been President of the European Commission over the past few years, and whose mandate will come to an end in January 1995?" (Yes, Jacques Delors [CORRECT]; Yes, a Frenchman; Yes, Jacques Santer; Yes, Jean-Luc Dehaene; Yes, other name; No/DK)

(47) "A successor of Jacques Delors has been chosen as the new President of the European Commission. Do you happen to know who? If yes, could you give me his/her name?" (Yes, Jacques Santer [CORRECT]; Yes, a Luxembourger; Yes, Jean-Luc Dehaene; Yes, other name; No/DK).

I construct a measurement scale from these three questions, so that one point is given for each correct answer. The result is a variable measuring a respondent's level of factual knowledge and coded from 0-3, where 48% of respondents score 0, 27% score 1, 17% score 2 and just 6% score 3. The correlation between subjective and factual knowledge is not particularly high, at just 0.30 (significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)). Is it reasonable to impute knowledge of the EU in general from these questions concerning the

Commission? Although a little more issue-specific than, say, asking respondents to name all the EU member states, the Commission is a (relatively) high-profile EU institution, with its President possibly the most visible specifically-European political figure.

To explore further the relationship between factual and subjective knowledge, and interest in EU politics I use factor analysis. The results are visible in table 7.4. below.

Table 7.4. EB 42 (1994) Rotated Factor Matrix for Education, Interest in EU Politics, Subjective and Factual Knowledge

	Factor 1
Interest in EU Politics	0.69
Subjective Knowledge	0.63
Factual Knowledge	0.48
Eigenvalue	1.71
%age Explained Variance	56.97
Cronbach's Alpha	0.62
Chi-squared (df)	- (0)

Only one factor with an eigenvalue of greater than one is extracted, so that all three variables tap the same underlying factor. Interest in EU politics and knowledge seem to go together, so that the scale would appear to distinguish between respondents with either higher or lower levels of interest and knowledge[15]. I include all three variables in the logit regression model below.

Finally, there is no measure for income in this particular Eurobarometer survey, while a standard demographic measure is available for education. The coding for these variables, along with all other dependent, independent and control variables is posted in table 7.5. below.

[15] The same factor analysis performed on a country-by-country basis reveals very similar patterns. In no country is more than one factor extracted. The relative factor loading is also identical, except in France and Belgium where factual and subjective knowledge load almost equally onto the underlying factor, and in Netherlands, Greece and Portugal, where subjective knowledge loads more heavily than interest in EU politics onto the underlying factor.

7.5.3. The Control Variables

Although there is no suggestion in the literature that any of the hypotheses from chapter four play a role in determining non-attitudes, for completeness I include measures of national pride, nationalism, European identity and racism in the regression model. The adoption of Eurobarometer data also necessitates redefining several other control variables, such as occupation. A summary of the control variables and coding arrangements is presented in table 7.5.

European identity is best measured using a question also taken by Citrin and Sides (2001) in their study of European identity (see section 5.2.2.). Charillon and Ivaldi also misguidedly make use of this question in their flawed measure of nationalism (see section 6.2.1.).

(15) "In the near future do you see yourself as...(nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European only?"

Some theorists view identity as a multi-dimensional concept (see section 5.2.2.), making this measure of identity perhaps more simplistic than one would desire. Similarly, one is not able to differentiate between the political and cultural dimensions to national pride identified in section 5.2.3. using question (48) below. Nevertheless, the absence of alternatives means that national pride is measured by the question:

(48) "Would you say that you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be (NATIONALITY)?"

Nationalism is not directly tackled by any of the questions in Eurobarometer 42. One might attempt to tap nationalist sentiment from a battery of other questions posed and

indeed this is attempted by Charillon and Ivaldi using the same Eurobarometer survey (1996). However, the authors make use of questions (48) and (15) below, along with two further questions investigating national identity and national pride. As the discussion in section 6.2.1. also makes clear, these questions are closer to other political phenomena than nationalism. So, I do not attempt to control for nationalism or minority nationalism.

I use the following question to capture racist attitudes:

(49) "You said that you felt rather fearful about the Single European Market. Among the following statements, could you tell me the main reasons for your fears about the Single Market? Too much immigration into (OUR COUNTRY)".

As the wording implies, this question is posed only to those respondents who responded in a previous question in the same survey that the Single European Market (SEM) left them fearful. The question is a little crude, as respondents either mention immigration as a factor or they do not, there is no possibility for respondents to express the degree of fear felt by the prospect of increasing immigration. Moreover, the structure of this question series, where respondents are only asked more about their fears concerning the SEM if on balance this is the dominant emotion means that some respondents with racist attitudes might be missed because on balance they view the SEM positively. Following the same logic displayed in section 5.2.5., I assume that question (49) tests attitudes on racism because the largest component of non-nationals in member states tends to be extra-communitarian[16].

Turning to the socio-demographic control variables, in the ISSP data I constructed an International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) of occupational status from competing national occupation scales. In the Eurobarometer data one can simply adopt the

[16] A rough and ready gauge of the pride, identity and racism control variables can be gained by running a logit regression model explaining support for integration. That is, 'very sorry' is coded 1 and 'relieved' 0, with other responses being excluded. The results show that pride and identity coefficients are positive and significant, while the racism coefficient is negative and significant. Thus the aggregate level findings from chapter six are confirmed.

proprietary measure of occupation. It follows from the categorical nature of this variable that unlike in previous chapters no special arrangements are necessary to measure the impact of the farming profession on attitude holding. I also add a host of familiar controls such as sex, age, subjective social class, religion and political affiliation. As for the ISSP data, the Eurobarometer data in this instance unfortunately contains no macroeconomic control variables. A summary of the control variables and coding arrangements is visible below in table 7.5.

Table 7.5. EB 42 (1994) Variable Coding

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION
Dependent/Independent variables	
Non-attitude holding	1=Non-attitude (indifferent), 0=Attitude (including D/K). N/A discarded
Interest in EU politics	Coded from 1-4 (1- Not at all, 2 – Not much, 3 – To some extent, 4 – A great deal). DK/NA discarded.
Subjective Knowledge	Coded from 1-4 (1- Not at all well, 2 – Not very well, 3 – Quite well, 4 – Very well). DK/NA discarded.
Factual Knowledge	Coded from 0-3 (0 – No questions answered correctly, 1 – One correct response, 2 – two correct responses, 3 – all three questions answered correctly)
Education	Coded from 0-9. Response indicates age respondent finished education +13 (1=14 years of education...9=22+, 0=never studied, respondents still studying are discarded).
Control Variables	
European/National identity	Coded from 1-4 (1 – Nat only, 2 – Nat + Euro., 3 – Euro + Nat, 4- Euro only). DK/NA
National Pride	discarded.
	Coded from 1-4 (1 – Not at all proud, 2 – Not very proud, 3 – Fairly proud, 4 – Very proud). Refusals, DK & NA discarded.
Racism	1=SEM fear, 0=Immigration not mention as a SEM fear
Occupation	Coded from 1-18 (1-housewife, 2-student, 3-unemployed, 4-retired, 5-farmer, 6-fisherman, 7-self-employed professional, 8-self-employed, 9-business owner, 10-professional, 11-general management, 12-middle management, 13-white collar worker, 14-white collar worker, travelling, 15-service job, 16-supervisor, 17-skilled manual, 18-unskilled manual).). This variable is categorical, with **retirees** as the base category.
Sex	1=Male, 0=Female
Age	From 15 to 55+ years. Coded as cohorts (1 – 15-24, 2 - 25-39, 3 - 40-54, 4 - 55+)
Subjective Social Class	Coded from 1-6 (1 – Working class, 2 – Lower Middle class, 3 - Middle class, 4 - Upper Middle class, 5 – Upper class, 6 – Refuses to be classified). This variable is treated as categorical. **Middle class** is the base category.
Political Affiliation	Coded from 1-6 (1 – Far left, 2 – Left, 3 – Centre, 4 – Right, 5 – Far right, 6 – Refusal, Don't Know). This variable is treated as categorical; **Left** being the omitted category.
Country dummies	With **Spain** as the omitted country.
Religion	Coded from 1-4 (1 – Roman Catholic, 2 - Protestant, 3 – Other religion, 4 – No religion). Taken as categorical variable, with **no religion** as the base category.

7.5.4. Model Methodology

In the sections above I outline the dependent, independent and control variables used to investigate the causes of non-attitude holding in the Eurobarometer 42 data. Here, I adumbrate the regression models that perform this analysis.

I analyse non-attitudes both at the aggregate and country level. The data in EB 42 pertains almost exclusively to the EU 12, and so I do not include in the analysis Sweden, Austria or Finland. I weight each national sample in proportion to population size within the EU 12 countries. I use the predefined Eurobarometer EU 12 weighting, where this means excluding data for East Germany. I also note that, in contrast to the ISSP data, Northern Ireland is included within the UK data. The binary nature of attitude holding means that I employ logit regression.

7.6. Results

In table 7.6. below I include an abridged version of the results from the aggregate model investigating non-attitudes. The full results, including the country-level charts, are visible in section A.5. of the appendix.

I note that because the of the number of response categories contained in the categorical variables, I only display those categories that are statistically significant in the table below and the results contained in the appendix.

Table 7.6. EB 42 (1994) Aggregate Level Impact on Non-Attitude Holding of the Independent Variables (abridged)

	b		*Odds ratio*
Interest	-0.41	**	0.66
	(0.03)		
Subjective Knowledge	-0.24	**	0.78
	(0.03)		
Factual Knowledge	-0.25	**	0.78
	(0.03)		
Education	-0.03	**	0.97
	(0.01)		
Identity	-0.30	**	0.74
	(0.03)		
Pride	-0.15	**	0.86
	(0.03)		
Racism	0.00		1.00
	(0.08)		
Constant	2.88	**	17.84
	(0.22)		
Number of Cases	10038		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	1424.56 (50)		
Pseudo R^2	0.11		

Note: Entries are *b* coefficients with their associated standard errors below.

Calculations correct to 2 decimal places

** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)

* indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)

7.7. Interpretation of the Results

In the subsections below I interpret the findings from section 7.6. at both aggregate and country level, and with reference to other empirical studies. The full regression models are placed in tables 7.5. and 7.5b. in section A.5. of the appendix.

7.7.1. Analysis of the Independent Variables at the Aggregate Level

From the aggregate level results one can confirm the hypotheses concerning the impact of knowledge, interest and education on non-attitudes, so helping to resolve the matter of causality between non-attitudes and these variables. As well as offering more information on the relationship between these three concepts, the results also allow one to identify an age and gender difference in attitude holding. In conjunction with the results from chapter six, one can see that the variables distinguishing between attitude holding also discriminate between positive and negative attitudes, so that higher variable scores tend to result in more positive attitudes (but not non-attitudes) and decreasing scores lead to a growth in both non-attitudes and negative attitudes.

The clearest finding from table 7.6. is that the relationships between attitude holding and interest in EU politics, subjective and factual knowledge and education are all negative and statistically significant at the aggregate level. Hence, one can confirm all the hypotheses from section 7.4. The results also confirm Zaller's findings, reported in section 7.4., that measures of political interest tend to outperform knowledge in explaining response stability.

With particular reference to the relationship between the independent variables, from the log odds ratios we can see that the likely impact on attitude holding is greatest for a unit change in the interest variable, more or less identical for subjective and factual knowledge and weakest for education. It is evident that education would remain that variable with the weakest likely effect on attitudes even were we to reduce its ten response categories to four, in harmony with the other variables. From the odds ratios, then, the regression results tend to support the factor analysis findings in table 7.5. That is, interest and knowledge seem to form part of one underlying variable, where interest better captures this variable than knowledge.

Secondly, the results go some way towards resolving the issue of causality between knowledge, interest and support for the EU. We have seen in tables 7.1. and 7.3. above how more knowledgeable and interested respondents tend to be more pro-EU. In section 7.4. I noted the concerns regarding causality for the findings presented in these tables, and the regression results in table 7.6. demonstrate the existence of a link from knowledge and interest to non-attitudes and, by implication, support[17]. This is not to imply that there is no link from support to, say, knowledge as well.

The third finding clear from table 7.6. is that higher levels of pride and identity are associated with an increased likelihood to hold an attitude towards European integration. Remembering from section 6.4.1. that both national pride and European identity are strongly linked to support for integration, it would seem that the findings from this chapter and the last are interconnected: support for integration tends to increase for respondents with a higher than average sense of European identity or national pride, and this is typically at the expense of both anti-integration sentiment and non-attitudes. The same phenomenon is visible elsewhere in the non-attitudes model for those variables that have a reasonably direct comparison in the ISSP support model, and held a pro-support, significant coefficient. So, older, male citizens are both more likely to support integration, and less likely to hold non-attitudes than younger females.

To better describe this phenomenon I note that *a priori* an increase in support requires the decrease in some other response category or categories by the same amount. The decrease might be spread amongst non-attitudes and negative opinion or, for instance, non-attitudes might stay level or increase while negative opinion decreases by a larger amount. The experience of the regression analysis here is that increases in support are accompanied by decreases in non-attitudes and negative opinions. The logical counterpart to this is that falling support redistributes opinions back amongst negative and non-attitudes. For example, in table 7.6. of section A.5. of the appendix Centrists are more likely to hold non-attitudes than Leftist respondents, as well as being more likely to

[17] In fact, an analysis of support for integration using EB 42 shows that interest and knowledge are both positively related to support.

be anti-integration than Leftists (from model 1c in table 6.3.). However, this pattern does not hold for Upper Middle Class respondents who, while being more likely to hold non-attitudes than the middle-classes, are not noticeably more anti-integration. Nevertheless, this tendency of responses to be 'redistributed' in a certain fashion is also visible at the aggregate level in figure 7.3. which charts question (3) over time. To demonstrate this relationship a little more rigorously, correlations of EU 10 responses from EB 15-40 (1981-1993) show negative associations between 'sorry' and 'indifferent' responses (-0.55**) and 'sorry' and 'relieved' responses (-0.65**). However, there is only a weakly positive and statistically insignificant association between 'relieved' and 'indifferent' responses (0.06). So, it seems that there is an asymmetric relationship between positive, negative and non-attitudes towards integration. Variables linked with an increase in support do so at the expense of negative and indifferent responses, while variables causing increases in non-attitudes are associated with a decrease in support but tend to have little impact on negative responses (see figure 7.5. below).

Figure 7.5. The Relationship between Pro, Anti and Non-Attitudes Towards European Integration Caused by Explanatory Variables



It appears, at least for the variables considered here, that there is not much crossover between negative and indifferent opinion. This arrangement seems reasonable, in that it seems respondents do not move from negative to indifferent, and then on to positive

attitudes. Indeed, if this were the case one could simply code non-attitudes as a 'middle-way' variable between positive and negative opinions and analyse all these attitudes together in one model. This 'middle way' pattern of responses seems more appropriate to Don't Know's rather than non-attitudes. I instead interpret non-attitudes as a variant of non-support for integration, where the other alternative would be anti-EU sentiment. Moreover, the pattern of responses should remind us that splitting the dependent variable into two different models is rather artificial and independent variables act consistently across the non-attitudes and positive and negative attitude models, so that the interpretation of coefficients should ideally be informed by the results from both sections.

The information revealed by the other control variables included in table 7.6. in section A.5. of the appendix is interesting, if a little scanty. Religion does not appear to be a relevant explanatory factor at the aggregate level, and none of the response categories are significant. There is a clear gender and age difference in attitude holding: it appears that older, male respondents are more likely to turn in an attitude than younger females. For age, there is a parallel with some recent research into political participation, especially voting. For instance, extensive comparative research into electoral turnout by Blais and Dobrzynska suggests that older citizens are more likely to vote (1998). Although there is no firm scholarly consensus on why this might be so, the suggestions of some authors in the context of welfare state reform might be applicable to attitude-holding and participation in general: namely, a decline in intergenerational solidarity amongst the young (a generational shift) is accompanied by a more acute awareness amongst older citizens of possible losses in entitlements (a cohort effect) (Kersbergen in Kuhnle, 2000).

The findings for political affiliation, subjective social class and occupation are rather more ambiguous. It seems reasonable that respondents who are unclear of their political affiliation ('DK' response category) are more likely not to hold an attitude than Leftist respondents. It is not immediately apparent why Centrists should be more likely to hold non-attitudes than Leftists. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer variable asks respondents to subjectively place themselves on a scale of 1-10, where 1 represents an extreme left viewpoint. This means that it is not possible to tie a respondent to particular political

parties. Similarly, the interpretation of relative increase in likelihood of Upper Middle Class, but not Upper Class, respondents not holding attitudes is rather hard to fathom. For the significant occupation categories I do not offer any specific interpretation, except to caution that the number of cases for fisherman is just seven.

In summary, many respondents display non-attitudes towards the European Union, where for this model the main explanatory factors are age, sex, national pride, European identity, knowledge, interest and education. This points to non-attitude holding as to a large extent a socio-demographic phenomenon. Although not possible here, it would have been especially interesting to test explanations of non-attitudes that dwelt more overtly on the psychological dimension, such as whether non-attitudes represent a specific disillusionment with the EU. Such an approach might be able to answer such questions as to what degree the EU institutional and policy framework itself is responsible for non-attitudes, or whether such attitudes are simply functions of wider socio-demographic trends.

7.7.2. Analysis of the Independent Variables at the Country Level

In this section I analyse the country results by sets of independent variables: interest, knowledge and education; pride, identity and racism; age, sex and religion and then the rest of the control variables. For key independent variables of concern, the country level findings tend to closely follow the aggregate level findings. However, the results for the remaining controls are fragmented, and particularly difficult to interpret.

Table 7.7. EB 42 (1994) Aggregate and Country Level Findings in Comparison

Variables	Interest	Subjective Knowledge	Factual Knowledge	Education	Identity	Pride	Racism
Aggregate	**-0.44**	**-0.24**	**-0.25**	**-0.04**	**-0.30**	**-0.14**	0.00
France	**-0.58**	-0.18	-0.18	-0.04	**-0.20**	-0.06	0.15
Belgium	**-0.64**	-0.19	-0.16	0.02	-0.18	**-0.48**	**1.09**
Netherlands	**-0.57**	**-0.26**	-0.17	-0.01	**-0.35**	-0.14	0.39
West Germany	**-0.58**	**-0.46**	**-0.47**	-0.07	**-0.35**	-0.17	-0.20
Italy	**-0.56**	**-0.26**	-0.18	-0.05	**-0.48**	**-0.25**	**0.87**
Luxembourg	**-0.81**	-0.31	-0.16	-0.16	-0.59	-0.18	0.83
Denmark	**-0.50**	**-0.43**	-0.14	0.00	**-0.27**	-0.18	0.03
Ireland	**-0.45**	-0.03	-0.19	0.01	0.05	**-0.29**	-0.89
UK	-0.15	**-0.22**	**-0.24**	-0.05	-0.14	0.05	**-0.66**
Greece	**-0.55**	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	-0.21	**-0.30**	0.63
Spain	**-0.39**	-0.35	0.10	0.03	-0.47	**-0.38**	-0.10
Portugal	**-0.30**	**-0.35**	0.10	0.03	**-0.47**	**-0.38**	-0.10

Significant coefficients at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test) or better are highlighted in bold

Following the example set with table 6.5 we can get a clearer idea of how closely the aggregate and country findings mirror each other with the aid of a table comparing the key independent variables (see table 7.7 above). For interest and knowledge there is a remarkable degree of confluence with the aggregate level findings; the directional effects of interest and knowledge are negative in all the countries. Moreover, the coefficients for subjective and factual knowledge are very similar in size. For West Germany and the UK, where both coefficients are significant, the values are almost identical.

Similarly, the country level identity and pride results mirror the aggregate level negative coefficient in all but two cases. On the other hand, education, negative at the aggregate level, is positive for five countries. However, with the education coefficients generally so small and not significant in any country this is not especially remarkable. Racism seems to be the variable with the most country-level variation, with a positive coefficient in only seven countries. The UK is the only country in which neither one of the identity and pride variables is significant. On the other hand, the UK is one of the three countries in which racism is statistically significant. For Belgium and Italy, the racism coefficient is positive, so that (overwhelmingly anti-EU) racists are more likely to hold non-attitudes than (overwhelmingly pro-EU) respondents who are particularly nationally proud or feel European. For the UK, however, the racism coefficient is negative, implying that anti-EU racists are more likely to hold an attitude. Although difficult to interpret, this might suggest that British racists see a particularly clear link between the EU and, say, increased racial diversity in society.

For the remainder of the variables included in the model the picture is rather fragmented. In common with section 6.4.4. there is a fair amount of variation in coefficient direction at the country level for age, sex and religion. The age coefficient is only significant (and negative) in the Netherlands and the UK. The sex coefficient is not significant in any state, while for religion, the only two significant results are that UK Protestants seem more likely to hold non-attitudes while in France respondents professing attachment to other religions are more likely to hold an attitude.

Turning to political affiliation, one might reasonably expect respondents who answer 'Don't Know' to be more likely to hold non-attitudes. While this is the case at the aggregate level and for some countries, Portuguese 'Don't Know' respondents are in fact more likely to hold an attitude. Combined with a coefficient for subjective knowledge that is higher than for interest in EU politics, this could be taken to mean that Portuguese respondents are relatively self-confident. For Greece, all Centre and Right respondents are more likely to hold an attitude than Leftists, while WC and LMC respondents are less likely to have an attitude towards integration than MC subjects. Other subjective social

class, occupation and political affiliation results appear too garbled to be constructively interpreted.

7.8. Conclusion

In this chapter I began by endorsing a conception of attitudes that falls between the Almond-Lippmann consensus and a revisionist position, thus allowing for the possibility both for non-attitudes and meaningful attitudes towards political objects. I go on to argue that non-attitudes can be measured in single time period data by taking non-opinions as an indicator, and that 'indifference' is a reasonable measure of non-opinions rather than simply non-committed opinions. On this approach, which differs to that of Converse, it is readily apparent that non-attitude levels are running at a high level and merit investigation. After having made the decision to select the Eurobarometer data for the logit regression analysis, a clear negative link is visible between higher levels of interest, knowledge, education and non-attitudes. Moreover, national pride and European identity are also negatively linked to the dependent variable, implying that increases in support for integration are drawn not just from anti-integration attitudes, but also non-attitudes. At the same time, a decrease in support would not appear to be fuelled by non-attitudes, serving to differentiate non-attitudes from 'Don't Know' responses. So, the variables that distinguish between attitude holding also discriminate between positive and negative attitudes.

This later finding emphasises the need, notwithstanding the difficulties derived from taking a different survey in this last data chapter, to place results from chapter six and seven along side each other. Aside from age and sex, the remainder of the control variables performed poorly and were notably difficult to interpret. In summary, it appears that interest and knowledge are at the forefront of explaining non-attitudes towards integration. Undoubtedly, this impression partially derives from the variables at our disposal. It would have been particularly interesting to include some measure of

intelligence or a range of variables that could capture respondents' emotional responses to the EU. A potential relationship between, say, 'disillusionment' and non-attitudes might shed light on whether the responsibility (and hence solution) for non-attitudes lies with socio-demographic factors or more directly with the political masters of the EU.

8. THESIS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1. Chapter Aim

The first aim of this chapter in section 8.2. is to collate and summarise the thesis results. All these results are cross-referenced to the section in which they were originally presented. In section 8.3. I then enter into a little speculation as to the wider significance of the results presented in the thesis, so that I end the chapter with some pointers for future research in this area.

8.2. Summary of Results

(1) Theories of regional integration differ in their emphasis on the role of the public in European integration, although there is enough evidence to satisfy the premise that the public is of some relevance.

- Realist, early neofunctionalist and the permissive consensus theories tend to exclude the public (1.3.2.; 1.3.4.).
    - The permissive consensus is criticised on empirical (2.4.) and theoretical grounds (1.3.2.).
- Revised neofunctionalist (including postmaterialism) and neorealist (interdependence) theories and their successors (two-level game theory, liberal intergovernmentalism) and multilevel governance stumble towards acknowledging a role for the public, often via the domestic sphere (1.3.2.-1.3.5.) Recent evidence from referenda in particular suggests that even this role is understated.

None of these theories really get to grips with the actual ways in which public opinion can shape integration. Only Sinnott makes a tentative attempt to explain this transmission mechanism (1.3.5.).

(2) Theories of integration are also silent on what function the public performs by exercising sway over integrative developments. I argue that public opinion is an important legitimising force behind the EU, and that attachment to the Union ('support' for integration) rather than European identity is all that is necessary for the public to fulfil this role (2.2.1.).

- Support itself can be thought of as a particular mode of orientation (an attitude) towards a political object (the EU), that can be either affective or utilitarian in nature (2.2.2.).
    - The affective/utilitarian split reappears when reviewing theories explaining support (chapter three) and operationalising national pride and explaining the interrelationships between pride, nationalism, European identity and racism (chapter five).
- There are several trends in support for integration over time.
    - A downswing in the 1970s fits in with the 'Eurosclerosis' thesis, while the 1980s was a time of booming support. Since the early 1990s support has been trending downwards, with a mild upwards bounce coming after 1997 (2.3.).
    - The support 'boom' of the 1980s meant that the relatively large difference in support between the psychological 'core' of early entrants and the 'periphery' of later entrants dwindled to almost nothing by the early 1990s.
    - Questions asking respondents more value-laden and general questions about the EU tend to record higher and more stable support levels than more specific (often utilitarian) questions (2.3.).

(3) Amongst those writers who do see public opinion as explaining support for integration, one can make a rough division between affective/utilitarian and public/private explanations.

- In the public, utilitarian category macroeconomic variables and intra-EU trade perform better than theories based on EU budget figures (3.2.).
- The evidence concerning farmers (private, utilitarian) is not conclusive (3.3.).

- Amongst private, affective explanations socio-demographic indicators sex, class, income and education outperform postmaterialism. The left-right cleavage also appears significant, although it is difficult to generalise outside the country level of analysis (3.4.).

I argue forcefully that these existent explanations are not sufficient to explain the role of the public in determining support for integration (3.5.).

- The national differences in support that remain in many (utilitarian) analyses spark interest in a micro-level explanatory role for affective factors; namely European identity, pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism.
- To maintain, as many authors do, that the principal basis of EU support is utilitarian implies, consciously or otherwise, a model of the EU that does not require identitative, legitimacy-inducing attachment. The advanced state of integration that exists in the European Union can be used to show that this argument runs counter to reality.

(4) I hypothesise about the concepts under consideration – European identity, national pride, nationalism, xenophobia and racism. Emphasis is placed on a theoretical review of these concepts as a detailed definition is often neglected in empirical social science.

- Social identity and self categorisation theory act as building blocks for appraising the effect of the concepts on support and justifies their consideration all together here (4.2.)
    - Where Europe is the 'outgroup' for respondents we can expect their attitudes towards it to be hostile e.g. nationalism, xenophobia and racism (4.5.-4.6.).
        - For minority nations attitudes are more difficult to predict - the EU may be seen as a facilitator of statehood or in a more traditional way as a barrier (4.5.).
    - Acknowledging that respondents may possess multiple identities, I couch the identity hypothesise in relative terms, so that respondents with a relatively strong sense of European identity are likely to support the EU (Europe is the 'ingroup' in this case) (4.3.).
    - Again, multiple identities mean that national pride may coexist with European pride, so that I do not hypothesise any relationship between pride and support (4.4.).
- Although I do not form hypotheses concerning the relationships between concepts, one can look to explain these interactions using the psychological approach of Adorno *et al.*

(1950). In this work, nationalism, xenophobia and racism are all linked by the underlying concept of ethnocentrism, an attitude usually held by authoritarian personality types. Hence at the minimum one can expect these attitudes all to be linked to each other. This is contrasted with patriotism, or love of country, which is roughly equivalent to national pride. Hence pride is not expected to be related to the ethnocentric variables.

- In contrast to the work of Adorno, self-categorisation theorists argue that all group members, not just ethnocentric respondents, engage in stereotyping, which is in turn shown not to be an inherently irrational process, so that the distinction between pride and the ethnocentric variables should not be pushed too far (4.2.).

Finally, one should remember that even if some of these hypotheses appear rather self-evident, there has been little research to demonstrate this (3.5.). Not only this, but the strength of the relationships is also of interest both in its own right and as compared to the impact of utilitarian explanations of support.

(5) I proceed to operationalise national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism in the ISSP data, which offers a better range of survey questions than the Eurobarometer survey series, even if only eight EU countries are included, against the fifteen available in the EB data (5.2.1.).

- Factor analysis reveals that there are two underlying 'cultural' and 'political' dimensions to national pride (5.2.3.).
- A minority nationalism variable is added to the model to account for the potentially divergent nationalist attitudes of the Basques, Catalans, Scots and Welsh (5.2.4.).
- It is not possible to operationalise xenophobia in the ISSP data, and this variable is dropped from all future analysis (5.2.5.).
- A number of relevant control variables are included in the OLS regression, including a socio-economic indicator of occupation (ISEI scale) (5.2.6.). Unfortunately, neither the ISSP data nor the Eurobarometer data used in chapter seven contain any macroeconomic control variables, a disappointing omission from the thesis as a whole.

The aggregate level results for the five OLS regression models (weighted by country population and with robust estimators) investigating political pride, cultural pride, European identity, nationalism and racism show that the variables all positively predict one other.

Exceptions are the relationships between political pride and racism, which is negative in both directions, and between European identity and political pride, where the relationship is not significant in either direction (5.3.).

I perform an aggregate level factor analysis on the key independent variables to test the idea that they are related to each other by some underlying concept. Once again, two underlying 'cultural' and 'political' factors are extracted.

- Political and cultural pride and nationalism load onto the first factor. The minor role for racism, and the link between pride and support shown in chapter six means that I do not see this factor as representing Adorno's concept of ethnocentrism. Moreover, it seems likely that one cannot expect national pride holders, forming part of the same underlying factor as nationalists, to be indifferent with respect to European integration as earlier hypothesised (5.4.1.).
- The second factor appears a straight measure of racism, leaving relative European identity as something entirely separate (5.4.1.).

(6) Using the same concepts, control variables and ISSP National Identity survey used above I construct a model to test the hypotheses from chapter four concerning the effect of pride *et al.* on support for European integration.

- The dependent variable asks respondents to consider whether they benefit or not from their country being a member of the European Union. I recode the dependent variable to make the distinction between positive and negative attitudes towards the European Union, and between attitudes themselves (comprising both positive and negative responses) as opposed to non-attitudes (defined temporarily here as 'Don't Know' or 'Have never heard of' responses) which are dropped. This recoded, dichotomous variable favours the use of the logit regression technique (6.2.6.)
- The supporting evidence for the hypotheses concerning pride, European identity, nationalism and racism is very limited and often methodologically flawed. There would appear to be a clear need for research in this area (6.2.2.-6.2.5.).

The aggregate level logit regression results on the eight EU countries retained in the ISSP National Identity survey (weighted by country population) confirms the negative effect of rising levels of nationalism and racism on support, as well as the positive effect of relative

European identity on support. The hypothesis of no relationship between national pride and support can be rejected, as rising levels of both political and cultural pride are associated with higher levels of support for European integration.

- A possible explanation for the positive relationship between political and cultural pride and support can be furnished by Risse *et al.* (2000) who see identity (and hence pride in that identity) altering over time in a 'constructivist' fashion: as citizen's national identities become more European in content, a link between pride and support appears (6.4.1.)
    - The positive relationship between pride and support, contrasts with the negative relationship between nationalism and support. In section 5.4.1. pride and nationalism are shown to load onto the same factor. I suggest that this can be explained by the fact that nationalism loads more heavily onto this common factor, so that pride is a necessary condition for nationalism.
- As well as being the most consistently significant variables at the country level of analysis, one standard deviation changes in European identity and racism have the strongest effect on support at the aggregate level (6.4.1.-6.4.2.).
- In a change from chapter five where minority nationalists were shown to be more likely to feel relatively European than ordinary respondents, in the chapter six results they are less likely to support European integration. There would appear to be some discrepancy between feeling European and supporting the European Union for such respondents. Catalan respondents are the only exception to this rule, where overall they are very slightly more likely to support integration than normal respondents (6.4.1.).
- At the aggregate level those control variables that are most use in explaining support for integration seem to be age, sex, occupation, and some strands of political affiliation. In addition, it is interesting to note those hypotheses disproved by the ISSP data, notably sections of Inglehart's post-modernism enterprise and the impact of farmers on support (6.4.3.).

(7) I complete the analysis of public opinion towards European integration by focusing on non-attitudes.

- I begin with a summary of over fifty years of debate on public attitude-holding, largely concerning matters of foreign policy. The crux of this debate revolves around understanding whether much public opinion can be interpreted as stable, consistent and

relevant to policy-makers (where we can think of unstable, inconsistent and irrelevant attitudes as non-attitudes). In the light of earlier thesis chapters it is certainly useful to examine theories that view public opinion as not entirely random and inconsistent (7.2.).

- The main point of the literature review is to identify key explanatory factors of non-attitudes, where I focus on and hypothesise around political knowledge, interest in politics and education (7.2./7.4.).
- Using mainly EB data, I am able to show that non-attitudes are reasonably prevalent in the European Union, and so merit further study here. Indeed, the level of non-attitudes is another reason to place into doubt the existence of any permissive consensus (7.3.).
- Rather than continue to use the ISSP survey data, I switch to EB 42 (1994) survey data. The reason for this is that question (3) is a better measure of non-attitudes than the dependent variable used in chapter six, where there is a risk that this simply captures 'non-committed' attitudes ('don't knows' rather than 'don't cares') (7.5.1). Using the EB data I argue that indifferent category responses to the chosen dependent variable equate with non-attitudes. This different measure is made necessary because in this chapter only single time period data is used.

The aggregate level logit results confirm that higher levels of political interest, knowledge and education all increase the likelihood of attitude-holding (7.6.). Additionally

- Interest in politics appears to explain more variation in the dependent variable that knowledge or education (7.7.1.)
- Increased levels of control variables for national pride and European identity are associated with a greater likelihood to hold an attitude towards integration. It appears that there is a tendency for these variables to increase support at the expense of negative and indifferent responses. However, increases in non-attitudes are associated with a decrease in support but not negative responses. There is not much crossover, then, between negative and indifferent opinion. It seems respondents do not move from negative to indifferent, and then on to positive attitudes (7.7.1.).

8.3. Avenues for Future Research

Although a somewhat forced comparison, in that I do not set out to entirely refute the explanatory power of utilitarian explanations of support for integration, there is some sense in which the sub-title to this thesis could be 'the other half of the book that Gabel should have written'. The work of many researchers, with Gabel (1998) as perhaps the leading exponent, has done much to raise the profile of utilitarian explanatory factors in explaining support for integration. Part of the aim of this thesis has been to redress that balance.

We have seen that there is a clear, important role for national pride, European identity, nationalism and racism in public evaluations of the European Union. This is how things should be; although the refrain that the EU is an economic giant but a political pygmy is a common one, it seems ridiculous that a political system with the clout of the EU is judged according only to economic criteria. However, this and other findings in the thesis lead to a wider set of avenues for future research beyond merely 'setting the record straight'.

From the opening demonstration of the impact of affective (and utilitarian) factors on support for integration, and the impact of public support on the integration process itself, means that there is ample room to update existing theories of integration to take account of these facts. Most theories only mention the public in passing, while only Sinnott (1994) makes an attempt to document the transmission mechanism for public opinion on European Union policy-making.

In section 2.2.1. I argue strongly for an attachment with the European Union based on support rather than on identity. It can be seen that while European identity is relatively uncommon, most respondents support the EU. Thus support legitimises a loose form of attachment to the EU, possibly based on civic republicanism, that could supplant the need for a full-blooded European identity or demos. Broadly, the implications for the 'Future of Europe' debate are for institutional arrangements that allows citizens to retain their national or regional attachments rather than a futile attempt to replace these with an overarching European identity: a 'Europe of nations' rather than a federal vision. In the light of this, the

'democratic deficit' argument looses some of its force: once one ceases to demand that European publics identify with the EU but merely support it, the actions of institutions such as the European Parliament gain in legitimacy[1].

In section 3.5. I am at pains to point out that the cross-national variation in support detected by some authors acts only as a spur to hypothesising at the micro-level. It would be an interesting exercise to adopt multi-level modelling techniques so as to gauge how far such differences could be accounted for by the social psychological variables proposed. The application of this type of model is certainly an avenue that could be taken to build on the findings of the thesis.

In chapter four I flesh out the notion of affective values impacting upon support for European integration. There are, however, plenty more factors that might come under this heading than just identity, pride, nationalism and racism. In particular, one might look to support for democratic values, trust in other countries and, say, respect for human rights. The relationship between these new affective factors and support might offer material for reflection on the idea 'What is Europe?' Approaching the question from a cross-national perspective also appears a fruitful line for research. On some accounts, for instance, Italy and other southern European member states hold a relatively positive opinion of European Union politics. On the other hand, one might contend that the Scandinavian countries are disaffected with the Union precisely because they perceive general political values in their countries to be more advanced. This is different from the emphasis on superior national values, which seems a source of disaffection in Switzerland and Britain. As well as focusing on the European Union, this approach might encompass applicant and non-applicant countries of Europe from the crude perspective of investigating whether they are 'fit' to join the EU.

This thesis could also be extended in a more straightforward way to other regions of Europe by using to Central and Eastern Europe Eurobarometer survey series to look at identity, pride, nationalism and racism. Especially interesting is how countries that under Soviet dominance

[1] On the other hand, we have seen how constructivist authors explain the link between national pride and support as based on changing conceptions of national identity (Risse *et al.*, 2000). If support itself is principally determined by identity, the above arguments loose their force.

for many decades were expected to foreswear nationalism react to the prospect of burying their national identity in European Union membership. Or could it be that the EU is seen as a way to preserve national identities? For future applicant countries in South Eastern Europe which have suffered from violent conflict over the last decade the relationship between the explanatory variables and European integration is also particularly interesting.

From chapter six it would be interesting to check the robustness of the findings that national pride is related to support for integration by replicating them on other datasets with alternative measures of national pride. It would also be worthwhile to develop and test further ideas about mechanisms that account for the positive association between national pride and support for the EU.

Although it proved not to have been possible here, it would be especially interesting to test explanations of non-attitudes that dwelt more overtly on the psychological dimension, such as whether non-attitudes represent a specific disillusionment with the EU. Such an approach might be able to answer such questions as to what degree the EU institutional and policy framework itself is responsible for non-attitudes, or whether such attitudes are simply functions of wider socio-demographic trends. The non-attitudes findings in general would benefit from being replicated with an alternate dependent variable or using a standard panel data approach so as to confirm that the 'indifference' approach adopted in this thesis is a valid measure of non-attitudes.

Finally, I hazard that several aspects of the thesis could be approached from a policy proposal perspective

- What policy recommendations might one make to increase public support for integration? One particular result from my thesis concerns national pride, where it appears that the prouder a respondent is of his or her country, the more likely they are to support integration. Could a 'constructivist' approach to national identity be the best way to ensure the acceptance of the European Union?
- Many respondents display 'non-attitudes' towards the European Union, choosing simply not to express a particular opinion on the subject. Is this simply a socio-demographic phenomenon (i.e. non-attitude holders tend to be less well educated or

wealthy) or can the EU be held responsible to a degree, perhaps through the failure to include teaching on the European Union in school curricula, public disillusionment with the EU or unnecessary institutional and policy-making complexity.

APPENDIX

Section A.1.

This section contains the country-level graphs for questions (1), (2), (3) and (4) from section 2.3.1. and 2.3.2.

Plate (1)










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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Plate (2)


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Portugal
Spain


Question (2) - Austria, Finland and Sweden
Net Support
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0
-20
-40
95 97 99
Austria
Finland
Sweden

Plate (3)


Question (3) - Belgium
Net Support
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40
20
0
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - France
Net Support
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60
40
20
0
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - Germany
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - Italy
Net Support
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60
40
20
0
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
Question (3) - Luxembourg
Net Support
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80
60
40
20
0
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - Netherlands
Net Support
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60
40
20
0
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
Question (3) - Denmark
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - Ireland
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - UK
Net Support
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50
0
-50
71 75 79 83 87 91 95


Question (3) - Greece
Net Support
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60
40
20
0
81 85 89 93


Question (3) - Portugal and Spain
Net Support
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50
0
85 89 93
Portugal
Spain


Question (3) - Austria, Finland, Sweden
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
1995
Austria
Finland
Sweden

Plate (4)


Question (4) - Belgium
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
-20
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - France
Net Support
100
50
0
-50
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Germany
Net Support
100
50
0
-50
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Italy
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Luxembourg
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Netherlands
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Denmark
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Ireland
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - UK
Net Support
100
50
0
-50
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Greece
Net Support
100
80
60
40
20
0
83
87
91
95
99


Question (4) - Portugal and Spain
Net Support
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80
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
-60
-80
86
90
94
98
Portugal
Spain


Question (4) - Austria, Finland, Sweden
Net Support
95
97
99
Austria
Finland
Sweden

Section A.2.

This table displays the coding of the variables used in chapters five and six.

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION
Dependent/Independent variables	
European/National identity	Scored from –3 to 3. Negative score indicates more national attachment [Mean = -0.65; variance = 0.80]
National Pride	Factor analysis scale [mean = 0.00; variance = 0.78 (political pride), 0.71 (cultural pride); range 4.77 (PP), 4.88 (CP)]. Levels of pride increase positively with variable score
Nationalism	Variable split into quartiles derived from Likert scale (scored from 3-15). Levels of nationalism increase positively with variable score [mean = 2.55; variance = 1.14]
Minority Nationalism	1=Favours unitary position 2=Holds separatist attitudes. Data on Ireland initially missing; coded to 1.07. Interaction variables are created for **Scotland, Wales, Catalonia** and the **Basque Country** by combining minority nationalism response with regional origin of respondent as appropriate
Racism	Factor analysis scale [mean = 0.00; variance = 0.75, range = 5.48]. Levels of racism increase positively with variable score
Support for European Integration	Bivariate scoring - either pro/anti-integration or attitude/non-attitude holding. 1=Pro-European or attitude holder respectively
Control variables	
Sex	1=Male, 0=Female
Age	From 14 to 96 years. Coded as cohorts (1 - ≤29;2 - 30-39; 3 - 40-49; 4 - 50-59; 5 - 60+)
Education	Coded from 1-7 (1 – no education; 2 – incomplete primary; 3 – primary completed; 4 – incomplete secondary; 5- secondary completed; 6 – incomplete university/semi-higher; 7- university completed). Some national variations apply[1].
Subjective Social Class	Coded from 1-7 (1 – Lower class; 2 – Working class; 3 - Lower Middle class; 4 - Don't know; 5 – Upper middle class; 6 – Upper class; 7 - Middle class). This variable is treated as categorical. **Middle class** is the base category. No data for GB or the Netherlands.
Political Affiliation	Coded from 1-6 (1 – Far left; 2 – Left, centre left; 3 - Right, conservative; 4 – Far right; 5 – Other, Don't Know; 6 - Centre, liberal). We code this variable so that 'N/A' (previously coded '0') and 'answer-refused' (previously coded '9') are coded system-missing. 'No party' ('7') and 'Don't know' ('8') are coded along with 'no specific party' ('6'). This variable is treated as categorical; **Left** being the omitted category. No data for Italy.
Income	Coded from 1-5 as quintiles in each country. Hence, this is a measure of the relative income of a respondent. Higher value equals greater wealth. Italy data missing.
Country dummies	With **Spain** as the omitted country.
Religion	Coded from 1-3 (1 - Protestant and Lutheran respondents, 2 - Roman Catholic, 3 - No religion professed). Taken as categorical variable, with **no religion** as the base category. ISEI coding from 16 to 90. Occupational status increases with score. Data missing for GB, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (coded to the mean of 43.5).
Occupation	
Occupation Dummy	1=no occupation data available, 0=occupation data available
Farmers	1=Agricultural worker; 0=non-agricultural worker

[1] The coding for Sweden, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Great Britain departs from this general model to take account of different national educational qualifications. These categories are broadly, however, the national equivalents of the qualifications set out in the general coding and are hence comparable.

Section A.3.

In this section I include the unabridged regression models from section 5.3.

For the following models:

- All data entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
- Calculations are correct to 2 decimal places.
- ** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
- * indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).

Table 5.6. Aggregate Level Impact on Political Pride of the Independent Variables

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Cultural Pride	0.21	**	0.18	**	0.20	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Identity	-0.02		-0.02		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Nationalism	0.20	**	0.19	**	0.18	**
	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.11	**	-0.11	*	-0.14	*
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Basque Country	0.05		0.10		0.15	
	(0.08)		(0.10)		(0.09)	
Catalonia	0.17	**	0.10		0.10	
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Scotland	-0.04		-0.01		-	
	(0.08)		(0.11)			
Wales	0.09		0.04		-	
	(0.09)		(0.12)			
Racism	-0.22	**	-0.20	**	-0.19	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Germany	0.89	**	0.78	**	0.86	**
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Great Britain	0.37	**	0.22	**	-	
	(0.06)		(0.08)			
Austria	0.66	**	0.63	**	0.65	**
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Italy	-0.50	**	-		-	
	(0.05)					
Ireland	0.32	**	0.42	**	0.47	**
	(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Netherlands	1.03	**	0.92	**	-	
	(0.05)		(0.06)			
Sweden	0.32	**	0.22	**	0.30	**
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Age	0.01		0.00		-0.01	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Sex	0.07	**	0.07	*	0.08	*
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Education	-0.02		-0.03	*	-0.06	**
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	

	A Ctd.	B Ctd.	C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant)	0.21 **	0.15 **	0.17 **
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Religion (Catholic)	0.24 **	0.19 **	0.25 **
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
ISEI score	0.00	0.00	0.00 *
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI dummy	0.02	0.10 *	0.11 *
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Farmers	-0.01	-0.10	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Income	-	0.04 **	0.03 *
		(0.01)	(0.02)
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.35 **	-0.40 **
		(0.06)	(0.07)
Political Affiliation (Left)	-	0.01	-0.06
		(0.05)	(0.06)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-	0.08 *	-0.02
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	-0.20	-0.19
		(0.16)	(0.18)
Political Affiliation (Other)	-	-0.17 **	-0.23 **
		(0.05)	(0.06)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-	-	0.01
			(0.11)
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	0.09
			(0.06)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-	-	-0.04
			(0.05)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-0.05
			(0.14)
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-	-	0.13 *
			(0.06)
Sub. Class (Upper)	-	-	0.38 *
			(0.19)
Constant	-4.15 **	-4.17 **	-3.18 **
	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.32)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.39	0.26	0.29
F stat. (DF)	127.54 (24)	38.10 (29)	28.20 (31)

Table 5.6b. Country Level Impact on Political Pride of the Independent Variables

	Germany		GB		Austria		Italy	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Cultural Pride	0.18	**	0.13		0.19	**	0.21	**
	(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.05)	
Identity	-0.05		-0.04		0.09		-0.05	
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)	
Nationalism	0.16	**	0.19	**	0.19	**	0.21	**
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.15		-0.01		-0.36	**	0.02	
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.12)		(0.08)	
Basque Country	-		-		-		-	
Catalonia	-		-		-		-	
Scotland	-		-0.02		-		-	
			(0.12)					
Wales	-		0.08		-		-	
			(0.12)					
Racism	-0.14	**	-0.21	**	-0.22	**	-0.26	**
	(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.03)	
Age	-0.04	*	0.03		0.03		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.05)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
Sex	0.07		0.11		0.03		0.01	
	(0.06)		(0.10)		(0.08)		(0.06)	
Education	-0.05	**	0.02		-0.05		0.00	
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.02)	
Religion (Protestant)	0.19	**	0.05		-0.05		-	
	(0.06)		(0.11)		(0.13)			
Religion (Catholic)	0.25	**	0.02		0.09		0.23	
	(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.14)	
ISEI score	0.00		-		0.00		-	
	(0.00)				(0.00)			
ISEI dummy	0.06		-		0.06		-	
	(0.06)				(0.10)			
Farmers	-0.13		-		-0.12		-	
	(0.11)				(0.12)			
Income	0.06	*	0.02		0.00		-	
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.04)			

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.50 **	-0.34 *	-	-
	(0.13)	0.17		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.05	-0.23	0.21	-
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.16)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.17 *	0.21	0.05	-
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.16)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-0.21	-	-	-
	(0.20)			
Political Affiliation (Other)	-0.28	-0.14	-0.50	-
	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.57)	
Sub. Class (Lower)	-0.20	-	-0.28	-
	(0.19)		(0.28)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.06	-	-0.16	-
	(0.06)		(0.10)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.08	-	0.11	-
	(0.08)		(0.11)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.40	-	0.36 *	-
	(0.24)		(0.15)	
Constant	-0.04	-0.93 **	0.24	-1.64 **
	(0.19)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.21)
Number of Cases	741	270	322	841
R^2	0.31	0.22	0.29	0.15
F stat. (DF)	14.41 (23)	4.01 (16)	6.62 (21)	19.71 (9)

	Ireland		Netherlands		Sweden		Spain	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Cultural Pride	0.21	**	0.18	**	0.06		0.27	**
	(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Identity	0.03		0.00		0.02		0.09	*
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Nationalism	0.06		0.11	**	0.17	**	0.18	**
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Minority Nationalism			-0.11		-0.12		0.03	
			(0.08)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Basque Country	-		-		-		0.07	
							(0.10)	
Catalonia	-		-		-		-0.06	
							(0.07)	
Scotland	-		-		-		-	
Wales	-		-		-		-	
Racism	-0.06		-0.14	**	-0.26	**	-0.23	**
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.06)	
Age	0.09	**	-0.03		0.00		0.05	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Sex	-0.04		0.05		0.06		0.02	
	(0.07)		(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Education	0.01		0.05	**	0.07	**	-0.04	
	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Religion (Protestant)	0.37		0.04		0.03		-0.95	**
	(0.28)		(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.25)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.05		0.04		0.02		0.09	
	(0.23)		(0.05)		(0.26)		(0.15)	
ISEI score	0.00		-		-		0.00	
	(0.00)						(0.00)	
ISEI dummy	0.13		-		-		0.16	
	(0.10)						(0.09)	
Farmers	-0.09		-		-		0.06	
	(0.11)						(0.24)	
Income	0.02		0.01		0.01		-0.03	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.14	0.09	0.07
		(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.20)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.17	-0.06	0.26 **	0.48 *
	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.20)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.07	-0.01	-0.13	-0.04
	(0.36)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.19)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	-0.10	-	-
		(0.16)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	-0.05	-0.16 **	-0.31 **	0.13
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.20)
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.14	-	0.21	0.26
	(0.21)		(0.29)	(0.16)
Sub. Class (Working)	-0.06	-	0.12	0.15
	(0.07)		(0.08)	(0.10)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.10	-	-	0.14
	(0.09)			(0.12)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-0.14	-	-0.03	-
	(0.19)		(0.17)	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.19	-	0.03	0.20
	(0.13)		(0.09)	(0.19)
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.09	-	-0.03	0.24
	(0.32)		(0.24)	(0.41)
Constant	-0.14	0.15	-0.87 **	-1.19 **
	(0.33)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.42)
Number of Cases	617	909	564	428
R^2	0.11	0.13	0.22	0.35
F stat. (DF)	3.53 (22)	8.41 (16)	8.25 (20)	8.80 (24)

Table 5.7. Aggregate Level Impact on Cultural Pride of the Independent Variables

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	0.18	**	0.18	**	0.20	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Identity	-0.05	**	-0.07	**	-0.05	*
	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Nationalism	0.12	**	0.13	**	0.17	**
	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.16	**	-0.19	**	-0.18	**
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Basque Country	-0.39	**	-0.26	*	-0.27	*
	(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.12)	
Catalonia	-0.08	*	-0.04		-0.05	
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Scotland	-0.16		-0.10		-	
	(0.11)		(0.15)			
Wales	0.02		0.09		-	
	(0.10)		(0.10)			
Racism	0.10	**	0.10	**	0.13	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Germany	-0.71	**	-0.70	**	-0.76	**
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Great Britain	0.09		0.19	*	-	
	(0.06)		(0.07)			
Austria	-0.21	**	-0.17	**	-0.24	**
	(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.06)	
Italy	0.24	**	-		-	
	(0.04)					
Ireland	0.50	**	0.53	**	0.52	**
	(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Netherlands	-0.58	**	-0.57	**	-	
	(0.05)		(0.06)			
Sweden	-0.36	**	-0.32	**	-0.40	**
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
	0.00		0.02		0.02	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
	-0.02		0.00		-0.04	
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
	0.00		-0.02		0.01	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)	

	A Ctd.	B Ctd.	C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant)	-0.02	-0.08	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Religion (Catholic)	0.00	-0.07	-0.12 *
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
ISEI score	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI dummy	0.09 *	0.05	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Farmers	0.09	0.07	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Income	-	-0.02	-0.01
		(0.01)	(0.02)
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	0.11	0.19 **
		(0.07)	(0.08)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-	0.10	0.08
		(0.05)	(0.07)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-	0.11 **	0.16 **
		(0.04)	(0.05)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	0.36 *	0.39 *
		(0.16)	(0.19)
Political Affiliation (Other)	-	0.05	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.07)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-	-	0.00
			(0.11)
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-0.04
			(0.05)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-	-	0.04
			(0.05)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	0.00
			(0.13)
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-	-	-0.03
			(0.06)
Sub. Class (Upper)	-	-	0.02
			(0.10)
Constant	1.11 **	1.09 **	0.81 **
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.33	0.35	0.36
F stat. (DF)	115.76 (24)	80.17 (29)	60.56 (31)

Table 5.7b. Country Level Impact on Cultural Pride of the Independent Variables

	Germany		GB		Austria		Italy	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	0.23	**	0.12		0.21	**	0.12	**
	(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.03)	
Identity	0.00		-0.13	**	-0.09	*	0.00	
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.02)	
Nationalism	0.21	**	0.03		0.22	**	0.08	**
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.02)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.15		-0.17		-0.13		-0.06	
	(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.15)		(0.06)	
Basque Country	-		-		-		-	
Catalonia	-		-		-		-	
Scotland	-		-0.16		-		-	
			(0.14)					
Wales	-		0.04		-		-	
			(0.10)					
Racism	0.17	**	-0.01		0.08		0.07	*
	(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.03)	
Age	0.03		0.03		0.09	*	-0.03	
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.02)	
Sex	-0.07		0.20	*	-0.20	*	-0.03	
	(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.04)	
Education	-0.01		-0.11	**	0.03		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.02)	
Religion (Protestant)	-0.08		-0.07		0.16		-	
	(0.07)		(0.10)		(0.15)			
Religion (Catholic)	-0.15		0.09		0.02		0.21	*
	(0.08)		(0.14)		(0.12)		(0.10)	
ISEI score	0.00		-		0.00		-	
	(0.00)				(0.00)			
ISEI dummy	0.08		-		0.04		-	
	(0.07)				(0.10)			
Farmers	0.26		-		-0.34	*	-	
	(0.16)				(0.17)			
Income	-0.01		-0.05		0.02		-	
	(0.02)		(0.04)		(0.04)			

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	0.19	-1.05 **	-	-
	(0.15)	0.18		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.12	-0.09	0.03	-
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.16)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.00	-0.04	0.01	-
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.17)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.24	-	-	-
	(0.22)			
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.23	0.00	-0.04	-
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.49)	
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.12	-	-0.15	-
	(0.18)		(0.26)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.01	-	0.09	-
	(0.07)		(0.11)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.05	-	-0.03	-
	(0.08)		(0.10)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	-0.01	-	-0.28	-
	(0.12)		(0.18)	
Constant	-0.78 **	1.03 **	-1.14 **	0.19
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.17)
Number of Cases	741	270	322	841
R^2	0.29	0.23	0.30	0.08
F stat. (DF)	12.61 (23)	4.52 (16)	8.09 (21)	7.24 (9)

	Ireland		Netherlands		Sweden		Spain	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	0.14	**	0.24	**	0.05		0.24	**
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Identity	-0.06	*	0.05		-0.06		-0.14	**
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Nationalism	0.10	**	0.05		0.12	**	0.07	*
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Minority Nationalism			-0.21	*	-0.14		-0.18	
			(0.10)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
Basque Country	-		-		-		-0.30	*
							(0.12)	
Catalonia	-		-		-		-0.04	
							(0.06)	
Scotland	-		-		-		-	
Wales	-		-		-		-	
Racism	0.03		0.08	*	0.04		0.04	
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Age	0.04		0.00		-0.02		-0.02	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Sex	-0.11	*	-0.10	*	0.01		0.08	
	(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Education	0.02		-0.10	**	0.00		0.02	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Religion (Protestant)	0.13		0.06		0.08		1.33	**
	(0.26)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.22)	
Religion (Catholic)	0.27		0.16	**	0.10		0.02	
	(0.22)		(0.06)		(0.56)		(0.13)	
ISEI score	0.00		-		-		0.00	
	(0.00)						(0.00)	
ISEI dummy	-0.09		-		-		-0.02	
	(0.09)						(0.08)	
Farmers	0.03		-		-		-0.22	
	(0.09)						(0.18)	
Income	0.01		-0.02		-0.03		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.35 **	0.03	0.20
		(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.09	-0.03	-0.01	0.18
	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.20)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.11	0.14 *	0.28 **	0.32
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.19)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	-0.20	-	-
		(0.16)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	-0.02	0.09	-0.01	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.22)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-0.18	-	-0.35	0.02
	(0.25)		(0.22)	(0.14)
Sub. Class (Working)	-0.13 *	-	-0.03	0.06
	(0.06)		(0.07)	(0.09)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.05	-	-	0.21 *
	(0.07)			(0.11)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	0.02	-	-0.09	-
	(0.16)		(0.19)	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.12	-	0.21 *	0.08
	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.15)
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.04	-	0.04	0.14
	(0.32)		(0.34)	(0.35)
Constant	0.03	0.28	-0.29	-0.26
	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.40)
Number of Cases	617	909	564	428
R^2	0.13	0.20	0.12	0.21
F stat. (DF)	3.81 (22)	15.32(16)	4.38 (20)	4.36 (24)

Table 5.8. Aggregate Level Impact on European Identity

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	-0.03		-0.02		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Cultural Pride	-0.08	**	-0.10	**	-0.07	*
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Nationalism	-0.07	**	-0.06	**	-0.06	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Minority Nationalism	0.22	**	0.19	**	0.16	*
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Basque Country	0.26	**	0.09		0.10	
	(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Catalonia	0.36	**	0.27	**	0.28	**
	(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
Scotland	0.18	*	0.21	*	-	
	(0.08)		(0.10)			
Wales	0.12		0.15		-	
	(0.11)		(0.15)			
Racism	-0.12	**	-0.14	**	-0.16	**
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Germany	0.21	**	0.17	*	0.07	
	(0.06)		(0.08)		(0.09)	
Great Britain	-0.36	**	-0.36	**	-	
	(0.07)		(0.10)			
Austria	0.17	**	0.07		-0.01	
	(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Italy	0.26	**	-		-	
	(0.05)					
Ireland	-0.31	**	-0.37	**	-0.31	**
	(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
Netherlands	0.00		-0.02		-	
	(0.06)		(0.08)			
Sweden	-0.17	*	-0.19	*	-0.24	**
	(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Age	-0.01		0.01		0.00	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
Sex	-0.02		-0.05		-0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Education	0.02		0.02		0.00	
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)	

	A Ctd.	B Ctd.	C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant)	-0.14 **	-0.14 **	-0.18 **
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Religion (Catholic)	0.00	0.01	-0.10
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
ISEI score	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI dummy	0.09 *	0.06	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Farmers	0.03	-0.06	-0.04
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Income	-	0.00	-0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.20 **	-0.19 *
		(0.07)	(0.08)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-	-0.05	-0.08
		(0.07)	(0.09)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-	-0.11 *	-0.10
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	-0.51 **	-0.49 *
		(0.18)	(0.22)
Political Affiliation (Other)	-	-0.06	-0.22 *
		(0.07)	(0.09)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-	-	0.03
			(0.12)
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-0.10
			(0.07)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-	-	-0.06
			(0.06)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	0.11
			(0.16)
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-	-	-0.03
			(0.08)
Sub. Class (Upper)	-	-	0.13
			(0.15)
Constant	-0.62	-0.03	0.04
	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.39)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.12
F stat. (DF)	30.65 (24)	16.42 (29)	13.15 (31)

Table 5.8b. Country Level Impact on European Identity

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	-0.08	-0.06	0.15	-0.05
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.04)
Cultural Pride	0.00	-0.23 **	-0.14 *	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Nationalism	-0.05	-0.12	0.00	-0.09 **
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Minority Nationalism	0.20 *	0.20	0.25	0.30 **
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.09)
Basque Country	-	-	-	-
Catalonia	-	-	-	-
Scotland	-	0.04	-	-
		(0.11)		
Wales	-	0.16	-	-
		(0.16)		
Racism	-0.23 **	-0.08	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Age	-0.01	0.05	0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Sex	-0.07	-0.03	-0.19	0.12 *
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.06)
Education	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Religion (Protestant)	-0.17 *	-0.13	0.29	-
	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.30)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.05	0.32	0.13	-0.43 *
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.20)
ISEI score	0.00	-	-0.01	-
	(0.00)		(0.00)	
ISEI dummy	0.09	-	0.15	-
	(0.07)		(0.14)	
Farmers	-0.13	-	0.06	-
	(0.16)		(0.21)	
Income	-0.02	0.00	0.12 **	-
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.20	0.06	-	-
	(0.16)	0.25		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.03	0.02	-0.40	-
	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.22)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.13	-0.15	-0.48 *	-
	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.23)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-0.54 *	-	-	-
	(0.26)			
Political Affiliation (Other)	-0.61	0.28	-1.12	-
	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.92)	
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.27 *	-	0.21	-
	(0.14)		(0.24)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.06	-	0.09	-
	(0.07)		(0.14)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.08	-	-0.17	-
	(0.10)		(0.15)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.18	-	-0.21	-
	(0.22)		(0.33)	
Constant	-0.29	-1.30 **	-1.02 *	-0.21
	(0.25)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.29)
Number of Cases	741	270	322	841
R^2	0.15	0.21	0.09	0.07
F stat. (DF)	4.95 (23)	3.94 (16)	1.34 (21)	5.61 (9)

N.B. The F-stat indicates that the models for GB and Austria are not significant.

Appendix

	Ireland		Netherlands		Sweden		Spain	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	0.05		0.01		0.03		0.16	*
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.07)	
Cultural Pride	-0.12	*	0.07		-0.09		-0.27	**
	(0.06)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.08)	
Nationalism	-0.07		-0.03		0.00		-0.10	*
	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Minority Nationalism			0.14		0.28	*	-0.04	
			(0.11)		(0.13)		(0.18)	
Basque Country	-		-		-		0.02	
							(0.12)	
Catalonia	-		-		-		0.30	**
							(0.10)	
Scotland	-		-		-		-	
Wales	-		-		-		-	
Racism	-0.22	**	-0.10	**	-0.13	**	-0.02	
	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Age	-0.07	*	0.02		0.03		-0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Sex	0.01		-0.10	*	0.03		0.12	
	(0.08)		(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.09)	
Education	0.00		0.01		0.03		-0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Religion (Protestant)	-0.23		0.02		-0.12		1.68	**
	(0.36)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.29)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.28		0.03		1.11	**	-0.27	
	(0.20)		(0.07)		(0.25)		(0.19)	
ISEI score	0.01	*	-				0.01	
	(0.00)						(0.01)	
ISEI dummy	0.02		-				0.01	
	(0.14)						(0.11)	
Farmers	0.17		-				0.13	
	(0.14)						(0.24)	
Income	-0.02		-0.01		-0.04		0.03	
	(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.04)	

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.08	-0.52 **	0.92
		(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.62)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.10	0.08	0.01	1.12
	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.62)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.55 **	0.00	0.19	1.04
	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.62)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	-0.57 **	-	-
		(0.19)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.08	0.03	-0.17	0.92
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.63)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-0.06	-	-0.39	-0.28
	(0.35)		(0.29)	(0.22)
Sub. Class (Working)	0.00	-	0.01	-0.14
	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.14)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.08	-	-	-0.08
	(0.10)			(0.16)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-0.12	-	0.24	-
	(0.20)		(0.22)	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.14	-	0.19 *	0.28
	(0.15)		(0.09)	(0.17)
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.68	-	0.44	0.02
	(0.41)		(0.24)	(0.33)
Constant	-0.62 *	-0.66 **	-1.22 **	-1.23
	(0.31)	(0.19)	(0.28)	(0.79)
Number of Cases	617	909	564	428
R^2	0.11	0.04	0.12	0.16
F stat. (DF)	4.60 (22)	2.2 (16)	4.89 (20)	3.16 (24)

N.B. The F-stat indicates that the models for the Netherlands and Spain are not significant.

Table 5.9. Aggregate Level Impact on Nationalism of the Independent Variables

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	0.30	**	0.30	**	0.30	**
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Cultural Pride	0.21	**	0.21	**	0.26	**
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Identity	-0.08	**	-0.07	**	-0.07	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.14	**	-0.11		-0.02	
	(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Basque Country	-0.19	*	-0.29		-0.29	
	(0.09)		(0.17)		(0.17)	
Catalonia	0.04		0.06		0.03	
	(0.06)		(0.09)		(0.09)	
Scotland	0.05		0.03		-	
	(0.08)		(0.11)			
Wales	-0.21		-0.19		-	
	(0.11)		(0.16)			
Racism	0.28	**	0.35	**	0.31	**
	(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Germany	-0.57	**	-0.59	**	-0.56	**
	(0.06)		(0.08)		(0.09)	
Great Britain	-0.02		-0.06		-	
	(0.07)		(0.10)			
Austria	0.23	**	0.29	**	0.26	**
	(0.05)		(0.07)		(0.08)	
Italy	-0.20	**	-		-	
	(0.06)					
Ireland	0.11		0.21	*	0.18	
	(0.06)		(0.08)		(0.09)	
Netherlands	-0.45	**	-0.44	**	-	
	(0.06)		(0.09)			
Sweden	-0.10		-0.06		0.01	
	(0.07)		(0.09)		(0.10)	
Age	0.08	**	0.06	**	0.07	**
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
Sex	0.06		0.08	*	0.07	
	(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Education	-0.10	**	-0.07	**	-0.08	**
	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	

	A Ctd.	B Ctd.	C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant)	0.02	-0.02	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Religion (Catholic)	0.07	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
ISEI score	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI dummy	0.04	0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Farmers	0.16	0.18	0.21
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Income	-	-0.02	-0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	0.05	0.05
		(0.08)	(0.09)
Political Affiliation (Cente)	-	-0.07	-0.13
		(0.06)	(0.08)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-	0.05	0.04
		(0.05)	(0.06)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	0.11	0.22
		(0.18)	(0.21)
Political Affiliation (Other)	-	-0.04	-0.07
		(0.06)	(0.08)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-	-	0.11
			(0.12)
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-0.06
			(0.08)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-	-	-0.07
			(0.07)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	0.01
			(0.16)
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-	-	0.06
			(0.08)
Sub. Class (Upper)	-	-	0.31
			(0.27)
Constant	3.95 **	3.53 **	2.99 **
	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.39)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.31	0.35	0.37
F stat. (DF)	118.27 (24)	70.48 (29)	55.71 (31)

Table 5.9b. Country Level Impact on Nationalism of the Independent Variables

	Germany		GB		Austria		Italy	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	0.30	**	0.26	**	0.28	**	0.29	**
	(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.04)	
Cultural Pride	0.30	**	0.05		0.29	**	0.20	**
	(0.04)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.05)	
Identity	-0.06		-0.10		0.00		-0.11	**
	(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.04)	
Minority Nationalism	0.07		-0.28	*	-0.35	*	-0.16	
	(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.17)		(0.09)	
Basque Country	-		-		-		-	
Catalonia	-		-		-		-	
Scotland	-		0.09		-		-	
			(0.13)					
Wales	-		-0.18		-		-	
			(0.17)					
Racism	0.31	**	0.41	**	0.31	**	0.18	**
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.04)	
Age	0.09	**	0.04		0.04		0.08	**
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.02)	
Sex	0.10		0.12		0.18		0.07	
	(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.10)		(0.07)	
Education	-0.05		-0.08		-0.19	**	-0.13	**
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.03)	
Religion (Protestant)	-0.13		0.06		0.19		-	
	(0.08)		(0.13)		(0.23)			
Religion (Catholic)	-0.02		-0.12		0.17		0.49	**
	(0.09)		(0.15)		(0.12)		(0.14)	
ISEI score	0.00		-		-0.01		-	
	(0.00)				(0.00)			
ISEI dummy	-0.03		-		-0.22		-	
	(0.08)				(0.12)			
Farmers	0.12		-		-0.09		-	
	(0.18)				(0.23)			
Income	-0.04		0.04		-0.03		-	
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.05)			

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.01	-0.70 **	-	-
	(0.18)	0.21		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.17	0.08	0.21	-
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.25)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.25 *	0.11	0.14	-
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.25)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.36	-	-	-
	(0.24)			
Political Affiliation (Other)	-0.21	-0.02	0.89 **	-
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.26)	
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.22	-	-0.05	-
	(0.20)		(0.20)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.05	-	-0.01	-
	(0.09)		(0.11)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.09	-	0.14	-
	(0.10)		(0.14)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.34	-	-0.04	-
	(0.34)		(0.34)	
Constant	1.96 **	2.90 **	4.11 **	2.53 **
	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.24)
Number of Cases	741	270	322	841
R^2	0.35	0.35	0.43	0.23
F stat. (DF)	20.01 (23)	8.06 (16)	151.9 (21)	37.34 (9)

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	0.09	0.28 **	0.27 **	0.31 **
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Cultural Pride	0.25 **	0.09	0.21 **	0.15 *
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Identity	-0.08	-0.05	0.00	-0.11 *
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Minority Nationalism		-0.20	-0.15	-0.16
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Basque Country	-	-	-	-0.26
				(0.17)
Catalonia	-	-	-	0.10
				(0.10)
Scotland	-	-	-	-
Wales	-	-	-	-
Racism	0.07	0.34 **	0.51 **	0.20 **
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Age	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Sex	0.07	0.11	0.20 *	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Education	-0.06	-0.05 *	-0.04	-0.15 **
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Religion (Protestant)	0.10	-0.08	-0.05	-0.38
	(0.29)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.30)
Religion (Catholic)	0.24	0.01	0.18	0.09
	(0.22)	(0.08)	(0.57)	(0.18)
ISEI score	0.00	-		0.00
	(0.00)			(0.00)
ISEI dummy	0.06	-		-0.02
	(0.11)			(0.13)
Farmers	0.03	-		0.60 **
	(0.16)			(0.18)
Income	-0.02	-0.09 **	-0.09 **	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.10	0.09	-1.08 **
		(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.08	0.00	0.09	-1.41 **
	(0.21)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.32	-0.13	-0.06	-1.39 **
	(0.30)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	-0.30	-	-
		(0.21)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.05	0.03	0.05	-1.49 **
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.34	-	0.40	-0.18
	(0.26)		(0.29)	(0.20)
Sub. Class (Working)	0.03	-	0.00	-0.29 *
	(0.09)		(0.10)	(0.12)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.01	-	-	-0.17
	(0.11)			(0.14)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	0.04	-	-0.01	-
	(0.21)		(0.23)	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.19	-	0.04	-0.31
	(0.15)		(0.12)	(0.25)
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.47	-	-0.44 *	0.68
	(0.45)		(0.18)	(0.98)
Constant	2.68 **	2.83 **	3.03 **	4.65 **
	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.42)
Number of Cases	617	909	564	428
R^2	0.12	0.18	0.32	0.29
F stat. (DF)	4.28 (22)	12.66 (16)	22.28 (20)	6.68 (24)

Table 5.10. Aggregate Level Impact on Racism of the Independent Variables

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	b (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)		*b* (s.e.)	
Political Pride	-0.23	**	-0.21	**	-0.20	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Cultural Pride	0.12	**	0.11	**	0.13	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)	
Identity	-0.09	**	-0.10	**	-0.12	**
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Nationalism	0.20	**	0.23	**	0.20	**
	(0.01)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Minority Nationalism	0.05		-0.07		-0.13	*
	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Basque Country	0.11		0.20		0.19	
	(0.07)		(0.12)		(0.12)	
Catalonia	0.06		0.14	*	0.14	*
	(0.04)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Scotland	-0.11		-0.12		-	
	(0.09)		(0.15)			
Wales	0.05		0.12		-	
	(0.11)		(0.14)			
Germany	0.67	**	0.58	**	0.55	**
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Great Britain	0.35	**	0.20	**	-	
	(0.06)		(0.08)			
Austria	0.27	**	0.13	*	0.12	
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Italy	0.57	**	-		-	
	(0.04)					
Ireland	-0.37	**	-0.48	**	-0.41	**
	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Netherlands	0.47	**	0.25	**	-	
	(0.05)		(0.06)			
Sweden	0.30	**	0.15	*	0.16	*
	(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.07)	
Age	0.03	**	0.03	**	0.03	*
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	
Sex	0.05		0.05		0.03	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Education	-0.11	**	-0.09	**	-0.07	**
	(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)	

	A Ctd.	B Ctd.	C Ctd.
Religion (Protestant)	0.01	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Religion (Catholic)	0.04	-0.10 *	-0.11
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
ISEI score	-0.003 *	-0.005 **	-0.005 **
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ISEI dummy	-0.01	0.03	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Farmers	-0.08	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Income	-	0.00	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.02)
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.05	-0.08
		(0.06)	(0.07)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-	0.11 *	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.07)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-	0.21 **	0.17 **
		(0.04)	(0.04)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	0.74 **	0.73 **
		(0.10)	(0.11)
Political Affiliation (Other)	-	0.19 **	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.06)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-	-	0.22
			(0.11)
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	0.01
			(0.05)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-	-	0.12 *
			(0.05)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-0.06
			(0.16)
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-	-	-0.08
			(0.06)
Sub. Class (Upper)	-	-	0.02
			(0.26)
Constant	-2.71 **	-1.25 **	-0.74 *
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.31)
Number of Cases	5823	3892	2672
R^2	0.26	0.28	0.33
F stat. (DF)	79.31 (24)	41.51 (29)	32.61 (31)

Table 5.10b. Country Level Impact on Racism of the Independent Variables

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	-0.16 **	-0.25 **	-0.33 **	-0.27 **
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Cultural Pride	0.15 **	-0.01	0.10	0.12 *
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Identity	-0.18 **	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Nationalism	0.20 **	0.34 **	0.31 **	0.13 **
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Minority Nationalism	-0.16	0.05	0.06	0.38 **
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.08)
Basque Country	-	-	-	-
Catalonia	-	-	-	-
Scotland	-	-0.19	-	-
		(0.18)		
Wales	-	0.10	-	-
		(0.15)		
Age	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Sex	0.05	0.08	0.03	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.06)
Education	-0.08 **	-0.14 **	-0.09	-0.14 **
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Religion (Protestant)	-0.16 *	-0.05	-0.09	-
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.23)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.21 **	-0.10	-0.08	0.50 *
	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.20)
ISEI score	-0.01 *	-	0.00	-
	(0.00)		(0.00)	
ISEI dummy	0.07	-	0.02	-
	(0.06)		(0.11)	
Farmers	-0.18	-	0.18	-
	(0.17)		(0.18)	
Income	0.02	0.00	0.01	-
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	

Appendix

	Germany	GB	Austria	Italy
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.03	0.65 **	-	-
	(0.15)	0.20		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.03	-0.25	-0.15	-
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.21)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.10	0.04	0.11	-
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.22)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.65 **	-	-	-
	(0.15)			
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.12	0.30	0.14	-
	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.26)	
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.06	-	0.32	-
	(0.17)		(0.17)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	0.09	-	0.25	-
	(0.06)		(0.13)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-	-	-	-
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.06	-	-0.10	-
	(0.08)		(0.13)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	0.10	-	-0.12	-
	(0.34)		(0.24)	
Constant	0.41	-0.30	-0.63	-0.49
	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.27)
Number of Cases	741	270	322	841
R^2	0.33	0.31	0.32	0.23
F stat. (DF)	17.76 (23)	6.74 (16)	10.32 (21)	37.34 (9)

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
	b (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)	*b* (s.e.)
Political Pride	-0.06	-0.18 **	-0.30 **	-0.21 **
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Cultural Pride	0.04	0.08 *	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Identity	-0.13 **	-0.07 *	-0.11 **	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Nationalism	0.04	0.18 **	0.37 **	0.10 **
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Minority Nationalism	-	-0.11	0.05	0.02
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Basque Country	-	-	-	0.09
				(0.12)
Catalonia	-	-	-	0.02
				(0.07)
Scotland	-	-	-	-
Wales	-	-	-	-
Age	-0.04	0.07 **	0.05	0.04
	(-0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Sex	-0.11	0.08	-0.10	-0.02
	(-0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education	0.01	-0.09 **	-0.08 *	-0.06 *
	(-0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Religion (Protestant)	-0.29	0.01	0.07	0.28
	(-0.26)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.20)
Religion (Catholic)	-0.36	0.09	-0.40 **	0.25 *
	(-0.19)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.12)
ISEI score	0.00	-	-	-0.01
	(0.00)			(0.00)
ISEI dummy	-0.11	-	-	-0.03
	(-0.09)			(0.09)
Farmers	0.14	-	-	0.10
	(-0.12)			(0.32)
Income	0.04	-0.02	0.03	-0.01
	(-0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)

	Ireland	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-	-0.43 **	-0.31	-0.71 *
		(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.35)
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.02	-0.14 *	-0.02	-0.58
	(-0.21)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.35)
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.03	0.30 **	0.32 **	-0.51
	(-0.18)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.34)
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-	0.26	-	-
		(0.15)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.04	0.21 **	0.05	-0.69 *
	(-0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.34)
Sub. Class (Lower)	-0.25	-	-0.01	0.40 *
	(-0.32)		(0.32)	(0.18)
Sub. Class (Working)	-0.03	-	0.22 *	0.00
	(-0.07)		(0.08)	(0.09)
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.14	-	-	0.16
	(-0.09)			(0.11)
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	0.15	-	-0.02	-
	(-0.13)		(0.24)	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.13	-	-0.12	-0.09
	(-0.10)		(0.10)	(0.17)
Sub. Class (Upper)	-0.30 **	-	-0.26	0.03
	(-0.10)		(0.23)	(0.56)
Constant	1.06 **	-0.18	-1.18 **	0.30
	(-0.26)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.45)
Number of Cases	617	909	564	428
R^2	0.12	0.18	0.38	0.20
F stat. (DF)	4.14 (22)	12.66 (16)	22.00 (20)	3.96 (24)

Section A.4.

In this section I include the unabridged regression models from section 6.3.

For the following models:

- All data entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
- Calculations are correct to 2 decimal places.
- ** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
- * indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).

Table 6.3. Aggregate Level Impact on Support of the Independent Variables

Model	1a			1b			1c		
	b		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	0.49	**	1.64	0.60	**	1.83	0.60	**	1.81
	(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.08)		
Cultural Pride	0.21	**	1.24	0.21	**	1.24	0.26	**	1.30
	(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.07)		
Identity	0.46	**	1.58	0.53	**	1.70	0.46	**	1.59
	(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.06)		
Nationalist Attitudes	-0.12	**	0.89	-0.13	**	0.88	-0.06		0.94
	(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.06)		
Minority Nationalism	-0.40	**	0.67	-0.30	*	0.74	-0.45	**	0.64
	(0.10)			(0.13)			(0.17)		
Basque Country	-0.50	*	0.61	-0.51		0.60	-0.46		0.63
	(0.21)			(0.31)			(0.32)		
Catalonia	0.48	**	1.61	0.35	*	1.42	0.43	*	1.54
	(0.14)			(0.17)			(0.18)		
Scotland	0.46		1.59	0.50		1.65	-		
	(0.26)			(0.32)					
Wales	0.29		1.34	0.10		1.11	-		
	(0.26)			(0.30)					
Racist Attitudes	-0.64	**	0.53	-0.67	**	0.51	-0.66	**	0.52
	(0.05)			(0.06)			(0.08)		
Germany	1.05	**	2.85	0.72	**	2.06	0.58	**	1.78
	(0.15)			(0.16)			(0.20)		
Great Britain	0.33	*	1.39	0.30		1.35	-		
	(0.16)			(0.20)					
Austria	-0.29		0.75	-0.48	*	0.62	-0.66	*	0.52
	(0.21)			(0.24)			(0.27)		
Italy	2.99	**	19.82	-			-		
	(0.15)								
Ireland	2.30	**	10.00	2.29	**	9.90	2.48	**	11.99
	(0.42)			(0.40)			(0.42)		
Netherlands	1.20	**	3.30	1.19	**	3.28	-		
	(0.22)			(0.24)					
Sweden	0.02		1.02	-0.04		0.96	0.01		1.01
	(0.25)			(0.25)			(0.28)		
Age	0.03		1.03	0.10	**	1.11	0.11	*	1.11
	(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)		
Sex	0.08		1.08	0.22	*	1.24	0.37	**	1.45
	(0.08)			(0.09)			(0.12)		
Education	0.02		1.02	0.06		1.06	0.00		1.00
	(0.03)			(0.04)			(0.04)		

	1a Ctd.			1b Ctd.			1c Ctd.		
Religion (Protestant)	0.12		1.13	0.11		1.12	0.05		1.05
	(0.11)			(0.12)			(0.15)		
Religion (Catholic)	0.13		1.14	0.04		1.04	-0.13		0.88
	(0.12)			(0.13)			(0.16)		
ISEI score	0.02	**	1.02	0.02	**	1.02	0.02	**	1.02
	(0.00)			(0.01)			(0.01)		
ISEI dummy	0.22	*	1.25	-0.01		0.99	-0.05		0.95
	(0.11)			(0.12)			(0.13)		
Farmers	-0.32		0.73	-0.46		0.63	-0.49		0.61
	(0.29)			(0.30)			(0.30)		
Income	-			-0.02		0.98	-0.03		0.97
				(0.04)			(0.04)		
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-			-0.72	**	0.49	-0.69	**	0.50
				(0.18)			(0.19)		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-			-0.26		0.77	-0.63	**	0.53
				(0.16)			(0.24)		
Political Affiliation (Right)	-			0.06		1.06	0.10		1.11
				(0.10)			(0.13)		
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-			-0.52		0.60	-1.25	**	0.29
				(0.34)			(0.42)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	-			-0.47	**	0.62	-0.53	**	0.59
				(0.16)			(0.20)		
Sub. Class (Lower)	-			-			0.19		1.21
							(0.29)		
Sub. Class (Working)	-			-			-0.48	**	0.62
							(0.18)		
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-			-			0.05		1.05
							(0.14)		
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-			-			-0.97		0.38
							(0.86)		
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-			-			-0.31		0.73
							(0.18)		
Sub. Class (Upper)	-			-			-0.08		0.93
							0.54		
Constant	-7.53	**	0.00	-3.90	**	0.02	-2.05	*	0.13
	(1.03)			(1.08)			(0.97)		
Number of Cases	4990			3354			2318		
Pseudo R^2	0.21			0.19			0.20		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	1235.65 (25)			795.68 (30)			568.62 (32)		

Table 6.3b. Country Level Impact on Support of the Independent Variables

	Germany			GB			Austria		
	b		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*	*b*		*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	0.43	**	1.54	0.89	**	2.43	1.06	**	2.89
	(0.16)			(0.29)			(0.26)		
Cultural Pride	0.20		1.23	-0.37		0.69	0.56	*	1.75
	(0.14)			(0.28)			(0.25)		
Identity	0.40	**	1.49	0.60	**	1.82	0.67	**	1.96
	(0.13)			(0.21)			(0.20)		
Nationalist Attitudes	0.02		1.03	-0.52	*	0.59	-0.03		0.97
	(0.12)			(0.23)			(0.20)		
Minority Nationalism	-0.53		0.59	-0.19		0.83	0.58		1.78
	(0.31)			(0.42)			(0.59)		
Basque Country	-			-			-		
Catalonia	-			-			-		
Scotland	-			0.11		1.12	-		
				(0.59)					
Wales	-			0.12		1.13	-		
				(0.52)					
Racist Attitudes	-0.87	**	0.42	-0.98	**	0.37	-0.71	**	0.49
	(0.15)			(0.25)			(0.20)		
Age	0.20	*	1.22	-0.01		0.99	0.08		1.08
	(0.09)			(0.18)			(0.15)		
Sex	0.55	*	1.74	0.69		1.99	-0.03		0.97
	(0.24)			(0.43)			(0.36)		
Education	0.03		1.03	0.24		1.27	0.42		1.52
	(0.10)			(0.17)			(0.24)		
Religion (Protestant)	-0.03		0.97	0.94	*	2.57	0.79		2.20
	(0.27)			(0.45)			(0.98)		
Religion (Catholic)	-0.14		0.87	1.00		2.72	0.05		1.05
	(0.30)			(0.61)			(0.45)		
ISEI score	0.02	*	1.02	-			-0.01		0.99
	(0.01)						(0.02)		
ISEI dummy	-0.23		0.79	-			0.46		1.59
	(0.25)						(0.44)		
Farmers	0.01		1.01	-			-0.36		0.70
	(0.60)						(0.73)		
Income	-0.14		0.87	-0.23		0.79	0.40	*	1.49
	(0.09)			(0.16)			(0.17)		

	Germany		GB		Austria	
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	0.27	1.31	-		-	
	(0.56)					
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.74	2.09	-0.07	0.93	-1.04	0.35
	(0.42)		(0.54)		(0.82)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.91 *	2.48	-0.38	0.69	-0.96	0.38
	(0.43)		(0.54)		(0.84)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-0.29	0.75	-		-	
	(0.71)					
Political Affiliation (Other)	0.53	1.70	-0.40	0.67	-	
	(0.90)		(0.75)			
Sub. Class (Lower)	-0.27	0.76	-		-0.30	0.74
	(0.58)				(0.91)	
Sub. Class (Working)	-		-		-	
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	-0.06	0.94	-		-0.71	0.49
	(0.26)				(0.47)	
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-		-		-	
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.57	0.56	-		-0.12	0.89
	(0.32)				(0.49)	
Sub. Class (Upper)	-0.64	0.53	-		-	
	(0.92)					
Constant	-0.01	0.99	1.85	6.33	-2.22	0.11
	(0.89)		(1.48)		(1.72)	
Number of Cases	637		225		258	
Pseudo R^2	0.16		0.29		0.27	
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	114.62 (24)		87.49 (17)		94.29 (20)	

	Italy		Ireland		Netherlands	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	-0.01	0.99	0.88 **	2.42	0.50 **	1.64
	(0.17)		(0.26)		(0.18)	
Cultural Pride	0.21	1.24	0.49	1.63	0.37 *	1.45
	(0.22)		(0.27)		(0.15)	
Identity	0.19	1.21	-0.28	0.76	0.64 **	1.90
	(0.15)		(0.20)		(0.14)	
Nationalist Attitudes	-0.05	0.95	-0.36	0.70	0.02	1.02
	(0.14)		(0.21)		(0.11)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.91 **	0.40	-		-0.41	0.66
	(0.31)				(0.39)	
Basque Country	-		-		-	
Catalonia	-		-		-	
Scotland	-		-		-	
Wales	-		-		-	
Racist Attitudes	-0.69 **	0.50	-1.42 **	0.24	-0.26	0.77
	(0.18)		(0.25)		(0.15)	
Age	-0.13	0.87	-0.13	0.87	0.00	1.00
	(0.10)		(0.15)		(0.08)	
Sex	-0.75 *	0.47	0.01	1.01	-0.39	0.68
	(0.30)		(0.41)		(0.22)	
Education	-0.29 **	0.75	0.03	1.03	0.18 *	1.20
	(0.11)		(0.17)		(0.08)	
Religion (Protestant)	-		-7.04	0.00	-0.16	0.85
			(24.12)		(0.31)	
Religion (Catholic)	0.57	1.77	-6.85	0.00	-0.54	0.58
	(0.69)		(24.09)		(0.28)	
ISEI score	-		0.02	1.02	-	
			(0.02)			
ISEI dummy	-		-0.24	0.79	-	
			(0.56)			
Farmers	-		0.29	1.33	-	
			(0.76)			
Income	-		0.11	1.11	0.18 *	1.20
			(0.16)		(0.08)	

	Italy			Ireland			Netherlands		
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-			-			-0.99	*	0.37
							(0.42)		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-			-0.34		0.71	-0.04		0.96
				(0.91)			(0.33)		
Political Affiliation (Right)	-			6.55			0.28		1.33
				(39.72)			(0.34)		
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-			-			-0.18		0.83
							(0.64)		
Political Affiliation (Other)	-			-0.15		0.86	-0.48		0.62
				(0.37)			(0.29)		
Sub. Class (Lower)	-			0.73		2.07	-		
				(1.26)					
Sub. Class (Working)	-			0.19		1.21	-		
				(0.45)					
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	0.48			-0.92		0.40	-		
	0.56			(0.47)					
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-			-0.02		0.98	-		
				(1.13)					
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	0.42			-0.52		0.60	-		
	0.42			(0.86)					
Sub. Class (Upper)	1.41			5.85			-		
	1.10			44.93					
Constant	5.46	**	235.52	8.63		5600.47	1.45		4.25
	(1.15)			(24.12)			(0.78)		
Number of Cases	731			584			592		
Pseudo R^2	0.11			0.22			0.12		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	46.75 (13)			74.01 (21)			75.40 (23)		

	Spain		Sweden	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Political Pride	1.14 **	3.12	0.48 **	1.62
	(0.20)		(0.18)	
Cultural Pride	0.29	1.34	0.27	1.31
	(0.20)		(0.18)	
Identity	0.42 **	1.52	0.83 **	2.30
	(0.14)		(0.15)	
Nationalist Attitudes	-0.12	0.89	-0.21	0.81
	(0.13)		(0.14)	
Minority Nationalism	-0.26	0.77	-1.24 **	0.29
	(0.44)		(0.45)	
Basque Country	-0.57	0.56	-	
	(0.44)			
Catalonia	0.41	1.51	-	
	(0.28)			
Scotland	-		-	
Wales	-		-	
Racist Attitudes	-0.35	0.71	-0.25	0.78
	(0.20)		(0.15)	
Age	-0.02	0.98	0.06	1.07
	(0.10)		(0.09)	
Sex	0.28	1.33	0.31	1.36
	(0.26)		(0.26)	
Education	-0.08	0.93	0.04	1.04
	(0.10)		(0.11)	
Religion (Protestant)	5.89		0.32	1.38
	22.25		(0.29)	
Religion (Catholic)	0.07	1.07	-0.49	0.61
	(0.45)		(1.47)	
ISEI score	0.03 *	1.03	-	
	(0.01)			
ISEI dummy	0.11	1.12	-	
	(0.32)			
Farmers	-2.50 *	0.08	-	
	(1.21)			
Income	0.19	1.21	0.06	1.06
	(0.12)		(0.09)	

	Spain		Sweden		
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	4.18	65.60	-1.60	*	0.20
	(14.96)		(0.74)		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	5.10	163.92	0.53		1.70
	(14.96)		(0.39)		
Political Affiliation (Right)	5.22	185.00	1.40	**	4.07
	(14.96)		(0.43)		
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-		-		
Political Affiliation (Other)	4.41	82.64	0.29		1.34
	(14.96)		(0.42)		
Sub. Class (Lower)	0.77	2.15	0.50		1.65
	(0.66)		(0.89)		
Sub. Class (Working)	-0.24	0.79	-0.68	*	0.51
	(0.33)		(0.31)		
Sub. Class (Lower Middle)	0.35	1.42	-		
	(0.41)				
Sub. Class (Don't Know)	-		-1.38	*	0.25
			(0.67)		
Sub. Class (Upper Middle)	-0.40	0.67	0.91	*	2.48
	(0.65)		(0.41)		
Sub. Class (Upper)	5.63		-0.67		0.51
	14.98		(0.95)		
Constant	-5.53	0.00	1.44		4.21
	(15.00)		(1.00)		
Number of Cases	397		426		
Pseudo R^2	0.27		0.25		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	125.95 (26)		149.85 (21)		

Section A.5.

In this section I include the unabridged regression models from section 7.6.

For the following models:

- All data entries are b coefficients with their associated standard errors below.
- Calculations are correct to 2 decimal places.
- ** indicates an estimate significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
- * indicates an estimate significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
- For the categorical variables, only statistically significant findings are reported.

Table 7.5. Aggregate Level Impact on Non-Attitude Holding of the Independent Variables

	b		*Odds ratio*
Interest	-0.44	**	0.64
	(0.03)		
Subjective Knowledge	-0.24	**	0.78
	(0.03)		
Factual Knowledge	-0.25	**	0.78
	(0.03)		
Education	-0.04	**	0.96
	(0.01)		
Identity	-0.30	**	0.74
	(0.03)		
Pride	-0.14	**	0.87
	(0.03)		
Racism	0.00		1.00
	(0.08)		
France	-0.09		0.91
	(0.09)		
Belgium	0.46	**	1.59
	(0.14)		
Netherlands	-0.03		0.97
	(0.13)		
West Germany	-0.65		0.52
	(0.10)		
Italy	-0.48		0.62
	(0.09)		
Luxembourg	-0.80		0.45
	(0.70)		
Denmark	-0.17		0.85
	(0.19)		
Ireland	-0.60	*	0.55
	(0.24)		
UK	0.19	*	1.21
	(0.10)		
Greece	-0.03		0.97
	(0.19)		
Portugal	0.21		1.23
	(0.14)		

	Ctd.		
Age	-0.26	**	0.77
	(0.03)		
Sex	-0.15	**	0.86
	(0.05)		
Religion (Catholic)	0.02		1.02
	(0.07)		
Religion (Protestant)	-0.05		0.95
	(0.08)		
Religion (Other)	-0.20		0.82
	(0.13)		
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	0.08		1.09
	(0.09)		
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.28	**	1.32
	(0.06)		
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.15		1.16
	(0.08)		
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.22		1.24
	(0.12)		
Political Affiliation (DK)	0.47	**	1.60
	(0.08)		
Sub. Class (Working)	0.04		1.04
	(0.06)		
Sub. Class (LMC)	0.09		1.10
	(0.07)		
Sub. Class (UMC)	0.20	*	1.22
	(0.09)		
Sub. Class (UC)	0.15		1.16
	(0.16)		
Sub. Class (Refusal)	-0.02		0.98
	(0.13)		
Fisherman	-3.20	*	0.04
	(1.47)		
Self-employed	-0.28	*	0.75
	(0.12)		
General Management	-0.51	*	0.60
	(0.24)		
Middle management	-0.48	**	0.62
	(0.12)		
Constant	2.99	**	19.83
	(0.21)		
Number of Cases	10053		
Pseudo R^2	0.10		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	1366.62 (49)		

Table 7.5b Country Level Impact on Non-Attitude Holding of the Independent Variables

	France		Belgium		Netherlands	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Interest	-0.58 **	0.56	-0.64 **	0.53	-0.57 **	0.56
	(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.13)	
Subjective Knowledge	-0.18	0.84	-0.19	0.83	-0.26 *	0.77
	(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.13)	
Factual Knowledge	-0.18	0.83	-0.16	0.85	-0.17	0.84
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.11)	
Education	-0.04	0.96	0.02	1.02	-0.01	0.99
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Identity	-0.20 *	0.82	-0.18	0.84	-0.35 **	0.70
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.11)	
Pride	-0.06	0.94	-0.48 **	0.62	-0.14	0.87
	(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)	
Racism	0.15	1.16	1.09 **	2.97	0.39	1.48
	(0.24)		(0.35)		(0.33)	
Age	-0.19	0.83	-0.13	0.88	-0.23 *	0.79
	(0.12)		(0.13)		(0.12)	
Sex	-0.25	0.78	-0.09	0.91	0.13	1.14
	(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.19)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.18	0.84	0.30	1.34	0.09	1.10
	(0.19)		(0.19)		(0.19)	
Religion (Protestant)	-1.99	0.14	1.08	2.93	0.06	1.06
	(1.11)		(1.41)		(0.25)	
Religion (Other)	-0.92 *	0.40	0.84	2.32	0.23	1.26
	(0.43)		(0.59)		(0.24)	
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	0.56 *	1.75	0.63 *	1.88	-0.79 *	0.45
	(0.28)		(0.31)		(0.38)	
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.46 *	1.58	0.44	1.56	-0.08	0.92
	(0.22)		(0.24)		(0.19)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.41	1.51	0.49	1.64	-0.26	0.77
	(0.28)		(0.27)		(0.23)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.47	1.59	-0.65	0.52	0.14	1.15
	(0.41)		(0.46)		(0.46)	
Political Affiliation (DK)	0.43	1.54	0.87 **	2.39	-0.37	0.69
	(0.33)		(0.31)		(0.34)	

	Fr.		Ctd.	Bel.		Ctd.	Neth.		Ctd.
Sub. Class (Working)	0.08		1.09	0.25		1.28	-0.14		0.87
	(0.20)			(0.20)			(0.21)		
Sub. Class (LMC)	0.00		1.00	0.32		1.37	-0.08		0.92
	(0.34)			(0.29)			(0.25)		
Sub. Class (UMC)	0.84	**	2.31	0.26		1.30	0.18		1.20
	(0.27)			(0.34)			(0.23)		
Sub. Class (UC)	-0.16		0.85	-1.34	*	0.26	-0.04		0.97
	(0.52)			(0.68)			(0.75)		
Sub. Class (Refusal)	-0.10		0.91	-0.08		0.93	0.00		1.00
	(0.37)			(0.48)			(0.53)		
Self-emp. Professional	-			-1.64	*	0.19	-		
				(0.78)					
Self-employed	-			-0.72	*	0.49	-		
				(0.35)					
Constant	2.53	**	12.54	3.55	**	34.90	3.02	**	20.46
	(0.74)			(0.78)			(0.71)		
Number of Cases	841			778			874		
Pseudo R^2	0.12			0.15			0.12		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	131.88 (37)			160.88 (37)			139.95 (38)		

Appendix

	West Germany		Italy		Luxembourg	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Interest	-0.58 **	0.56	-0.56 **	0.57	-0.81 **	0.45
	(0.15)		(0.12)		(0.22)	
Subjective Knowledge	-0.46 **	0.63	-0.26 *	0.77	-0.31	0.73
	(0.16)		(0.13)		(0.25)	
Factual Knowledge	-0.47 **	0.63	-0.18	0.83	-0.16	0.85
	(0.12)		(0.14)		(0.17)	
Education	-0.07	0.93	-0.05	0.95	-0.16	0.86
	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.08)	
Identity	-0.35 **	0.70	-0.48 **	0.62	-0.59 **	0.55
	(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.20)	
Pride	-0.17	0.84	-0.25 *	0.78	-0.18	0.84
	(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.20)	
Racism	-0.20	0.82	0.87 *	2.39	0.83	2.30
	(0.32)		(0.39)		(0.91)	
Age	0.04	1.05	-0.01	0.99	0.27	1.31
	(0.14)		(0.13)		(0.23)	
Sex	-0.06	0.95	0.18	1.20	-0.04	0.96
	(0.23)		(0.18)		(0.37)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.25	0.78	-0.43	0.65	-0.88	0.42
	(0.32)		(0.31)		(0.55)	
Religion (Protestant)	-0.32	0.72	0.41	1.51	-	
	(0.32)		(1.11)			
Religion (Other)	-0.15	0.86	0.54	1.72	-	
	(0.71)		(0.82)			
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.89	0.41	0.26	1.29	-0.30	0.74
	(0.58)		(0.32)		(0.82)	
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.07	1.08	0.49 *	1.64	0.04	1.04
	(0.26)		(0.24)		(0.46)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	0.06	1.07	0.39	1.47	-0.18	0.84
	(0.33)		(0.30)		(0.56)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.43	1.54	1.04 **	2.82	-0.54	0.58
	(0.61)		(0.39)		(1.23)	
Political Affiliation (DK)	0.48	1.61	1.06 **	2.88	0.02	1.02
	(0.35)		(0.26)		(0.58)	

Appendix

	WG.		Ctd.	Italy		Ctd.	Lux.		Ctd.
Sub. Class (Working)	-0.29		0.75	-0.08		0.93	-0.05		0.95
	(0.29)			(0.25)			(0.41)		
Sub. Class (LMC)	0.54		1.71	0.10		1.11	-0.35		0.70
	(0.30)			(0.26)			(0.75)		
Sub. Class (UMC)	0.29		1.34	0.19		1.21	-0.22		0.80
	(0.34)			(0.29)			(0.59)		
Sub. Class (UC)	0.45		1.58	0.25		1.28	-		
	(0.50)			(0.49)					
Sub. Class (Refusal)	0.97		2.65	-2.30	*	0.10	-0.38		0.69
	(0.65)			(1.13)			(0.54)		
Housewife	-			-0.73	*	0.48	-		
				0.31					
Professional	1.61	*	5.03	-			-		
	0.79								
								*	
Constant	2.93	**	18.67	2.91	**	1.00	4.21	*	67.13
	(0.89)			(0.80)			(1.45)		
Number of Cases	693			884			352		
Pseudo R^2	0.18			0.14			0.20		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	146.38 (37)			149.90 (37)			75.15 (32)		

	Denmark		Ireland		UK	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Interest	-0.50 **	0.61	-0.45 **	0.64	-0.15	0.86
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.08)	
Subjective Knowledge	-0.43 **	0.65	-0.03	0.97	-0.22 *	0.81
	(0.14)		(0.11)		(0.09)	
Factual Knowledge	-0.14	0.87	-0.19	0.82	-0.24 *	0.79
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.11)	
Education	0.00	1.00	0.01	1.01	-0.05	0.95
	(0.03)		(0.05)		(0.04)	
Identity	-0.27 *	0.76	0.05	1.05	-0.14	0.87
	(0.13)		(0.13)		(0.08)	
Pride	-0.18	0.84	-0.29 *	0.75	0.05	1.06
	(0.12)		(0.14)		(0.09)	
Racism	0.03	1.03	-0.89	0.41	-0.66 *	0.52
	(0.26)		(0.86)		(0.27)	
Age	-0.08	0.92	-0.17	0.84	-0.58 **	0.56
	(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.09)	
Sex	0.14	1.15	-0.06	0.95	-0.02	0.98
	(0.17)		(0.21)		(0.15)	
Religion (Catholic)	-0.38	0.69	-0.49	0.61	-0.15	0.86
	(0.61)		(0.36)		(0.20)	
Religion (Protestant)	0.19	1.20	0.14	1.15	0.32 *	1.38
	(0.20)		(0.68)		(0.16)	
Religion (Other)	0.10	1.10	-1.10	0.33	-0.12	0.89
	(0.60)		(0.91)		(0.33)	
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.53	0.59	-0.14	0.87	-0.01	0.99
	(0.44)		(0.48)		(0.35)	
Political Affiliation (Centre)	0.01	1.01	-0.49 *	0.61	0.42 *	1.53
	(0.21)		(0.25)		(0.18)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.26	0.77	-0.36	0.70	0.25	1.29
	(0.24)		(0.31)		(0.23)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	0.18	1.19	-0.42	0.66	-0.43	0.65
	(0.49)		(0.40)		(0.41)	
Political Affiliation (DK)	-0.47	0.63	-0.30	0.74	0.15	1.16
	(0.49)		(0.31)		(0.26)	

	Den.		Ctd.	Ire.		Ctd.	UK.		Ctd.
Sub. Class (Working)	0.15		1.17	0.31		1.37	-0.04		0.96
	(0.20)			(0.20)			(0.16)		
Sub. Class (LMC)	-0.56		0.57	0.21		1.23	-0.43	*	0.65
	(0.36)			(0.28)			(0.22)		
Sub. Class (UMC)	0.03		1.03	-0.29		0.75	-0.10		0.90
	(0.28)			(0.50)			(0.47)		
Sub. Class (UC)	0.39		1.48	-0.03		0.97	0.47		1.59
	(0.65)			(0.64)			(1.18)		
Sub. Class (Refusal)	-0.63		0.53	0.72	*	2.04	0.35		1.42
	(0.91)			(0.36)			(0.32)		
Constant	2.77	**	16.04	2.72	**	15.11	2.22	**	9.19
	(0.74)			(0.87)			(0.60)		
Number of Cases	922			845			1179		
Pseudo R^2	0.10			0.09			0.12		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	111.79 (38)			93.11 (37)			193.87 (38)		

	Greece		Spain		Portugal	
	b	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*	*b*	*Odds ratio*
Interest	-0.55 **	0.58	-0.39 **	0.67	-0.30 **	0.74
	(0.10)		(0.10)		(0.10)	
Subjective Knowledge	-0.08	0.92	-0.02	0.98	-0.35 **	0.71
	(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Factual Knowledge	-0.02	0.98	-0.20	0.82	0.10	1.11
	(0.10)		(0.12)		(0.09)	
Education	-0.01	0.99	0.00	1.00	0.03	1.03
	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Identity	-0.21	0.81	-0.19	0.83	-0.47 **	0.63
	(0.12)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Pride	-0.30 **	0.74	-0.28 *	0.75	-0.38 **	0.68
	(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.12)	
Racism	0.63	1.87	0.44	1.55	-0.10	0.91
	(0.38)		(0.39)		(0.49)	
Age	-0.09	0.91	0.10	1.11	-0.17	0.85
	(0.10)		(0.11)		(0.10)	
Sex	-0.10	0.90	-0.35	0.70	-0.26	0.77
	(0.18)		(0.18)		(0.18)	
Religion (Catholic)	-		-0.16	0.86	0.19	1.21
			(0.22)		(0.31)	
Religion (Protestant)	-		-		0.47	1.59
					(1.00)	
Religion (Other)	-0.48	0.62	-0.65	0.52	-0.34	0.71
	(0.72)		(0.74)		(0.68)	
Political Affiliation (Far Left)	-0.64	0.53	0.25	1.29	0.23	1.25
	(0.37)		(0.30)		(0.40)	
Political Affiliation (Centre)	-0.59 **	0.55	0.44 *	1.55	-0.14	0.87
	(0.23)		(0.21)		(0.21)	
Political Affiliation (Right)	-0.86 **	0.42	0.44	1.56	-0.06	0.94
	(0.29)		(0.26)		(0.28)	
Political Affiliation (Far Right)	-1.12 **	0.33	0.36	1.43	-0.82 *	0.44
	(0.31)		(0.34)		(0.39)	
Political Affiliation (DK)	-0.34	0.71	0.28	1.33	-0.51 *	0.60
	(0.28)		(0.24)		(0.23)	

	Gr.		Ctd.	Sp.		Ctd.	Port.		Ctd.
Sub. Class (Working)	0.43	*	1.54	0.02		1.02	0.32		1.38
	(0.18)			(0.21)			(0.19)		
Sub. Class (LMC)	0.52	*	1.69	-0.22		0.80	0.03		1.03
	(0.27)			(0.21)			(0.22)		
Sub. Class (UMC)	-0.68		0.51	0.22		1.25	-0.55		0.57
	(0.50)			(0.43)			(0.50)		
Sub. Class (UC)	-			-			-0.65		0.52
							(0.67)		
Sub. Class (Refusal)	0.38		1.46	-0.57		0.57	1.59		4.91
	(0.47)			(0.42)			(0.95)		
Constant	3.47	**	32.02	1.85	**	6.34	3.87	**	47.90
	(1.00)			(0.69)			(0.77)		
Number of Cases	924			837			845		
Pseudo R^2	0.11			0.07			0.09		
LR Chi^2 (d.f.)	137.00 (34)			83.92 (35)			109.32 (35)		

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